There has been some confusion as to who, in particular, determines whether a state of war exists for international law purposes. Is it a decision made by army commanders, international courts, or the heads of state? To answer this question we first need to understand the term war. By definition, war is a violent contention between two or more countries, called States, which is allowable under international law.

War as it is understood today is different from what it was understood in the nineteenth century when the Hawaiian Kingdom government was unlawfully overthrown by United States armed forces on January 17, 1893. According to Professor Brownlie, “The right of war, as an aspect of sovereignty, which existed in the period before 1914, subject to the doctrine that war was a means of last resort in the enforcement of legal rights, was very rarely asserted either by statesmen or works of authority without some stereotyped plea to a right of self-preservation, and of self-defence, or to necessity or protection of vital interests, or merely alleged injury to rights or national honour and dignity.” (Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) 41).

In the absence of a system of dispute resolution, such as today’s Permanent Court of Arbitration (est. 1899) or the International Court of Justice (est. 1945), war was seen as a form of judicial procedure, a litigation of sorts between nations that involved lethal punishment. It was a means by which one State could obtain redress for wrongs committed against it. War, however, was considered a course of last resort.

“It was generally thought that a state of war came into existence between two countries if, and only if, one of these countries made it clear that it regarded itself as being in a state of war,” says Judge Greenwood. (Christopher Greenwood, “Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law,” in Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations (2nd ed., 2008) 45). Representatives of countries in international law are Heads of Governments, whether they are Presidents, Monarchs or Prime Ministers. Any political determination made by these Heads of States that their countries are in a state of war is conclusive. In the case of the United States it would be the President, and in the case of the Hawaiian Kingdom it would be the Monarch.

International law differentiates a “declaration of war” from a “state of war.” According to McNair and Watts, “the absence of a declaration…will not of itself render the ensuing conflict any less a war.” In other words, since a state of war is based upon concrete facts of military action there is no requirement for a formal declaration of war to be made. In 1946, a United States Federal Court had to determine whether a United States naval captain’s life insurance policy, which excluded coverage if death came about as a result of war, covered his death during the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1945. The family of the captain was arguing that the United States was not a war at the time of his death because the Congress did not declare war against Japan until the following day. The Court denied the family’s claim and determined, “that the formal declaration by the Congress on December 8th was not an essential prerequisite to a political determination of the existence of a state of war commencing with the attack on Pearl Harbor.” (New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (C.C.A. 10th, 1946), 41 American Journal of International Law (1947), 682).

On the 100th anniversary of the United States unlawful overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom government in 1893, the United States Congress enacted a joint resolution offering an apology. Of significance in the resolution was a particular “whereas” clause, which stated “Whereas, in a message to Congress on December 18, 1893, President Grover Cleveland reportedly fully and accurately on the illegal acts of the conspirators, described such acts as an ‘act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of Congress, and acknowledged that by such acts the government of a peaceful and friendly people was overthrown.” (Annexure 2, Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, 119 International Law Reports (2001) 612).

At first read, it would appear that the “conspirators” were the subjects that committed the “act of war,” but this is misleading. First, under international law, only a country can commit an “act of war”, whether through its military and/or its diplomats; and, second, under municipal laws, which are the laws applicable to a particular country, conspirators within a country could only commit treason not “acts of war.” These two concepts are reflected in the terms coup de main and coup d’état. The former is a successful invasion by an outside military force, while the former is a successful internal revolt, which was also referred to in the nineteenth century as a revolution. According to the United States Department of Defense, a coup de main is an “offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke.” (U.S. Department of Defense, The Dictionary of Military Terms (2009)).

In a petition to President Cleveland on December 27, 1893, from the Hawaiian Patriotic League, its leadership, comprised of Hawaiian statesmen and lawyers, clearly articulated the difference between a “revolution” and a “coup de main,” and, as such, an international crime was committed. The petition read:

“Last January, a political crime was committed, not only against the legitimate Sovereign of the Hawaiian Kingdom, but also against the whole of the Hawaiian nation, a nation who, for the past sixty years, had enjoyed free and happy constitutional self-government. This was done by a coup de main of U.S. Minister Stevens, in collusion with a cabal of conspirators, mainly faithless sons of missionaries and local politicians angered by continuous political defeat, who, as revenge for being a hopeless minority in the country, resolved to ‘rule or ruin’ through foreign help. The facts of this ‘revolution,’ as it is improperly called, are now a matter of history.” (Petition of the Hawaiian Patriotic League to President Cleveland (Dec. 27, 1893), The Executive Documents of the House of Representatives (1895), 1295).

Whether by chance or design, the 1993 Congressional Apology Resolution did not accurately reflect what President Cleveland stated in his message to Congress on December 18, 1893. When Cleveland stated that the “military demonstration upon the soil of Honolulu was of itself an act of war,” he was referring to United States armed forces and not to any of the conspirators. Cleveland noted, “that on the 16th day of January, 1893, between four and five o’clock in the afternoon, a detachment of marines from the United States steamer Boston, with two pieces of artillery, landed at Honolulu. The men, upwards of 160 in all, were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition and with haversacks and canteens, and were accompanied by a hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies.” Clearly the act of war was committed by the armed forces of the United States. The landing, however, was just the beginning stage of a coup de main with the ultimate goal of seizing control of the Hawaiian government.

As part of the plan, the U.S. diplomat, John Stevens, would prematurely recognize the small group of insurgents on January 17th as if they were a successful revolution thereby giving it de facto status. International law, however, provides the parameters by which a revolution is deemed to have been successful. Foreign States would acknowledge success when an insurgency has secured complete control of all governmental machinery, no opposition by the lawful government, and has the acquiescence of the national population. According to Professor Lauterpacht, “So long as the revolution has not been successful, and so long as the lawful government…remains within national territory and asserts its authority, it is presumed to represent the State as a whole.” (E. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947) 93). With full knowledge of what constitutes a successful revolution, Cleveland provided a blistering indictment:

“When our Minister recognized the provisional government the only basis upon which it rested was the fact that the Committee of Safety…declared it to exist. It was neither a government de facto nor de jure. That it was not in such possession of the Government property and agencies as entitled it to recognition is conclusively proved by a note found in the files of the Legation at Honolulu, addressed by the declared head of the provisional government to Minister Stevens, dated January 17, 1893, in which he acknowledges with expressions of appreciation the Minister’s recognition of the provisional government, and states that it is not yet in the possession of the station house (the place where a large number of the Queen’s troops were quartered), though the same had been demanded of the Queen’s officers in charge.” (Annexure 1—President Cleveland’s message to the Senate and House of Representatives dated 18 December 1893, Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, 119 International Law Reports (2001) 605).

“Premature recognition is a tortious act against the lawful government,” explains Professor Lauterpacht, which “is a breach of international law.” (Ibid, 95). And according to Stowell, a “foreign state which intervenes in support of [insurgents] commits an act of war against the state to which it belongs, and steps outside the law of nations in time of peace.” (Ellery C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law (1921) 349, n. 75). Furthermore Stapleton states, “Of all the principles in the code of international law, the most important—the one which the independent existence of all weaker States must depend—is this: no State has a right FORCIBLY to interfere in the internal concerns of another State.” (Augustus Granville Stapleton, Intervention and Non-Intervention (1866) 6).

Cleveland then explained to the Congress the egregious effects these acts of war had upon the Hawaiian government and its apprehension of a “cabal of conspirators” who committed high treason.

“Nevertheless, this wrongful recognition by our Minister placed the Government of the Queen in a position of most perilous perplexity. On the one hand she had possession of the palace, of the barracks, and of the police station, and had at her command at least five hundred fully armed men and several pieces of artillery. Indeed, the whole military force of her kingdom was on her side and at her disposal, while the Committee of Safety, by actual search, had discovered that there were but very few arms in Honolulu that were not in the service of the Government. In this state of things if the Queen could have dealt with the insurgents alone her course would have been plain and the result unmistakable. But the United States had allied itself with her enemies, had recognized them as the true Government of Hawaii, and had put her and her adherents in the position of opposition against lawful authority. She knew that she could not withstand the power of the United States, but she believed that she might safely trust to its justice. Accordingly, some hours after the recognition of the provisional government by the United States Minister, the palace, the barracks, and the police station, with all the military resources of the country, were delivered up by the Queen upon the representation made to her that her cause would thereafter be reviewed at Washington, and while protesting that she surrendered to the superior force of the United States, whose Minister had caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the provisional government, and that she yielded her authority to prevent collision of armed forces and loss of life and only until such time as the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should undo the action of its representative and reinstate her in the authority she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.” (Annexure 1—President Cleveland’s message to the Senate and House of Representatives dated 18 December 1893, Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, 119 International Law Reports (2001) 606).

According to Professor Wright, “War begins when any state of the world manifests its intention to make war by some overt act, which may take the form of an act of war.” Quincy Wright, “Changes in the Concept of War,” 18 American Journal of International Law (1924) 758). In his review of customary international law in the nineteenth century, Professor Brownlie concluded, “that in so far a ‘state of war’ had any generally accepted meaning it was a situation regarded by one or both parties to a conflict as constituting a ‘state of war.’” (Brownlie, 38).

Cleveland concluded by an “act of war…the Government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown.”(Annexure 1—President Cleveland’s message to the Senate and House of Representatives dated 18 December 1893, Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, 119 International Law Reports (2001) 608). More importantly, Cleveland referred to the Hawaiian people as “friendly and confiding,” not “hostile.” This is a classic case of where the United States President admits an unjust war, but a state of war nevertheless. In the absence of a treaty or agreement to end the state of war that has ensued for over a century, international humanitarian law regulates the Hawaiian situation.

These are the very matters that will come before the International Commission of Inquiry: Incidents of War Crimes in the Hawaiian Islands—The Larsen Case.

As the Tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom pointed out in, “in the nineteenth century the Hawaiian Kingdom existed as an independent State recognized as such by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and various other States, including by exchanges of diplomatic or consular representatives and the conclusion of treaties.” (Award, Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, 119 International Law Reports (2001) 581). As an independent State, the Hawaiian Kingdom was a member of the Family of Nations along with other independent States including the United States. According to Westlake in 1894, they comprised, “First, all European States […] Secondly, all American States […] Thirdly, a few Christian States in other parts of the  world, as the Hawaiian Islands, Liberia and the Orange Free State.” (John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (1894) 81).

In 1893, there were 44 independent and sovereign States in the Family of Nations: Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chili, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Hawaiian Kingdom, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Liberia, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Orange Free State that was later annexed by Great Britain in 1900, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Domingo, San Salvador, Serbia, Spain, Sweden-Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In 1945, there were 45, and today there are 193.

From a State of Peace to a State of War—No Middle Ground

International law, which is law between nations, formed the protocol and relations between these member States. “Traditional international law was based upon a rigid distinction between the state of peace and the state of war,” states Judge Greenwood (Christopher Greenwood, “Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law,” in Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations (2nd ed., 2008) 45). “Countries were either in a state of peace or a state of war; there was no intermediate state.” (Ibid.) This is also reflected by the fact that the renowned jurist of international law, Lassa Oppenheim, separates his treatise on International Law into two volumes, Vol. I—Peace, and Vol. II—War and Neutrality.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Hawaiian Kingdom was not only independent and sovereign, but also a neutral State explicitly recognized by treaties with Germany, Spain and Sweden-Norway. The Hawaiian Kingdom enjoyed a state of peace with all States. This status of affairs, however, was interrupted by the United States when the state of peace was transformed to a state of war that began on January 16, 1893. On January 17, 1893, Queen Lili‘uokalani, the Executive Monarch of the Hawaiian Kingdom, made the following protest and a conditional yielding of her authority to the President of the United States in response to military action taken against the Hawaiian government by order of the U.S. resident diplomat John Stevens. The Queen’s protest stated:

“I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a provisional government of and for this Kingdom. That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said provisional government. Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.” (Annexure 2, Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, 119 International Law Reports (2001) 612).

Under international law, the landing of American troops without the consent of the Hawaiian government was an act of war. But in order for an act of war to transform the status of affairs to a state of war, the act must be unlawful under international law. In other words, an act of war would not change the status of affairs to a state of war from that of peace if the action were legal under international law. According to Professor Wright, “An act of war is an invasion of territory…and so normally illegal. Such an act if not followed by war gives grounds for a claim which can be legally avoided only by proof of some special treaty or necessity justifying the act.” (Quincy Wright, “Changes in the Concept of War,” 18 American Journal of International Law (1924), 756).

Military action in a foreign State considered lawful under international law, includes proportionate reprisals in response to another State’s action just short of all out war, and military actions taken to protect its citizenry in the foreign State. Furthermore, the act of war must have been intentional—animo belligerendi, to overthrow the government of the invaded State. As international law is a law between States, which derives from agreements, the claim made by Queen Lili‘uokalani that United States troops unlawfully invaded the kingdom had to be acknowledged by the President of the United States as true. In her protest she called upon the President to investigate the facts and then “undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.” In international law, this is called restitutio in integrum.

After ten months of investigating the overthrow, President Cleveland notified the Congress on December 18, 1893, that the “military demonstration upon the soil of Honolulu was of itself and act of war” that could not be justified under international law as “either with the consent of the Government of Hawaii or for the bona fide purpose of protecting the imperiled lives and property of citizens of the United States.” (Annexure 1—President Cleveland’s message to the Senate and House of Representatives dated 18 December 1893, Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, 119 International Law Reports (2001) 604).

The President then concluded, “By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of Congress, the Government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown.” (Ibid, 608). He notified the Congress that he initiated negotiations with the Queen “to aid in the restoration of the status existing before the lawless landing of the United States forces at Honolulu on the 16th of January last, if such restoration could be effected upon terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties concerned.” (Ibid, 610). What Cleveland did not know at the time of his message to the Congress was that the Queen, on the very same day in Honolulu, accepted the conditions for settlement in an attempt to return to a state of peace. The executive mediation began on November 13, 1893 between the Queen and U.S. diplomat Albert Willis. The President was not aware of the agreement until January 12, 1894.

Despite being unaware of the agreement to settle, President Cleveland’s political determination was an acknowledgment that the United States was in a state of war with the Hawaiian Kingdom since the invasion occurred on January 16, 1893, as stated by the Queen in her protest on January 17, 1893. International law defines war as “a contention between States for the purpose of overpowering each other.” (L. Oppenheim, International Law, vol. II—War and Neutrality (3rd ed., 1921) 74).

Once a state of war ensued between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States, “the law of peace ceased to apply between them and their relations with one another became subject to the laws of war, while their relations with other states not party to the conflict became governed by the law of neutrality.” (Greenwood, 45). This outbreak of a state of war between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States would “lead to many rules of the ordinary law of peace being superseded…by rules of humanitarian law.” (Ibid, 46).

A state of war “automatically brings about the full operation of all the rules of war and neutrality.” (Myers S. McDougal, “The Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-temporal Analysis,” 52 American Journal of International Law (1948) 247). And according to Venturini, “If an armed conflict occurs, the law of armed conflict must be applied from the beginning until the end, when the law of peace resumes in full effect.” (Gabriella Venturini, “The Temporal Scope of Application of the Conventions,” in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta, and Marco Sassòli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (2015), 52). Only by a treaty or agreement between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States could a state of peace be restored, without which a state of war ensues.

In order to transform the state of war to a state of peace an attempt was made by executive agreement entered into between President Cleveland, by his resident diplomat Albert Willis, and Queen Lili‘uokalani in Honolulu on December 18, 1893 (David Keanu Sai, “A Slippery Path Towards Hawaiian Indigeneity: An Analysis and Comparison between Hawaiian State Sovereignty and Hawaiian Indigeneity and Its Use and Practice Today,” 10 Journal of Law and Social Challenges (2008) 119-127). Cleveland, however, was unable to carry out his duties and obligations to restore the situation that existed before the unlawful landing of American troops due to political wrangling in the Congress. The state of war continued.

It is a common misconception that only through a declaration of war by the Congress could a state of war exist for the United States. A Federal court in 1946, however, dispensed with this theory in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion. The Court stated, “it cannot be denied that the acts and conduct of the President, acting in furtherance of his constitutional authority and duty, would constitute a political determination of a state of war of which the courts would take judicial notice. We can discern no demonstrable difference in the supposition and the actual facts, and we therefore conclude that the formal declaration by the Congress on December 8th was not an essential prerequisite to a political determination of the existence of a state of war commencing with the attack on Pearl Harbor [on December 7th].” (New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (C.C.A. 10th, 1946), 41 American Journal of International Law (1947), 682).

Therefore, the conclusion reached by President Cleveland that an act of war had been committed by the United States was a “political determination of the existence of a state of war,” and that a formal declaration of war by the Congress was not essential. The “political determination” by President Cleveland regarding the actions taken by the military forces of the United States on January 16, 1893, was the same as the “political determination” by President Roosevelt regarding actions taken by the military forces of Japan on December 7, 1945. Both “political determinations,” being acts of war, created a state of war for the United States. A declaration of war by the Congress was not essential in both situations.

The Duty of Neutrality by Third States

When the President declared that a state of war existed by an act of war committed by the American military in his message to Congress, all of the other 42 States were under a duty of neutrality. “Since neutrality is an attitude of impartiality, it excludes such assistance and succour to one of the belligerents as is detrimental to the other, and, further such injuries to the one as benefit the other.” (L. Oppenheim, International Law, vol. II—War and Neutrality (3rd ed., 1921) 401).

The duty of a neutral State, not a party to the conflict, “obliges him, in the first instance, to prevent with the means at his disposal the belligerent concerned from committing such a violation,” e.g. to deny recognition of a puppet government unlawfully created by an act of war. (Ibid, 496). Twenty of these States violated their obligation of impartiality by recognizing the so-called Republic of Hawai‘i, a United States puppet government created by an act of war committed by the United States on January 17, 1893. These States include:

• Austria-Hungary (January 1, 1895);
• Belgium (October 17, 1894);
• Brazil (September 29, 1894);
• Chile (September 26, 1894);
• China (October 22, 1894);
• France (August 31, 1894);
• Germany (October 4, 1894);
• Guatemala (September 30, 1894);
• Italy (September 23, 1894);
• Japan (April 6, 1897);
• Mexico (August 8, 1894);
• Netherlands (November 2, 1894);
• Norway-Sweden (December 17, 1894);
• Peru (September 10, 1894);
• Portugal (December 17, 1894);
• Russia (August 26, 1894);
• Spain (November 26, 1894);
• Switzerland (September 18, 1894); and
• United Kingdom (September 19, 1894).

“If a neutral neglects this obligation, he himself thereby commits a violation of neutrality, for which he may be made responsible by a belligerent who has suffered through the violation of neutrality committed by the other belligerent and acquiesced in by him.” (Ibid, 497). The recognition of the so-called Republic of Hawai‘i did not create any legality or lawfulness on the part of the puppet regime, but rather is the indisputable evidence that these States’ violated their duty to be neutral. Diplomatic recognition of governments occurs during a state of peace and not during a state of war, unless providing recognition of belligerency status. The recognitions were not recognizing the Republic as a belligerent in a civil war with the Hawaiian Kingdom, but rather under the false pretense that the Republic succeeded in a revolution and therefore was the new government of Hawai‘i during a state of peace. As such, their relationship with the Hawaiian Kingdom has since been regulated by humanitarian law.

State of War—No Question

The state of war has ensued to date, only to be concealed by a false narrative promoted by the United States government that Hawai‘i was purportedly annexed in 1898 through American legislation (Sai, Slippery Path, 84-94), coupled with a formal policy of the war crime of denationalizing school children beginning in 1906. The purpose of the policy was to obliterate the national consciousness of the Hawaiian Kingdom in the minds of the children and replace it with American patriotism. Within three generations, the effect of the denationalization was nearly complete.

The Hawaiian Kingdom has been in a “legal” state of war with the United States for over a century and the application of the laws of occupation and applicable humanitarian law has not diminished. Without a treaty between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States to return the state of affairs back to a state of peace, the state of war continues. As Judge Greenwood stated, “Countries were either in a state of peace or a state of war; there was no intermediate state.”

This is the longest state of war ever to have taken place in the history of international relations, which has created a humanitarian crisis of unimaginable proportions. International humanitarian laws apply, which includes customary international law regarding war and neutrality, 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.