Americans are Protected Persons in the Hawaiian Kingdom

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, “The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols form the core of international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They protect people not taking part in hostilities and those who are no longer doing so.” Coverage of the Geneva Conventions also apply to occupied territories where there is no actual fighting. Amnesty International defines war crimes as “crimes that violate the laws or customs of war defined by the Geneva and Hague Conventions.”

Internationally, “protected persons” is a legal term under international humanitarian law that refers to specific protections afforded to civilians in occupied territory whose rights are protected under the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV, and its Additional Protocol. According to Article 4 of the Geneva Convention:

“Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”

Under this definition, civilians who possess the nationality of the occupying State while they reside in the territory of the occupied State are not protected under the Geneva Convention. Article 147 of the Geneva Convention provides a list of grave breaches, called war crimes, which would apply to protected persons as defined under Article 4.

“Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a [occupying] Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”

The relevant grave breaches and explanations that would apply to the American occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom can be found in paragraphs 190 through 205 of the Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed in federal court in Washington, D.C. If you are a protected person whose situation would fall under one of the explanatory paragraphs in the mandamus, a grave breach or war crime may have been committed against you.

Fifty years later, however, this definition of a protected persons was expanded to include the citizenry of the occupying State. This was an evolution of international criminal law ushered in by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The case was the prosecution and conviction of Duško Tadić who was a Bosnian Serb. After being arrested in Germany in 1994, he faced among other counts, twelve counts of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV. On May 7, 1997, he was convicted by the trial court on 11 counts but did not include the counts of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention.

In paragraph 608 of its judgment, the trial court found that Tadic was not guilty of 11 counts of grave breaches because the civilian victims possessed the same Yugoslavian citizenship as Tadic who represented the occupying Power in the war. The prosecutors appealed this decision and it was not only reversed by the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY, but it also expanded the definition of protected persons in occupied territory under international humanitarian law.

In its judgment in 1999, the Appeals Chamber concluded:

“[The] primary purpose [of Article 4] is to ensure the safeguards afforded by the [Geneva] Convention to those civilians who do not enjoy the diplomatic protection, and correlatively are not subject to the allegiance and control, of the State in whose hands they may find themselves. In granting its protection, Article 4 intends to look to the substance of relations, not their legal characterisation as such. … Hence, even if in the circumstances of the case the perpetrators and the victim were to be regarded as possessing the same nationality, Article 4 [Geneva Convention] would still be applicable.” Tadic, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment (1999), para. 168 and 169.

This is an important evolution in international criminal law and has a profound impact on the occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Up until 1999, protected persons in the Hawaiian Islands excluded American citizens. But since 1999, the Tadic case has expanded protection to citizens of the occupying State who reside in the territory of an occupied State. The operative word is no longer nationality or citizenship, but rather allegiance that would apply to all persons in an occupied State. This is not to be confused with an oath of allegiance, but rather the law of allegiance that applies over everyone whether they signed an oath or not. Hawaiian law only requires an oath of allegiance for government employees.

Under Hawaiian Kingdom law there is specific wording that covers allegiance. It is found in the Hawaiian Penal Code under sections 2 and 3 of  Chapter VI for the crime of treason.

“Allegiance is the obedience and fidelity due to the kingdom from those under its protection. … An alien, whether his native country be at war or at peace with this kingdom, owes allegiance to this kingdom during his residence therein, and during such residence, is capable of committing treason against this kingdom.”

By expanding the scope and application of protected persons to American citizens residing in the Hawaiian Kingdom, they, along with all other nationalities of foreign States as well as Hawaiian subjects, are afforded equal protection under the Geneva Convention and can be considered victims of grave breaches or war crimes committed against them by American citizens in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

Hawai‘i County Corporation Counsel Joe Kamelamela on the Hot Seat by Council Member Jennifer Ruggles

COUNCIL MEMBER JEN RUGGLES SAYS CORPORATION COUNSEL OPINION INADEQUATE ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES

Says Opinion Does not Conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct and Legal Standards

Hilo, HI- Council member Jen Ruggles released a letter today in response to Corporation Counsel Joe Kamelamela’s opinion regarding possible criminal liability for war crimes. In a letter on Corporation Counsel letterhead dated August 22, 2018, Kamelamela’s answer consisted of two sentences stating, “we opine that you will not incur criminal liability under state, federal and international law. See Article VI, Constitution of the United States of America (international law cannot violate federal law).”

Council member Ruggles, stated that she had been advised by her attorney that Kamelamela’s answer was inconsistent with Rule 1.1 of the Hawai‘i Rules of Professional Conduct that applies to all licensed attorneys including government lawyers such as Corporation Counsel. The rule requires, “Competent handling of a particular matter [which] includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners.”

Last week Ruggles had sent a letter to Mr. Kamelamela requesting he assure her that she was not incurring criminal liability under international humanitarian law and United States Federal law as a Council member for legislating and being complicit in the collection of taxes, foreclosures, and criminal prosecutions that appeared to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution and international humanitarian law.

Ruggles said she had retained legal counsel, Stephen Laudig, to be sure that her concerns received proper consideration. She said her attorney had advised her to refrain from legislating until Mr. Kamelamela has assured her she was not incurring criminal liability for the alleged war crime of enacting American law within the occupied territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the legal definition of “assure” is to “make certain and put beyond all doubt.”

Ruggles said Laudig advised her that Kamelamela’s answer was a conclusory statement unsupported by any facts and analysis and not a legal opinion. Therefore, Laudig stated that Kamelamela’s “letter provides no analysis, or argument making it something other than a legal opinion in the sense that it marshals no facts or law to reach a reasoned position.”

Laudig also pointed out to Kamelamela that his statement that “international law cannot violate federal law”, was not a true statement. He went on to further state that Kamelamela’s statement was a similar conclusion made by U.S. Department of Justice Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo in his now infamous legal opinion regarding Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees dated January 9, 2002. Like Council member Ruggles who is concerned of incurring criminal liability, the General Counsel for the U.S. Department of Defense was also concerned about the incurring of criminal liability under international treaties and federal laws on the treatment of individuals detained by the U.S. Armed Forces during the conflict in Afghanistan. Yoo’s conclusion in his legal opinion stated “that neither the federal War Crimes Act [18 U.S.C. §2441] nor the Geneva Conventions would apply.”

Laudig states to Kamelamela that “Yoo’s legal opinion was found to be flawed and allegations of war crimes against Yoo and those relying on his opinion, arose in Germany in 2006, Spain in 2009, and Russia in 2013. After the United States Senate Intelligence Committee Report on CIA torture was released in December 2014, Erwin Chemerinsky, who at the time was Dean of the University of California, Irvine School of Law, called for the prosecution of Yoo for his role in authoring, as well as co-authoring, what came to be known as the Torture Memos.”

Laudig cautioned Kamelamela as to how he should “answer Council member Ruggles’ inquiries, because she is not the only member of the County Council that could be affected by your legal opinion.”

Council member Ruggles’ attorney reminded Kamelamela that the Office of the Corporation Counsel is tasked with giving legal counsel on matters related to the official powers and duties of Council members. He reminded Kamelamela that her request was made in her official capacity seeking legal advice in order to assure her that she was not incurring criminal liability under international humanitarian law and United States Federal law as a Council member for:

  1. Participating in legislation of the Hawai‘i County Council that would appear to be in violation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Geneva Convention where the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom must be administered and not the laws of the United States;
  2. Being complicit in the collection of taxes from protected persons that stem from legislation enacted by the Hawai‘i County Council, which would appear to be in violation of Article 28 and 47 of the Hague Regulations and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention where pillaging is prohibited;
  3. Being complicit in the foreclosures of properties of protected persons for delinquent property taxes that stem from legislation enacted by the Hawai‘i County Council, which would appear to be in violation of Article 28 and 47 of the Hague Regulations and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention where pillaging is prohibited, as well as in violation of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations and Articles 50 and 53 of the Geneva Convention where private property cannot be confiscated; and
  4. Being complicit in the criminal prosecution of protected persons for committing misdemeanors or felonies that stem from legislation enacted by the Hawai‘i County Council, which would appear to be in violation of 147 of the Geneva Convention where protected persons are prohibited from being unlawfully confined, and cannot be denied a fair and regular trial by a tribunal with competent jurisdiction.

Council member Ruggles stated that Corporation Counsel’s letter did not comply with her request for a legal opinion. Her attorney compared the quality of Kamelamela’s letter of the 22nd  to a previous 5 page much more thorough opinion on a much simpler matter dated November 3, 2017 involving a grant she wanted to provide for a community center titled Orchidland Neighbors CRF Grant Follow-up that included sections on background, facts, analysis, and a conclusion. She says for this grant Kamelamela had provided a legal opinion that appeared to have met the standard of professional conduct and that she was anticipating a response of similar quality. She also referred to a 12-page opinion by Kamelamela’s predecessor, Lincoln Ashida, which also included facts, analysis, and a conclusion to then Council member Bob Jacobson dated May 26, 2004, regarding Article III, Section 3-2, Hawai‘i County Charter WRK. NO. 03-3641

During last week’s Council Committee meetings on August 21, 2018, Kamelamela admitted that he had not yet read her 9-page letter, and Ruggles says that she was taken aback by Kamelamela’s uninformed comments made, which insinuated she was involved with Native Hawaiian sovereignty groups and that is what had motivated her inquiry.

She stated Kamelamela’s comments “struck me as improper and not what I would expect from a professional tasked with the responsibilities of his office nor from an attorney speaking to an elected official in public.”

She went on to state:

“I represent my constituents from District 5, and swore to support and defend the U.S. Constitution. If Kamelamela had read the letter before voicing his opinion on my legitimate request, he would have clearly known that the native Hawaiian sovereignty movement is unrelated to the issue of potential liability for war crimes. The memorandum opinion of Dr. deZayas, was not from a sovereignty group, but from a United Nations Independent Expert. His use of the terms ‘plundering’, ‘enabling’, and ‘colluding’ are precise legal terms associated with criminal activity for violating the Hague and Geneva Conventions. I do not take this memorandum lightly, nor should he.”

In Laudig’s response to Kamelamela, he states, “This letter is in the nature of a follow up reminder and opportunity to provide what could be described as a ‘proper’ legal opinion which would include…meeting the standards of competent practitioners’ as the Hawai‘i Rules of Professional Conduct outlines.”

Ruggles says, “until Corporation Counsel provides her with a proper legal opinion responding to the statement of facts, consistent with the Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct, and the legal definition of assurance that I am not incurring criminal liability under U.S. law and international law, which includes the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV, I painfully regret I have been advised by my attorney that I must continue to refrain from legislating.”

Ruggles added, “I will be holding a townhall meeting on this issue shortly, and as always, welcome our constituents’ concerns, questions, and ideas on any issue. I am available to them and will continue to work hard in providing transparency and accountability in government.”

Click to download:

Council member Ruggles’ Letter to Corporation Counsel Joe Kamelamela, August 21, 2018

Corporation Counsel Joe Kamelamela’s Letter to Council Member Ruggles’ Letter, August 22, 2018

Council member Ruggles’ Response Letter to Corporation Counsel Joe Kamelamela, August 28, 2018

Breaking Ranks: Legislator in the State of Hawai‘i Concerned About War Crimes

COUNCIL MEMBER JEN RUGGLES RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT ALLEGED WAR CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST PROTECTED PERSONS

Concerned She May Be Incurring Criminal Liability and Requests Corporation Counsel Opinion regarding incurring Criminal Liability

Hilo, HI- Council member Jen Ruggles released a statement today stating she had recently come to understand that she may be in violation of her oath of office to uphold the United States constitution and may be incurring criminal liability for war crimes under both U.S. federal law and international law. She has retained Stephen Laudig as legal counsel in order to communicate with the County Corporation Counsel on this matter.

Click here to download the letter to Joe Kamelamela, Hawai‘i County Corporation Counsel.

Through her attorney, Council member Ruggles has formally requested the Office of Corporation Counsel to assure her that she is not incurring criminal liability under international humanitarian law and United States Federal law as a Council member for:

  1. Participating in legislation of the Hawai‘i County Council that would appear to be in violation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Geneva Convention where the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom must be administered and not the laws of the United States;
  2. Being complicit in the collection of taxes from protected persons that stem from legislation enacted by the Hawai‘i County Council, which would appear to be in violation of Article 28 and 47 of the Hague Regulations and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention where pillaging is prohibited;
  3. Being complicit in the foreclosures of properties of protected persons for delinquent property taxes that stem from legislation enacted by the Hawai‘i County Council, which would appear to be in violation of Article 28 and 47 of the Hague Regulations and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention where pillaging is prohibited, as well as in violation of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations and Articles 50 and 53 of the Geneva Convention where private property cannot be confiscated; and
  4. Being complicit in the criminal prosecution of protected persons for committing misdemeanors or felonies that stem from legislation enacted by the Hawai‘i County Council, which would appear to be in violation of 147 of the Geneva Convention where protected persons are prohibited from being unlawfully confined, and cannot be denied a fair and regular trial by a tribunal with competent jurisdiction.

Until Corporation Counsel is able to assure, under applicable laws, that Council member Ruggles is not incurring criminal liability under international humanitarian law and U.S. law, she says she will be refraining from participating in the proposing and enacting of legislation for the Hawai‘i County Council. She will continue to serve her constituents as a Council member on all other matters that do not conflict with the topics of her request to the Corporation Counsel. As soon as Corporation Counsel can assure her that no criminal liability is being incurred, she will return to legislate.

“I took an oath where I swore to support and defend the U.S. Constitution, and the constitution states that treaties are the supreme law of the land. My current understanding is that the Hague and Geneva Conventions are international treaties ratified by the United States,” Ruggles said, “and until our county attorney assures me I am not violating my oath of office, and not incurring criminal liability, I must refrain from enacting any further legislation. I am eagerly awaiting his response. In the meanwhile my constituents can be assured that I am still available to them, will continue to focus on our district and stand up for our disadvantaged populations.”

Her attorney, Stephen Laudig, states that Ruggles had been made aware of the history of the United States’ occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom when she received an email from the Hawaiian Kingdom acting Council of Regency informing her, and all other Hawaii legislators, of several legal actions substantiating the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a sovereign and independent State. Among the legal actions were the Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom proceedings held under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, Netherlands; the United Nations Independent Expert, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Dr. Alfred deZayas’ memorandum to the members of the judiciary of the State of Hawai‘i dated February 25, 2018; and the more recent lawsuit of David Keanu Sai, as Chairman of the Council of Regency v. Donald Trump, as President of the United States that was filed with United States District Court for the District of Columbia on June 15, 2018 addressing the failure of the United States to administer the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom under Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the 1949 Geneva Convention.

Ruggles says she then sought to verify the claims made by the chair of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Acting Council of Regency, Dr. Keanu Sai, and has found his research to be thorough and comprehensive as to the explanation of legal facts describing the events leading up to and during the commencement of the illegal occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom. She also became aware that in seven different criminal and civil cases, Dr. Sai was acknowledged and admitted as an expert witness on the subject of the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and international laws. Three of those cases were held on Hawai‘i Island in the Third Circuit.

The turning point that got Ruggles to take action was the United Nations Independent Expert’s memorandum to State of Hawai‘i officials and the lawsuit filed in Washington, D.C. In his memorandum, the Independent Expert stated, “I have come to understand that the lawful political status of the Hawaiian Islands is that of a sovereign nation-state in continuity; but a nation-state that is under a strange form of occupation by the United States resulting from an illegal military occupation and a fraudulent annexation.” He goes on to state that “As such, international laws (the Hague and Geneva Conventions) require that governance and legal matters within the occupied territory of the Hawaiian Islands must be administered by the application of the laws of the occupied state (in this case, the Hawaiian Kingdom), not the domestic laws of the occupier (the United States).”

Ruggles’ says she views the Independent Expert’s statements as authoritative under international law especially from the fact that when Dr. deZayas was elected by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2012, the United States was a member and did not dispute his appointment.

Consequently, council member Ruggles says she began to question her own position as an elected official who swore to support and defend the constitution of the United States as to whether or not she is incurring criminal liability for enacting United States law as a legislator, which appears to be in conflict with Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention which mandates the occupying State (United States) to administer the laws of the occupied State (Hawaiian Kingdom).

Ruggles says, “I want it to be clear that this action, on my part should not be construed as a publicity stunt but is rather acting upon the advice of counsel given the awareness she has regarding alleged war crimes, and the awareness other State of Hawai‘i officials had and remained silent.” Ruggles says she “is a firm believer in the rule of law and not the politics of power.”

State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia – A Recipe for War Crimes?

When the United States assumed control of its installed puppet regime under the new heading of Territory of Hawai‘i in 1900, and later the State of Hawai‘i in 1959, it surpassed “its limits under international law through extraterritorial prescriptions emanating from its national institutions: the legislature, government, and courts (Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (1993), p. 19).” The legislation of every state, including the United States of America and its Congress, are not sources of international law.

In The Lotus case, (1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 10, p. 18), the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that “Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.” According to Judge Crawford, derogation of this principle will not be presumed (James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed., 2006), p. 41).

Since Congressional legislation has no extraterritorial effect, it cannot unilaterally establish governments in the territory of a foreign state. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens, and operations of the nation in such territory must be governed by treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international law (United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)).”

The U.S. Supreme Court also concluded that “[t]he laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation within its own jurisdiction (The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824)).” Therefore, the State of Hawai‘i cannot claim to be a government as its only claim to authority derives from Congressional legislation that has no extraterritorial effect. As such, international law defines the State of Hawai‘i as an organized armed group.

According to Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I (2009), p. 14, “organized armed groups … are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates.” They explain that “this definition of armed forces covers all persons who fight on behalf of a party to a conflict and who subordinate themselves to its command.” Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention, IV, states:

“The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: (1) To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (2) To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) To carry arms openly; and (4) To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”

In 2013, State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia, 128 Hawai‘i 479, 486 (2013), the State of Hawai‘i Supreme Court responded to a defendant who “contends that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his criminal prosecution because the defense proved the existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the illegitimacy of the State of Hawai‘i government, with “whatever may be said regarding the lawfulness” of its origins, “the State of Hawai‘i … is now, a lawful government.” This is a bold statement to be made by the Supreme Court without providing any evidence of its lawfulness other than declaring its lawfulness.

From a standpoint of evidence, the jurisdiction of the State of Hawai‘i court stems from its lawfulness. This lawfulness, however, is allowed to be challenged by a defendant under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Hawai‘i Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for a defendant to file a motion to dismiss based upon subject matter jurisdiction. In Nishitani v. Baker, 82 Haw. 281, 289 (1996), the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) stated,

“that although the governments of the State of Hawaii and the United States had recently acknowledged the illegality of the overthrow of the Kingdom, neither recognizes that the Kingdom exists at the present time (citations omitted).  Because the defendant had ‘presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,’ we determined that the defendant had failed to meet his burden under HRS ß 701-115(2) (1993) of proving his defense of lack of jurisdiction. … [And] where immunity claims are raised as a defense to jurisdiction, the burden is on the defendant to establish his immunity status.”

The citation by the ICA of HRS ß 701-115(2) states, “No defense may be considered by the trier of fact unless evidence of the specified fact or facts has been presented.” In other words, it is incumbent on the defendant to present the evidence if he is challenging the jurisdiction of the court. In Kaulia, there was no evidentiary hearing by the trial court because the trial court denied Kaulia his right to present ‘specified fact or facts” that conclude “the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.”

Kaulia’s attorney sought to have Dr. Keanu Sai serve as an expert witness. Dr. Sai had been admitted in both criminal and civil proceedings as an expert witness on the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law.

“[O]n March 15, 2010, Kaulia filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Motion to Dismiss) challenging the court’s jurisdiction over the case based on the existence of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i (Kingdom). At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the court confirmed that in off-the-record conferences it had denied Kaulia’s request for an evidentiary hearing to call witnesses, including one Dr. Keanu Sai, to establish the existence of the Kingdom. The court then denied Kaulia’s Motion to Dismiss.” State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia,128 Haw. 479, 482 (2013).

On appeal, the ICA held that “[t]he Circuit Court did not err in precluding Kaulia from calling a witness to present evidence concerning the Kingdom of Hawai‘i in support of his motion to dismiss case for lack of jurisdiction (State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia, 127 Haw. 414 (2012),” despite the ICA’s previous decision in State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, 77 Haw. 219, 221 (1994), that “it was incumbent on Defendant to present evidence supporting his claim…that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” According to The American Heritage Dictionary (2nd ed., 1982),  the term ‘incumbent’ is defined as “[i]mposed as an obligation or duty; obligatory.” Legally, the phrase ‘incumbent on’ means “mandatory, obligatory, requisite (William C. Burton, Legal Thesaurus 754 (2nd ed., 1992)).”

Like the ICA, the Supreme Court in blatant disregard of the ICA cases of Lorenzo and Baker, “rejected Kaulia’s argument that the circuit court erred in precluding Kaulia from calling a witness to present evidence concerning the existence of the Kingdom in support of his Motion to Dismiss (State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia, 128 Haw. 479, 487 (2013)).”

The irony of this whole matter is that the Supreme Court cited Lorenzo and Baker as its basis to deny Kaulia’s argument, which is that “it was incumbent on Defendant to present evidence supporting his claim…that the Kingdom exists as a state.” The decisions by the Circuit Court, ICA and Supreme Court in Kaulia clearly run counter to HRS ß 701-115(2). According to this flawed logic, so long as the trier of fact (judge) can prevent the defense from presenting “evidence of the specified fact or facts” it does not need to consider it. Prosecutors and plaintiff’s attorneys now cite State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia as the precedent case to deny defendants’ motions to dismiss. This is a feeble attempt to close the door that they opened in 1994 in State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo.

The State of Hawai‘i courts have established an echo chamber to shield themselves from the precedence set by the courts themselves in Lorenzo and Baker. The term echo chamber is “widely used in today’s lexicon, that describes a situation where certain ideas, beliefs or data points are reinforced through repetition of a closed system that does not allow for the free movement of alternative or competing ideas or concepts.” As Mohajer, The Little Book of Stupidity: How We Lie to Ourselves and Don’t Believe Others 20, 7 (2015), wrote:

“The confirmation bias is so fundamental to [our] development and [our] reality that you might not even realize it is happening. We look for evidence that supports our beliefs and opinions about the world but excludes those that run contrary to our own… In an attempt to simplify the world and make it conform to our expectations, we have been blessed with the gift of cognitive biases.”

While this game of hide and seek is being played out by the State of Hawai‘i judiciary, these actions constitute violations of the 1907 Hague and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which have been codified by the Congress under 18 U.S.C. §2441—War crimes.

The United Nations Independent Expert, Dr. Alfred M. deZayas notified the State of Hawai‘i judiciary to not “plunder…enable or collude.” Plunder is another word for the war crime of pillaging, which is prohibited under Article 28 of the 1907 Hague Convention, IV, 18 U.S.C. §2441(c)(2). To deny a person of a fair and regular trial is also a war crime under Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV, 18 U.S.C. §2441(c)(2). The terms enable and collude are terms associated with conspiring to commit war crimes.

Hawaiian Nationality and the Law of Occupation

The Hawaiian nationality is termed Hawaiian subject and not Hawaiian citizen. The distinction between subject and citizen is that the former is the political status of an individual in a monarchical form of government, whether absolute or constitutional, and the latter is the political status of an individual in a republic or non-monarchical government.

Under Hawaiian law, nationality can be acquired four ways:

  1. Born within Hawaiian territory—jus soli, also called native-born or natural-born;
  2. Born outside of Hawaiian territory from parents with Hawaiian nationality—jus sanguinis;
  3. Naturalize. The Minister of the Interior, with the approval of the Monarch, shall have the power in person upon the application of any alien foreigner who shall have resided within the Kingdom five years or more, stating his intention to become a permanent resident of the Kingdom, to administer the oath of allegiance to such foreigner, if satisfied that it will be for the good of the Kingdom. (§429, Article VIII, Hawaiian Civil Code);
  4. Denizen. The Monarch can confer upon any alien resident abroad, or temporarily resident in this Kingdom, letters patent of denization, conferring upon such alien, without abjuration of allegiance, all the rights, privileges and immunities of a native. The letters patent shall render the denizen in all respects accountable to the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and impose upon him the like fealty to the King, as if he had been naturalized. (§433, Article VIII, Hawaiian Civil Code).

Once a State is occupied, international law preserves the status quo of the occupied State as it was before the occupation began. To preserve the nationality of the occupied State from being manipulated by the occupying State to its advantage, international law only allows individuals born within the territory of the occupied State to acquire the nationality of their parents. In order to preserve the status quo, Article 49 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention mandates that the “Occupying Power shall not…transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” To do so is a war crime.

For individuals, who were born within Hawaiian territory, to be a Hawaiian subjects they must be a direct descendant of an individual who was a Hawaiian subject prior to the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom government on January 17, 1893. All other individuals born after this date to the present are aliens who can only acquire the nationality of their parents.

According to the 1890 government census, Hawaiian subjects numbered 48,107, with the aboriginal Hawaiians, both pure and part, numbering 40,622, being 84% of the national population, and the non-aboriginal Hawaiians numbering 7,485, being 16%. Despite the massive migrations of foreigners to the Hawaiian Islands since 1893, which, according to the State of Hawai‘i Office of Hawaiian Affairs, numbers 1,302,939 in 2009, with the aboriginal Hawaiian population at 322,812 (25.3%), the status quo of the national population of the Hawaiian Kingdom is maintained.

In other words, with the increase in numbers of Hawaiian subjects, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal, since 1898, the status quo of the Hawaiian national population has been maintained to date. Therefore, under the international laws of occupation, the aboriginal Hawaiian population of 322,812 in 2009 would continue to be 84% of the Hawaiian national population, and the non-aboriginal Hawaiian population of 61,488 would continue to be 16%. The balance of the population in 2009, being 918,639, are aliens.