
On September 12, 2026, the attorney for Amici Curiae filed a motion for the Court to reconsider its September 4th Order denying Amici Curiae’s brief in support of the Kamehameha Schools. The amici curiae comprise of sixty-eight scholars and academics, along with the Hawaiian Kingdom Council of Regency, from eleven countries. Four of the amici are scholars of international law.
Amicus curiae is Latin for friend of the court. If there is more than one person, the filing is called an amici curiae or friends of the court. In the American court system, an amici curiae are individuals who are not a party to the case but have a particular expertise that can assist the judge in making a consequential decision. Thus, they are called friends of the court. These kinds of briefs are important because they provide expert knowledge, highlight the broader real-world consequences of a potential ruling, and help judges make fully informed decisions.
In their brief, the amici explain why the Court is not legal because it is operating within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom, a country that still exists since the nineteenth century despite the unlawful overthrow of its government by U.S. troops on January 17, 1893. However, the amici state that the Court can make itself legal by transforming into an occupation court, under the law of occupation, that would administer Hawaiian Kingdom law in order for the Defendant Kamehameha Schools to have a fair trial.
At present, the Court and the Plaintiff Students for Fair Admissions are operating under American law, which the amici point out is the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty. Amici conclude their brief by stating if the Court does not begin to comply with international law and the law of occupation it would be committing the war crimes of usurpation of sovereignty and depriving Kamehameha Schools of a fair trial.
According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for reconsideration is allowed if the Court committed a manifest error by applying a wrong legal standard. The motion argues the court committed a manifest error of law by misapplying Jones v. United States. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and subjects of that government.”
The amici stated in their motion that the executive branch of the U.S. did “determine” the Hawaiian Kingdom as the sovereign over the Hawaiian Islands when it recognized it as an independent State. Amici then state:
What followed were the 1849 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Hawaiian Kingdom at the United States (9 Stat. 977); the 1875 Treaty of Reciprocity (19 Stat. 625); the 1883 Postal Convention Concerning Money Orders (23 Stat. 736); the 1884 Supplementary Convention to the 1875 Treaty of Reciprocity (25 Stat. 1399); and the establishment of the Hawaiian Legation in Washington, D.C., and the United States Legation in Honolulu, to include both establishing Consulates in both countries.
Also, the amici curiae provided, in their brief, clear and undeniable evidence, under international law, that the United States executive branch, by its Embassy at The Hague, recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as a State since the nineteenth century and the Council of Regency as its interim government during arbitration proceedings at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, 119 International Law Reports 566 (2001), under customary international law grounded on opinio juris (Doc. 157, p. 40-41), and by treaty under the 2000 Sai-Clinton agreement (Id., p. 37-39). These are contemporary determinations made by the executive branch of the United States that conclusively binds this Court and the Plaintiff Students for Fair Admissions pursuant to Jones.
The amici argued that the Court misapplied the legal standard set by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Jones as if the executive branch did not recognize the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and sovereign over the Hawaiian Islands. Because the U.S. executive made these determinations of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State since the nineteenth century it is not a political question, and that such determinations are binding on the Court and Students for Fair Admissions because the plaintiff are citizens of the United States. In its Order the Court disregarded the actions taken by the executive branch as if it never occurred. Thus, the Court is wrongly claiming it is still a political question as to who the sovereign over the Hawaiian Islands is.
In its Order, the Court also claims that it is “bound to accept the lawfulness of the government of the United States and the applicability of its laws” in the State of Hawai‘i. The amici assert that U.S. laws, which includes the law establishing the State of Hawai‘i in 1959, have no effect outside of the United States, as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in two cases.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., the Supreme Court stated, “Neither the [federal] Constitution nor the [federal] laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens, and operations of the nation in such territory must be governed by treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international law.” In The Apollon, it stated, “The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation within its own jurisdiction.”
The amici state that imposing U.S. laws in the Hawaiian Kingdom is a violation of international humanitarian law and the law of occupation, amounting to the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during occupation.
The motion also critiques the Court’s disregard of the Lorenzo principle, which places the burden on defendants to prove the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom. In 2014, the State of Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, stated:
Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the Kingdom of Hawai‘i “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.
Amici, show that this legal standard has applied to all State of Hawai‘i courts for the past thirty-two years and applies to the U.S. District Courts in Hawai‘i for the past twenty-four years. Amici provided sufficient factual and legal evidence of the Kingdom’s continued existence, and that the Court erred by disregarding the binding nature of the Lorenzo principle. The amici stated:
Neither did the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals in Lorenzo, the State of Hawai‘i Supreme Court in Armitage, nor did Judge Ezra in United States v. Goo, invoke Jones. For the Court now to invoke Jones is a blatant manifest error of law that runs counter to the Lorenzo principle that has bound U.S. District Courts in Hawai‘i for the past 24 years.
Under international law, there is a legal principle of the presumption of State continuity, even under occupation. In its motion that amici state:
“[t]here is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations […] despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government,” and that “belligerent occupation does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.” Judge Crawford further points out that “the presumption—in practice a strong one—is in favour of the continuance, and against the extinction, of an established state.” See James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 417 (1979). Consequently, “[i]f one were to speak about a presumption of continuity, one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States.”
Consequently, Lorenzo and Armitage erred when it placed the burden on the defendant because under international law that burden is placed on the Plaintiff or the Judge who oppose that continuity to provide rebuttable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom has ceased to exist as a State under international law. Failure to provide rebuttable evidence the presumption of Hawaiian State continuity remains. By disregarding the facts and international law, the Court committed manifest error of law by not properly applying the Lorenzo principle and providing no rebuttable evidence as to the presumption of Hawaiian State continuity and the evidence provided by the amici curiae in its brief.
These arguments, by the amici, collectively challenge the court’s jurisdiction and the application of U.S. law in Hawai‘i, grounding their claims in both U.S. and international law, and emphasizing the ongoing legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The amici conclude its motion with:
Under international humanitarian law and the law of occupation, the Court is obligated to transform itself into an Article II occupation court so that it can administer Hawaiian Kingdom law that protect the rights of the Defendant Kamehameha Schools, unless the Court can provide rebuttable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom is not the de jure sovereign over the Hawaiian Islands, which it has not done. Until there is rebuttable evidence, this Court IS situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom and NOT within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
The burden is on the Court, pursuant to Curtiss-Wright Corp., to provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom ceases to exist as a State, under international law, by reference to “treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international law.” And Curtiss-Wright Corp. precludes the Court from referencing “the [federal] Constitution [or] the [federal] laws passed in pursuance of it,” because it has no “force in foreign territory.” In its Order denying amici curiae’s motion for leave to file amici curiae brief, the Court could have, sua sponte, provided rebuttable evidence as to the presumption of Hawaiian State continuity and evidence provided in the amici curiae’s brief, but it did not.
Therefore, the Court’s willful act not to transform into an Article II occupation court would be a violation of international humanitarian law and the law of occupation, and, consequently, would constitute the commission of the war crimes of usurpation of sovereignty during occupation and deprivation of fair and regular trial, thereby making the Defendant Kamehameha Schools a war crime victim. Under international law, the Council of Regency, as the interim government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, has a duty and obligation to investigate war crimes committed within Hawaiian territory. See David Keanu Sai, “All States have a Responsibility to Protect their Population from War Crimes—Usurpation of Sovereignty During Military Occupation of the Hawaiian Islands,” 6(2) International Review of Contemporary Law 72-81 (2024).

