Putin Warns US and NATO Countries of Nuclear Attack: Island of O‘ahu Targeted for Nuclear Strike

Posted on February 24, 2022 by Hawaiian Kingdom

Yesterday, Russian forces invaded Ukraine from the north, east and south. Russian President Vladimir Putin justified the invasion as a response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) coming too close to Russia’s borders. According to the U.S. State Department, NATO “was created in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations to provide collective security against the Soviet Union.” After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has taken the mantle of the former Soviet Union and maintains a very large military force and nuclear weapons. Former Soviet States to the west of Russia became members of NATO with the exception of Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia.

*Map of NATO expansion since 1949 – Wikipedia*

Russia views the encroachment of NATO to its western border as a security threat. In a speech after meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron on February 7, 2022, Putin stated “Of course NATO and Russia potentials are incompatible” and warns of nuclear war if Ukraine joins NATO.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is reminiscent of the United States aggression against the Hawaiian Kingdom during the Spanish-American War. As Russia claims NATO is a national security threat to its existence, the United States claimed Japan was an immediate threat of invasion of the United States west coast.

After the United States admitted unlawful overthrow of the Hawaiian Government, Mahan wrote a letter to the Editor of the New York Times where he advocated seizing the Hawaiian Islands. On January 31, 1893, he wrote that the Hawaiian Islands, “with their geographical and military importance, [is] unrivalled by that of any other position in the North Pacific.” Mahan used the Hawaiian situation to bolster his argument of building a large naval fleet. He warned that a maritime power could well seize the Hawaiian Islands, and that the United States should take that first step. He stated that to hold the Hawaiian Islands, “whether in the supposed case or in war with a European state, implies a great extension of our naval power. Are we ready to undertake this?” Mahan would have to wait four years to find an ally in President William McKinley’s Department of the Navy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt.

Roosevelt sent a private and confidential letter, on May 3, 1897, to Mahan. He wrote, “I need not tell you that as regards Hawaii I take your views absolutely, as indeed I do on foreign policy generally. If I had my way we would annex those islands tomorrow.” Moreover, Roosevelt told Mahan that Cleveland’s handling of the Hawaiian situation was “a colossal crime, and we should be guilty of aiding him after the fact if we do not reverse what he did.” Roosevelt also assured Mahan “that Secretary [of the Navy] Long shares [their] views. He believes we should take the islands, and I have just been preparing some memoranda for him to use at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow.”

In a follow up letter to Mahan, on June 9, 1897, Roosevelt wrote that he “urged immediate action by the President as regards Hawaii. Entirely between ourselves, I believe he will act very shortly. If we take Hawaii now, we shall avoid trouble with Japan.” Eight days later, on June 16, 1897, the McKinley administration signed a treaty of “incorporation” with its American puppet—the Republic of Hawai‘i, in Washington, D.C. On the following day, Queen Lili‘uokalani submitted a formal protest to the U.S. State Department stating, “I declare such a treaty to be an act of wrong toward the native and part-native people of Hawaii, an invasion of the rights of the ruling chiefs, in violation of international rights both toward my people and toward friendly nations with whom they have made treaties, the perpetuation of the fraud whereby the constitutional government was overthrown, and, finally, an act of gross injustice to me.”

While the so-called treaty failed to get the required 2/3’s vote from the Senate for ratification, a joint resolution of annexation, being an internal law of the United States, was submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 4, 1897, in its place, and pushed through both Houses of the Congress. President McKinley signed it into law on July 7, 1898. In a secret session of the Senate on May 31, 1898, whose transcripts were not opened to the public until 1969, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge acknowledged that the McKinley “Administration was compelled to violate the neutrality of those islands, that protests from foreign representatives had already been received, and complications with other powers were threatened, that the annexation or some action in regard to those islands had become a military necessity.”

The United States aggression against the Hawaiian Kingdom, a sovereign and independent State like Ukraine, gives rise to the proverbial idiom, “who’s calling the kettle black.”

Putin’s warning draws the Hawaiian Kingdom, being a neutral State, into a theater of war should the United States enter the Russia-Ukrainian conflict. According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s Base Structure Report for 2012, the U.S. military has 118 military sites that span 230,929 acres of the Hawaiian Islands, which is 6% of the total acreage of Hawaiian territory. As the headquarters for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, being the largest unified combatant command in the world, the Hawaiian Islands are targeted for nuclear strikes by Russia, China and North Korea.

The United States prolonged and illegal occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom is a direct violation of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s neutrality, which is specifically stated in its treaties with Germany, Spain and Sweden and Norway. Article XV of its treaty with Spain provides “Her Majesty the Queen of Spain engages to respect, in time of war the neutrality of the Hawaiian Islands, and to use her good offices with all the other powers having treaties with the same, to induce them to adopt the same policy toward the said Islands.”

Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention, V, provides “The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable,” and Article 2 provides “Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.” The United States’ violation of these Articles have placed the residents of the Hawaiian Islands into harms way when Japan attacked U.S. military installations on O‘ahu on December 7, 1941, and continue to place Hawai‘i’s residents in harms way in the event of a nuclear attack.

In 1990, the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) published Risks and Hazards: A State by State Guide. One of the subjects included nuclear targets and identified 6 nuclear targets on the island of O‘ahu that coincided with the locations of military posts of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. Also included as a target is the Headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Command at Camp Smith that lies in the back of a residential area in Halawa. According to FEMA, the entire Island of O‘ahu would be obliterated if a nuclear attack were to take place with few survivors and total destruction of buildings.

Americanization has desensitized Hawai‘i’s population and has made the presence of the U.S. military in the islands normal. Americanization has also erased the memory of the U.S. invasion in 1893 and portrayed the military presence as protecting the islands from an aggressor country intent on invasion, when in fact the Hawaiian Islands were seized in 1898 to serve as a defense to protect the United States west coast from invasion.

After the defeat of the Spanish Pacific Squadron in the Philippines, U.S. Congressman Francis Newlands (D-Nevada), submitted House Resolution 259 annexing the Hawaiian Islands (also known as the Newlands Resolution), to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 4, 1898.

Six days later, hearings were held on the Newlands Resolution, and U.S. Naval Captain Alfred Mahan’s testimony explained the military significance of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States:

“It is obvious that if we do not hold the islands ourselves we cannot expect the neutrals in the war to prevent the other belligerent from occupying them; nor can the inhabitants themselves prevent such occupation. The commercial value is not great enough to provoke neutral interposition. In short, in war we should need a larger Navy to defend the Pacific coast, because we should have not only to defend our own coast, but to prevent, by naval force, an enemy from occupying the islands; whereas, if we preoccupied them, fortifications could preserve them to us. In my opinion it is not practicable for any trans-Pacific country to invade our Pacific coast without occupying Hawai‘i as a base.”

The Hawaiian Islands was and continues to be the outpost to protect the United States and their presence in the Hawaiian Islands is in violation of international law and the laws of occupation.

Triggering State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts

Posted on February 22, 2022 by Hawaiian Kingdom

According to the Articles of State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, enforcement of international law must be triggered by the injured State, which in this case is the Hawaiian Kingdom, through its restored government, the Council of Regency. But prior to the triggering State responsibility for an internationally wrongful act or acts, it must be clear as to what is the internationally wrongful act or acts committed against an injured State.

As a sovereign and independent State, the Hawaiian Kingdom possessed certain fundamental rights under international law. The principal corollaries of sovereign and independent States are: first, exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and the population residing there; second, the duty of non-intervention in the territory of exclusive jurisdiction of other States; and third, the obligations arising from customary international law and treaties by contracting States.

These rules are regarded at the highest level of international law and are called jus cogens or peremptory norms. A peremptory norm or rule is one that cannot be downplayed or derogated. To downplay these principles would undermine the very existence of international law and the international order of States.

When the United States invaded the Hawaiian Kingdom with U.S. troops on January 16, 1893, under the false flag of protecting American lives and property, it violated the duty of non-intervention. As a result of the unlawful overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom government the following day on January 17th, it violated the exclusive jurisdiction of the Hawaiian government over its territory and its resident population by supplanting an American proxy called the provisional government.

It wasn’t until five years later that the United States Congress enacted an internal law purporting to have annexed a foreign State on July 7, 1898. Two years later, the Congress enacted another internal law changing the name of their insurgency they installed to be called the Territory of Hawai‘i. And in 1959, the Congress changed the name of the Territory of Hawai‘i to the State of Hawai‘i.

When the United States unlawfully overthrew the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, customary international law at the time obligated the United States to temporarily administer the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an occupied State. The customary international law of occupation was later codified under the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Conventions, both of which the United States and signed and ratified. This failure to administer Hawaiian Kingdom law violated the third principle of obligations arising from customary international law and treaties.

Under international law, there are only three ways in which a State can acquire additional territory. These mechanisms include: cession from other States by a treaty (the Louisiana Purchase by the United States from France in 1803); by the physical occupation of territory that is terra nullius (Latin: “land belonging to no one”), which is land not under the sovereignty or control of any other State; or by prescription, where a State acquires territory from another State through a continued period of uncontested sovereignty.

In the federal lawsuit, Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden, the United States asserts that it is the legitimate sovereign over the Hawaiian Islands because it “annexed Hawaii in 1898, and Hawaii entered into the union as a state in 1959.” The United States made no reference to a treaty of cession or even a claim by prescription. Instead, it is relying on its internal law as a mechanism for acquiring foreign territory and imposing American law through its creation called the State of Hawai‘i.

As the Permanent Court of International Justice, in The Lotus Case, stated in 1927, “the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside of its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.” Congressional laws are not “a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.”

The significance of this statement is legally profound because the United States explicitly admitted, in a court of law, that it is committing internationally wrongful acts that has led to the commission of war crimes and human rights violations as pointed out in the Amended Complaint. A State cannot rely on internationally wrongful acts as a defense for the violation of international laws. This reasoning is absurd and synonymous with an individual on trial for theft of a car admits to stealing the car as a defense for the theft.

On October 11, 2021, the Council of Regency, by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent a note verbale to all of the embassies accredited to the United Nations in New York City. It stated, “This Note Verbale serves as a notice of claim by an injured State, pursuant to Article 43 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), invoking the responsibility of all Member States of the United Nations who are responsible for the internationally wrongful act of recognizing the United States presence in the Hawaiian Kingdom as lawful to cease that act pursuant Article 30(a), and to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition pursuant to Article 30(b). The form of reparation under Article 31 shall take place in accordance with the provisions of Part Two—Content of the International Responsibility of a State(s).”

The joint letter by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and the American Association of Jurists—Asociación Americana de Juristas (AAJ), sent to all the Embassies accredited to the United Nations in New York City and in Geneva on February 16, 2022, reinforces the Hawaiian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ note verbale.

The IADL and AAJ Sent a Joint Letter to all UN Ambassadors Calling for Enforcement of International Law Regarding the Prolonged Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom

Posted on February 19, 2022 by Hawaiian Kingdom

There may be confusion between resolving a dispute between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States, and enforcement regarding the United States violations of international law since January 16, 1893, when US troops invaded a sovereign and independent State.

A dispute did exist between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States when the Hawaiian government was overthrown on January 17, 1893. Queen Lili‘uokalani stated in her conditional surrender to the United States that “I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said provisional government.” But in a letter from the Secretary of State John Foster to President Benjamin Harrison, “At the time the provisional government took possession of the Government buildings no troops or officers of the United States were present or took any part whatever in the proceedings.”

The Hawaiian Kingdom was claiming the overthrow was a result of an invasion by the United States, and the United States was claiming that the provisional government was established by a successful revolution without any participation of US troops. President Grover Cleveland, who succeeded President Harrison, stated to the Congress that “The truth or falsity of [the Queen’s] protest was surely of the first importance. If true, nothing but the concealment of its truth could induce our Government to negotiate with the semblance of a government thus created, nor could a treaty resulting from the acts stated in the protest have been knowingly deemed worthy of consideration by the Senate. Yet the truth or falsity of the protest had not been investigated.”

President Cleveland initiated an investigation on March 11, 1893, with the appointment of James Blount, former chairman of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs, as Special Commissioner. Commissioner Blount arrived in the Hawaiian Islands late March and began his investigation on April 1st. He sent periodic reports to Secretary of State Walter Gresham in Washington, D.C., and on July 17, 1893, he submitted his final report.

After going over the reports submitted by Commissioner Blount, Secretary of State Gresham stated in a letter to the President on October 18, 1893, “Refusing to recognize the new authority or surrender to it, [the Queen] was informed that the Provisional Government had the support of the American minister, and, if necessary, would be maintained by the military force of the United States then present; that any demonstration on her part would precipitate a conflict with that force; that she could not, with hope of success, engage in war with the United States, and that resistance would result in a useless sacrifice of life.” Gresham further stated:

When [the Queen’s protest] was prepared at the conclusion of the conference, and signed by the Queen and her ministers, a number of persons, including one or more representatives of the Provisional Government, who were still present and understood its contents, by their silence, at least, acquiesced in its statements, and, when it was carried to President Dole, he [endorsed] upon it, “Received from the hands of the late cabinet this 17th day of January, 1893,” without challenging the truth of any of its assertions.

The dispute of these facts were resolved and Queen Lili‘uokalani was proven correct. In his message to the Congress on December 18, 1893, President Cleveland concluded that the provisional government “was neither a government de facto nor de jure,” but rather self-proclaimed. He went further and stated, “that a candid and thorough examination of the facts will force the conviction that the provisional government owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States.”

Through executive mediation between the Queen and the new U.S. Minister to the Hawaiian Islands, Albert Willis, that lasted from November 13 through December 18, 1893, an agreement of peace was reached. According to the executive agreement, by exchange of notes, the President committed to restoring the Queen as the Executive Monarch, and the Queen, after being restored, to grant a full pardon to the insurgents. Political wrangling in the Congress, however, blocked President Cleveland from carrying out his obligation of restoration of the Queen.

Five years later during the Spanish-American War, the United States Congress enacted a joint resolution of annexation, and President Cleveland’s successor, President William McKinley, signed it into U.S. law on July 7, 1898. The legislation of every independent State, including the United States, through its Congress, are confined in their operation within the territorial borders of the State that enacted the legislation.

In The Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in 1927 that “the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside of its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.” Since 1898, the United States has been unlawfully imposing American municipal laws over the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom in violation of international laws and the law of occupation.

There is no dispute between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States. Instead, there is the lack of enforcement of international law regarding the United States prolonged and illegal occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom since 1893.

Enforcement of international law is through the governments of States. Enforcement of international law had been asymmetrical and often called the Achilles heel of international law. From April 25 to June 26, 1945, fifty States met in San Francisco who eventually signed the United Nations Charter with the hope that the new organization would prevent another world war.

The United Nations began to address the subject of enforcement of international law. After nearly forty-years of critical review and analysis, the Articles of State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts was accepted by vote of the United Nations General Assembly in October 2002. By this resolution, the member States of the United Nations accepted the Articles as a reflection of customary international law, which is binding upon all States in the international system whether they are members of the United Nations or not. The main Articles include:

Article 30. The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to cease that act, if it is continuing.
Article 31. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.
Article 32. The responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to comply with its obligations under international law.
Article 35. A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed.
Article 41(1). States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach of international law.
Article 41(2). No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of international law, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.

In a deliberate move to enforce compliance with international law, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and the American Association of Jurists—Asociación Americana de Juristas (AAJ), sent a joint letter to all the Embassies accredited to the United Nations in New York City and in Geneva regarding the prolonged and illegal belligerent occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States since January 17, 1893. The joint letter was sent on February 16, 2022. The Hawaiian Kingdom’s Attorney General received a copy of the letter by email from the IADL and the AAJ on February 18. In its joint letter to the ambassadors to the United Nations, the IADL and the AAJ stated:

For the restoration of international law and the tenets of the UN Charter, the IADL and the AAJ calls upon the United States to immediately comply with international humanitarian law and the law of occupation in its prolonged and illegal occupation of the Hawaiian Islands.
The IADL and the AAJ fully supports the NLG’s 10 November 2020 letter to State of Hawai‘i Governor David Ige urging him to “proclaim the transformation of the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties into an occupying government pursuant to the Council of Regency’s proclamation of June 3, 2019, in order to administer the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom. This would include carrying into effect the Council of Regency’s proclamation of October 10, 2014, that bring the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom in the nineteenth century up to date.”

We urge all UN Member States to comply with the Articles of State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). The U.S. violation of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s sovereignty and its failure to comply with international humanitarian law for over a century is an internationally wrongful act. As such, UN Member States have an obligation to not “recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach…nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation,” and member States “shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach [by a member State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law].”

Both the IADL and the AAJ, as non-governmental organizations, have special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and are accredited to participate in the Human Rights Council’s sessions as Observers. The IADL and the AAJ are planning to bring this to the attention of the United Nations Human Rights Council at its 49th session when it convenes on February 28, 2022, in Geneva, Switzerland.

U.S. Files Their Reply to Hawaiian Kingdom’s Opposition to the U.S. Motion to Dismiss

Posted on February 12, 2022 by Hawaiian Kingdom

Today the United States filed its Reply to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Opposition to their Motion to Dismiss. At no point in these proceedings has the United States countered the facts and evidence provided by the Hawaiian Kingdom. In other words, the facts of this case have not been contested and, as such, are considered in favor of the Hawaiian Kingdom in its effort to have the federal court transform itself into an Article II Occupation Court.

This is also the first time ever where the United States had to present their position as to its claim of sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands. In all prior cases that came before the federal courts, the United States relied on the judges of these courts to dismiss the cases because it presents a political question. The political question doctrine prevents federal courts from recognizing the sovereignty of a country if, and only if, the political branches of the President and/or Congress had not already recognized that sovereignty.

In other words, a federal court cannot assert the political question doctrine if a country such as Switzerland filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., against certain officials of the United States because the United States recognized Switzerland as a sovereign and independent State and entered into a treaty of friendship, commerce and extradition with the Swiss government on November 25, 1850.

This is exactly the same situation with the Hawaiian Kingdom where the United States recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as a sovereign and independent State on July 6, 1844, and entered into a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with the Hawaiian Kingdom on December 20, 1849. Just as the United States has a treaty with Switzerland so does the Hawaiian Kingdom has a treaty of friendship, establishment and commerce with Switzerland dated July 10, 1864. The political question doctrine does not apply to the Hawaiian Kingdom but it has been used as an expedient remedy to temporarily protect the United States in its own courts.

In its Motion to Dismiss, the United States takes the position that it has sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands because the Congress passed a joint resolution of annexation in 1898 and in 1959 Hawai‘i became the 50th State of the Federal Union. This is a frivolous claim because United States laws, which includes the federal constitution, have no force and effect beyond the borders of the United States. If this is true, the United States Congress can pass a joint resolution annexing Canada today. Only by a treaty can one country acquire the territory of another country. As pointed out by the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., in 1936:

“Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens, and operations of the nation in such territory must be governed by treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international law. As a member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United States in that field are equal to the right and power of the other members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely sovereign.”

This is consistent at the international level where the Permanent Court of International Justice, in The Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), stated, in 1927, “the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.”

The U.S. District Court claims to be an Article III Court by virtue of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which provides for the authority of the Judiciary. Because the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright stated that “Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory,” the U.S. District Court in Hawai‘i cannot claim to be an Article III Court because the U.S. Constitution has no force in foreign territory. It can only exist as an Article II Court under the President’s authority as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in foreign territory. As stated in the Amicus Brief:

“Under the concept of void ab initio, there are structures that have no legal effect from inception. The United States occupation of Hawai‘i began with unclean hands, and this can only be remedied by a clean slate and a new beginning.”

In the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, it stated that the United States cannot rely on its internal laws, which includes federal court decisions that dismissed cases under the political question doctrine, for its failure to perform its obligation under international law. Under international law, the United States is obligated to administer the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom because it still exists as a sovereign and independent State despite that its government was illegally overthrown on January 17, 1893. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, acknowledged the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State in 1999 and the Council of Regency as its restored government.

In its Reply, the United States continued to attempt to confuse the Court by stating what the Arbitration Tribunal stated and what the PCA did as explained by Italian scholar Professor Federico Lenzerini in his legal opinion, which is attached to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Judicial Notice as Exhibit 1. As the Hawaiian Kingdom clearly explained in all of its pleadings to include its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, there is a very clear distinction between the institutional jurisdiction of PCA, which is an inter-governmental organization, and the subject matter jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal that is established by the PCA.

In accordance with Article 47 of the 1907 Convention that established the PCA, it allows access to the institutional jurisdiction of the PCA by States that have not signed and ratified the 1907 Convention, which are called non-contracting States. As the Hawaiian Kingdom is not a contracting State to the 1907 Convention, it would have access to the PCA’s institutional jurisdiction under Article 47.

The Arbitral Tribunal in the Larsen case was established in accordance with Article 47 as stated in the PCA’s Annual Reports from 2000 to 2011. If the Hawaiian Kingdom was not a State under international law, there would not have been a Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom case. The United States stated in their Reply:

“The primary authority cited as support for Plaintiff’s theory remains Prof. Lenzerini’s interpretation of the significance of the decision by the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) to institute an arbitration involving Plaintiff. The arbitral award explicitly rejects this inference. It demonstrates that the PCA refused to reach a conclusion about Plaintiff’s sovereignty. Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff’s interpretation of the PCA’s actions were correct, it would not matter. The questions raised by Plaintiff and Prof. Lenzerini are classic political questions about the recognition of state sovereignty that the Court has no jurisdiction to answer.”

This statement is convoluted and a word salad. Foremost, the United States implies that the PCA and the Arbitral Tribunal are one in the same when it stated that the “PCA refused to reach a conclusion about Plaintiff’s sovereignty.” This is a false statement because the PCA did reach a conclusion “about Plaintiff’s sovereignty” when it formed the Tribunal on June 9, 2000. The proceedings were initiated on November 8, 1999, but the International Bureau had to be sure that the Hawaiian Kingdom existed as a State before it could form the Tribunal in the first place.

The United States relies on what the Tribunal stated in its Award that “in the absence of the United States of America [as a party], the Tribunal can neither decide that Hawaii is not part of the USA, nor proceed on the assumption that it is not.” What the United States leaves out is that it was the Hawaiian Kingdom that requested the Tribunal to declare that the Hawaiian Kingdom exists as a State. The request was made because the 2000 Annual Report acknowledging the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State in accordance with Article 47 did not come out yet.

The Hawaiian Kingdom also knew that even if the Tribunal did pronounce the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State without the participation of the United States in the proceedings it would only apply and be binding between Larsen and the Hawaiian Kingdom. As stated under Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), decisions of the ICJ have “no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” And as stated by ICJ Judge Thomas Buergenthal before the membership of the American Society of International law in 2009:

“It is clear, of course, that the doctrine of stare decisis is not part of international law. For states not parties to a case, judgments of the ICJ and of some other international courts are formally not lawmaking in character in the sense in which decisions of Common Law courts are binding precedents within their respective jurisdictions.”

The existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State is a question of fact and not a question of law to be decided by an international court because independent States are co-equal to each other and cannot be subjected to an international court unless it consents to its jurisdiction to preside over the dispute. To allow an international court to determine whether a State exists undermines the sovereignty of the State in the first place. Furthermore, to give consent to an international court the party to the case has to be a State in the first place. The United States is trying to argue the significance of an egg without acknowledging the chicken that laid the egg by arguing the egg and the chicken are the same thing.

When the United Nations was considering an Advisory Opinion by the ICJ on the status of Palestine in 1948, Israeli Foreign Minister Eban argued that the “existence of a State is a question of fact and not of law.” Professor Oppenheim also stated, “The formation of a new State is…a matter of fact, and not law.” The Hawaiian Kingdom is not a new State but rather an existing State since the nineteenth century and the United States has not contested the facts that show this.

Because the United States Motion to Dismiss was filed after the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Civil Law that explains the actions taken by the PCA in acknowledging the existence of Hawaiian Statehood, the judge will have to make that determination first. When the Court has transformed itself into an Article II Occupation Court it can then take up the Motions to Dismiss filed by the United States and the Swedish Consul, and also the Statement of Interest by the United States because it would have jurisdiction to address the arguments. But then again, when the Court transforms into an Article II Occupation Court, the Motions to Dismiss and the Statement of Interest are moot and fall to the ground.

Right now it doesn’t have jurisdiction because it is not within the territory of the United States but rather sits within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom, being an occupied State. The United States at no time in these proceedings presented any counter evidence, such as a treaty, that the Hawaiian Islands have been ceded to the United States. They solely rely on Congressional law and not international law.

The United States has backed itself into a corner that it cannot get out of and appears to be relying on the Court to try to get it out of a predicament of its own making since 1893. Based on the evidence before this Court and the involvement of 30 other countries that have Consulates in the Hawaiian Kingdom in the case, and the authors of the Amicus Brief, which are the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the National Lawyers Guild, and the Water Protectors Legal Collective, all of whom are organizations of lawyers and jurists at both the international and national levels, the Court is bound to follow the rule of law and grant the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Judicial Notice. The United States has given no credible reason for the Court to not take judicial notice, which would lead to the transformation of the Court from an Article III Court to an Article II Occupation Court.

Hawaiian Kingdom files its Reply to the US Opposition of Judicial Notice of Civil Law and Exposes a Conspiracy at the Highest Level of the US Government

Posted on January 28, 2022 by Hawaiian Kingdom

On January 14, 2022, the United States filed their Opposition to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Civil Law regarding the action taken by the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration acknowledging the Hawaiian Kingdom as a non-Contracting State to the 1907 Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The United States simultaneously filed a Cross-Motion to Dismiss the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Amended Complaint, which it combined with their Opposition.

Today the Hawaiian Kingdom filed two pleadings in the federal lawsuit. The first filing was its Reply to the United States Opposition to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Judicial Notice of the Civil Law. The second filing was its Opposition to the United States Cross-Motion to Dismiss. The United States will need to file their Reply to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Opposition by February 11, 2022. In its opening of both the Reply and the Opposition, the Hawaiian Kingdom states:

Federal Government Defendants’ (“FGDs”) opposition and cross-motion to dismiss is based entirely on the jurisdiction of this Court as an Article III Court. FGDs contend that Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA is the legitimate sovereign over the Hawaiian Islands because “[t]he United States annexed Hawaii in 1898, and Hawaii entered the union as a state in 1959 [and that] [t]his Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the courts of the state of Hawaii have repeatedly ‘rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty’ distinct from its identity as a part of the United States.” FGDs’ claims lack merit on several grounds and are an attempt to obscure, mislead and misinform this Honorable Court’s duty to apply the rule of law. Furthermore, while Plaintiff views the actions taken by this Court as a matter of due diligence regarding Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice, which is not a dispositive motion, FGDs’ motion to dismiss, being a dispositive motion, can only be entertained after the Court possesses subject matter and personal jurisdiction as an Article II Court.

Both filings are substantially the same but because of the limited word count for the Reply, the Opposition’s word count allowed more information to be added, especially adding critical information of a conspiracy at the highest level of President McKinley’s administration to illegally seize the Hawaiian Islands for military purposes. Leading this conspiracy was the former President Theodore Roosevelt, who at the time was serving as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Under international law today, this conspiracy would be considered an internationally wrongful act in the unilateral seizure of the territory of a sovereign and independent State.

It is important for the reader to understand this part of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s history from a legal standpoint and why the United States claims of sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands lack any credible evidence under both international laws and United States laws. These legal proceedings have cleared the “smoke and mirrors” that the United States has relied on in claiming Hawai‘i is the 50th State of the Federal Union. It has forced the United States to admit its claim over the Hawaiian Islands is “only” by virtue of a joint resolution of annexation. Not by conquest and not by prescription, which is lapse of time. But by a joint resolution, which, as a congressional action, has no force and effect beyond the borders of the United States.

In order for the readers to understand the scope and magnitude of the legal consequences of the United States’ actions in its prolonged and illegal occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom, here follows the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Reply and Opposition in its entirety. The footnotes have been omitted but can be retrieved in the filings.

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II. UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM AS A STATE AND ITS GOVERNMENT PREDATES 1898

The legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State predates, not postdates, 1898. FGDs omit in their pleading that President John Tyler on July 6, 1844, explicitly recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State by letter from Secretary of State John C. Calhoun to the Hawaiian Commission. This was confirmed by the arbitral tribunal in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom:

[I]n the nineteenth century the Hawaiian Kingdom existed as an independent State recognized as such by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and various other States, including by exchanges of diplomatic or consular representatives and the conclusion of treaties.

The recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State was also the recognition of its government—a constitutional monarchy, as its agent. Successors in office to King Kamehameha III, who at the time of the United States recognition was King of the Hawaiian Kingdom, did not require diplomatic recognition. These successors included King Kamehameha IV in 1854, King Kamehameha V in 1863, King Lunalilo in 1873, King Kalākaua in 1874, and Queen Lili‘uokalani in 1891.

The legal doctrines of recognition of new governments only arise “with extra-legal changes in government” of an existing State. Successors to King Kamehameha III were not established through “extra-legal changes,” but rather under the constitution and laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom. According to Professor Peterson,

A government succeeding to power according to the constitution, basic law, or established domestic custom is assumed to succeed as well to its predecessor’s status as international agent of the state. Only if there is legal discontinuity at the domestic level because a new government comes to power in some other way, as by coup d’état or revolution, is its status as an international agent of the state open to question.

On January 17, 1893, by an act of war, the United States unlawfully overthrew the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom. President Grover Cleveland entered into an executive agreement with Queen Lili‘uokalani on December 18, 1893, in an attempt to restore the government but was politically prevented from doing so by members of Congress. The failure to restore the government, however, did not affect the legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State under international law.

In Texas v. White, the Supreme Court stated that a State “is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed.” The Supreme Court also stated that a “plain distinction is made between a State and the government of a State.” The Supreme Court’s position is consistent with international law where the “state must be distinguished from the government. The state, not the government, is the major player, the legal person, in international law.”

According to Judge Crawford, “[p]ending a final settlement of the conflict, belligerent occupation does not affect the continuity of the State. The governmental authorities may be driven into exile or silenced, and the exercise of the powers of the State thereby affected. But it is settled that the powers themselves continue to exist. This is strictly not an application of the ‘actual independence’ rule but an exception to it…pending a settlement of the conflict by a peace treaty or its equivalent.” There is no peace treaty or its equivalent between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States.

In 1996, remedial steps were taken to restore the Hawaiian government. An acting Council of Regency was established in accordance with the Hawaiian Constitution and the doctrine of necessity to serve in the absence of the Executive Monarch. The Council was established in similar fashion to the Belgian Council of Regency after King Leopold was captured by the Germans during the Second World War. As the Belgian Council of Regency was established under Article 82 of its 1821 Constitution, as amended, in exile, the Hawaiian Council was established under Article 33 of its 1864 Constitution, as amended, in situ. According to Professor Oppenheimer, the inability for the Belgian Council to convene the Legislature under Article 82 to provide a Regent due to Germany’s belligerent occupation it “did not create any serious constitutional problems. … While this emergency obtains, the powers of the King are vested in the Belgian Prime Minister and the other members of the cabinet.”

Like Belgium, Article 33 provides that the Cabinet Council “shall be a Council of Regency, until the Legislative Assembly, which shall be called immediately shall proceed to choose by ballot, a Regent or Council of Regency, who shall administer the Government in the name of the King, and exercise all the Powers which are constitutionally vested in the King.” Like the Belgian Council, the Hawaiian Council was bound to call into session the Legislative Assembly to provide for a regency but because of the prolonged belligerent occupation it was impossible for the Legislative Assembly to function. Until the Legislative Assembly can be called into session, Article 33 provides that the Cabinet Council, comprised of the Ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance and the Attorney General, “shall be a Council of Regency, until the Legislative Assembly” can be called into session. The operative words are “shall” and “until.”

The Hawaiian Council was established in accordance with the domestic laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom as they existed prior to the unlawful overthrow of the previous administration of Queen Lili‘uokalani, and, therefore, did not require diplomatic recognition like the previous administrations. Hence, the FGDs are estopped, as a matter of United States practice from 1846 to 1893 and international law, from denying the existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State and its government—the Council of Regency.

III. PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUITY OF THE HAWAIIAN STATE

Under international law, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations…despite a period in which there is…no effective, government,” and that belligerent “occupation does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.” “A presumption is a rule of law, statutory or judicial, by which finding of a basic fact gives rise to existence of presumed fact, until presumption is rebutted.” “If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts sustaining its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by a reference to a valid demonstration of legal rights, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.”

According to Craven, “[under international law,] as it existed at the critical date of 1898, it was generally held that a State might ceased to exist in one of three scenarios: a) By the destruction of its territory or by the extinction, dispersal or emigration of its population (a theoretical disposition). b) By the dissolution of the corpus of the State (cases include the dissolution of the German Empire in 1805-6; the partition of the Pays-Bas in 1831 or of the Canton of Bale in 1833). [And] c) By the State’s incorporation, union, or submission to another (cases include the incorporation of Cracow into Austria in 1846; the annexation of Nice and Savoy by France in 1860; the annexation of Hannover, Hesse, Nassau and Schleswig-Holstein and Frankfurt into Prussia in 1886). Of the three scenarios only the third would in principle apply to the Hawaiian situation, which occurs by an agreement that is evidenced by a valid treaty between the acquiring and the ceding State, whether in a state of peace or in a state of war. Since 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom has been in a state of war with the United States.

The 1898 joint resolution of annexation is not a treaty of State “incorporation” under international law but rather an internal law of the United States that stems from a failed treaty. To give the joint resolution proper context, the legislative history is important in understanding the backstory of the joint resolution. The driving force for annexation was military interest as advocated by U.S. Naval Captain Alfred Mahan.

Ignoring the protest, President McKinley submitted the treaty for Senate ratification, which required a minimum of 60 votes under United States law. The Senate, however, was not convening until December 6, 1897. This prompted two Hawaiian political organizations to mobilize signature petitions protesting annexation. According to Professor Silva, the “strategy was to challenge the U.S. government to behave in accordance with its stated principles of justice and of government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” The Hawaiian Political Association (Hui Kalai‘āina) gathered over 17,000 signatures, and the Hawaiian Patriotic League (Hui Aloha ‘Āina) gathered 21,269 signatures. The last official census, done in 1890, tallied Hawaiian subjects at 48,107, and, therefore, the petitions, in fact, represented the majority of the Hawaiian citizenry.

The leaders representing the Hawaiian Patriotic League and the Hawaiian Political Association, arrived in Washington, D.C., on December 6, 1897, the same day the Senate opened its session, and were told there were 58 votes for annexation. The next day, they met with Queen Lili‘uokalani and chose her as chair of the Washington Committee. In that meeting, “they decided to present only the petitions of Hui Aloha ‘Āina because the substance of the two sets of petitions were different. Hui Aloha ‘Āina’s petition protested annexation, but the Hui Kālai‘āina’s petitions called for the monarchy to be restored. They agreed that they did not want to appear divided or as if they had different goals.”

Senators Richard Pettigrew and George Hoar met with the Committee and said they would lead the opposition in the Senate. Senator Hoar stated he would introduce opposition into the Senate and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “On December 9, with the delegates present, Senator Hoar read the text of the petitions to the Senate and had them formally accepted.” In the days that followed, the Committee would meet with many Senators urging them not to ratify the treaty. Two of the leading Senators for annexation were Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and John Morgan, who were both strong believers in Captain Mahan’s views on Hawai‘i.

Unbeknownst to the Queen and the Hawaiian delegates, Senators began to inquire into the military importance of annexing the Hawaiian Islands. On this matter, Senator James Kyle made a request, by letter, to Mahan, on February 3, 1898, where he wrote, “[r]ecent discussions in the Senate brought prominently to the front the question of the strategic features of the Hawaiian Islands, and in this connection many quotations have been made from your valuable and highly interesting contribution to literature in regard to these islands.”

This was war rhetoric to justify the preemptive seizure of a neutral State for military interests. It was precisely what Germany did in 1914 to justify its invasion and occupation of Luxembourg. Germany invaded Luxembourg before formally declaring war against France. German military commander, Herr von Jagow then stated, “to our great regret, the military measures which have been taken have become indispensable by the fact that we have received sure information that the French military were marching against Luxemburg. We were forced to take measures for the protection of our army and the security of our railway lines.” Herr von Jagow then issued a proclamation stating “all the efforts of our Emperor and King to maintain peace have failed. The enemy has forced Germany to draw the sword. France has violated the neutrality of Luxemburg and has commenced hostilities on the soil of Luxemburg against German troops, as has been established without a doubt.” The French protested against this German invasion and confirmed there were no French troops in Luxembourg. Thus, according to Garner, “The alleged intentions of France were merely a pretext, and the violation of Luxemburg was committed by Germany solely in her military interest and in no sense on the ground of military necessity.”

It appears the Senators were not swayed by Mahan’s position because by the time the Hawaiian Committee left Washington, D.C., on February 27, 1897, they had successfully chiseled the 58 Senators in support of annexation down to 46. Unable to garner the necessary 60 votes, the treaty failed by March, yet war with Spain was looming over the horizon, and the Hawaiian Kingdom would have to face the belligerency of the United States again. American military interests would be the driving forces behind the occupation of the islands, and Mahan’s philosophy, the guiding principles. On April 25, 1898, Congress declared war on Spain.

On May 1, 1898, the U.S.S. Charleston, a protect cruiser, was commissioned. Then on May 5, it was ordered to lead a convoy of 2,500 troops to reinforce Dewey in the Philippines and Guam. In a move to deliberately violate Hawaiian neutrality, the convoy set a course to re-coal and arrived in Honolulu harbor on June 1. This convoy took on 1,943 tons of coal before it left on June 4. A second convoy of troops arrived in Honolulu harbor on June 23 and took on 1,667 tons of coal. On June 8, H. Renjes, the Spanish Vice-Counsel in Honolulu, lodged a formal protest. Renjes declared, “In my capacity as Vice Consul for Spain, I have the honor today to enter a formal protest with the Hawaiian Government against the constant violations of Neutrality in this harbor, while actual war exists between Spain and the United States of America.”

The U.S. gave formal notice to the other powers of the existence of war so that these powers could proclaim neutrality, yet the United States was also violating the neutrality of the Hawaiian Kingdom at that time. From Professor Bailey’s view, the position taken by the United States “was all the more reprehensible in that she was compelling a weak nation to violate the international law that had to a large degree been formulated by her own stand on the Alabama claims. Furthermore, in line with the precedent established by the Geneva award, Hawaii would be liable for every cent of damage caused by her dereliction as a neutral, and for the United States to force her into this position was cowardly and ungrateful.” Bailey also wrote, “At the end of the war, Spain or a cooperating power would doubtless occupy Hawaii, indefinitely if not permanently, to insure payment of damages with the consequent jeopardizing of the defenses of the Pacific Coast.”

On May 4, Representative Francis Newlands submitted a joint resolution for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. On May 17, the joint resolution was reported out of the Committee without amendment and headed to the floor of the House of Representatives. The joint resolution’s accompanying Report justified the congressional action to seize the Hawaiian Islands as a matter of military interest, which was advocated by Mahan.

The Congressional record clearly showed that when the joint resolution of annexation reached the floor of the House of Representatives, members of Congress knew the limitations of congressional laws. Representative Thomas H. Ball emphatically stated, “[t]he annexation of Hawaii by joint resolution is unconstitutional, unnecessary, and unwise. …Why, sir, the very presence of this measure here is the result of a deliberate attempt to do unlawfully that which can not be done lawfully.” When the resolution reached the Senate, Senator Augustus Bacon sarcastically remarked that the “friends of annexation, seeing that it was not possible to make this treaty in the manner pointed out by the Constitution, attempted then to nullify the provision in the Constitution by putting that treaty in the form of a statute, and here we have embodied the provisions of the treaty in the joint resolution which comes to us from the House.” Senator William Allen added, “[t]he Constitution and the statutes are territorial in their operation; that is, they can not have any binding force or operation beyond the territorial limits of the government in which they are promulgated.” He later reiterated, “I utterly repudiate the power of Congress to annex the Hawaiian Islands by a joint resolution.”

Despite these objections the Congress passed the joint resolution and President McKinley signed it into law on July 7, 1898. This notwithstanding, the Department of Justice in 1988 concluded in a legal opinion, it is “unclear which constitutional power Congress exercised when it acquired Hawaii by joint resolution. Accordingly, it is doubtful that the acquisition of Hawaii can serve as an appropriate precedent for a congressional assertion of sovereignty over an extended territorial sea.”

Since the United States failed to carry out its obligation to reinstate the Executive Monarch and her Cabinet, under the executive agreement concluded with the Cleveland administration, the McKinley administration took complete advantage of its puppet called the Republic of Hawai‘i, and deliberately violated Hawaiian neutrality during the war. This served as leverage to force the hand of Congress to pass the joint resolution purporting to annex a foreign State. This was revealed while the Senate was in secret session on May 31, 1898, where Senator Lodge argued that the “[a]dministration was compelled to violate the neutrality of those islands, that protests from foreign representatives had already been received, and complications with other powers were threatened, that the annexation or some action in regard to those islands had become a military necessity.”

The transcripts of the secret session would not be made public until January 1969, after a historian noted there were gaps in the Congressional records. The transcripts were made public after the Senate passed a resolution authorizing the U.S. National Archives to open the records. The Associated Press in Washington, D.C., reported that “the secrecy was clamped on during a debate over whether to seize the Hawaiian Islands—called the Sandwich Islands then—or merely developing leased areas of Pearl Harbor to reinforce the U.S. fleet in Manila Bay.”

In violation of international law and the treaties with the Hawaiian Kingdom, the United States maintained the insurgents’ control until the Congress could reorganize its puppet. By statute, the Congress changed the name of the Republic of Hawai‘i to the Territory of Hawai‘i on April 30, 1900. Later, on March 18, 1959, the Congress, again by statute, changed the name of the Territory of Hawai‘i to the State of Hawai‘i. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, however, “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory,” which renders these congressional acts ultra vires. Of significance is this Court’s Article III status that derives from Section 9(a) of the 1959 Statehood Act.

Under the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur, FGDs’ argument that “[t]he United States annexed Hawaii in 1898, and Hawaii entered the union as a state in 1959” fails to constitute “a valid demonstration of legal rights, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States.” Therefore, the United States has provided no “facts sustaining its rebuttal” of the continuity of the Hawaiian State. Furthermore, under international law, the 1898 joint resolution of annexation and the 1959 Statehood Act, are considered internationally wrongful acts, and the FGDs are estopped from asserting that it is the legitimate sovereign over the Hawaiian Islands.

IV. DEFENDANTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM INVOKING ITS INTERNAL LAW AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR NOT COMPLYING WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

When the United States assumed control of its installed puppet under the new title of Territory of Hawai‘i in 1900, and later the State of Hawai‘i in 1959, it surpassed “its limits under international law through extraterritorial prescriptions emanating from its national institutions: the legislature, government, and courts.” The purpose of this extraterritorial prescription was to conceal the belligerent occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom and bypass their duty to administer the laws of the occupied State in accordance with customary international law at the time, which was later codified under Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. According to Professor Benvinisti, “[t]he occupations of Hawaii, The Philippines, and Puerto Rico reflected the same unique US view on the unlimited authority of the occupant.” This extraterritorial application of American municipal laws is prohibited by the rules of jus in bello.

The occupant may not surpass its limits under international law through extra-territorial prescriptions emanating from its national institutions: the legislature, government, and courts. The reason for this rule is, of course, the functional symmetry, with respect to the occupied territory, among the various lawmaking authorities of the occupying state. Without this symmetry, Article 43 could become meaningless as a constraint upon the occupant, since the occupation administration would then choose to operate through extraterritorial prescription of its national institutions.

According to Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, FGDs are prohibited from “invok[ing] the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty,” which is Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, U.S. foreign relations law pronounced the rule that no State may invoke its internal law as justification for the nonobservance of a treaty by which it is bound. In Coplin v. United States, the Supreme Court referred to the U.S. government’s brief in Weinberger v. Rossi: “[a]though the Vienna Convention is not yet in force for the United States, it has been recognized as an authoritative source of international treaty law by the courts…and the executive branch.” The court was referring to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention. “The first sentence of article 27 gives expression to a well-established principle of international law that a State may not evade its international obligations by pleading its own law as an excuse for noncompliance.” While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures and the Local Rules of the Court are not internal law, they are administrative rules that do not have binding force but are instructional for the purposes of these proceedings until the Court transforms itself into an Article II Court and declare these rules to be binding.

V. DISTINGUISHING THE INSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION FROM THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE LARSEN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

FGDs erred when they stated that “[c]entral to Professor Lenzerini’s opinion is an arbitration between an individual, Lance Larsen, and the Plaintiff before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) at the Hague, which Plaintiff and Professor Lenzerini believe is a tacit acknowledgment of Plaintiff’s status as a sovereign entity. However, the final arbitral award from the PCA in this dispute, issued on February 5, 2001, explicitly stated that, ‘in the absence of the United States of America [as a party] the Tribunal can neither decide that Hawaii is not part of the USA, nor proceed on the assumption that it is not.’”

Plaintiff is puzzled by this statement, given Plaintiff’s previous pleadings clearly distinguishes between the institutional jurisdiction of the PCA and the subject matter jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. What are the undisputed facts is that a notice of arbitration was filed by Larsen’s counsel with the International Bureau of the PCA on November 8, 1999, and that six months later the International Bureau, by virtue of Article 47 of the 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (“1907 Convention”), established the arbitral tribunal on June 9, 2000. Professor Lenzerini, in his opinion attached to Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice, addressed the actions taken by the International Bureau of the PCA prior to the formation of the arbitral tribunal, which the civil law tradition explains from an evidentiary standpoint, and not the arguments of the arbitral tribunal, which did not have subject matter jurisdiction because of the indispensable third-party rule. Without the Hawaiian Kingdom being a juridical fact, the International Bureau could not have completed the juridical act of establishing the arbitral tribunal in the first place.

The institutional jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was also recently the central issue relating to the “Situation in the State of Palestine.” Like Article 47 of the 1907 Convention, Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute grants the ICC the authority to “exercise its jurisdiction” to investigate international crimes within the territory of a State Party to the Statute. Professor Malcolm Shaw authored an amicus curiae brief filed with the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I on March 16, 2020, that addressed the question of Palestinian Statehood. According to Shaw:

[W]hether or not Palestine is a state is actually critical to defining and determining the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in this matter. If Palestine is not a state, then it cannot have sovereignty over territory and cannot come within the terms of article 12 of the Statute. Thus, in the absence of clear and irrefutable evidence of Palestine’s existence as a state and taking into account the lack of an international consensus in this regard, both quantitative and qualitative, the Court cannot assert that there is such a state at this point in time.

Article 12 does not refer to the subject matter jurisdiction of an ICC trial court, but rather provides institutional jurisdiction for the Prosecutor of the ICC to investigate international crimes that may or may not go to trial. Similarly, Article 47 does not refer to the subject matter jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, but rather provides the institutional jurisdiction for the International Bureau to form the arbitral tribunal to resolve an international dispute.

VI. CONCLUSION

The FGDs have provided no legal basis for the Court to grant FGDs’ cross-motion to dismiss. While this Court has yet to transform itself from an Article III Court to an Article II Court, the Plaintiff perceives this Court to be in a state of due diligence regarding Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice. In the meantime, neither the Plaintiff nor the FGDs can get relief for their amended complaint and cross-motion to dismiss, respectively, until the Court possesses subject matter and personal jurisdiction as an Article II Court pursuant to Pennoyer v. Neff.

On September 30, 2021, Magistrate Judge Rom A. Trader issued an Order granting the Motion for Leave to File Amended Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Nongovernmental Organizations with Expertise in International Law and Human Rights Law [ECF 90]. Amici filed their Amended Amicus Curiae Brief on October 6, 2021 [ECF 96]. Before the Court can address FGDs’ motion to dismiss it must first transform itself into an Article II Court for the reasons stated in the filed Amicus Brief, which is “trustworthy evidence of what [international] law really is.”

Therefore, this Court is bound by treaty law to take affirmative steps to transform itself into an Article II Court by virtue of Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, just as the International Bureau of the PCA established the arbitral tribunal by virtue of Article 47 of the 1907 Convention because of the juridical fact of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State. This Court is bound to transform itself into an Article II Court because it is situated within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom and not within the territory of the United States. Furthermore, FGDs have provided no rebuttable evidence to the contrary other than invoking its internal laws as justification for not complying with its international obligations, which are barred by customary international law and treaty law.

Clerk Enters Default for State of Hawai‘i Officials in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden and U.S. Files Response to Judicial Notice of Civil Law

Posted on January 20, 2022 by Hawaiian Kingdom

Yesterday, the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i entered default for the State of Hawai‘i, Governor David Ige, Securities Commissioner Ty Nohara, and Director of the Department of Taxation Isaac Choy, in federal lawsuit Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden.

In talks with Hawaiian Kingdom Attorney General Dexter Ka‘iama, the State of Hawai‘i Attorney General’s office requested an extension of time to file a response to the Amended Complaint that was filed on August 11, 2021. It was mutually agreed that the filing of a response was due no later than January 10, 2022.

The entry of default against the State of Hawai‘i and its officials prevents them from participating in the proceedings, and, more importantly, an entry of default is an acceptance of the allegations made against them by the Hawaiian Kingdom to be true. The next step is for the Hawaiian Kingdom to file a motion with the Court for default judgment so that it can grant the relief as stated in the Amended Complaint.

Before the Hawaiian Kingdom can file a motion for default judgment, the Court needs to first transform itself into an Article II Occupation Court so that it has jurisdiction over the case.

The Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Civil Law on Juridical Fact of the Hawaiian State and the Consequential Juridical Act by the Permanent Court of Arbitration is critical for the Court to transform itself into an Article II Occupation Court, similar to Federal Article II Courts that were established in occupied Germany from 1945-1955.

The Hawaiian Kingdom did not file a Motion for Judicial Notice but rather a Request for Judicial Notice of the Civil Law. It was the Court that transformed the Request into a Motion and gave a timeline for the United States to respond and the Hawaiian Kingdom to reply to that response. A Request for Judicial Notice is considered by the Court alone. The United States filed their response on January 14, 2022, and the Hawaiian Kingdom is preparing to file their reply on January 28.

Instead of refuting the information provided in the Motion for Judicial Notice, the United States argues that it is the legitimate sovereign over the Hawaiian Islands because the “United States annexed Hawaii in 1898, and Hawaii entered the union as a state in 1959.” From this position it then argues that this “Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the courts of the state of Hawaii have repeatedly ‘rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty’ distinct from its identity as a part of the United States.”

The Hawaiian Kingdom views the actions taken by the Court regarding the Motion for Judicial Notice as a matter of due diligence on the part of the Court, and, therefore, will be responding to the United States arguments and show why it is without merit.

The legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State predates, not postdates, 1898. The United States fails to address in its filing that President John Tyler on July 6, 1844, explicitly recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State by letter from Secretary of State John C. Calhoun to the Hawaiian Commission. This was confirmed by the arbitral tribunal in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom:

“In the nineteenth century the Hawaiian Kingdom existed as an independent State recognized as such by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and various other States, including by exchanges of diplomatic or consular representatives and the conclusion of treaties.”

On January 17, 1893, by an act of war, the United States unlawfully overthrew the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom. President Grover Cleveland entered into an executive agreement with Queen Lili‘uokalani on December 18, 1893, in attempt to restore the government but was politically prevented from doing so by members of Congress. The failure to restore the government, however, did not affect the legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a sovereign and independent State under international law.

In Texas v. White, the Supreme Court stated that a “‘state,’ in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed.” The Supreme Court further stated that a “plain distinction is made [in the U.S. Constitution] between a State and the government of a State.”

Therefore, when the rebels seized control of the Texas government and joined the Confederacy in the Civil War it did not affect or change the State of Texas under the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court’s position is consistent with international law where the “state must be distinguished from the government. The state, not the government, is the major player, the legal person, in international law.”

According to Judge Crawford, “Pending a final settlement of the conflict, belligerent occupation does not affect the continuity of the State. The governmental authorities may be driven into exile or silenced, and the exercise of the powers of the State thereby affected. But it is settled that the powers themselves continue to exist. This is strictly not an application of the ‘actual independence’ rule but an exception to it…pending a settlement of the conflict by a peace treaty or its equivalent.” There is no peace treaty or its equivalent between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States.

In its reply, the Hawaiian Kingdom will expound on the legal presumption of continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law, why the United States cannot invoke its internal law as a justification for not complying with international obligations, and distinguishing the institutional jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Arbitration from the subject matter jurisdiction of the Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom arbitration tribunal, when it acknowledged the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a juridical fact.

UPDATE: Federal Government Given Extension to File Opposition to Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Civil Law

Posted on January 9, 2022 by Hawaiian Kingdom

On December 16, 2021, United States Magistrate Judge Rom Trader issued an order allowing the United States to file their Response Memorandum to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Civil Law regarding the action taken by the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration acknowledging the Hawaiian Kingdom as a non-Contracting State to the 1907 Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes from December 16, 2021 to January 14, 2022. The Hawaiian Kingdom will need to file their Reply in support of their Motion for Judicial Notice by January 28, 2022.

The United States will also be filing a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the same day their Response is due. The Hawaiian Kingdom is scheduled to file their Opposition to the Motion Dismiss on the same day they will be filing their Reply in support of their Motion for Judicial Notice. The United States will then file their Reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss by February 11, 2022.

Judge Trader’s order confirmed a Stipulation Agreement entered into between Dexter Ka‘iama, Attorney General for the Hawaiian Kingdom, and Michael J. Gerardi, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. The Stipulation Agreement stated:

In light of the Court’s decision to convert Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice into a motion, the impending deadlines for responding to the complaint and the Rule 16 conference, and the forthcoming federal holidays of Christmas and New Year’s Day, good cause exists to modify the current deadlines. Resolution of the Plaintiff’s pending motion and of Defendants’ motion to dismiss may obviate the need for a Rule 16 conference. Defendants further state that they need additional time to consult with representatives of multiple government agencies, as well as supervisory officials within the Department of Justice, to prepare the necessary filing. Moreover, many federal officials are likely to be unavailable during the holiday season due to preplanned leave.

Gerardi disclosed to Attorney General Ka‘iama that the basis for their Motion to Dismiss would argue that federal courts have already determined that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist and, therefore, it presents a political question that would require presiding Judge Leslie Kobayashi to dismiss the case. The political question doctrine applies only to Article III Courts, which are federal courts within the territory of the United States. It does not apply to federal courts established outside of the United States, which are called Article II Courts.

The doctrine prevents the federal courts from determining the question of sovereignty over territory because that determination is committed to the political branches of the federal government. If there is a question of sovereignty over Native American tribal lands the political branch to determine that question in the affirmative would be the legislative branch—the Congress by virtue of federal recognition. If the question of sovereignty concerns a country outside of the United States it would be the executive branch, headed by the President, recognizing a territory as an “independent and sovereign State.”

It would appear that Gerardi is not aware that President Tyler on July 6, 1844 explicitly recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State by letter from Secretary of State John C. Calhoun to the Hawaiian Commission comprised of Timoteo Ha‘alilio and William Richards. While in the Washington, D.C., the Hawaiian Commission sent a letter dated December 14, 1842, to Secretary of State Daniel Webster requesting that the United States recognize the Hawaiian Kingdom as a “sovereign and independent State.”

On December 19th, Secretary of State Webster responded by stating that President Tyler is “willing to declare, as the sense of the Government of the United States, that the Government of the Sandwich Islands [Hawaiian Islands] ought to be respected; that no power ought either to take possession of the islands as a conquest, or for the purpose of colonization, and that not power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing Government, or any exclusive privileges or preferences in matters of commerce.” He further stated, “the President does not see any present necessity for the negotiation of a formal treaty, or the appointment or reception of diplomatic characters.” The use of the term “ought” is not conclusive as “shall.”

His his message to the House of Representatives on December 31, 1842, President Tyler stated that the United States “is content with its independent existence,” but did not explicitly recognize the Hawaiian Kingdom as a “sovereign and independent State” as required by customary international law. President Tyler did not declare the United States’ recognition of Hawaiian independence, which prompted to the Hawaiian Commission to travel to Europe to seek explicit recognition from Great Britain and France.

On November 28, 1843, the Hawaiian Commission was able to secure formal recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a “sovereign and independent State” from Great Britain and France by a formal joint proclamation. While in Washington, D.C., after returning from Europe, the Hawaiian Commission sent another letter to Secretary of State Calhoun, who succeeded Webster, on July 1, 1844, inquiring whether the United States considered its “various acts in relation to the Sandwich Islands as a full and perfect recognition of independence.”

Secretary of State Calhoun responded to the Hawaiian Commission on July 6, 1844. He wrote that the appointment of a United States Commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands was “regarded by the President as a full recognition on the part of the United States, of the Independence of the Hawaiian Government.” A Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States was signed in Washington, D.C., on December 20, 1849.

There is no political question for the United States to raise in its Motion to Dismiss because the United States, by its President, formally recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as a sovereign and independent State. On December 18, 1893, President Grover Cleveland acknowledged the United States’ overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom was an act of war and unlawful. The overthrow of the Government of an independent State does not equate to the overthrow of the State itself and its existence. The State would still exist and the situation would be called “belligerent occupation.”

This is precisely what occurred when the Allied Powers occupied Germany from 1945-1955 after the Nazi government of Germany was militarily overthrown. According Professor Ian Brownlie:

Thus after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War the four major Allied powers assumed supreme power in Germany. The legal competence of the German state [its independence and sovereignty] did not, however, disappear. What occurred is akin to legal representation or agency of necessity. The German state continued to exist, and, indeed, the legal basis of the occupation depended on its continued existence.

UPDATE: Federal Court Issues Minute Order regarding Hawaiian Kingdom’s Request for Judicial Notice of Civil Law

Posted on December 8, 2021 by Hawaiian Kingdom

After reviewing the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Request for Judicial Notice regarding Civil Law on the “Juridical Fact” of the Hawaiian State and the Consequential “Juridical Act” by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, District Court Judge Leslie Kobayashi issued a Minute Order today setting dates for additional filings. Judge Kobayashi will be considering the Request for Judicial Notice as a Non Hearing Motion.

The Order stated that Defendants have until December 21, 2021 to file a Response Memorandum to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Request for Judicial Notice of Civil Law. The Plaintiff, if it chooses, will need to file a Reply Memorandum by January 4, 2022. After the parties file their submissions, the “Court to issue Order.”

Hawaiian Kingdom Files Request for Federal Court to take Judicial Notice of Civil Law

Posted on December 7, 2021 by Hawaiian Kingdom

At the center of the federal lawsuit is the court’s jurisdiction, which is its authority to preside over the case. Without proper jurisdiction or authority, the Court cannot make any decision regarding the Hawaiian Kingdom’s allegations in its Amended Complaint, or even any substantive issues raised by the defendants through motions or statements of interest. In its Amended Complaint, the Hawaiian Kingdom explained:

3. While this court is operating within the territory of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM and not within the territory of Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, its jurisdiction is found as a de facto Article II Court. According to Professor Bederman:
What, then, is distinctive about a court established under Article II of the Constitution? First, executive tribunals are established without an act of Congress or any other form of legislative concurrence. Congressional intent concerning the status of a presidential court is irrelevant because no congressional approval is needed. The fact that the President alone can create an executive court places it outside the scope of Article III of the Constitution, which demands that Congress shall establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Second, the executive courts are created pursuant only to the power and authority granted to the President in Article II of the Constitution. In practice, the only presidential power that would call for the creation of a court is that arising from his responsibility as Commander in Chief of the armed services and his subsequent war-making authority.
4. The authority for this Court to assume jurisdiction as a de facto Article II Court is fully elucidated in the Amicus Curiae brief previously lodged in these proceedings by virtue of the Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief on July 30, 2021 [ECF 45] by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), the National Lawyers Guild (NLG), and the Water Protector Legal Collective (WPLC). The Amicus brief is instructional for the Court to transition to a de facto Article II Court.
5. An Article II Court was established in Germany after hostilities ceased in 1945 during the Second World War. After the surrender, western Germany came under belligerent occupation by the United States, France and Great Britain. The military occupation officially came to an end on May 5, 1955, with the entry into force of peace treaties called the Bonn Conventions between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Occupying States. During the occupation, these Article II Courts had jurisdiction “over all persons in the occupied territory,” except for Allied armed forces, their dependents, and civilian officials, for “[a]ll offenses against the laws and usages of war[,] […] [a]ll offenses under any proclamation, law, ordinance, notice or order issued by or under the authority of the Military Government or of the Allied Forces, [and] [a]ll offenses under the laws of the occupied territory or any part thereof.”
6. Like the Article II Court in Germany, this Court has Jurisdiction as a de facto Article II Court because this action arises under international humanitarian law—law of armed conflict, which include the 1907 Hague Convention, IV (1907 Hague Regulations), the 1907 Hague Convention, V, the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV (1949 Fourth Geneva Convention), and Hawaiian Kingdom law. Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.
7. The Court is authorized to award the requested declaratory and injunctive relief as a de facto Article II Court because it is situated within the territory of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM that has been under a prolonged belligerent occupation by the United States of America since January 17, 1893.

On August 17, 2021, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) and the Water Protector Legal Collective (WPLC) filed a motion for permission to file an amicus curiae brief with the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawai‘i in support of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s complaint against U.S. President Biden and others for violations of international law, the commission of war crimes, and human rights violations in its prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The motion was filed after the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Amended Complaint on August 11, 2021.

An amicus curiae is “one (such as a professional person or organization) that is not a party to a particular litigation but that is permitted by the court to advise it in respect to some matter of law that directly affects the case in question.” The amicus brief was attached to the motion for the court to consider. In its request for permission, the IADL-NLG-WPLC stated:

1. The nongovernmental organizations whose views are represented in this brief have expertise in public international law, international human rights, humanitarian law, and norms regarding statehood, sovereignty, and self-determination.
2. Movants submit this brief to ensure a proper understanding and application of the international law and historical precedent relevant to this case regarding Article II occupation courts. The amici are additionally human rights organizations that have an interest in ensuring an informed interpretation of international human rights law in domestic jurisprudence.

On September 30, 2021, Federal Magistrate Rom Trader issued an Order granting permission for the IADL-NLG-WPLC to file their amicus brief that supports the Hawaiian Kingdom’s claim that the Court must transform itself into an Article II Court. By granting permission, the Court will not only utilize the amicus brief to assist in its decision regarding its transformation into an Article II Court, but it also acknowledges the merit of the IADL-NLG-WPLC’s argument. If it were a frivolous argument, the Court would not have granted permission to file the brief because granting permission is at the discretion of the Court. The Court was able to issue this Order without having resolved its jurisdiction, because the brief addresses jurisdiction for the Court to consider when it transforms itself into an Article II Occupation Court.

The IADL-NLG-WPLC filed their amicus brief on October 6, 2021 and opened with:

The purpose of this brief is to bring to the Court’s attention customary international law norms and judicial precedent regarding Article II occupation courts that bear on the long-standing belligerent occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States at issue in this case.
In assessing the legality of the US occupation of Hawai‘i, the Court should be cognizant of customary international law and international human rights treaties that are incorporated into domestic law by virtue of Article VI, section 2 of the Constitution (the “Supremacy Clause”). International law, which includes treaties ratified by the United States as well as customary international law, is part of U.S. law and must be faithfully executed by the President and enforced by U.S. courts except when clearly inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution or subsequent acts of Congress.
The question here is not whether the Hawaiian Kingdom has standing in an Article III court. The question is whether this court can sit as an Article II occupation court and whether the claims of the Hawaiian Kingdom can be redressed. The answer to both questions is yes.

It is evident that the Court has accepted the arguments that it is not properly constituted because it is located in the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom and not within the territory of the United States. Adding to the serious consequences of this case was the closure of three consulates of the Czech Republic, Finland, and India. This prompted the United States Department of Justice to file a Statement of Interest on November 5, 2021, that was asking the Court to dismiss the thirty consulates from the lawsuit because the United States claimed they had immunity.

Of the summons that were served, 12 foreign consulates failed to respond within 21 days and entries of default were entered by the Clerk of the Court. These foreign consulates include Austria, Belgium, Chile, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, South Korea, Spain, and Thailand. Default is where a defendant has failed to defend against a claim that has been brought by the filing of a complaint. By default, these foreign consulates accept the allegation of the Hawaiian Kingdom that it is true they are unlawful. The next stage is to get a judgment of default by the judge so that they can be ordered to close. The Hawaiian Kingdom, however, is prevented from filing a motion for judgment of default because the Court is not an Article II Court that operates in territory belligerently occupied by the United States.

The Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Response to the United States Statement of Interest on November 7, 2021, stating the consulates cannot claim to be immune from the lawsuit because they were never lawful under international law to begin with because the Hawaiian Kingdom did not give its permission to have the consulates established within its territory. Rather, these consulates, as stated by the United States in its Statement of Interest, were established by the United States Department of State. In its Response, the Hawaiian Kingdom also maintained that the “Court is compelled by international and U.S. constitutional law to first transform itself from an Article III Court to a de facto Article II Court before it may lawfully assert subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to address any of the issues raised.”

On November 29, 2021, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Supplemental Response to the United States’ Statement of Interest that explained the significance of the action taken by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) through the civil law tradition of understanding of the “juridical fact” of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence under the rules of customary international law, and the consequential “juridical act” by the International Bureau of the PCA that acknowledged the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence, which authorized the PCA to form an arbitral tribunal on June 9, 2000 to resolve the dispute in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom.

Here is a link to an explanation by the University of California, Berkeley Law School of the civil law tradition and the common law and why they are distinct. The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom are common law systems where juries determine “facts” and the judges determine “laws.” In a civil law system, there are no juries and the judge determines both laws and facts, which is why there are certain facts, called “juridical facts,” that create legal consequences, as opposed to other facts that don’t create legal consequences.

The Supplemental Response also explained the consequences of the United States and the thirty countries that have their consulates named in the lawsuit of serving on the PCA’s Administrative Council and acknowledged the Hawaiian Kingdom as a non-Contracting State to the 1907 Hague Convention under customary international law, opinio juris.

Yesterday, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Request for Judicial Notice regarding Civil Law on the “Juridical Fact” of the Hawaiian State and the Consequential “Juridical Act” by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Attached to the Request is a legal opinion by Professor Federico Lenzerini from the University of Siena, Italy, which is a civil law country. In its Request, the Hawaiian Kingdom stated:

Plaintiff HAWAIIAN KINGDOM hereby requests that, pursuant to FRCP Rule 44.1, the Court take judicial notice of the civil law regarding the juridical act of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) recognizing the juridical fact of the Statehood of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the Council of Regency as its government.
Attached to the accompanying declaration as Exhibit “1” is an expert opinion of Professor Federico Lenzerini, a professor of international law at the University of Siena, Italy. Italy’s legal system is civil law and Professor Lenzerini is very familiar with the civil law tradition providing the ontological legal basis of the juridical fact of the Statehood of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the Council of Regency as its government, and of the juridical act taken by the PCA within the “reasonings and analogies of the…civil law.” Furthermore, the PCA is situated in the Netherlands, which is a civil law country like Italy.
Plaintiff contends, in support of its amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, that the Court’s transformation to an Article II Court has a direct nexus to the PCA’s juridical act of acknowledging the Hawaiian Kingdom, a juridical fact, as a non-Contracting State to the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Accordingly, in support of said allegations and such evidence, Plaintiff requests that the Court takes judicial notice of the relevant provisions of the civil law regarding juridical facts and juridical acts.
FRCP Rule 44.1 provides as follows:
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country shall give notice by pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.

The recent filing brings in an expert’s legal opinion on the role that civil law had when the International Bureau of the PCA acknowledged the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as a State to be a “juridical fact.” Civil law refers to the action taken by the International Bureau as a “juridical act.” The International Bureau is headed by a Secretary General who is Dutch by nationality, and that the Netherlands, like Italy, is a civil law system. In other words, the Secretary General would have been familiar with a “juridical fact” and the consequential “juridical act” in accepting the international dispute of Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom under the jurisdiction of the PCA. In his legal opinion, attached to the Hawaiian Kingdom Request for the Court to take judicial notice, Professor Lenzerini explains:

According to a civil law perspective, the juridical act of the International Bureau of the PCA instituting the arbitration in the case of Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom may be compared – mutatis mutandis – to a juridical act of a domestic judge recognizing a juridical fact (e.g. filiation) which is productive of certain legal effects arising from it according to law. Said legal effects may include, depending on applicable law, the power to stand before a court with the purpose of invoking certain rights. In the context of the Larsen arbitration, the juridical fact recognized by the PCA in favour of the Hawaiian Kingdom was its quality of State under international law. Among the legal effects produced by such a juridical fact, the entitlement of the Hawaiian Kingdom to be part of an international arbitration under the auspices of the PCA was included, since the existence of said juridical fact actually represented an indispensable condition for the Hawaiian Kingdom to be admitted in the Larsen arbitration, vis-à-vis a private entity (Lance Paul Larsen). Consequently, the International Bureau of the PCA carried out the juridical act consisting in establishing the arbitral tribunal as an effect of the recognition of the juridical fact in point. Likewise, e.g., the recognition of the juridical fact of filiation by a domestic judge, also the recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State had in principle retroactive effects, in the sense that the Hawaiian Kingdom did not acquire the condition of State per effect of the PCA’s juridical act. Rather, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Statehood was a juridical fact that the PCA recognized as pre-existing to its juridical act.

It is expected that the Court will take judicial notice of the civil law as explained by Professor Lenzerini. By doing so, the Court would appear to be moving closer to transforming itself into an Article II Court in accordance with the international law of occupation.

Hawaiian Kingdom Files Supplemental Response to U.S. Statement of Interest in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden

Posted on December 1, 2021 by Hawaiian Kingdom

The day after celebrating Hawaiian Independence Day (Lā Kūʻokoʻa), the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Supplemental Response to the United States Statement of Interest that the Department of Justice filed on November 5, 2021.

In its Supplemental Response, the Hawaiian Kingdom opened with:

The Plaintiff would like to expand on what it stated in its conclusion that the “jurisdiction of the Court as an Article II Court is consequential to the existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State,” by drawing the Court’s attention to the consequences of the United States and those States whose Consulates are Defendants in this case that did not object to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”), by its International Bureau, of its juridical act of acknowledging the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a non-Contracting State, is a reflection of customary international law and the practice of States—opinio juris, thereby precluding the United States and Defendant foreign Consulates from denying otherwise.
The Plaintiff hereafter explains the significance of the PCAʻs juridical act by tying it directly to the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a juridical fact through the application of the civil law, as opposed to the common law, in international proceedings.

Throughout the world there are different legal systems. The predominant legal system is called citizens law or civil law, which draws from Roman law and spread throughout continental Europe. It developed over time on the basis of general principles that derived from a book titled Corpus Iuris Civilis (Body of Civil Law) and a set of universities. Great Britain, however, operates under a common law system derived from centuries of judge made law. The underlying difference is civil law is made by citizens and common law is made by judges. There are nearly 150 countries that have a civil law legal system.

The Hawaiian Kingdom also stated in its Supplemental Response the impact that the civil law had and continues to have in international law and international institutions such as the PCA.

According to Professor Picker, “[t]here is a wide degree of support for the proposition that civil law has served as the most significant influence on international law.” He goes on to state that “some would even argue that international law is essentially a civil law system.” And Professor Nagle explains, “[i]t is the civil-law traditions that have most widely influenced international law [and] international organizations.” Furthermore, as stated by Professors Merryman and Clark, “[t]he civil law was the legal tradition familiar to the Western European scholar-politicians who were the fathers of international law. The basic charters and the continuing legal development and operation of the European Communities are the work of people trained in the civil law tradition.”
Of the 44 Contracting States to the 1907 Convention that established the PCA at the Hague Conference in 1907, the United States and Great Britain, as common law States, were the only States that were not from a civil law tradition. The other 42 States were represented by men who were “trained in the civil law tradition.” This includes the Netherlands where the PCA is situated in its city The Hague. The current number of Contracting States to the 1907 Convention is 122, the majority of which are based on the civil law tradition.
Therefore, it stands to reason that the action taken by the PCA in acknowledging the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State for purposes of its institutional jurisdiction should be viewed through the reasonings of the civil law tradition as opposed to the common law.

The two legal systems deal with evidence differently mainly because there are no juries in the civil law system. Jury trials originated in England. In the common law system, the judge determines the law and its effect, but the jury determines the facts. In the civil law system, because there is no jury, certain facts can create a juridical or legal effect. Juridical is another word for legal.

In the civil law system, the opposing parties argue points of law and the judge controls the gathering of evidence or facts. While in the common law system, the parties to the conflict gathers evidence to support their side of the argument. The judge does not get involved with evidence except to ensure the introduction of evidence is according to certain rules. In its Supplemental Response, the Hawaiian Kingdom explains how facts work in a civil law system:

In the civil law tradition, a fact is juridical or legal when it produces a legal effect, by virtue of a legal rule. In Schexnider v. McDermott Int’l Inc., the federal court in Louisiana stated juridical facts are defined as “events having prescribed legal effects.” According to the German tradition of the civil law, a juridical act, which is triggered by a juridical fact, “sets the law in motion and produces legal consequences.” Under American jurisprudence, the equivalent of a juridical act in the civil law tradition is judicial notice of a fact or facts.
The Hawaiian Kingdom, as an independent and sovereign State in continuity, is a juridical fact according to the civilian law. Both rights and powers held by a subject of international law may arise from a juridical fact, which is precisely what occurred when arbitral proceedings were initiated in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom at the PCA, being a subject of international law. An arbitration agreement was entered into between Larsen and the Hawaiian Kingdom on October 30, 1999, and a notice of arbitration was filed by the claimant on November 8, 1999, with the PCA’s International Bureau. Access to the institutional jurisdiction of the PCA would only be triggered by the juridical fact of the Hawaiian Kingdom being a non-Contracting “State,” and not by Larsen as a “private party.” This juridical fact set in motion and produced legal consequences, which was the convening of the ad hoc arbitral tribunal on June 9, 2000.

Prior to the formation of the tribunal under the auspices of the PCA, as an intergovernmental organization and subject of international law, it required that the international dispute conform to the provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1907 Convention) as a matter of international law. Access to the auspices of the PCA are for Contracting and non-Contracting States, and the Hawaiian Kingdom is a non-Contracting State to the 1907 Convention. Private parties do not have access to the PCA unless sponsored by their State. In this case, the Plaintiff did not sponsor Larsen in its suit, but rather waived its sovereign immunity by consenting to submit their dispute to the PCA for resolution of the dispute by virtue of Article 47, which is a legal rule that provides for non-Contracting States to have access to the jurisdiction of the PCA.
The juridical fact of the Hawaiian State and its continuity produced a legal effect for the International Bureau of the PCA to do a juridical act of accepting the dispute under the auspices of the PCA by virtue of Article 47, being a legal rule. The international dispute between Larsen and the Hawaiian Kingdom was not created by the juridical fact, but rather the juridical fact determined the legal conditions for the PCA’s acceptance of the dispute, which is the juridical act by which the dispute is established in order to have access to the jurisdiction of the PCA.
The significance of the juridical act taken by the International Bureau acknowledging the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence, is that the United States, as a member of the PCA Administrative Council, was fully aware of the Larsen case and did not object to the juridical act by the International Bureau. In fact, the United States entered into an agreement with the Council of Regency to access all records and pleadings of the case.
State continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom is determined by the rules of customary international law. And while State members of the Administrative Council furnishes to all Contracting States “with an annual Report” in accordance with Article 49, it does represent “State practice [that] covers an act or statement by…State[s] from which views can be inferred about international law,” and it “can also include omissions and silence on the part of States.” The fact that the United States, to include all member States of the Administrative Council and those States whose consulates are Defendants in this case, did not object to the International Bureau’s juridical act of acknowledging the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a non-Contracting State, is a reflection of the practice of States—opinio juris. Furthermore, the Administrative Council is a treaty-based component of an intergovernmental organization comprised of representatives of States, and “their practice is best regarded as the practice of States.”

In other words, the member States of the Administrative Council, by their failure to protest the International Bureauʻs juridical act of acknowledging the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State, is considered the practice of States, which is a part of customary international law. By their silence they admit that according to the rules of customary international law, the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist. It also acknowledges that the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom is a juridical fact, and not just a fact.

In the civil law system not every fact produces legal consequences. A chair in the kitchen is a fact, but it doesn’t produce legal consequences. But the existence of a State, which is a subject of international law, is a juridical fact because it does produce legal consequences. The PCA’s juridical act is an acknowledgment that the existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State is a juridical fact in the civil law system. The nearly 150 countries in the world that have a civil law legal system would have to accept that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a juridical fact by virtue of the juridical act done by the PCA. Juridical facts create juridical acts. A juridical act does not operate on its own. It has to stem from a juridical fact.

In common law States, like the United States, facts can produce legal consequences but the facts need to be recognized by a judge, which is called judicial notice. According to the Legal Information Institute, when “a court takes judicial notice of an indisputable fact in a civil case, the fact is considered conclusive.” When one of the parties in a federal lawsuit does not recognize the status of a country as an independent State, the court could, on its own, reach out to the U.S. State Department to see whether that country in question is a State, and take judicial notice of the determination by the State Department that it is a State for purposes of international law. Rule 201(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the “court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it…can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.”

In Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden, the Magistrate Judge or the District Court Judge can, by judicial notice, recognize the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom by virtue of the actions taken by the PCA because the PCA is a source “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” This would then allow the federal court to transform itself into an Article II Court. In its conclusion, the Hawaiian Kingdom stated:

This Court is in the same situation as the PCA regarding jurisdiction as an institution. Where the PCA’s juridical act stems from the juridical fact of the Hawaiian State’s continued existence whereby the PCA established the arbitral tribunal pursuant to Article 47 of the 1907 Convention regarding jurisdiction, this Court, as a matter of jurisdiction, is capable of an Order taking judicial notice of the fact of the Hawaiian State’s continued existence that would grant this Court subject matter and personal jurisdiction pursuant to Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, where “[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”

U.S. Department of Justice Files Statement of Interest Claiming Foreign Consulates in Hawai‘i Have Immunity in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden

Posted on November 8, 2021 by Hawaiian Kingdom

The Hawaiian Kingdom filed an Amended Complaint on August 11, 2021. According to federal court proceedings, when a complaint is filed, a court must take the alleged facts as true. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint must be accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the complainant, which in this case is the Hawaiian Kingdom.

In its amended complaint, the Hawaiian Kingdom alleged that the foreign consulates named as defendants in the case are unlawful because they did not get permission to establish themselves as consuls from the Hawaiian Kingdom government. Instead, the consulates were given permission by the United States government. The United States can only give permission for consulates to be established within its own territory and not the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom despite being belligerently occupied by the United States since 1893. The Hawaiian Kingdom is seeking the Court to declare that these foreign consuls are unlawful under both international law and Hawaiian Kingdom law.

While no media outlet is covering this case, it is gaining the attention of foreign countries that have consulates in Hawai‘i and the U.S. State Department. Since the lawsuit was initiated by the Hawaiian Kingdom on May 20, 2021, three countries closed their consulates in Hawai‘i—the Czech Republic, Finland and India.

Sweden was the only foreign consulate to respond by filing a Motion to Dismiss on September 21, 2021. Anders Nervell, who is also a law partner at Clay Chapman Iwamura Pulice & Nervell, is named as a defendant in his official capacity as Honorary Consul for Sweden. Nervell does not seek to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, but only over himself because he is claiming personal immunity from the jurisdiction of the federal court.

In his filing, Nervell claims that he is immune from jurisdiction of the federal court under article 71(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Vienna Convention is a treaty that has been signed and ratified by 181 States, to include the United States.

The federal court ordered the Hawaiian Kingdom to file a response no later than October 20, 2021, and that if Nervell would like to file a reply to the Hawaiian Kingdom response, it must be no later than November 3, 2021.

On September 30, 2021, Federal Magistrate Rom Trader issued an Order granting permission for the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the National Lawyers Guild and the Water Protectors Legal Collective (IADL-NLG-WPLC) to file their amicus brief that supports the Hawaiian Kingdom’s claim that the Court must transform itself into an Article II Court.

By granting permission, the Court will not only utilize the amicus brief to assist in its decision regarding its transformation into an Article II Court, but it also acknowledges the merit of the IADL-NLG-WPLC’s argument. If it were a frivolous argument, the Court would not have granted permission to file the brief because granting permission is at the discretion of the Court. The IADL-NLG-WPLC filed their amicus brief on October 6, 2021.

The Court’s Order and the filing of the amicus brief was timely for the Hawaiian Kingdom’s response to Nervell.

On October 19, 2021, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Response. While citing article XII of the 1852 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway that requires any Swedish consul must be approved and admitted by the Hawaiian Kingdom and not by the United States, the Hawaiian Kingdom maintained that the “Court is compelled by international and U.S. constitutional law to first transform itself from an Article III Court to a de facto Article II Court before it may lawfully assert subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to address any of the issues raised” by Nervell. The Hawaiian Kingdom also maintained that Nervell was never a lawful Honorary Consul for Sweden approved by the Hawaiian Kingdom, and therefore could not claim to be protected by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Vienna Convention only applies to lawfully established consuls.

In its Response, the Hawaiian Kingdom drew attention to the jurisdiction of the court, which it stated in federal court proceedings, a judgment is void “if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject-matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.” In other words, before the Court can make any judgment in this lawsuit, which would include Nervell’s motion to dismiss, it needs to have lawful jurisdiction first. If it doesn’t, which is the position taken by the Hawaiian Kingdom and the IADL-NLG-WPLC in its amicus brief, all judgments made are void and of no effect. The filing of the amicus brief supported the Hawaiian Kingdom’s response.

The Hawaiian Kingdom, in its response, cited the U.S. Supreme Court, in Pennoyer v. Neff, which stated:

No State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory. The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists as an elementary principle that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory except so far as is allowed by comity, and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.

On November 3, 2021, Nervell filed his Reply where he stated that the Hawaiian Kingdom merely gave, in its response, “tendentious ramblings regarding international law,” and it “can play no role here.” The irony of this statement is that the so-called “ramblings regarding international law” were along the same lines as the amicus brief regarding Article II Courts, which the Magistrate Judge accepted as having merit. In other words, international law regarding Article II Courts is playing a “role here.”

Two days later, on November 5, the United States Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest attempting to influence the Court to dismiss all of the 30 defendant Consuls General and Honorary Consuls, and to set aside entry of default of the 12 Consuls General and Honorary Consuls. The United States filed its Statement of Interest “to set forth its views with respect to the immunity of the consular officers named as defendants in this lawsuit.”

Like Nervell, the United States also attempts to discredit the Hawaiian Kingdom. In its introduction, the United States stated that this “lawsuit is brought by a group of individuals who call themselves the ‘Council of Regency,’ which in turn purports to the be the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom (‘Plaintiff’). Plaintiff requests that the Court declare that the Council of Regency, not the democratically-elected government, is the rightful ruler of Hawaii.”

The United States also adopts the legal arguments in Nervell’s Motion to Dismiss, which provided the opportunity for the Hawaiian Kingdom to respond to the United States’ Statement of Interest, and also to reveal the errors in Nervell’s November 3 reply.

On November 7, 2021, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Response to the United States’ Statement of Interest. The Hawaiian Kingdom opened with:

By filing its statement of interest, the UNITED STATES engages in unfounded and disparaging remarks directed at Plaintiff in a poor attempt to present a false narrative of Plaintiff’s status and the UNITED STATES’ factual and undisputed recognition of that status. Exposure of this false narrative, as more fully set forth herein below, opens for clear view of an argument, by the UNITED STATES, that strains credibility and subject to terminable contradiction by the facts and laws presented in these proceedings.

In its Response, the Hawaiian Kingdom views the United States’ use of the term purport as “a pejorative statement inserted in a non-answer pleading that attempts to influence the Court that its argument that the Defendant Consulates have immunity from jurisdiction via the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations has merit.” The Hawaiian Kingdom goes on to state:

As the Council of Regency are officers de facto of a government, albeit a government of an occupied State where democratic principles have no play in a belligerent occupation, the UNITED STATES, as a government itself of an independent and sovereign State, must provide rebuttable evidence that another government of a co-equal independent and sovereign State is not what it claims to be. To do otherwise, is an insult to its dignity because the Council of Regency is the Head of the Hawaiian Kingdom government. According to Oppenheim,
“Since dignity is a recognized quality of States as International Persons, all members of the Family of Nations grant reciprocally to one another by custom certain rights and ceremonial privileges. (These are chiefly the rights to demand—that their heads shall not be libelled and slandered […].) Every State must not only itself comply with the duties corresponding to these rights of other States, but must also prevent its subjects from such acts as violate the dignity of foreign States, and must punish them for acts of that kind which it could not prevent. The Municipal Laws of all States must therefore provide for the punishment of those who commit offences against the dignity of foreign States, and, if the Criminal Law of the land does not contain such provisions, it is no excuse for failure by the respective States to punish offenders.”
Though it cites NERVELL’S REPLY, the UNITED STATES, like NERVELL, fails to counter the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint that: (a) the UNITED STATES, to include Sweden and all States of the other Consular Defendants, as members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Administrative Council, acknowledged the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM as a non-Contracting State under Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and the Council of Regency as its government and; (b) the UNITED STATES, by its embassy in The Hague, entering into an agreement with the Council of Regency, as the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, to have access to all records and pleadings of the arbitral proceedings.

The Response stated that the arguments by the United States and Nervell “are blatantly unsubstantiated denials and desperate attempts by both to distract this Court from the facts of this case. Furthermore, Sweden, as a co-equal sovereign and independent State is responsible for NERVELL’s pleadings, which has a tenor of arrogance.” The Hawaiian Kingdom then went on to address the flaws of Nervell’s citing of State of Hawai‘i and federal court decisions regarding the Hawaiian Kingdom as they serve as precedent cases. Nervell fails to mention that these decisions are in personam, which only bind the litigants of that particular case, and not decisions in rem, which would apply to a thing, such as the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

All NERVELL cites in his reply is both State of Hawai‘i and federal court decisions regarding the Hawaiian Kingdom. These court decisions only reflect the allegations of facts made or not made by the defendants in the cases cited. It has no application to the instant case before this Court because these decisions are in personam and not in rem. What these decisions do provide, however, are instructional for defendants that claim the Hawaiian Kingdom exists in their particular case, to provide evidence of the Hawaiian State’s existence. NERVELL’S REPLY cites United States v. Lorenzo, where the court stated, “[t]he appellants have presented no evidence that the Sovereign Kingdom of Hawaii is currently recognized by the federal government (emphasis added).” The operative words here are “presented no evidence.”
NERVELL’s REPLY further goes on to cite Keliihuluhulu v. Keanaaina, where the federal court stated, “[a]s stated by the Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”), a statement that is as true now as it was when the ICA stated in 1994, ‘presently there is no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s foreign nature.’ Hawaii v. French, 77 Haw. 222, 228, 883 P.2d 644, 650 (CT. App. 1994) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).” The operative word here is “presently.” In other words, these federal court decisions clearly state that the defendants provided no factual or legal evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State.
On the contrary, the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, as the Plaintiff, has provided “a factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state” despite the UNITED STATES admitted illegal overthrow of its government on January 17, 1893. The Amici also address the French case in their filed amicus brief [ECF 96].
“In Defendant County of Kaua‘i’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s original Complaint, the County cites Hawai‘i v. French, 77 Haw. 222, 228, 883 P.2d 644, 650 (Ct. App. 1994) in support of the statement that there is ‘no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature. [ECF No. 15-1, Page ID #158]. This assertion is factually and legal incorrect. The 1994 ruling in French stands in stark contrast to the 2001 Arbitral Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom and the PCA Annual Reports from 2000-2011, that explicitly found Hawai‘i to be a continued state to-date under international law (emphasis added).”
The Court’s Order granting permission for Amici to file their amicus brief stated that the “briefing ‘supplement[s] the efforts of counsel, and draw[s] the court’s attention to law that escaped consideration.’” As such, the amicus brief, which supplements the Amended Complaint regarding its jurisdictional statement, must also be considered true. Reinforcing the merit of the amicus is that the Court granted permission to the Amici to file their brief.

The Hawaiian Kingdom concludes its Response to the United States Statement of Interest with:

The jurisdiction of the Court as an Article II Court is consequential to the existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State. In the Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated, “[t]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.” There is no permission from the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM giving its consent to the UNITED STATES, whether by its Congress or otherwise, to establish an Article III Court within the territorial jurisdiction of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM. In the absence of consent by the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, authorization for this Court to transform into an Article II Court is by virtue of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.
Until this Court transforms itself into an Article II Court, it is precluded from considering the relief sought by the UNITED STATES SOI and NERVELL’S MTD because, as an Article III Court, it does not possess subject matter and personal jurisdiction. In colloquial terms, the UNITED STATES, on behalf of the Consular Defendants, including NERVELL, appear to be asking for a chicken without first qualifying the egg. Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of the Court, and Court decisions, to include the United States Supreme Court, are instructional and not binding until the Court, as an Article II Court, declares otherwise in conformity with the laws of armed conflict—international humanitarian law.

What Role Does the Amicus Brief Serve in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden?

Posted on October 31, 2021 by Hawaiian Kingdom

In his Order granting approval for the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the National Lawyers Guild and the Water Protector Legal Collective (IADL-NLG-WPLC) to file their amicus brief, Federal Magistrate Judge Rom Trader explained the role of an amicus. He stated:

When determining whether to grant leave to file an amicus brief, courts consider whether the briefing “supplement[s] the efforts of counsel, and draw[s] the court’s attention to law that escaped consideration.” The amicus may be either impartial or interested individuals, whose function is to advise or make suggestions to the court. “The district court has broad discretion to appoint amici curiae.”

In other words, Judge Trader accepts that the amicus brief “supplements” the Hawaiian Kingdom’s position that the Court is presently not lawful as an Article III Court and must, therefore, assume jurisdiction as an Article II Court because it is located outside of the United States. Article II and Article III Courts reflect the authority of federal courts under the U.S. constitution to preside over civil and criminal matters. By allowing the filing of the amicus Judge Trader acknowledges that IADL-NLG-WPLC amicus‘ “function is to advise or make suggestions to the court.”

Article II refers to the authority of the President as commander and chief of the armed forces where federal courts can be established in foreign territory that is being occupied by the United States. Article III refers to the judiciary of the United States federal government where Article III Courts exist within the States of the Federal Union. Article III Courts do not exist in the territory of foreign States. According to Justice Story, in Picquet v. Swan, “no sovereignty can extend its process beyond its territorial limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial decisions. Every exertion of authority beyond this limit is a mere nullity.”

To put it another way, Judge Trader has explicitly admitted there is merit to the position taken by the Hawaiian Kingdom and the authors of the amicus brief that presently the Court is not lawful until it assumes jurisdiction as an Article II Court because it is not located in the State of Hawai‘i but rather in the Hawaiian Kingdom as an occupied State. The amicus opened with:

The purpose of this brief is to bring to the Court’s attention customary international law norms and judicial precedent regarding Article II occupation courts that bear on the long-standing belligerent occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States at issue in this case.
In assessing the legality of the US occupation of Hawai‘i, the Court should be cognizant of customary international law and international human rights treaties that are incorporated into domestic law by virtue of Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution (the “Supremacy Clause”). International law, which includes treaties ratified by the United States as well as customary international law, is part of U.S. law and must be faithfully executed by the President and enforced by U.S. courts except when clearly inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution or subsequent acts of Congress
The question here is not whether the Hawaiian Kingdom has standing in an Article III court. The question is whether this court can sit as an Article II occupation court and whether the claims of the Hawaiian Kingdom can be redressed. The answer to both questions is yes.

In its conclusion, the amicus stated:

Under the concept of void ab initio, there are structures that have no legal effect from inception. The United States occupation of Hawai‘i began with unclean hands, and this can only be remedied by a clean slate and a new beginning. Recognition of the prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States through Declaratory Judgment is not only a redressable claim, it is long overdue and would only be consistent with what is already known to the international community and clear under international law. Additionally, granting the Hawaiian Kingdom injunctive relief would acknowledge the Kingdom’s continuous sovereignty, mitigate the United States’ liability for its war crimes against the Hawaiian people, and apply local law as required of an occupying power by the international law of war. Acknowledging extraterritoriality and occupation would have the practical effect of applying the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom but as was the case with prior occupation courts, this would not nullify any prior decisions of any of the courts currently operating in Hawai‘i, so long as they are not inconsistent with local law.
For the foregoing reasons, amici request that the Court consider U.S. obligations under international law, which forms part of U.S. law, in evaluating the long-standing occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

In his Order granting permission to file the amicus brief, Judge Trader also stated that he granted permission after he “carefully reviewed the Motion and attached brief, records and files in this case, and the applicable law.” This would include the Hawaiian Kingdom’s amended complaint. In its amended complaint, the Hawaiian Kingdom addressed the subject of jurisdiction of the court:

3. While this court is operating within the territory of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM and not within the territory of Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, its jurisdiction is found as a de facto Article II Court. According to Professor Bederman:
What, then, is distinctive about a court established under Article II of the Constitution? First, executive tribunals are established without an act of Congress or any other form of legislative concurrence. Congressional intent concerning the status of a presidential court is irrelevant because no congressional approval is needed. The fact that the President alone can create an executive court places it outside the scope of Article III of the Constitution, which demands that Congress shall establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Second, the executive courts are created pursuant only to the power and authority granted to the President in Article II of the Constitution. In practice, the only presidential power that would call for the creation of a court is that arising from his responsibility as Commander in Chief of the armed services and his subsequent war-making authority.
4. The authority for this Court to assume jurisdiction as a de facto Article II Court is fully elucidated in the Amicus Curiae brief previously lodged in these proceedings by virtue of the Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief on July 30, 2021 [ECF 45] by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), the National Lawyers Guild (NLG), and the Water Protector Legal Collective (WPLC). The Amicus brief is instructional for the Court to transition to a de facto Article II Court.
5. An Article II Court was established in Germany after hostilities ceased in 1945 during the Second World War. After the surrender, western Germany came under belligerent occupation by the United States, France and Great Britain. The military occupation officially came to an end on May 5, 1955, with the entry into force of peace treaties called the Bonn Conventions between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Occupying States. During the occupation, these Article II Courts had jurisdiction “over all persons in the occupied territory,” except for Allied armed forces, their dependents, and civilian officials, for “[a]ll offenses against the laws and usages of war[,] […] [a]ll offenses under any proclamation, law, ordinance, notice or order issued by or under the authority of the Military Government or of the Allied Forces, [and] [a]ll offenses under the laws of the occupied territory or any part thereof.”
6. Like the Article II Court in Germany, this Court has Jurisdiction as a de facto Article II Court because this action arises under international humanitarian law—law of armed conflict, which include the 1907 Hague Convention, IV (1907 Hague Regulations), the 1907 Hague Convention, V, the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV (1949 Fourth Geneva Convention), and Hawaiian Kingdom law. Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.
7. The Court is authorized to award the requested declaratory and injunctive relief as a de facto Article II Court because it is situated within the territory of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM that has been under a prolonged belligerent occupation by the United States of America since January 17, 1893.
8. Venue is proper because the events giving rise to this claim occurred in this District, and the Defendants are being sued in their official capacities.

By this action taken by Magistrate Judge Trader, the jurisdiction of the court is now front and center. If a court does not have jurisdiction over a case, which can be raised at any time throughout the proceedings, its decisions on any motion or even the complaint is void and without merit. This was explicitly stated by a federal court in Jalapeno Property Management, LLC v. Dukas, where a judgment is void only “if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject-matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.”

According to the rules, Judge Trader, as a Magistrate, is required to provide a report and recommendation to District Judge Leslie Kobayashi who serves as the trial Judge. It will be up to Judge Kobayashi to make a decision on transforming the Court from an Article III to an Article II Court. Prior to his report and recommendation, however, Judge Trader has the authority to appoint additional amicus briefs to be filed in order to address other matters not covered by the IADL-NLG-WPLC’s amicus.

This may be what Judge Trader is considering, because there are other matters that are related to Article II Courts such as procedural rules and appellate review of its decisions. Decisions by Article II Courts are not reviewable on appeal by Article III Appellate Circuit Courts as well as the U.S. Supreme Court. Article II Courts have their own procedural rules that are adopted and their own Appellate Courts that reside within the occupied territory.

In its amended complaint, the Hawaiian Kingdom brought this to the attention of the Court by referencing the establishment of Article II Courts in occupied Germany. The creation of these courts to include procedure and appeals stemmed from the Army War Department and published in the Federal Register on April 3, 1947 under Title 10. Judge Trader may very well consider asking for an amicus from the Staff Judge Advocate of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command on how Article II Courts, similar to those established in Germany, can be established in Hawai‘i. The Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is a named defendant in his official capacity.

Judge Trader has not provided any timeline for his report and recommendation to be completed.

Finland and India Close Their Hawai‘i Consulates

Posted on October 17, 2021 by Hawaiian Kingdom

Finland and India followed suit with the Czech Republic that closed their consulates in Hawai‘i as a result of a federal lawsuit filed by the Hawaiian Kingdom against 30 foreign consulates and leadership of the Federal Government and the State of Hawai‘i for violations of international law, war crimes and human rights violations. In its Amended Complaint, the Hawaiian Kingdom alleges:

104. The PCA Administrative Council’s annual reports from 2000-2011 clearly states that the Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, as a member of the PCA Administrative Council, explicitly acknowledged the continued existence of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM as a non-Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention as evidenced in the PCA Administrative Council’s annual reports. Unlike the ICA and the trial court in Lorenzo, the PCA did apply international law in their determination of the continued existence of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM as an independent and sovereign State for jurisdictional purposes. As such, the treaties between the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM and the Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA remain in full force and effect except where the law of occupation supersedes them. The other Contracting States with the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM in its treaties, which include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, are also members of the PCA Administrative Council and, therefore, their acknowledgment of the continuity of the Hawaiian State is also an acknowledgment of the full force and effect of their treaties with the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM except where the law of occupation supersedes them.
105. The Consular Corps Hawai‘i is comprised of 38 countries, 32 of which are also members of the PCA Administrative Council in The Hague, Netherlands. These countries include, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and the United Kingdom via the Australian Consulate.
106. §458 of the Hawaiian Civil Code states, “[n]o foreign consul, or consular or commercial agent shall be authorized to act as such, or entitled to recover his fees and perquisites in the courts of this Kingdom, until he shall have received his exequatur.” These consulates have not presented their credentials to the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM in order to receive exequaturs but rather received their exequaturs from the Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA under the municipal laws of the United States.
107. In diplomatic packages sent to the foreign embassies in Washington, D.C., that maintain consulates in the territory of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM by DAVID KEANU SAI, as Minister of Foreign Affairs ad interim, on April 15th and 20th of 2021, the Ambassadors were notified that their Consulates “within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom is by virtue of ‘American municipal laws,’ which stand in violation of Hawaiian sovereignty and independence, and, therefore constitutes an internationally wrongful act.” The diplomatic note further stated that the “Council of Regency acknowledges that [foreign] nationals should be afforded remedial prescriptions regarding defects in their real estate holdings that have resulted from the illegal occupation in accordance with ‘laws and established customs’ of the Hawaiian Kingdom.” This subject is covered in the Royal Commission of Inquiry’s Preliminary Report re Legal Status of Land Titles throughout the Realm and its Supplemental Report re Title Insurance.”
108. The maintenance of Defendants’ foreign Consulates in the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom also constitutes acts of belligerency. On June 30, 2021, the Czech Republic filed a letter to this Court announcing the temporary closure of its Honorary Consulate in the Hawaiian Kingdom. The Hawaiian Kingdom acknowledges this act of State to be in conformity with Article 30(a) of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), whereby “[t]he State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation (a) to cease that act, if it is continuing.” Article 30(b), however, states that the responsible State shall “offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.” The Czech Republic has yet to assure the government of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM guarantees of non-repetition. Furthermore, Article 31 provides that the “responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act,” and that the “[i]njury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of State.”

The closure of the Czech, Finnish and Indian Consulates are in conformity with Article 30(a) and (b) of the International Law Commission’s articles of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). As a result of the closure of their Consulates, the Czech Republic, Finland and India were dismissed from the lawsuit.

Hawai‘i Federal Court Seriously Considering Transformation into an Article II Occupation Court

Posted on October 16, 2021 by Hawaiian Kingdom

1. The nongovernmental organizations whose views are represented in this brief have expertise in public international law, international human rights, humanitarian law, and norms regarding statehood, sovereignty, and self-determination.
2. Movants submit this brief to ensure a proper understanding and application of the international law and historical precedent relevant to this case regarding Article II occupation courts. The amici are additionally human rights organizations that have an interest in ensuring an informed interpretation of international human rights law in domestic jurisprudence.

In its complaint, the Hawaiian Kingdom takes the position that the Court must first transform itself into an Article II Court for it to have lawful jurisdiction because it is located in the territory of an occupied State, which is outside of the United States. According to Professor Bederman, in his law article Article II Courts,

What, then, is distinctive about a court established under Article II of the Constitution? First, executive tribunals are established without an act of Congress or any other form of legislative concurrence. Congressional intent concerning the status of a presidential court is irrelevant because no congressional approval is needed. The fact that the President alone can create an executive court places it outside the scope of Article III of the Constitution, which demands that Congress shall establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Second, the executive courts are created pursuant only to the power and authority granted to the President in Article II of the Constitution. In practice, the only presidential power that would call for the creation of a court is that arising from his responsibility as Commander in Chief of the armed services and his consequent war-making authority.

An Article II Court was established in Germany after hostilities ceased in 1945 during the Second World War. After the surrender, western Germany came under belligerent occupation by the United States, France, and Great Britain. The military occupation officially came to an end on May 5, 1955, with the entry into force of the Bonn Conventions between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Occupying States. During the occupation, these Article II Courts had jurisdiction “over all persons in the occupied territory,” except for Allied armed forces, their dependents, and civilian officials, for “all offenses against the laws and usages of war, all offenses under any proclamation, law, ordinance, notice or order issued by or under the authority of the Military Government or of the Allied Forces, and all offenses under the laws of the occupied territory or any part thereof.”

Currently, the U.S. District Court is called an Article III Court. This designation refers to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which is the judicial branch of the United States headed by a Supreme Court over Circuit Courts of Appeal, and District Courts established in the States of the Federal Union. The authority of the District Court for Hawai‘i comes from section 9(a) of the 1959 Hawai‘i Statehood Act that established the State of Hawai‘i.

In its complaint, the Hawaiian Kingdom explains that Congress cannot establish a U.S. District Court in a foreign country, the Hawaiian Kingdom, that has been under a prolonged occupation by the United States for over a century. The Congress can only enact laws that apply within the United States and not outside of it. According to a 1988 legal opinion by the U.S. Department of Justice regarding the annexation of Hawai‘i by a congressional joint resolution, “there is a serious question whether Congress has the authority either to assert jurisdiction over an expanded territorial sea for purposes of international law or to assert the United States’ sovereignty over it.”

On September 30, 2021, U.S. Magistrate Judge Rom Trader issued an Order granting permission for the IADL-NLG-WPLC to formally file their amicus curiae brief in order to aid the Court in its decision on transforming itself into an Article II Occupation Court. Judge Trader’s Order stated, “The Court, having carefully reviewed the Motion and attached brief, records and files in this case, and the applicable law, GRANTS the Motion.” The IADL-NLG-WPLC filed their amicus brief on October 6, 2021. In its brief, the IADL-NLG-WPLC stated:

The purpose of this brief is to bring to the Court’s attention customary international law norms and judicial precedent regarding Article II occupation courts that bear on the long-standing belligerent occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States at issue in this case.
In assessing the legality of the US occupation of Hawai‘i, the Court should be cognizant of customary international law and international human rights treaties that are incorporated into domestic law by virtue of Article VI, section 2 of the Constitution (the “Supremacy Clause”). International law, which includes treaties ratified by the United States as well as customary international law, is part of U.S. law and must be faithfully executed by the President and enforced by U.S. courts except when clearly inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution or subsequent acts of Congress.
The question here is not whether the Hawaiian Kingdom has standing in an Article III court. The question is whether this court can sit as an Article II occupation court and whether the claims of the Hawaiian Kingdom can be redressed. The answer to both questions is yes.

The significance of this Order cannot be underestimated. The Court is seriously considering transforming itself into an Article II Occupation Court.

COVID-19: What is the Difference Between Anecdotal Evidence and Scientific Evidence

Posted on September 3, 2021 by Hawaiian Kingdom

As Hawai‘i’s people begin to awake to the reality of their country, the Hawaiian Kingdom, having been under an illegal and prolonged occupation by the United States since January 17, 1893, they have to contend with conflicting information on a daily basis. It is like walking down the hallway of a house in the dark. Every door that opens is someone telling “their” story with evidence “they” gathered that “they” say supports “their” conclusion. Which story is accurate and which story is not? There needs to be some sort of standard to discern fact from fiction whether it is about the Hawaiian Kingdom or COVID-19 that is in the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Stories are called anecdotes, and information that someone may use to tell the story could be anecdotal evidence. “Anecdotal Evidence is information you obtain from a subjective report, an observation, or some kind of example that may or may not be reliable. In addition, anecdotal evidence is not scientifically valid or representative of a larger group or of conditions in another location.” In academic research, anecdotal evidence is considered a fallacy. The anecdote is the story to be told and the evidence is selectively chosen by the storyteller to support the story. This is commonly referred to as “confirmation bias” or “cherry picking” because the storyteller would ignore evidence that would undermine the story being told.

Anecdotal evidence is on the opposite spectrum of science, which is “the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.” In political science, which is social science, it is “the systematic study of governance by the application of empirical and generally scientific methods of analysis. As traditionally defined and studied, political science examines the state and its organs and institutions.”

In both the hard sciences and the social sciences, there is a reliance on theory, which is an explanation of a set of known facts. A simple way to think of it is that the theory of football exists to explain the facts of a football game. Both sciences have a critical component called research and research relies on theories and evidence.

One of the ways to discern a person using anecdotal evidence from a person using scientific evidence is to first see their credentials, whether professional or academic, that would indicate that they have a particular expertise in the subject area. You should not prefer a golf coach to explain to you a football game. Second, does the person have published articles on the subject that has been peer-reviewed. This is very important because peer-review is a form of a vetting process that qualifies a person’s explanation and conclusions of a particular subject.

The way peer-review works is a journal’s editorial board will receive a manuscript that represents the author’s research and findings. If the manuscript satisfies the editorial board’s criteria of topic and form, the editorial board will seek out academics that are recognized as experts in certain fields that are covered in the manuscript. A peer-review journal can have up to 4 referees to review and provide comment on the manuscript. Peer-review is usually double blind where the referees do not know who the author is, and the author does not know who the referees are. All the author knows is that the referees are experts in certain fields that the editorial board reached out to.

After the reviews by the referees are submitted to the editorial board, the board will go over the comments made by the referees and determine whether the manuscript is suitable for publication. Some manuscripts would be rejected, while others would be conditionally accepted with adjustments as recommended by the referees. A manuscript based on anecdotal evidence would not be accepted for publication from the start.

In the case of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the vetting process was the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom. Larsen sought to hold the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom legally accountable for allowing the unlawful imposition of American municipal laws over him that caused him to have an unfair trial and be subsequently incarcerated. However, before the PCA could form an arbitration tribunal to resolve the dispute, it had to ensure that the institution had jurisdiction or authority to do so in the first place.

Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention (PCA) only allows access to the PCA if one of the parties is a “State” recognized under international law. The proceedings were instituted on November 8, 1999, and after the PCA verified the Hawaiian Kingdom to be a “State” an arbitration tribunal was formed on June 9, 2000. The Secretariat of the PCA, also known as the International Bureau, served as a vetting institution, and after its due diligence in reviewing the evidence through the legal theory of international law, it concluded that the Hawaiian Kingdom is an independent State.

This finding by an intergovernmental institution, falsifies the storytellers using anecdotal evidence. Since then, academics have published peer-review journal articles and publications that speak to the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State in continuity that has been under a prolonged belligerent occupation by the United States since January 17, 1893.

In this time of the pandemic, it is crucial to distinguish anecdotal evidence from scientific evidence. Dr. Anthony Fauci is an expert in this field, and he does have the credentials. More importantly, Dr. Fauci has publications on the topic of COVID-19 in peer-review journals. If Dr. Fauci lived in nineteenth century, the Hawaiian Kingdom Government’s Board of Health would have relied on his opinions and recommendations regarding COVID-19 if it arrived in the Hawaiian Islands.

Hawaiian Kingdom Blog

Weblog of the acting government of the Hawaiian Kingdom presently operating within the occupied State of the Hawaiian Islands.

Category Archives: International Law

Putin Warns US and NATO Countries of Nuclear Attack: Island of O‘ahu Targeted for Nuclear Strike

Triggering State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts

The IADL and AAJ Sent a Joint Letter to all UN Ambassadors Calling for Enforcement of International Law Regarding the Prolonged Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom

U.S. Files Their Reply to Hawaiian Kingdom’s Opposition to the U.S. Motion to Dismiss

Hawaiian Kingdom files its Reply to the US Opposition of Judicial Notice of Civil Law and Exposes a Conspiracy at the Highest Level of the US Government

Clerk Enters Default for State of Hawai‘i Officials in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden and U.S. Files Response to Judicial Notice of Civil Law

UPDATE: Federal Government Given Extension to File Opposition to Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Civil Law

UPDATE: Federal Court Issues Minute Order regarding Hawaiian Kingdom’s Request for Judicial Notice of Civil Law

Hawaiian Kingdom Files Request for Federal Court to take Judicial Notice of Civil Law

Hawaiian Kingdom Files Supplemental Response to U.S. Statement of Interest in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden

U.S. Department of Justice Files Statement of Interest Claiming Foreign Consulates in Hawai‘i Have Immunity in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden

What Role Does the Amicus Brief Serve in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden?

Finland and India Close Their Hawai‘i Consulates

Hawai‘i Federal Court Seriously Considering Transformation into an Article II Occupation Court

COVID-19: What is the Difference Between Anecdotal Evidence and Scientific Evidence

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