The Day of Reckoning Has Finally Arrived for the Insurgency of 1893

Determined to hold to account individuals that have committed war crimes and human rights violations throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom under this prolonged occupation by the United States, the Council of Regency, by Proclamation on April 17, 2019, established a Royal Commission of Inquiry (“Royal Commission”) in similar fashion to the United States proposal of establishing a Commission of Inquiry after the First World War “to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed during its course.”

In accordance with Hawaiian administrative precedence in addressing crises, the Royal Commission was established by “virtue of the prerogative of the Crown provisionally vested in [the Council of Regency] in accordance with Article 33 of the 1864 Constitution, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation into the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom.” His Excellency, Dr. David Keanu Sai, Ph.D., was designated as Head of the Royal Commission, and Dr. Federico Lenzerini, Ph.D., as Deputy Head. Pursuant to Article 3 – Composition of the Royal Commission, the Head of the Royal Commission has been authorized to seek “recognized experts in various fields.”

The Royal Commission has acquired legal opinions from the following experts in international law: on the subject of the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom under international law, Professor Matthew Craven from the University of London, SOAS, School of Law; on the subject of the elements of war crimes committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom since 1893, Professor William Schabas, Middlesex University London, School of Law; and on the subject of human rights violations in the Hawaiian Kingdom and the right of self-determination by the Hawaiian citizenry, Professor Federico Lenzerini, University of Siena, Italy, Department of Political and International Studies. These experts, to include the Head of the Royal Commission, are the authors of chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Part II of the Royal Commission’s eBook – The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom.

According to Article 1(2), “The purpose of the Royal Commission shall be to investigate the consequences of the United States’ belligerent occupation, including with regard to international law, humanitarian law and human rights, and the allegations of war crimes committed in that context. The geographical scope and time span of the investigation will be sufficiently broad and be determined by the head of the Royal Commission.”

Article 1(3) provides, “The results of the investigation will be presented to the Council of Regency, the Contracting Powers of the 1907 Hague Convention, IV, respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Contracting Powers of the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the Contracting Powers of the 2002 Rome Statute, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the National Lawyers Guild in the form of a report.”

In Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, it recognizes that when “determining whether a rule has become international law, substantial weight is accorded to…the writing of scholars.” According to Black’s Law, 6th ed., United States courts have acknowledged that the “various Restatements have been a formidable force in shaping the disciplines of the law covered [and] they represent the fruit of the labor of the best legal minds in the diverse fields of law covered.” The Restatement drew from Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations [are] subsidiary means for the determination of rules of [international law].” These “writings include treatises and other writings of authors of standing.” Professors Craven, Schabas, and Lenzerini are “authors of standing” and their legal opinions are “sources” of the rules of international law.

The Royal Commission would first provide Preliminary Reports on various subjects relative to its mandate, followed by periodic Reports of its investigation of war crimes that meet the constituent elements of mens rea and actus reus, and human rights violations.

Criminal Report no. 22-0001

The day of reckoning has finally arrived through Hawaiian law for those individuals who have been found “guilty” of the crime of treason. After three years of preliminary reports, the Royal Commission has just published its first Criminal Report no. 22-0001 regarding the insurgency of 1893 and attainder of treason.

For over a century, members of the Provisional Government and its successor the Republic of Hawai‘i were not held accountable for their treasonous actions on January 17, 1893, in the unlawful overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom under the protection of U.S. troops that invaded Honolulu the day before. Although war crimes and human rights violations did not exist at the time under international law, the high crime of treason did under Hawaiian Kingdom law.

Some of the insurgents came to be known as the Big Five, a collection of five large businesses, that wielded considerable political and economic power after 1893 to benefit themselves. The Big Five were Castle & Cooke, Alexander & Baldwin, C. Brewer & Co., American Factors (now Amfac), and Theo H. Davies & Co. In a May 3, 1940 report on the Hawaiian Islands by Elwyn J. Eagen to the Congressional Special House Committee on the National Labor Relations Act, he stated:

Virtually every business of any importance is owned or controlled by the so-called “Big-Five.” These companies have interlocking directorships. This method of obtaining joint action extends not only to the companies named but also to various subsidiary corporations. Most of the land in the Islands is owned or controlled by the same group which manage the affairs of the “Big Five.” There are no independent banks on the Islands. All of the banks are controlled by virtually the same people who are interested in the “Big-Five.” By controlling loans, the officers of the “Big Five” are able to keep semi-independent business men from engaging in activities hostile to their interests. They are also able to know the financial condition of all the inhabitants of the Islands. Persons who do not comply with the wishes of the “Big Five” are refused loans or extension and are forced out of business.

In the Statute Laws of 1846, section 7, it was enacted: “[l]and so patented [that is purchased from the Government] shall never revert to the king of these islands, nor escheat to this government, for any other cause than attainder of high treason, as defined in the criminal code (emphasis added).” Among the prerogatives of the king that affect lands is “[t]o punish for high treason by forfeiture, if so the law decrees.” The King’s superior right to forfeiture was transferred to the government when the Hawaiian Kingdom became a constitutional monarchy. Under the treason statute, which has no degrees, the Penal Code states:

  1. Treason is hereby defined to be any plotting or attempt to dethrone or destroy the King, or the levying of war against the King’s government, or the adhering to the enemies thereof, giving them aid and comfort, the same being done by a person owing allegiance to this kingdom.
  2. Allegiance is the obedience and fidelity due to the kingdom from those under its protection.
  3. An alien, whether his native country be at war or at peace with this kingdom, owes allegiance to this kingdom during his residence therein, and during such residence, is capable of committing treason against this kingdom.
  4. Ambassadors and other ministers of foreign states, and their alien secretaries, servants and members of their families, do not owe allegiance to this kingdom, though resident therein, and are not capable of committing treason against this kingdom.
  5. To constitute the levying of war, contemplated in the first section of this chapter, it shall be requisite that the persons concerned therein be parties to some overt act, in or towards procuring, preparing or using force, or putting themselves in a condition in readiness to use force, either by being present at such overt act, or by promoting, aiding in, or being otherwise accessory before the fact to the same.
  6. In order to constitute the levying of war, the force must be employed or intended to be employed for the dethroning or destruction of the King or in contravention of the laws, or in opposition to the authority of the King’s government, with an intent or for an object affecting some of the branches or departments of said government general, or affecting the enactment, repeal or enforcement of laws in general, or of some general law; or affecting the people, or the public tranquility generally; in distinction from some special intent or object, affecting individuals other than the King, or a particular district.
  7. An accessory before the fact to treason is guilty of treason, and shall be subject to prosecution, trial and punishment therefor, though the principals more directly concerned have not been convicted, or are not amendable to justice.
  8. No person shall be convicted of treason but by the testimony of two or more lawful witnesses to the same overt act of treason whereof he stands charged, unless he shall in open court, confess such treason.
  9. Whoever shall commit the crime of treason, shall suffer the punishment of death; and all his property shall be confiscated to the government.
  10. If any person who shall have knowledge of the commission of treason against this kingdom, shall conceal the same, and shall not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known such treason to the Governor of the island on which he resides, he is guilty of a great crime, and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment at hard labor not exceeding ten years, in the discretion of the court.

By specific reference to the term attainder, the Hawaiian legislature adopted the English common law on high treason. In The King v. Agnee et al., the Hawaiian Supreme Court stated, “[w]e do not recognize as conclusive the common law nor the authorities of the courts of England or of the United States, any farther than the principles which they support may have become incorporated in our system of laws, and recognized by the adjudication of the Supreme Court.” In Agnee, the Court cited English common law commentators on criminal law such as Chitty and Bishop as well as English criminal cases.

Under English common law, attainder of high treason is a metaphor that has the effect of the corruption of blood resulting from the commission of high treason along with reversion of property by escheat, both real and personal, to the king or government. Attainder is under “common law, that extinction of civil rights and capacities which took place whenever a person who had committed treason or felony received sentence of death for his crime. The effect of ‘attainder’ upon such felon was, in general terms, that all his estate, real and personal, was forfeited. At the common law, attainder resulted in three ways, viz: by confession, by verdict, and by process or outlawry (emphasis added).”

By “process,” attainder resulted by an act of Parliament called a bill of attainder, which Edward Coke critiqued as a process that lacked provable evidence but acknowledged that the Parliament did have the authority to attaint for high treason. When Henry VIII ascended to the throne in 1509, “attainder by parliament was an established means of dealing with special offenders, particularly those who posed a threat to the security of the king and his realm.” John Hatsell’s Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons that was published in 1781 explains:

Although it is true, that this measure of passing Bills of Attainder…has been used as an engine of power…it is not therefore just to conclude, that no instances can occur, in which it ought to be put in practice. Cases have arisen…and may again arise, where the public safety, which is the first object of all government, has called for this extraordinary interference; and, in such instances, where can the exercise of an extraordinary power be vested with more security, than in the three branches of the legislature [Monarch, House of Lords, House of Commons]? It should, however, always be remembered, that this deviation from the more ordinary forms of proceeding by indictment or impeachment, ought never to be adopted, but in cases of absolute necessity; and in those instances only, where, from the magnitude of the crime, or the imminent danger to the state, it would be a greater public mischief to suffer the offence to pass unpunished, than even to over-step the common boundaries of law; and…by an exemplary through extraordinary proceeding, to mark with infamy and disgrace, perhaps to punish with death, even the highest and most power offenders.

In Coke’s commentary on the 1352 Statute of Treasons in the Third Institute, he explains that the term “attaint” in the statute “necessarily implieth that he be proceeded with, and attainted according to the due course, and proceedings of law, and not by absolute power.” The suspect, according to Coke, had to be attainted with direct proof of evidence and not attainted with the probability of evidence. He explains, “This doth also strengthen the former exposition of the word (provablement,) that it must be provably, by an open act, which must be manifestly proved.”

According to William Blackstone, “ANOTHER immediate consequence of attainder is the corruption of blood, both upwards and downwards; so that an attainted person can neither inherit lands or other hereditaments from his ancestors, nor retain those he is already in possession of, nor transmit them by descent to any heir; but the same shall escheat to the lord of the fee, subject to the king’s superior right of forfeiture: and the person attainted shall also obstruct all descents to his posterity, wherever they are obliged to derive a title through him to a remoter ancestor.” 

Section 8 of the Hawaiian treason statute addresses the first two ways where attainder results by conviction by trial or confession without trial. The third way is by “process” or “outlawry.” The latter was a process during the medieval period in England for the county court or by writ declared a fugitive on the run for the commission of treason an “outlaw.” The former could be done by a bill of attainder or law of attainder enacted by the English Parliament and signed into law by the Monarch.  While the United States constitutionally prohibits bills of attainder, where “[n]o bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,” and Great Britain abolished practically all the law of forfeiture and escheat for treason and felony in 1870, the Hawaiian Kingdom has no such prohibition, which would allow bills of attainder to be enacted by the Legislative Assembly, but no such bill has ever been enacted.

While bills of attainder were a product of domestic law of a State and not the courts, they could also result as a consequence of a “process” of international law by virtue of a treaty between the governments of two States where the negotiations and agreement included, inter alia, the subject of high treason as defined by a State’s domestic law. This was precisely the case of the Agreement of Restoration entered into between Queen Lili‘uokalani and President Grover Cleveland on 18 December 1893.

Of the three modes of attainting a person or persons of the high crime of treason under English common law, the insurgents were attainted by “process” as evidenced in President Cleveland’s six-month investigation from 1 April to 18 October 1893, and acknowledged by Queen Lili‘uokalani in the Agreement of Restoration of 18 December 1893. The condition of the Agreement of Restoration for the Queen, after being restored to the throne, “to grant full amnesty as to life and property to all those persons who have been or who are now in the Provisional Government, or who have been instrumental in the overthrow of your government,” presupposes that these persons were guilty of committing the high crime of treason, and, therefore, were attainted. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, amnesty is a “sovereign act of forgiveness for past acts, granted by a government to all persons (or to certain classes of persons) who have been guilty of…treason. … Included in the concept of pardon is ‘amnesty,’ which is similar in all respects to a full pardon, insofar as when it is granted both the crime and punishment are abrogated; however, unlike pardons, an amnesty usually refers to a class of individuals irrespective of individual situations (emphasis added).” The Queen, however, was not restored and, therefore, amnesty was not granted to those found guilty of treason by a “process.”

As a person who is attainted by a conviction of treason by a court of law whereby escheat occurs at the moment of the commission of the crime so that all intervening dealings with the property are avoided, escheat for a person attainted by a “process,” like a bill of attainder or the Agreement of Restoration, occurs at the moment of the commission of the crime as well. Section 9 of the treason statute states, “[w]hoever shall commit the crime of treason, shall suffer the punishment of death; and all his property shall be confiscated to the government.” The term “property” in the statute includes both real and personal.

According to Thomas Tomlins, in the Law-Dictionary explaining the Rise, Progress, and Present State of the British Law, vol. 1 (1835), as “to Corruption of Blood, this operates upwards and downwards, so that an attainted person can neither inherit lands or other hereditaments from his ancestors, nor retain those he is already in possession of, nor transmit them by descent to any heir; but the same shall escheat to the lord of the fee, subject to the king’s superior right of forfeiture; and the person attainted shall also obstruct all descents to his posterity, wherever they are obliged to derive a title through him to a remoter ancestor.” Therefore, all persons who were guilty of the crime of high treason, their real property escheated to the Hawaiian government, and their ownership to personal property vested in the Hawaiian government at the moment they committed the crime of treason since 17 January 1893 and suffers the pains and penalties from the effects of the doctrine of the corruption of blood thereafter.

One of the Big Five is Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. The history of Alexander and Baldwin goes back to 1869 when Samuel T. Alexander and Henry P. Baldwin entered into a partnership called the Haiku Sugar Company on Maui. The Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company, formerly owned by Claus Spreckels, was later acquired by Alexander & Baldwin, as well as Kihei Plantation.

While Alexander left the islands in 1883 because of bad health and settled in Oakland, California, he continued his business relation with Baldwin in the Hawaiian Kingdom. In 1894, the partners formed a new firm in San Francisco under the name of Alexander & Baldwin, for the purpose of conducting a general commercial business and handling their plantation interests in the United States. A branch was established in Honolulu in 1897 where the main office was located. The firm was incorporated as Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., in 1900 with Baldwin as its president.

At the time of the overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Baldwin was living on the island of Kaua‘i and was an active member of the Annexation Club. In a letter to U.S. Special Commissioner James Blount dated April 25, 1893, Baldwin stated, “I have acquired considerable property and represent plantations that have this year an output of about 23,000 tons of sugar.”

On May 30, 1894, Baldwin participated in the Republic of Hawai‘i’s constitutional convention. Because Baldwin was found guilty of treason by “process,” he was attainted on May 30, 1894 when he committed the high crime and all his property, both real and personal escheated and reverted to the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Despite the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom was not restored until 1997 by a Council of Regency, the office of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom was vested with Baldwin’s property as a consequence of a breach of Hawaiian law. And under the doctrine of corruption of blood, the family of Baldwin was prevented from any lawful inheritance through or from Baldwin because he was stained with treason.

For a list of all persons found guilty of the high crime of treason download the Royal Commission’s Criminal Report no. 22-0001.

UPDATE: Hawaiian Kingdom files Motion for Evidentiary Hearing to Compel the Federal Defendants to Prove the Hawaiian Kingdom Does Not Exist According to the Lorenzo Principle

On August 15, 2022, Judge Leslie Kobayashi filed an Order denying the Hawaiian Kingdom’s request to allow the Ninth Circuit to review her previous Order dated July 28, 2022, denying the Hawaiian Kingdom’s motion to reconsider her decision. Federal rules allow a party to file a motion for reconsideration within 10 days of the Order. In her August 15 Order, she stated:

“Here, whether the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a sovereign and independent state is not a controlling question of law. ‘The Ninth Circuit, this court, and Hawaii state courts have rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty.’ Although the resolution of whether the Hawaiian Kingdom exists as a sovereign and independent state could, theoretically, materially affect the outcome of litigation, the question presented does not rise to the level of an exceptional case warranting departure from the congressional directive to grant interlocutory appeals sparingly.”

The Hawaiian Kingdom does not agree with Judge Kobayashi that the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence is not a controlling question of law that would bind the Court. On August 24, 2022, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a motion for Judge Kobayashi to reconsider her decision on the grounds of judicial estoppel, and in accordance with the Lorenzo principle to schedule an evidentiary hearing in order to compel the Federal Defendants to prove that the Hawaiian Kingdom no longer exists as a State. According to the Ninth Circuit, in Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, judicial estoppel prevents “a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.”

In its recent filing, the Hawaiian Kingdom drew attention to the United States’ position in support of the Lorenzo principle in United States v. Goo in 2002 where it prevailed, and then in these proceedings regarding the Lorenzo principle they act as if it never existed. The Lorenzo principle stems from the Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) case State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo that centered on the subject of whether the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State still exists.

This case not only placed the burden of proof that the Kingdom still exists on the defendant, but it also separated the Hawaiian Kingdom from the native Hawaiian sovereignty movement and nation building. In 2014, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, explained:

“Petitioners’ theory of nation-building as a fundamental right under the ICA’s decision in Lorenzo does not appear viable. Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] ‘exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature[,]’ and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her. Thus, Lorenzo does not recognize a fundamental right to build a sovereign Hawaiian nation.”

The ICA reiterated that a defendant has to provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State and not just say it exists. In State of Hawai‘i v. Araujo, the ICA stated:

Because Araujo has not, either below or on appeal, “‘presented any factual or legal basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,’” (citing Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i at 221, 883 P.2d at 643), his point of error on appeal must fail.

The Lorenzo court, however, also acknowledged that it may have misplaced the burden of proof and what needs to be proven. It stated, “although the court’s rationale is open to question in light of international law, the record indicates that the decision was correct because Lorenzo did not meet his burden of proving his defense of lack of jurisdiction.”

Because international law provides for the presumption of the continuity of the State despite the overthrow of its government by another State, it shifts the burden of proof and what is to be proven. According to Judge Crawford, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government.” Judge Crawford also stated that belligerent occupation “does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.”

In other words, under international law, it is presumed the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists as a State despited its government being militarily overthrown by the United States on January 17 1893. Addressing the presumption of the continuity of the German State after hostilities ceased in Europe during the Second World War, Professor Brownlie explains:

“Thus, after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War the four major Allied powers assumed supreme power in Germany. The legal competence of the German state [its independence and sovereignty] did not, however, disappear. What occurred is akin to legal representation or agency of necessity. The German state continued to exist, and, indeed, the legal basis of the occupation depended on its continued existence.”

“If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.” A “valid demonstration of legal title” would be an international treaty where the Hawaiian Kingdom ceded itself to the United States. No such treaty, except for the “Big Lie” that Hawai‘i is a part of the United States.

Up until now, the State of Hawai‘i courts and the federal court in Honolulu have been placing the burden on the defendants to prove the Kingdom still exists. Whether the burden is to prove the kingdom’s existence or to prove it doesn’t exist, it is a controlling law that binds the State of Hawai‘i courts.

The Lorenzo case had become a precedent case and was cited by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court in 8 cases, and by the ICA in 45 cases. The latest Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s citation of Lorenzo was in 2020 in State of Hawai‘i v. Malave. The most recent citation of Lorenzo by the ICA was in 2021 in Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Cummings. Since 1994, Lorenzo had risen to precedent, and, therefore, is common law. Federal law mandates federal courts to apply the common law of the State where the court is.

U.S. District Judge David Ezra, who was the presiding judge in United States v. Goo, stated that he was adhering to the Lorenzo principle and that the defendant did not meet his burden of proof. The defendant was claiming that “he is immune from suit or judgment in any court of the United States or the State of Hawaii. Defendant contends that the State is illegally occupying the Kingdom, and thus the laws of the Kingdom should govern his conduct rather than any state or federal laws. Therefore, Defendant opposes an order from a federal court forcing him to pay “foreign” taxes through a foreclosure mechanism.”

In these proceedings, the Federal Defendants act as if there is no such thing as the Lorenzo principle, which is contrary to their position as the United States in the Goo case. The Federal Defendants managed to convince Judge Kobayashi that the case should be dismissed because the issue of whether the kingdom exists is a political question which does not allow the court to have jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction it wouldn’t be able to have an evidentiary hearing.

In none of the 53 cases that cited the Lorenzo principle did the courts invoke the political question doctrine. Even in the 17 federal cases that applied the Lorenzo principle, which includes Goo, did the courts invoke the political question doctrine. All stated the defendants failed to provide any evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists as a State.

The Lorenzo principle gives the State of Hawai‘i and the federal court limited jurisdiction to hear the evidence. If there is no evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists it maintains its jurisdiction. But if evidence shows that the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists, then the courts has no jurisdiction. In these proceedings, when the Federal Defendants fail to provide evidence that the Kingdom no longer exists, the Court will have to transform itself into an Article II Occupation Court in order to have jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the Hawaiian Kingdom.

The issue is not a “political question” but rather a “legal question” that the court has jurisdiction in order to hear the evidence. In another case that came before the ICA, in State of Hawai‘i v. Lee, ICA stated that the Lorenzo court “suggested that it is an open legal question whether the ‘Kingdom of Hawai‘i’ still exists.”

The Federal Defendants are attempting to make an end run on the football field and argue that the Hawaiian Kingdom cannot tackle them. It is an attempt by the Federal Defendants to overcome a difficulty without directly confronting it, which is precisely why judicial estoppel applies and judicial integrity is the primary function of judicial estoppel. Here is what federal courts of appeal say regarding judicial estoppel:

According to the First Circuit, judicial estoppel is to be used “when a litigant is ‘playing fast and loose with the courts,’ and when ‘international self-contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice.’”

The Second Circuit states that judicial estoppel “is supposed to protect judicial integrity by preventing litigants from playing fast and loose with courts, thereby avoiding unfair results and unseemliness.”

The Third Circuit established a requirement that “the party changed his or her position in bad faith, i.e., in a culpable manner threatening to the court’s authority and integrity.”

The Fourth Circuit applies judicial estoppel to prevent litigants from “blowing hot and cold as the occasion demands.”

According to the Fifth Circuit, “litigants undermine the integrity of the judicial process when they deliberately tailor contradictory (as opposed to alternate) positions to the exigencies of the moment.”

The Sixth Circuit states that judicial estoppel “preserves the integrity of the courts by preventing a party from abusing the judicial process through cynical gamesmanship, achieving success on one position, then arguing the opposite to suit an exigency of the moment.”

The Seventh Circuit seeks to have judicial estoppel “to protect the judicial system from being whipsawed with inconsistent arguments.”

The Eighth Circuit says, “the purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. As we read the caselaw, this is tantamount to a knowing misrepresentation to or even fraud on the court.”

The Ninth Circuit allows judicial estoppel to preclude “a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.”

Observing that for judicial estoppel to apply, according to the Eleventh Circuit, the “inconsistencies must be shown to have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.”

This inconsistent position taken by the Federal Defendants has placed the Hawaiian Kingdom in an unfair position. In its closing statement, the Hawaiian Kingdom stated:

“If the Federal Defendants are confident that “Plaintiff’s claim and assertions lack merit,” then let them make their case that the Hawaiian Kingdom “ceases to be a state” under international law pursuant to the Lorenzo principle that the Goo court adhered to. But they cannot prevail by having the Court muzzle the Plaintiff in its own case seeking justice under the rule of law.”

The United States knows that over a century of lies is coming to an end because there never was any evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom no longer exists as a State. As Sir Walter Scott wrote in 1808, “Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to deceive.” It means that when you act dishonestly you are initiating problems, and a domino structure of complications, which will eventually run out of control.

UPDATE for Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden: Hawaiian Kingdom Files Supplement to its Motion to Appeal after Judge Kobayashi Issues latest Order on Friday

This past Friday, August 12, 2022, District Judge Leslie Kobayashi filed a Minute Order taking under advisement the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion to Certify for interlocutory appeal her Order of July 28, 2022, denying the Hawaiian Kingdom’s motion for reconsideration of her previous Order granting the Federal Defendants motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

The Federal Defendants include Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., President of the United States; Kamala Harris, Vice-President of the United States; John Aquilino, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service; Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senate Majority Leader; and Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives.

In their Motion to Dismiss, the Federal Defendants were claiming that this case presents a political question and that it should be dismissed. A political question means that since the United States has not recognized a nation as being sovereign and independent, the court’s will not adjudicate the case because the recognition of the sovereignty of that nation is first committed to the political branches of government. An example of a political question is Palestine. Because the United States has yet to recognize Palestine as an independent State, the federal courts deny access on matters relating to Palestine because it is a political question that the political branches have yet to recognize it.

The political question doctrine, however, does not apply in this case because the United States recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as a sovereign and independent State on July 6, 1844, by letter of Secretary of State John C. Calhoun on behalf of President John Tyler, and later entered into treaty relations and the establishment of embassies and consulates in the two countries.

Also, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §202, comment g, states that the United States’ “duty to treat a qualified entity as a state also implies that so long as the entity continues to meet those qualifications its statehood may not be ‘derecognized.’” The United States cannot now claim that it has de-recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom. It must show a treaty where the Hawaiian Kingdom merged with the United States, which would result in its extinguishment. No such treaty exists.

In her June 9, 2022 Order granting the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Kobayashi stated, “Plaintiff bases its claims on the proposition that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a sovereign and independent State. However, ‘Hawaii is a state of the United States…. The Ninth Circuit, this court, and Hawai‘i state courts have rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty.’” She then concludes, without reference to any evidence, “Plaintiff’s claims are ‘so patently without merit that the claims require no meaningful consideration.’”

The Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 15, 2022, because Judge Kobayashi’s Order is not in line with the court decisions she cited regarding the Hawaiian Kingdom. In its motion, the Hawaiian Kingdom brought to the attention of Judge Kobayashi the Lorenzo principle that stemmed from a 1994 appeals case, State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, that came before the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). That case centered on whether or not the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist despite the unlawful overthrow of its government by the United States on January 17, 1893.

Lorenzo lost his appeal because the ICA stated, “Lorenzo has presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” In other words, if Lorenzo did provide the evidence of the Kingdom’s existence as a State his appeal would have been granted and his criminal conviction by the trial court overturned.

In 2002, District Court Judge David Ezra, in United States v. Goo, stated, “This court sees no reason why it should not adhere to the Lorenzo principle.” What is surprising is that Judge Kobayashi was serving at the time as the Magistrate Judge under District Court Judge Ezra who made the decision that the court would “adhere to the Lorenzo principle.” The case centered on an Order issued by Magistrate Judge Kobayashi, which Judge Ezra affirmed. Judge Kobayashi cannot simply disregard the Lorenzo principle, when in fact the Lorenzo principle was used to confirm her Order as a Magistrate Judge.

In 2004, the ICA reiterated that a defendant has to provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State and not just say it exists. In State of Hawai‘i v. Araujo, the ICA stated:

Because Araujo has not, either below or on appeal, “‘presented any factual or legal basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,’” (citing Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i at 221, 883 P.2d at 643), his point of error on appeal must fail.

Finally, in 2014, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, clarified this evidentiary burden. The Supreme Court stated:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the Kingdom “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.

When Judge Kobayashi stated in her Order granting the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss that the “Ninth Circuit, this court, and Hawai‘i state courts have rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty,” this is not an accurate statement. What the courts did conclude is that the defendants in those cases did not provide any evidence of the Kingdom’s existence as a State according to the Lorenzo principle. Instead, the defendants provided argument but not any evidence to support their argument. Judge Kobayashi’s statement would appear that these courts concluded the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist as a State, which was clearly not the case.

Despite the Hawaiian Kingdom’s attempt to draw the attention of Judge Kobayashi to the Lorenzo principle and her errors, she issued an Order on July 28, 2022, denying the Hawaiian Kingdom’s request for reconsideration. She stated, “Although Plaintiff argues there are manifest errors of law in the 6/9/22 Order, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision. Plaintiff’s mere disagreement, however, does not constitute grounds for reconsideration.”

Normally, when one of the parties to a lawsuit wants to appeal a decision made by a federal judge they have to wait until the case is over. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “A district court order…is not appealable [under § 1291] unless it disposes of all claims as to all parties or unless judgment is entered in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).” In other words, an Order is appealable while a case is still pending before the district court if it is in compliance with certain rules.

Federal statute 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) allows for Orders, called interlocutory orders, to be appealable if there is a difference of opinion regarding a controlling question of law. This is precisely what Judge Kobayashi stated in her Order denying the request for reconsideration. She stated, “Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” This disagreement centers on a law that is supposed to be applied by the court in these proceedings. In this case, it would be the application of the Lorenzo principle.

Laws are not only legislative enactments but also include Appellate Court and Supreme Court decisions called common law. When there is no statute or law that would apply to a particular issue, the courts are allowed to make decisions that bind the lower courts when those type of matters come before the trial courts. Until a law is enacted on that particular matter or the highest court changes its decision, the common law would continue to apply at the district court level and bind the judges in their decisions.

The Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Motion to Certify so that the Ninth Circuit can review Judge Kobayashi’s Orders. Under §1292(b), the district court judge must first certify that the request to appeal an interlocutory order to the Ninth Circuit has met certain elements. §1292(b) states:

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order.

When a motion is filed in court proceedings, the other party, in this case the Federal Defendants, will have to file a motion to oppose or not oppose the filing. Dexter Ka‘iama, Attorney General for the Hawaiian Kingdom, spoke with the Department of Justice who is representing the Federal Defendants and told them that the Hawaiian Kingdom will be filing a motion for certification and asked if they would oppose or agree with the action. They told Attorney General Ka‘iama that they would oppose it.

The Hawaiian Kingdom was planning to respond to the Federal Defendants’ filing of their opposition with additional information it had found to support its Motion to Certify. However, when Judge Kobayashi filed her Order this past Friday, she stated, “that no response to the Certification Motion is necessary,” which means the Federal Defendants will not be filing their opposition as to why they oppose the motion to certify. They merely stated to Attorney General Ka‘iama that they will oppose it.

On Sunday, August 14, 2022, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Supplement to its Motion to Certify with the information it intended to reply to the Federal Defendants’ filing of their opposition. In its supplement to its motion, the Hawaiian Kingdom showed that there are other laws, along with the Lorenzo principle, to be the controlling law on this topic that Judge Kobayashi disregarded.

In its recent filing, the Hawaiian Kingdom expanded on the Lorenzo principle as the common law of the State of Hawai‘i. For the past 28 years, State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo was cited by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court in 8 cases, the most recent was in 2020. The ICA cited Lorenzo in 45 cases, the most recent was in 2021.

As common law of the State of Hawai‘i, Judge Kobayashi was bound to apply it in this case because of §34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, which is codified under 28 U.S.C. §1652:

The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.

Reinforcing this statute, the United States Supreme Court, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, stated that “federal courts are bound to follow decisions of the courts of the State in which the controversies arise.” Judge Kobayashi cannot simply disregard 28 years of decisions by the State of Hawai‘i courts that say defendants must provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State despite its government being unlawfully overthrown by the United States on January 17, 1893. The Hawaiian Kingdom also stated:

Further, it appears that the Court adopted a federal rule of decision to favor the United States despite its admitted illegal conduct regarding the overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom on January 17, 1893. The application of the Lorenzo principle, as the common law of the State of Hawai‘i, should not be deemed by the Court to be incompatible with federal interests because it does not promote the interest of the United States. This is problematic because the federal court did adopt the Lorenzo principle as federal law in 17 cases, but this Court adopted a rule of decision—political question doctrine, in this one instance without any basis in law or fact, that unfairly advances the interest of the United States and shields them from accountability for its admitted unlawful conduct. This gives the impression that the Court is giving one party to the controversy an unfair advantage.

The Hawaiian Kingdom concluded:

Because the Court chose to supersede the decisions of the ICA and the Hawai‘i Supreme Court regarding the evidentiary basis of Lorenzo by invoking the political question doctrine in favor of the United States, the Court should certify for interlocutory appeal so that the Ninth Circuit can address this matter in the light of §1652, Erie, and the Lorenzo principle as controlling law in this case.

UPDATE for Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden: Hawaiian Kingdom Files Motion to Appeal Judge Kobayashi’s Fourth Order to the Ninth Circuit

On July 12, 2022, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an Order dismissing the appeal of the Hawaiian Kingdom that came before a three-judge panel comprised of Justices Silverman, Callahan, and Collins. The Order stated that the Ninth Circuit Court “lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the challenged orders are not final or appealable.” The Court explained, “A district court order is…not appealable [§1291] unless it disposes of all claims as to all parties or unless judgment is entered in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).”

The Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden proceedings are still taking place at the district court in Hawai‘i, which is why the Ninth Circuit denied the appeal. While the Ninth Circuit was deliberating, District Court Judge Leslie Kobayashi issued a third Order granting the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice because the case presents a political question. The basis for her third Order was the same regarding her previous two Orders that were before the Ninth Circuit. Without providing any supporting evidence that it is a political question, Judge Kobayashi stated:

Plaintiff bases its claims on the proposition that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a sovereign and independent state. However, “Hawaii is a state of the United States… The Ninth Circuit, this court, and Hawaii state courts have rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty.” “‘[T]here is no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.’”

As such, Plaintiff’s claims are “patently without merit that the claim[s] require[] no meaningful consideration.” In any event, to the extent that Plaintiff’s ask the Court to declare that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a sovereign territory, the United States Supreme Court made clear over 130 years ago that “[w]ho is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political, question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges….” “The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.” “This principle has always been upheld by” the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and Plaintiff’s claims against the Federal Defendants must be dismissed.

On June 15, 2022, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a motion for reconsideration with Judge Kobayashi. For the first time in these proceedings, the Hawaiian Kingdom, in its motion, addressed the Lorenzo principle and who actually has the burden of evidence and what needs to be proven. In State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, the Intermediate Court of Appeals admitted that its “rationale is open to question in light of international” by placing the burden on the defendant to provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State.

If the court applied international law, which they admitted they didn’t but could, there is a presumption that the Hawaiian Kingdom, an established and recognized State in the nineteenth century, continues to exist until there is rebuttable evidence to the contrary. In other words, when you apply international law it is not an issue of whether the Hawaiian Kingdom exists as a State, but rather an issue that the Hawaiian Kingdom no longer exists as a State under international law.

You start off with the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence until an opposing party provides evidence that the United States extinguished the existence of the Kingdom. There is no such evidence, which is why the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1999 verified the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as a “State” in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom.

It is clear that the federal court does apply the State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo case when defendants assert that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist. In 2002, U.S. District Court Judge David Ezra, in United States v. Goo, stated:

Since the Intermediate Court of Appeals for the State of Hawaii’s decision in Hawaii v. Lorenzo, the courts in Hawaii have consistently adhered to the Lorenzo court’s statements that the Kingdom of Hawaii is not recognized as a sovereign state by either the United States or the State of Hawaii. See Lorenzosee also State of Hawaii v. French (stating that “presently there is no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognizing attributes of a state’s sovereign nature”) (quoting Lorenzo). This court sees no reason why it should not adhere to the Lorenzo principle.

In State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, the Intermediate Court of Appeals explained, it “was incumbent on Defendant to present evidence supporting his claim. Lorenzo has presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” Because Lorenzo presented no evidence is why his appeal was denied. Affirming the jurisdictional issue and the burden of providing evidence, the State of Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, explained:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.

The operative word in Judge Ezra’s decision, like the Intermediate Court of Appeals, is “presently” because of the evidentiary burden not being met. Regarding this burden to provide evidence, Judge Ezra stated, “that Defendant has failed to provide any viable legal or factual support for his claim that as a citizen of the Kingdom he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts.”

The Lorenzo principle was applied by the federal court in 17 cases since 1993 and was addressing the fact that the defendants in these cases provided no evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State. That is why the decisions had the word “presently,” because it is still an open question. Not one of these cases stated what Judge Kobayashi stated in her Order that the issue is a political question.

While the Hawaiian Kingdom did not have the burden to provide evidence of its continued existence as a State pursuant to the Lorenzo principle, it did so throughout these proceedings from the start. Whether or not who has the burden to provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence or its non-existence, the outcome is the same regarding the jurisdiction of the State of Hawai‘i court or the federal court. Simply stated, if the Hawaiian Kingdom exists then the courts have no jurisdiction.

The Lorenzo principle is called federal common law, which Black’s Law dictionary defines as a “body of decisional law developed by the federal courts.” In 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, stated that federal courts have to apply the laws and decisions of State courts where they reside. As Judge Ezra explained, the Lorenzo principle stems from the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals in State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo.

No State of Hawai‘i court applying the precedent of State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo in their decisions or the 17 federal court decisions applying the Lorenzo principle stated that the issue presents a political question. Judge Kobayashi’s statement that the issue is a political question has no basis in fact or in law.

On July 28, 2022, Judge Kobayashi denied the Hawaiian Kingdom’s motion. In her fourth Order she stated, “Plaintiff’s Motion fails to identify any new material facts not previously available, an intervening change in law, or a manifest error of law or fact. Although Plaintiff argues there are manifest errors of law in the 6/9/22 Order, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” She sums it up that it’s merely a disagreement.

It is clear that Judge Kobayashi’s opinion that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist flies in the face of an evidentiary burden in the Lorenzo principle that has and continues to be applied by the State of Hawai‘i courts since 1994 and the federal court since 1993. This is not a mere disagreement between Judge Kobayashi and the Hawaiian Kingdom, but rather a complete disregard of 29 years of court decisions that when a party is claiming the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist it must provide evidence of a factual or legal basis. Her decision is a clear “manifest error of law.”

This past Friday, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a motion to certify for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit of a non-final order. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the Ninth Circuit Court can hear a non-final order if it involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

The question of law and the difference of opinion would be the Lorenzo doctrine, which Judge Kobayashi acknowledged when she stated, “Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” The issue that it “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” is that the Hawaiian Kingdom could move for summary judgement because none of the Federal Defendants contested the allegations in the amended complaint. A summary judgment is a judgment entered by a court for one of the parties without going to trial.

There is a two-step process for a non-final Order to be taken up on appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court. First, Judge Kobayashi will have to first certify the appeal with an Order, and, second, the Hawaiian Kingdom will have to file that Order with the Ninth Circuit for their acceptance of the appeal. If Judge Kobayashi denies the certification, the Hawaiian Kingdom will appeal on this same subject when the case has come to a close. This filing of the appeal now is so that resources and money won’t be wasted by continuing the proceedings in the district court, especially when everything centers on the Lorenzo doctrine.

The issue before the federal court in Hawai‘i is no longer its status as an Article II Occupation Court, but rather the Lorenzo principle and the issue of the Hawaiian Kingdom continued existence as a State. The transformation of the federal court into an Article II Occupation Court is incidental to the Lorenzo principle and the application of international law.