The Chair of the Maui County Council’s Disaster, Resilience, International Affairs and Planning (DRIP) Committee, Councilwoman Tamara Paltin, invited Dr. Keanu Sai to give an update on the status of Hawai‘i under international law at the DRIP Committee meeting on March 6, 2024. In 2019, Dr. Sai did three presentations on the Hawaiian Kingdom for the Maui County Council’s Land Use Committee.
On October 20, 2023, the Council of Regency, as the government of the occupied State, initiated the process to terminate the 1884 Supplemental Convention (“Pearl Harbor Convention”). Secretary of State Antony Blinken received the notice of termination from the Council of Regency on October 26, 2023, at 05:47 hours, which consequently triggered the tolling of twelve months. According to the terms of the Pearl Harbor Convention, the treaty will be terminated on October 26, 2024, 05:47 hours.
The Pearl Harbor Convention extended the duration of the 1875 Commercial Reciprocity Treaty an additional seven years until 1894, unless either the United States or the Hawaiian Kingdom gives notice to the other of its intention to terminate the treaty and convention. According to Article I:
The High Contracting Parties agree, that the time fixed for the duration of the said Convention, shall be definitely extended for a term of seven years from the date of the exchange of ratifications hereof, and further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the High Contracting Parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, each of the High Contracting Parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of seven years or at any time thereafter.
As a condition for the extension of the commercial treaty, the United States sought exclusive access to Pearl Harbor. Article II of the Pearl Harbor Convention provides:
His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the Government of the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end the United States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other things needful to the purpose aforesaid.
According to Article 1, the Pearl Harbor Convention came into effect in 1887 after ratifications were exchanged in Washington, D.C., and would last for seven years and further until “either of the High Contracting Parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same,” where termination would commence twelve months after the notification is received by the other High Contracting Party. Although the Hawaiian government was unlawfully overthrown by the United States on 17 January 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law continued to exist.
After the Hawaiian government was overthrown by the United States in 1893, the United States did nothing with Pearl Harbor until 1908 when the United States Congress allocated monies to build a naval station instead of a “coaling and repair station.” This violated the terms of the Pearl Harbor Convention as well as violating the Hawaiian Kingdom’s neutrality under international law.
The Pearl Harbor Convention has a direct nexus to the presence of the U.S. military component commands of the Indo-Pacific Command that has military installations and firing ranges outside of the perimeter of Pearl Harbor. Component commands of the Indo-Pacific Command include: United States Army Pacific, United States Marine Corps Forces Hawai‘i, and United States Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.
A note of the Hawaiian Kingdom attached to the Pearl Harbor Convention stated, “that Hawaiian Sovereignty and jurisdiction were not impaired that the Hawaiian Government was not bound to furnish land for any purpose and that the privilege to be granted should be coterminous with the Treaty.” Coterminous is defined as “having the same boundaries,” which is limited to Pearl Harbor.
The unlawful presence of the United States military has transformed the Hawaiian Kingdom from a neutral State into a military target by its adversaries, which first occurred on 7 December 1941 when Japan’s military forces attacked U.S. military targets. The high probability of military attacks by other countries, such as North Korea, China, and Russia continue due to the rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific region. In 1990, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Risks and Hazards—A State by State Guide listed 6 targets for nuclear attack that would effectively annihilate the entire Island of O‘ahu. The presence of the United States military places the civilian population of the Hawaiian Kingdom into perilous danger.
The component commanders—General Charles A. Flynn, Commander U.S. Army Pacific, Lieutenant General William M. Jurney, Commander U.S. Marine Corps Forces Hawai‘i, Captain Mark Sohaney, USN, Commander U.S. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, and Colonel Monica Gramling, Deputy Commander U.S. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, were notified by Dr. David Keanu Sai, as Head of the Royal Commission of Inquiry:
In light of the termination of the Pearl Harbor Convention, all Title 10 military forces of the four component commands of the Indo-Pacific Command—Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, shall forthwith cease and desist any and all military exercises, to include utilizing live fire ranges across the islands, and anywhere within 200 nautical miles from the low water mark of the shoreline of the islands that constitute the Hawaiian Kingdom’s territorial sea and its exclusive economic zone, and to complete the withdrawal from the Hawaiian Islands by 26 October 2024.
The Staff Judge Advocates of the Indo-Pacific Command and the 25th Infantry Division were also included with the notifications. In his letters, Dr. Sai restated from the Council of Regency’s proclamation terminating the Pearl Harbor Convention:
And, We do require that when the United States has received this notice of termination, it shall, prior to the expiration of twelve months in accordance with Article I of the 1884 Supplemental Convention, remove all movable property at its military facilities throughout the Hawaiian Islands, including unexploded munitions, and fuel, with the exception of real property attached to the land or erected on it, including manmade objects, such as buildings, homes, structures, roads, sewers, and fences, to include on other properties that have been or are currently under its supervision and command.
Dr. Sai stated that the reasoning for notifying the component commands was because it was unclear whether the State Department notified Indo-Pacific Command of the termination of the Pearl Harbor Convention. Dr. Sai also stated that it did not appear that U.S. troops were beginning to be withdrawn. In his letters to the commanders of the component commands, Dr. Sai addressed the war crimes of confiscation or destruction of property:
Military installations and target ranges beyond Pearl Harbor were unlawfully confiscated by the United States from the Hawaiian Kingdom public lands and the estates of private persons in violation of international humanitarian law and the law of occupation. Live fire at these target ranges constitute destruction of property. According to Professor William Schabas, renowned expert on international criminal law, war crimes and human rights, in his legal opinion on war crimes being committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom, there are five elements of the war crime of confiscation or destruction of property.
Following the end of hostilities during the Second World War, the war crimes tribunals in Nuremburg and Tokyo, “marked a clear recognition by the international community that all members of the chain of command who participate or acquiesce in war crimes must bear individual criminal responsibility.” Command responsibility arises when the military superior during an occupation of a foreign State fails to exercise sufficient control and accountability for his/her subordinates’ in the commission of war crimes. And a “non-military commander is [also] responsible for omissions which lead to the commission of crimes.” The doctrine of command responsibility arises when a superior, by omission, fails to control or punish those under his/her command.
Dereliction of the performance of a duty arises when a commander took no action to prevent, stop, or punish. Confiscation and destruction of property are war crimes and commanders of the four component commands have a duty to stop the further commission of these and other war crimes. Dereliction of the performance of a duty is also a war crime of omission.
Dr. Sai’s letter concluded with:
Since 17 April 2023, I have been in communication with Major General Kenneth Hara of the State of Hawai‘i Department of Defense, regarding his duty under international law and Army regulations, to transition the State of Hawai‘i into a military government. Of note in my meeting with BG Okamura on November 1, 2023, he stated to me that the withdrawal of U.S. troops because of the termination of the Pearl Harbor Convention will create chaos. I acknowledged that it would indeed be chaotic, and then answered that is precisely why MG Hara must establish a military government to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. troops and begin to comply with the law of occupation. BG Okamura responded to me with that’s a good plan.
Unlike American politicians, members of the military have a duty and responsibility to comport with international law and regulations. To begin to withdraw Title 10 troops under your command is a duty imposed by the terms of a treaty and that you have command responsibility. Your presence in this country was by virtue of a treaty that would last from 1887 to 1894, and further, unless either country gives notice to the other of its intention to terminate. That notice to terminate was received by the United States on 26 October 2023 at 05:47 hours, which triggered the tolling of 12 months for termination. Therefore, your withdrawal is a duty imposed by the termination of that treaty that is not affected by any presidential or congressional action.
There would be no duty imposed upon you if the Hawaiian Kingdom had ceased to exist as a State under international law, but this is not the case because the United States recognized the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State and the Council of Regency as its government by opinio juris. Additionally, the United States explicitly recognized the Council of Regency by agreement so it could be granted permission to access all records and pleadings of the Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
When United States President Grover Cleveland admitted that the overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom was an “act of war,” it triggered international humanitarian law and the law of occupation on January 17, 1893. Instead of restoring Queen Lili‘uokalani as the Executive Monarch under a treaty called an executive agreement, by exchange of notes, between the Queen and President Cleveland, on December 18, 1893, Cleveland’s successor, President William McKinley unilaterally seized the Hawaiian Islands when he signed into American law the joint resolution of annexation on July 7, 1898. The purpose of the unilateral seizure of the Islands was to establish a military outpost to protect the west coast of the United States.
For the past 131 years, the United States has not been held to account for their violations of international law and the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom because violations of international law did not hold governmental officials of the State accountable for the actions of soldiers who committed war crimes. In 1919, there was an attempt to hold to account the German Kaiser for war crimes by an international tribunal established by the Allies of the First World War.
In its report, the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the First World War concluded, “All persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offenses against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution” by the international tribunal. The United States, however, was against this. U.S. members of the Commission stated:
In regard to the latter point, it will be observed that the American representatives did not deny the responsibility of the heads of states for acts which they may have committed in violation of law, including in so far as their country is concerned, the laws and customs of war, but they held that heads of states are, as agents of the people, in whom the sovereignty of any state resides, responsible to the people for the illegal acts which they may have committed, and that they are not and that they should not be made responsible to any other sovereignty.
In other words, the United States position was to have the countries themselves prosecute their Heads of State. This position also implied that if the country’s won’t prosecute their Heads of State, their criminal culpability would go unchecked. The United States position would change, however, after the fall of the Nazi government and the Imperial Japanese government during the Second World War. Here an international tribunal was established to try high-level officials of the Nazi regime for war crimes and high-level officials of the Imperial Japanese government. This unified system laid the groundwork for the creation of international criminal law.
As stated by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union v. Göring et al. (1948), “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” Abstract entities are countries called States. In other words, you can’t punish the State, but you can hold to account members of the government of a State, whether civilian or military, for war crimes.
In 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in The Hague, Netherlands for the prosecution of war crimes. 123 States approved the Rome Statute that established the ICC with jurisdiction over their territories. Collectively, you have 124 governmental organizations to prosecute war crimes, which are the 123 prosecutors and criminal courts of the States, and the prosecutor and courts of the ICC. Prosecutions for war crimes by the ICC are “for the most serious crimes of international concern,” while prosecution by the 123 States are for war criminal that enters into the territory. According to Article 1 of the Rome Statute:
An International Criminal Court is hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concerns, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.
The significance of Article 1 is that the primary responsibility to prosecute war criminals are the 123 States and not the ICC. The war criminal reports by the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) establish the evidentiary basis for prosecution by these States when those subjects of the reports enter their territory. As part of its mandate, it is also the duty of the RCI to ensure that these war criminals get prosecuted by all means necessary. There are no statutes of limitations to prevent the prosecution of war crimes. The Council of Regency is currently in communication with the legal counsel at the United Nations regarding the Hawaiian Kingdom’s accession to the Rome Statute that grants jurisdiction of the ICC over the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom.
To begin to comply with international humanitarian law and the law of occupation, the decision to be made by February 17, 2024, does not fall upon an “abstract entity” called the United States or the State of Hawai‘i but rather upon Major General Kenneth Hara and the members of the State of Hawai‘i Legislature and the County Councils themselves.
For Major General Hara, his duty under international humanitarian law and the law of occupation is to transform the State of Hawai‘i into a military government on February 17. The action to be taken by members of the State of Hawai‘i Legislature and the County Councils is to cease and desist by February 17 the commission of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation.
Their failure to comply does not affect the mandate of the RCI or the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Their failure to comply with the law of occupation merely serves as evidence of meeting the elements of the war crime and having criminal culpability.
In a letter that was emailed to Major General Hara yesterday by Dr. David Keanu Sai, as Head of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, he opened with:
On behalf of the Council of Regency, I hereby make a final appeal for you to perform your duty of transforming the State of Hawai‘i into a military government on February 17, 2024, in accordance with Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and Army regulations. To not do so, you will have command responsibility for the commission of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the State of Hawai‘i.
Copied to the letter included members of the State of Hawai‘i Legislature and the County Councils. In that letter, Dr. Sai then laid out the circumstances that led to establishing the date of February 17, 2024, as the deadline for action. After 24 years of exposure of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an occupied State, the State of Hawai‘i is now at a crossroads. To continue on the path of illegality, or to change course because of legality is the question that faces officials of the State of Hawai‘i. In his letter to the members of the Legislature and County Councils on February 7, 2024, Dr. Sai wrote:
[I]f you shall not cease the enactment of American municipal laws and continue to commit the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation with impunity, you will be the subject of a war criminal report, which will provide the factual information, to include this letter of communication, that satisfies the aforementioned four elements of criminal culpability. I urge you not to take this lightly. War crimes have no statute of limitations.
These ultimatums put forth by the Royal Commission of Inquiry stems from its duty and responsibility to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed within Hawaiian territory. This responsibility is not a choice but a duty, under international law, in order to protect the population of an occupied State. On the contrary, there is no responsibility or duty to enact American laws by officials that were elected by the American citizenry in the territory that is occupied by the United States because to do so is the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation. However, to commit an international crime the act must be accompanied with mens rea or the guilty mind. In other words, the war crime must be committed with intent and knowledge.
Prior to receiving the letter from the Royal Commission of Inquiry it could be assumed that the members of the Legislature and the County Councils were not aware that their action in enacting American laws in an occupied State was unlawful under international law. But after they received the letter, the circumstances have changed, and their continued action of enacting laws would be committed with intent and knowledge.
Last year, when Germany prosecuted Irmgard Furchner, a 97-year-old woman, of being an accessory to more than 10,000 murders for her role as a secretary to the SS commander of the Nazis’ Stutthof concentration camp during the Second World War, the prosecutors had to prove intent. In the case, the judges were convinced Furchner “knew and, through her work as a stenographer in the commandant’s office of the Stutthof concentration camp from June 1, 1943, to April 1, 1945, deliberately supported the fact that 10,505 prisoners were cruelly killed by gassings, by hostile conditions in the camp,” by transportation to the Auschwitz death camp and by being sent on death marches at the end of the war.
In the Hawaiian situation, the enactment of American laws is the source of secondary war crimes such as denationalization through Americanization, unfair trial by a court that lacks lawful authority, unlawful confinement ordered by a judge without authority, destruction of property as the case of Mauna Kea, etc. Therefore, the enactment of American laws in an occupied State is not an innocent act of legislative responsibility unless there is irrefutable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom is not an occupied State. If the Hawaiian Islands constitute a part of the territory of the United States and that the State of Hawai‘i is a lawfully established government under the constitution and laws of the United States, then officials of the State of Hawai‘i have nothing to worry about.
Professor William Schabas, renowned expert on international criminal and war crimes, states that in order to establish criminal intent for war crimes, there is no requirement for a legal evaluation as to the existence of an occupation stemming from an international armed conflict. Instead, there is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances of an occupation. Conversely, a legal evaluation would be welcomed not for determining whether an act constitutes a war crime, but for providing irrefutable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not continue to exist as an occupied State.
This is why Major General Hara, after being apprised by Dr. Sai on April 17, 2023, that war crimes are being committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom as an occupied State, he tasked his Staff Judge Advocate, Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd Phelps, to investigate. He could not find any legal basis to conclude Major General Hara has no such duty to establish a military government because the Hawaiian Kingdom is not an occupied State and that the State of Hawai‘i is a lawful entity. There exists no such legal opinion.
In fact, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel does have a legal opinion on the annexation of Hawai‘i by a congressional legislation that it published in 1988. The opinion is not what you would expect from the federal government on Hawai‘i. The legal opinion was advising the State Department on the legal issues raised by a proposed Presidential proclamation to extend the territorial sea from three miles off the coast of the United Stats to twelve miles. In that legal opinion, Acting Assistant Attorney General Douglas W. Kmiec concluded,
It is therefore unclear which constitutional power Congress exercised when it acquired Hawaii by joint resolution. Accordingly it is doubtful that the acquisition of Hawaii can serve as an appropriate precedent for a congressional assertion of sovereignty over an extended territorial sea.
In support of this conclusion, Acting Assistant Attorney General Kmiec relied on statements made in 1898 by members of the Congress, and also writings of constitutional scholar Professor Westel Willoughby who stated:
The constitutionality of the annexation of Hawaii, by a simple legislative act, was strenuously contested at the time both in Congress and by the press. The right to annex by treaty was not denied, but it was denied that this might be done by a simple legislative act. … Only by means of treaties, it was asserted, can the relations between States be governed, for a legislative act is necessarily without extraterritorial force—confined in its operation to the territory of the State by whose legislature it is enacted.
If it is unclear how Congress could annex foreign territory by legislative action, it would be equally unclear how Congress could establish the State of Hawai‘i by legislative action in 1959. Without a treaty all American laws imposed in the Hawaiian Kingdom constitutes the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation.
In 2014, however, there was an attempt by an official of the State of Hawai‘i to get an answer from the State Department regarding the functions of the State of Hawai‘i in light of the 1988 legal opinion. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs top executive, Dr. Kamana‘opono Crabbe, submitted a formal request with the U.S. Department of State requesting a legal opinion from the U.S. Attorney General’s Office of Legal Counsel addressing the legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom under international law.
In his letter to Secretary of State John F. Kerry, Crabbe said, “because the Department of State is the United States’ executive department responsible for international relations and who also housed diplomatic papers and agreements with the Hawaiian Kingdom, I am respectfully submitting a formal request to have the Department of State request an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, addressing the following questions:
• First, does the Hawaiian Kingdom, as a sovereign independent State, continue to exist as a subject of international law?
• Second, if the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist, do the sole-executive agreements bind the United States today?
• Third, if the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist and the sole-executive agreements are binding on the United States, what effect would such a conclusion have on United States domestic legislation, such as the Hawai‘i Statehood Act, 73 Stat. 4, and Act 195?
• Fourth, if the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist and the sole-executive agreements are binding on the United States, have the members of the Native Hawaiian Roll Commission, Trustees and staff of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs incurred criminal liability under international law?”
This letter boxed in the Secretary of State by forcing him to answer the first question as to whether the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a subject of international law. If the Office of Legal Counsel can write a legal opinion that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not continue to exist, they don’t have to answer following three questions. The Secretary of State did not make the request for a legal opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, which affirms the 1988 legal opinion that Congress could not annex the Hawaiian Islands by legislation.
Major General Hara and members of the Legislature and the County Councils should take heed of this information as February 17, 2024, is fast approaching.
The legal basis for the Council of Regency’s establishment under Hawaiian constitutional law and the legal doctrine of necessity was based on the continued existence of the country called the Hawaiian State. What was unlawfully overthrown on January 17, 1893, was the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom and not the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law. In fact, international law protects the State and its continuity from the continuous violations of its sovereignty by another State. What international law cannot protect, however, is the population of the Hawaiian Islands from denationalization through Americanization that began as a formal policy in 1906.
Under international criminal law, denationalization is the process of replacing the national consciousness of the Hawaiian Kingdom, to include its language, in the minds of school children with the national consciousness of the United States and its English language. Within three generations since 1906, the national consciousness of the Hawaiian Kingdom was wiped clean in the minds of the population in the Hawaiian Islands. Denationalization is a policy carried out in the school systems of the occupied States that attempts to change the national consciousness in the minds of school children. The United States and the Allied Powers in the First World War determined denationalization to be a war crime committed by Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria against the population of the Kingdom of Serbia when Serbia was occupied.
From the Allied Powers 1919 Commission on Responsibilities for the First World War, under the heading “attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory,” the Commission charged several crimes committed in Serbia by the Bulgarian authorities: “Efforts to impose their national characteristics on the population;” “Serbian language forbidden in private as well as in official relations. People beaten for saying “Good morning” in Serbian;” Inhabitants forced to give their names a Bulgarian form;” “Serbian books banned—were systematically destroyed;” “Archives of churches and law-courts destroyed;” “Schools and churches closed, sometimes destroyed;” “Bulgarian schools and churches substituted—attendance at school compulsory;” “Population forced to be present at Bulgarian national solemnities.” The Commission also stated that in Serbia the Austrian and German authorities “interfered with religious worship, by deportation of priests and requisition of churches for military purposes. Interfered with the Serbian language.” In United States v. Greifelt et al., in 1948, the war crimes tribunal specifically referred to the war crime of denationalization by German authorities in occupied territories during the Second World War. The tribunal observed:
Attempts of this nature were recognized as a war crime in view of the German policy in territories annexed by Germany in 1914, such as in Alsace and Lorraine. At that time, as during the war of 1939-1945, inhabitants of an occupied territory were subjected to measures intended to deprive them of their national characteristics and to make the land and population affected a German province. The methods applied by the Nazis in Poland and other occupied territories, including once more Alsace and Lorraine, were of a similar nature with the sole difference that they were more ruthless and wider in scope than in 1914-1918. In this connection the policy of ‘Germanizing’ the populations concerned, as shown by the evidence in the trial under review, consisted partly in forcibly denationalizing given classes or groups of the local population, such as Poles, Alsace-Lorrainers, Slovenes and others eligible for Germanization under the German People’s List. As a result in these cases the programme of genocide was being achieved through acts which, in themselves, constitute war crimes.
The operative word used when describing the policy and acts of denationalization committed against the population of occupied States in both World Wars was “attempts.” The reason for the choice of this word was because the First World War only lasted for four years, and the Second World War only lasted six years. The American occupation is now at 131 years where the lies to conceal the occupation have become institutionalized and perceived to be the truth. As British novelist Dresden James wrote, “When a well-packaged web of lies has been sold gradually to the masses over generations, the truth will seem utterly preposterous and its speaker a raving lunatic.”
Another war crime committed by German, Austrian and Bulgarian authorities in occupied territories during the First World War was usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation. Usurpation of sovereignty is the imposition of the laws of the occupying State over the territory and its population of the occupied State. During the military occupation of a State, the occupying State is obligated to temporarily administer the laws of the occupied State until there is a treaty of peace. To impose the occupying State’s laws is a crime.
The Commission on Responsibility for the First World War charged that in Poland the German and Austrian forces had “prevented the populations from organising themselves to maintain order and public security” and that they had “[a]ided the Bolshevist hordes that invaded the territories.” It said that in Romania the German authorities had “instituted German civil courts to try disputes between subjects of the Central Powers or between a subject of these powers and a Romanian, a neutral, or subjects of Germany’s enemies.” In Serbia, the Bulgarian authorities had “[p]roclaimed that the Serbian State no longer existed, and that Serbian territory had become Bulgarian.” It listed several other war crimes of Bulgaria committed in occupied Serbia: “Serbian law, courts and administration ousted;” “Taxes collected under Bulgarian fiscal regime;” “Serbian currency suppressed;” “Public property removed or destroyed, including books, archives and MSS (e.g., from the National Library, the University Library, Serbian Legation at Sofia, French Consulate at Uskub);” “Prohibited sending Serbian Red Cross to occupied Serbia.” It also charged that in Serbia the German and Austrian authorities had committed several war crimes: “The Austrians suspended many Serbian laws and substituted their own, especially in penal matters, in procedure, judicial organisation, etc.;” and “Museums belonging to the State (e.g., Belgrade, Detchani) were emptied and the contents taken to Vienna.”
The crime of “usurpation of sovereignty” was referred to by Judge Blair of the American Military Commission in a separate opinion in United States v. Alstötter et al. of 1951, “This rule is incident to military occupation and was clearly intended to protect the inhabitants of any occupied territory against the unnecessary exercise of sovereignty by a military occupant.”
When the Hawaiian government was restored by a Council of Regency in 1997, it also held vicarious liability for its actions. As a constitutional monarchy, the primary duty of the Hawaiian government is to protect the rights of its population. In Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Larsen was alleging that he was not being protected by the Regency because the Regency, he argued, was allowing the unlawful imposition of American laws over him which led to his unfair trial and incarceration. The Regency denied this allegation but used the Permanent Court of Arbitration to recognize the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State and the Regency as its government.
This duty for governments to protect its population from war crimes reached the international level in 2005. At the United Nations World Summit in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect was unanimously adopted. The principle of the Responsibility to Protect has three pillars: (1) every State has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing; (2) the wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual States in meeting that responsibility; and (3) if a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter. In 2009, the General Assembly reaffirmed the three pillars of a State’s responsibility to protect their populations from war crimes and crimes against humanity. And in 2021, the General Assembly passed a resolution on “[t]he responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” The third pillar, which may call into action State intervention, can become controversial.
Rule 158 of the International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law specifies that “States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.” This “rule that States must investigate war crimes and prosecute the suspects is set forth in numerous military manuals, with respect to grave breaches, but also more broadly with respect to war crimes in general.”
What faced the Regency was how to protect a population from the commission of war crimes when that population itself had been completely denationalized into believing that the State of Hawai‘i exists as a lawful government under United States laws. The Regency’s strategy after returning from the PCA in the Netherlands was to effectively engage the devastating effects of denationalization through academic research at the university level. Since 2000, this research made public through published peer review articles, master’s theses, doctoral dissertations, books, and classroom instruction have managed to tear down the facade that the State of Hawai‘i is lawful and that the United States is an occupying Power.
During the occupation of the territory by an occupying State, there are two legal systems that exist at the same time, that of the occupied State and that of the occupying State. As Professor Krystina Marek explains, in “the first place: of these two legal orders, that of the occupied State is regular and ‘normal,’ while that of the occupying power is exceptional and limited. At the same time, the legal order of the occupant is…strictly subject to the principle of effectiveness, while the legal order of the occupied State continues to exist notwithstanding the absence of effectiveness.” The Regency knew that while the State of Hawai‘i exercised effective, but unlawful, control of Hawaiian territory there are rules that apply called international humanitarian law and the law of occupation. To knowingly violate these international laws created criminal culpability. While the Regency has no effective control as a result of the American occupation, it does have effective control of factual and legal information that it will use to compel compliance where the prolonged occupation will eventually come to an end by a treaty of peace.
Determined to hold to account individuals who have committed war crimes and human rights violations throughout the Hawaiian Islands, being the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the Council of Regency, by proclamation on April 17, 2019, established a Royal Commission of Inquiry (“RCI”) in similar fashion to the United States proposal of establishing a Commission of Inquiry after the First World War “to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed during its course.” Dr. David Keanu Sai serves as Head of the RCI and Professor Federico Lenzerini from the University of Siena, Italy, as its Deputy Head.
On February 7, 2024, the RCI sent a letter of communication to all members of the State of Hawai‘i legislature and the County Councils regarding the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation. In the letter, Dr. Sai apprised them of his communication he’s had since April 17, 2023, with Major General Kenneth Hara, State of Hawai‘i Adjutant General, regarding his duty to transform the State of Hawai‘i into a Military Government and to begin to administer the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom as the occupied State. Dr. Sai directed Major General Hara that, in accordance with international laws and Army regulations, he will issue a proclamation transforming the State of Hawai‘i into a Military Government. Should he fail to do so would be a dereliction in the performance of his duty and the war crime of omission.
Major General Hara would also be made the subject of an RCI war criminal report for the purpose of prosecution. There are no statutes of limitation for war crimes, which means a person can be prosecuted regardless of his age. In 2022, a German court convicted a 97-year-old women for war crimes she committed during the Second World War.
Major General Hara also has the duty to protect officials and employees of the State of Hawai‘i and the Counties who, like the Legislature and County Councils, are committing the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation. The RCI has given more than enough time for Major General Hara to have completed his due diligence done by his Staff Judge Advocate Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd Phelps as to the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an occupied State. On July 27, 2023, he acknowledged that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist, which consequently triggered his duty.
There are two laws that distinguish themselves from each other. There are “national” laws that are established within countries called States, and there are “international” laws that are established by the States themselves. Sources of national laws include the constitution, whether written or unwritten, statutes enacted by the legislature, and decisions by the highest court if the country is a common law system, e.g. United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom. Civil law countries like Italy and Germany do not have judge made laws. An indicator of whether the country is common law is if they have jury trials.
Every State is geo-political, which means that each State has their own geographical location and unique political experience that contribute to the function of their government, whether autocratic or democratic. And foreign influences and interests is what drives government reform and survival. In this regard, no two countries are alike.
Current international law has its roots in the Middle Ages of Europe. At the time, the Holy Roman Empire had great influence over the kings and dukes called Cannon Law. However, commercial, and maritime law was developing as well. In England the Law Merchant was established that covered rules governing foreign trade, which England, because of its naval power, declared was universal. This resulted in mercantile courts being established in trading ports throughout Europe to resolve disputes between traders of goods. According to Professor Malcolm Shaw,
Such rules, growing out of the Middle Ages, constituted the seeds of international law, but before they could flourish, European thought had first to be developed by that intellectual explosion known as the Renaissance. This complex of ideas changed the face of European society and ushered in the modern era of scientific, humanistic and individualistic thought.
The eventual fall of the supremacy of the Holy Roman Empire in 1648 gave rise to the States headed by kings and dukes. With a history of interaction between themselves that grew into custom prior to the fall, the interactions escalated with the introduction of the concept of sovereignty and centralized control of government of the State by another concept called the Leviathan, especially in the States of England, France and Spain. The concept of Leviathan was espoused by Thomas Hobbs in 1651 that advocated for a centralized monarchical form of government. With the printing press invented in the fifteenth century, this Hobbsian theory reached the ruling classes across Europe, who at the time were the only ones that could read.
With the rise of States and their interaction with each other, custom became the foundation of international law, which was supplemented with treaties. Eventually, principles of law that prevailed in the different States became norms or rules of international law that was universally accepted. When the Kingdom of Hawai‘i became a British Protectorate in 1794, the Hawaiian Kingdom in the nineteenth century was very much influenced by British forms of governance and the development of international law.
As a result of the positivist movement within States, which was a movement based on a scientific approach in thought rather than on faith, the movement eventually moved into the political and legal realms of governance called legal positivism. This movement eventually created the basis for a departure from the natural law of kings and dukes that relied on cannon law and moral thought, to a legal system that is based on existing and verifiable laws established by the legislature or the judges in a common law system. It establishes logic, consistency, and measurability like the methods of science and mathematics. Most importantly, legal positivism promotes predictability. In the courts of a common law country, this is called stare decisis, which is decision making by precedent set in previous court decisions.
Legal positivism eventually advocated the rule of law and not the politics of power, which drove many countries in Europe in the mid-nineteenth century into constitutional forms of governance and the recognition of civil and political rights. The French Revolution was an extension of this movement against absolute rule by a King. The Hawaiian Kingdom was riding this wave of government reform as it spread throughout Europe, and it successfully evolved from absolute rule to a constitutional form of governance with democratic principles without suffering the pains of revolution by the people like the case of France.
Positivism eventually would reach the international realm and be the driving force in reforming international law. Since constitutionalism separated government from the person of the king, which means the king was no longer the supreme absolute ruler but now a constitutional head of government, there would now be a separation of the government from the State.
In the sixteenth century, French jurist and political philosopher Jean Bodin stressed the importance that “a clear distinction be made between the form of the state, and the form of the government, which is merely the machinery of policing the state.” Nineteenth century political philosopher Frank Hoffman also emphasizes that a government “is not a State any more than a man’s words are the man himself,” but “is simply an expression of the State, an agent for putting into execution the will of the State.” Professor Quincy Wright, a twentieth century American political scientist, also concludes that, “international law distinguishes between a government and the state it governs.” Therefore, a State would continue to exist despite its government being overthrown by military force by another State’s armed forces.
As a result, customary international law would begin to be codified into treaty law. One particular aspect of customary international law was to bring order into the chaos of war, which was recognized as a means of enforcement of international law. Codification of the international laws of war began at the Brussels Conference in 1874 where the representatives of powerful and weak States advocated the formulation of the laws of war through multilateral treaties. While the first multilateral treaties that codified the laws of war were not done until 1899 called the Hague Conventions, rules of war eventually became accepted by States as customary international law, and they were recognized by States when they were at war since the mid-nineteenth century.
When a State’s territory is “effectively” occupied, customary international law obligates the occupying State to administer the laws of the occupied State. This is reflected in Articles 2 and 3 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration where, “[the occupying State] shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety [and] shall maintain the laws which were in force in the country in peacetime, and shall not modify, suspend or replace them unless necessary.” Although the Declaration failed to be signed off by the European States and become codified, it did have scholarly approval. The Institut de droit international (IDI) in 1875 declared:
[A]lthough there was room for improvement, the new rules on occupation as suggested by the 1874 Brussels Declaration were essentially more favorable to peaceful citizens and public and private ownership in occupied territories than what had been provided by practice thus far and by the teaching of most scholars. The IDI subsequently adopted the same rules in its Oxford Manual on Land Warfare (1880).
Eventually codification occurred in 1899. Article 43 of the 1899 Hague Regulations states, “The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” According to Professor Eyal Benvenisti:
The law of occupation as ultimately expressed in the 1899 Hague Regulations imposes two types of obligations on an army that seizes control of enemy land during war: the obligation to protect the life and property of the inhabitants and the obligation to respect the sovereign rights of the ousted government.
The “text of Article 43, according to Professor Benvenisti, “was accepted by scholars as mere reiteration of the older law.” Professor Doris Graber states that “nothing distinguishes the writing of the period following the 1899 Hague code from the writing prior to that code. And according to Professor Georg Schwarzenberger, “the Hague Regulations…was declaratory of international customary law.” The United States government also recognizes that Article 43 is customary international law that predates the Hague Regulations. In a 1943 legal opinion, the United States stated:
The Hague Convention clearly enunciated the principle that the laws applicable in an occupied territory remain in effect during the occupation, subject to change by the military authorities within the limits of the Convention. Article 43: … This declaration of the Hague Convention amounts only to a reaffirmation of the recognized international law prior to that time.
The administration of occupied territory is set forth in the Hague Regulations, being Section III of the Hague Regulations. The 1899 Hague Regulations was superseded by the 1907 Hague Regulations. Also, consistent with what was generally considered the international law of occupation, in force at the time of the Spanish-American War that predates the codification, the “military governments established in the territories occupied by the armies of the United States were instructed to apply, as far as possible, the local laws and to utilize, as far as seemed wise, the services of the local Spanish officials.”
Commenting on the occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Professor Patrick Dumberry states:
[T]he 1907 Hague Convention protects the international personality of the occupied State, even in the absence of effectiveness. Furthermore, the legal order of the occupied State remains intact, although its effectiveness is greatly diminished by the fact of occupation. As such, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV provides for the co-existence of two distinct legal orders, that of the occupier and the occupied.
Stark parallels can be drawn between what the United States did to the Hawaiian Kingdom and what Iraq did to Kuwait in 1990, commonly referred to as the First Gulf War. Just as Iraq, without justification, invaded Kuwait and overthrew the Kuwaiti government August 2, 1990, the United States did the same to the Hawaiian Kingdom and its territory. Where Kuwait was under a belligerent occupation by Iraq for 7.5 months, the Hawaiian Kingdom has been under a belligerent occupation by the United States for 131 years.
Hiding the occupation does not legalize it under international law. The international law of occupation has and continues to apply in the prolonged American occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Hawaiian national consciousness is regained through education and knowing its legal and political history.
International law literally means the law between (inter) nations called States and not above these States. Domestic or municipal laws, on the other hand, are laws that reside within (intra) a State and that the persons in the territory of the State are subject to these laws. The reason why international is between and not above States is because they are considered politically independent from each other and are sovereign over their territory and their nationals abroad. This creates sovereign equality among the States. Therefore, for international law to be established, the State has to consent by international custom or by treaty.
According to article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice these are five primary sources of international law: (a) treaties between States; (b) customary international law derived from the practices of State; (c) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law; (d) judicial decisions and the writings of “the most highly and qualified publicists.”
Regarding customary international law there must be evidence that States accept the practice as law. The evidence must show a consensus among States concerning rules or actions—practices done by States as well as by international organizations that were established by States. According to Professor Ian Brownlie this evidence includes the following:
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of official legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals of military law, executive decisions and practices, order to naval forces etc., comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, state legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly.
According to the International Court of Justice, for a rule of customary international law to exist, there needs to be “two conditions [that] must be fulfilled” where there is a “‘settled practice’ together with opinio juris,” where the practice is accepted as law by States. This acceptance can be achieved by the silence or omission of the concerned States regarding the practice. In other words, States do not always have to say “I accept as law” the practice that was done in order for it to be considered law. Opinio juris is Latin for “an opinion of law.” The opinio juris can be the creation of a “new” rule of international law, or the acceptance of an “existing” rule of international law.
An example of a “new” rule of international law was when the Hawaiian Kingdom was recognized as an independent State by Great Britain and France on November 28, 1843. As a recognized independent State, the Hawaiian Kingdom would be protected under the rules of international law, in particular, the “existing” rule that the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State would continue to exist despite the military overthrow of its government. This existing rule is called the presumption of continuity of a State, which means that the State is presumed to continue to exist despite the removal of its government by another State.
This existing rule of international law is explained by Judge James Crawford where he states, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations…despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government,” and belligerent occupation “does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.” Addressing the presumption of the German State’s continued existence despite the military overthrow of the Nazi government during the Second World War, Professor Brownlie explains:
Thus, after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War the four major Allied powers assumed supreme power in Germany. The legal competence of the German state [its independence and sovereignty] did not, however, disappear. What occurred is akin to legal representation or agency of necessity. The German state continued to exist, and, indeed, the legal basis of the occupation depended on its continued existence.
Therefore, “If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Matthew Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.” Evidence of “a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States” would be an international treaty, particularly a peace treaty, whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom would have ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States. Examples of foreign States ceding sovereign territory to the United States by a peace treaty include the 1848 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico and the 1898 Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. There is no treaty of peace where the Hawaiian Kingdom ceded its sovereignty and territory to the United States, which means the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist under international law and that the present system of government under United States domestic law called the State of Hawai‘i is illegal.
One piece of evidence of international custom is “the practice of international organs” that have been established and are managed by States like the United Nations or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The former was established by States who became Contracting States to the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, and the latter was established by States who became Contracting States to the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899 PCA Convention), which was superseded by the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1907 PCA Convention). What will eventually come before the PCA in the Hawaiian Kingdom case is whether the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State from the nineteenth century, and not whether the Hawaiian Kingdom is a new State. This brings it squarely under the existing rule of “continuity” or “discontinuity” of a State that was already established.
Because the PCA establishes ad hoc arbitral tribunals to resolve international disputes on a case by case basis, it must first have institutional jurisdiction before it can form the tribunal. For those States that are Contracting States to the 1899 PCA Convention when the PCA was established, they had automatic access to the PCA facilities. However, it was possible for non-Contracting States to have access to the PCA facilities as well.
Article 26 addressed the jurisdiction of the PCA in two parts, for Contracting States and for non-Contracting States. The first part of article 26 states, “The International Bureau at The Hague is authorized to place its premises and its staff at the disposal of the Signatory Powers for the operations of any special Board of Arbitration.” In other words, if the arbitral tribunal, being a “special Board of Arbitration,” was formed by the Contracting State or States and not by the PCA, they could still have access to the PCA “premises and its staff.”
The second part states, “The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court may, within the conditions laid down in the Regulations, be extended to disputes between non-Signatory Powers, or between Signatory Powers and non-Signatory Powers, if the parties are agreed on recourse to this Tribunal.” In other words, the second part grants access to disputes with non-Contracting States. In international law, the term “Powers” are synonymous with “States.”
At a meeting of the Contracting States in The Hague, Netherlands, it was agreed that the 1899 PCA Convention would be replaced by the 1907 PCA Convention. Article 47 reiterated the two-part institutional jurisdiction of the PCA. The first part states, “The Bureau is authorized to place its offices and staff at the disposal of the Contracting Powers for the use of any special Board of Arbitration.” The second part states, “The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court may, within the conditions laid down in the regulations, be extended to disputes between non-Contracting Powers or between Contracting Powers and non-Contracting Powers, if the parties are agreed on recourse to this Tribunal.”
Prior to the Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom case that lasted from November 8, 1999, to February 5, 2001, there were six instances where the PCA Secretary General recognized either both or one of the parties to the dispute to be a non-Contracting State to the 1899 or the 1907 PCA Conventions. The action taken by the PCA Secretary General is a practice of an “international organ” recognizable under international custom. When the PCA recognizes the State as a non-Contracting State it relies on “existing” rules of international law that provides for its existence or, in the case of the Hawaiian Kingdom, its continued existence.
In annex 2 of the PCA’s 111th Annual Report in 2011, certain cases have a footnote that states, “Pursuant to article 47 of the 1907 Convention (article 26 of the 1899 Convention).” In annex 2, the Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom is listed as the 33rd case under the jurisdiction of the PCA since its inception in 1899. If both parties to the dispute are Contracting States but the dispute involves a “special Board of Arbitration” than that created by the PCA it would be noted to have been established pursuant to article 47 of the 1907 PCA Convention or pursuant to article 26 of the 1899 PCA Convention. If the case involved a non-Contracting State, it would also be cited by the same wording of the footnote. Here is the link to the current 122 States that are Contracting States to the 1899 and 1907 PCA Conventions.
Regarding the involvement of a non-Contracting State to the dispute, the first instance was an arbitration between Norway and Sweden called The Grisbådarna Case that lasted from March 14, 1908, to October 23, 1909. The subject of the dispute was the maritime boundary between the two countries in the aftermath of the separation of the union of the Swedish-Norwegian Kingdom in 1905. Prior to the dissolution of the union, the Swedish-Norwegian Kingdom became a Contracting State to the 1899 PCA Convention on September 4, 1900. However, after the dissolution, Sweden became a Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention on January 26, 1910, and Norway became a Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention on November 18, 1910. Both countries were non-Contracting States during the arbitration, and, therefore, were allowed access to the jurisdiction of the PCA under article 47.
The second instance was a dispute between Russia and Turkey, called the Russian Claim for Interest on Indemnities case, that lasted from July 22, 1910, to November 11, 1912. While Russia became a Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention on January 26, 1910, Turkey was and continues to be a non-Contracting State.
The third instance was a dispute between the French High Commission to the States of Levant under Mandate (Syria and Lebanon) and the Egyptian Government over Egypt’s refusal to have the French Company Radio Orient in Egypt to receive any telegrams. The proceedings lasted from November 11, 1938, to April 2, 1940. Although France became a Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention on December 6, 1919, Egypt did not become a Contracting State until November 4, 1968.
The fourth instance was a dispute between France and Greece regarding the administration of light houses. The proceedings lasted from July 15, 1931, to July 24, 1956. Although France became a Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention on December 6, 1910, Greece was and continues to be a non-Contracting State.
The fifth instance was in 1997 in a dispute between Italy and Costa Rica regarding a dispute over a loan agreement between the two countries. The proceeding lasted from September 11, 1997, to June 26, 1998. While Italy is a non-Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention, Costa Rica did not become a Contracting State until after the arbitration on July 20, 1999.
In 1928, a precedence was set for the PCA to allow a dispute between a “private entity” and a State. In this case, there was a dispute centered on a contract between China and Radio Corporation of America—Radio Corporation of America v. China. The proceeding lasted from November 10, 1928, to April 13, 1935. The jurisdiction of the PCA was invoked by China, that became a Contracting State on January 26, 1910, according to article 47 because it involved a “special Board of Arbitration” that was not established by the PCA.
While China was the first Contracting State to have a dispute with a “private entity” that came under the jurisdiction of the PCA in 1928, the Larsen case was the first instance that the PCA had jurisdiction over a dispute between a non-Contracting State—the Hawaiian Kingdom and a “private entity”—Larsen in 1999.
The Royal Commission of Inquiry has just published its latest memorandum on why all 193 Member States of the United Nations recognizes the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the Council of Regency as its government.
It has been 24 years since the arbitral proceedings at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) were initiated on 8 November 1999 in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom. Before the arbitral tribunal was established on 9 June 2000, the PCA Secretary General recognized the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a non-Contracting State to the 1907 Hague Convention, I, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (“PCA Convention”). The PCA Secretary General also recognized the Council of Regency as its government. The Council of Regency was not claiming to be a new State but rather it claimed the legal personality of the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom since the nineteenth century.
One of the four sources of international law is customary international law, which is a general practice by an international actor and accompanied by opinio juris. Opinio juris takes place when acts or omissions by States occur following a belief that these States are obligated as a matter of law to take action or refrain from acting in a particular way. According to the International Court of Justice, for a rule of customary international law to exist, there needs to be “two conditions [that] must be fulfilled” where there is a “‘settled practice’ together with opinio juris,” where the practice is accepted as law by States. This acceptance can be achieved by the silence or omission of the concerned States regarding the practice. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice explained:
[F]or a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned “amount to a settled practice,” but they must be accompanied by opinio juris sive neccessitatis. Either the States taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, must behave so that their conduct is evidence of a belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such belief […] the subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of opinio juris sive neccessitatis.
The relevant rule of customary international law, which is applicable to the Hawaiian Kingdom, is the presumption of continuity of the State despite the military overthrow of its government. Because international law provides for the presumption of the continuity of the State despite the overthrow of its government by another State, the burden of proof shifts as to what must be proven. According to Judge Crawford, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations […] despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government,” and belligerent occupation “does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.” Addressing the presumption of the German State’s continued existence despite the military overthrow of the Nazi government during the Second World War, Professor Brownlie explains:
Thus, after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War the four major Allied powers assumed supreme power in Germany. The legal competence of the German state [its independence and sovereignty] did not, however, disappear. What occurred is akin to legal representation or agency of necessity. The German state continued to exist, and, indeed, the legal basis of the occupation depended on its continued existence.
Therefore, “[i]f one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.” Evidence of “a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States” would be an international treaty, particularly a peace treaty, whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom would have ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States. Examples of foreign States ceding sovereign territory to the United States by a peace treaty include the 1848 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico and the 1898 Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. There is no treaty of peace where the Hawaiian Kingdom ceded its sovereignty and territory to the United States.
This practice or action taken by the PCA Secretary General was uncontested by all 122 Contracting States to the PCA Convention. This serves as evidence of their acceptance of the continuity of Hawaiian Statehood. The acceptance by the 122 States of the PCA’s recognition of continuity, as opposed to discontinuity of the Hawaiian State, established a normative character of opinio juris supporting the existence of the rule of customary international law sanctioning the presumption of continuity of a State, despite the military overthrow of its government. As the International Court of Justice explains, the behavior of these States is such “that their conduct is evidence of a belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it,” as regards the international legal rule of the presumption of State continuity despite the persistence of a status of military occupation. The significance of the Larsen case under international law cannot be underestimated.
Since the Larsen case, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Council of Regency took deliberate and incremental steps, under international law, to assure that all Member States of the United Nations would recognize the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as an independent State despite the prolonged occupation by the United States. This memorandum looks at those steps that eventually got all 193 Members States of the United Nations to acknowledge, under international law, the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State since the nineteenth century, and the Council of Regency as its government, being the successor to Queen Lili‘uokalani’s administration.
Awareness of the American occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom is spreading in academic circles throughout Europe. In 2022, the Polish Journal of Political Science published a book review by Dr. Anita Budziszewska of the Royal Commission on Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom.
Dr. Budziszewska is a faculty member of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. In the years 2011-2020 she served as the coordinator for mobility, exchange and international cooperation at the IIR UW and at the WNPiSM UW. During the years 2016-2020 served as the Plenipotentiary of the Dean of the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies for international cooperation under the Erasmus+ program (European Union).
Dr. Budziszewska was member of the Polish mission to the United Nations during the 43rd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva (43rd session of UN HRC). In 2020-2021 external expert of the project Polska360 organized/financed by the Kresy RP. Foundation and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland. She conducts classes on Elements of Diplomatic Protocol as part of the training organized by the Polish Olympic Committee and the Polish Corporation of Sports Managers. Member of the Organizing Committee of 8th Pan-European Congress of International Relations in Warsaw (2013) co-organized with the European International Studies Association.
Dr. Budziszewska completed scientific and professional internship, e.g. at the Polish Representation to the United Nations Office in Geneva. Study and training stays, among others, at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the University of Zurich and the University of Oxford. International speeches, lectures and papers abroad, e.g. in Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Finland, Croatia, Hungary and the UK. Member of the European Research Network on Philanthropy, International Studies Association and European International Studies Association.
Here follows her book review that was published in volume 8, issue 2 of the Polish Journal of Political Science.
The subject of review here is the multi-author publication Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom, edited by Dr. David Keanu Sai, Head of the Hawaiian Royal Commission of Inquiry, published in 2020. The book is divided into three parts, i.e. Part 1 Investigating war crimes and human rights violations committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom; Part 2 The prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom; and Part 3 Hawaiian law, treaties with foreign states and international humanitarian law. This final part represents a collection of source documents in such fields as Hawaiian law, but also international-law treaties with foreign states (in fact 18 including the USA)—dating back to the 19th century. A selection of treaties from the sphere of international humanitarian law has also been made and included.
The essence of the publication nevertheless resides in its two first parts, in which the authors offer an in-depth treatment of the complicated long-time relationship between Hawaii and the United States. Nevertheless, the thesis pursued here overall is the straightforward one that Hawaii has been occupied illegally and incorporated into the United States unlawfully, with that occupation continuing to the present day and needing to be understood in such terms. The authors also pursue the difficult thread of the story relating to war crimes.
The above main assumption of the book is emphasised from the very beginning of Part 1, which is preceded by the text of the Proclamation Establishing the Royal Commission of Inquiry, recalling that that Commission was established to “ensure a full and thorough investigation into the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom.”
In fact, the main aim of the above institution as called into being has been to pursue any and all offences and violations in the spheres of humanitarian law, human rights and war crimes committed by the Americans in the course of their occupation of Hawaii—which is given to have begun on 17 January 1893.
Presented next is the genesis and history of the Commission’s activity described by its aforementioned Head—Dr. David Keanu Sai. He presents the Commission’s activity in detail, by reference to concrete examples; with this part going on to recreate the entire history of the Hawaiian-US relations, beginning with the first attempt at territorial annexation. This thread of the story is supplemented with examples and source texts relating to the recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain countries (e.g. the UK and France, and taken as evidence of international regard for the integrity of statehood). Particularly noteworthy here is the author’s exceptionally scrupulous analysis of the history of Hawaii and its state sovereignty. No obvious flaws are to be found in the analysis presented.
It is then in the same tone that the author proceeds with an analysis relating to international law, so as to point to the aspects of Hawaii’s illegal occupation by the United States—including an unprecedentedly detailed analysis of the contents of documents, resolutions, mutual agreements and official political speeches, but also reference to other scientific research projects. This very interesting strand of the story is followed by Matthew Craven in Chapter 3 on the Continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under International Law. Notwithstanding the standpoint on the legality of the occupation or annexation of Hawaii by the United States, the matter of the right to self-determination keeps springing up now and again.
Considerable attention is also paid to the multi-dimensional nature of the plebiscite organised in 1959 (with regard to Hawaii’s incorporation as a state into the United States of America), with the relative lack of transparency of organisation pointed out, along with various breaches and transgressions that may have taken place.
In turn, in Chapter 4—on War Crimes Related to the United States’ Belligerent Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom—William Schabas makes attempts to verify the assertion, explaining the term war crimes and referring to the wording of the relevant definition that international law is seen to have generated. The main problem emerging from this concerns lack of up-to-date international provisions as regards the above definition. The reader’s attention is also drawn to the incomplete nature of the catalogue of actions or crimes that could have constituted war crimes (in line with the observations of Lemkin).
While offering narration and background, this Chapter’s author actually eschews Hawaiian-US examples. Instead, he brings the discussion around to cases beyond Hawaii, and in so doing also invokes examples from case-law (e.g. of Criminal Courts and Tribunals). While this is a very interesting choice of approach, it would still have been interesting for the valuable introduction to the subject matter to be supplemented by concrete examples relating to Hawaii, and to the events occurring there during the period under study.
Chapter 5—on International Human Rights Law and Self-Determination of Peoples Related to the United States’ Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom—allows its author Federico Lenzerini to contribute hugely to the analysis of the subject matter, given his consideration of the human rights protection system and its development with a focus on the right to self-determination. The author separates those dimensions of the law in question that do not relate to the Hawaiian Kingdom, as well as those that may have application to the Hawaiian society. Indeed, the process ends with Applicability of the Right to Self-Determination During the American Occupation—a chapter written with exceptional thoroughness, objectivity and synthesis. The author first tells the story on how the human rights protection system came to be formulated (by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants of 1996, but also by reference to other Conventions). Rightly signalled is the institutional dimension to the protection of human rights, notably the Human Rights Committee founded to protect the rights outlined in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is of course recalled that the US is not a party to the relevant Protocols, which is preventing US citizens from asserting the rights singled out in the 1966 Covenants. Again rightly, attention is also paid to the regional human rights mechanism provided for by the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, which also lacks the United States as a party.
The focus here is naturally on the right to self-determination, which the author correctly terms the only officially recognised right of a collective nature (if one excludes the rights of tribal peoples). The further part of the chapter looks at the obligations of states when it comes to safeguarding their citizens’ fundamental human rights. The philosophical context underpinning the right to self-determination is considered next (with attention rightly paid first to liberty related aspects and the philosophical standpoints of Locke and Rousseau, along with the story of the formulation of this right’s ideological basis and reference to what is at times a lack of clarity regarding its shape and scope (not least in Hawaii’s case). What is therefore welcome is the wide-ranging commentary offered on the dimensions to the above rights that do relate to Hawaiian society as well as those that do not.
In summing up the substantive and conceptual content, it is worth pointing to the somewhat interdisciplinary nature of the research encompassed. Somewhat simplifying things, this book can first be seen as an in-depth analysis of matters historical (with much space devoted to the roots of the relations between Hawaii and the United States, to the issue of this region’s occupation and the genesis of Hawaii’s incorporation into the USA). These aspects have all been discussed with exceptional thoroughness and striking scrupulousness, in line with quotations from many official documents and source texts. This is all pursued deliberately, given the authors’ presumed intention to illustrate the genesis of the whole context underpinning the Hawaiian-US relations, as well as the further context through which Hawaii’s loss of state sovereignty came about. This strand to the story gains excellent illustration thanks to Dr. Keanu Sai.
The second part is obviously international law related and it also has much space devoted to it by the authors. The publication’s core theses gain support in the analysis of many and varied international documents, be these either mutual agreements between Hawaii and the United States or international Conventions, bilateral agreements of other profiles, resolutions, instruments developed under the aegis of the UN or those of a regional nature (though not only concerned with the Americas, as much space is devoted to European solutions, and European law on the protection of human rights in particular). There is also much reference to international case-law and jurisprudence in a broader sense, the aim being to indicate the precedents already arrived at, and to set these against the international situation in which Hawaii finds itself.
However, notwithstanding this publication’s title, the authors here do not seek to “force-feed” readers with their theses regarding Hawaii’s legal status. Rather, by reaching out to a wide range of sources in international law as well as from history, they provide sufficient space for independent reflection and drawing of conclusions. In this regard, it would be interesting if few remarks were devoted to present-day relations between Hawaii and the rest of the USA, with a view to achieving a more-profound illustration of the state of this relationship. However, it might seem from the book’s overall context that this was done deliberately so that the foundations of this unique dispute gain proper presentation. All is then augmented further by Part 3—the collection of agreements and documents considered to sustain the main assumptions of the publication under review. Were I to force myself to point out any failure of the book to meet expectations, I would choose the cultural dimension. There is no way of avoiding an impression—only enhanced by cover-to-cover reading—that this publication is deeply rooted in the Hawaiians’ sense of cultural and historical identity. So it would have been interesting to see the cultural dimension addressed, including through a more in-depth analysis of social awareness. At the very least, I have in mind here Article 27 UDHR, traditionally regarded as the source of the right to culture and the right to participate in cultural life. To be added to that might be Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While (as Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted in 1970) the right in question initially meant access to high culture, there has since been a long process of change that has seen an anthropological dimension conferred upon both culture and the right thereto. A component under that right is the right to a cultural identity—which would seem to be the key space in the Hawaiian context. The UN and UNESCO have in fact been paying a great deal of attention to this matter, with the key relevant documents being the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions that in general links these issues with the human rights dimension as well as the Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their Contribution to It (1976).
So a deeply-rooted cultural-identity dimension would have offered an interesting complement to the publication’s research material, all the more so as it would presumably reveal the attempts to annihilate that culture (thus striking not merely at statehood, but at national integrity of identity). An interesting approach would then have been to show in details whether and to what extent this is resisted by the USA (e.g. in regard to the upholding of symbols of material and non-material cultural heritage).
However, given the assumption the book is based on—i.e. the focus on state sovereignty (not the right of cultural minorities, but the right of a nation to self-determination), the above “omission” actually takes nothing away from the value of the research presented. However, the aspect of national identity—of which cultural and historical identity is a key component—may represent an impulse for further, more in-depth research.
I regard this publication as an exceptionally valuable one that systematises matters of the legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom, taking up the key issues surrounding the often ignored topic of a difficult historical context occurring between Hawaii and the United States. The issue at stake here has been regenerated synthetically, on multiple levels, with a penetrating analysis of the regulations and norms in international law applying to Hawaii – starting from potential occupied-territory status, and moving through to multi-dimensional issues relating to both war crimes and human rights. This is one of the few books – if not the only one – to describe its subject matter so comprehensively and completely. I therefore see this work as being of exceptional value and considerable scientific importance. It may serve not only as an academic source, but also a professional source of knowledge for both practicing lawyers and historians dealing with the matter on hand. The ambition of those who sought to take up this difficult topic can only be commended.
In 1875, a Commercial Reciprocity Treaty was entered into between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States that was to last for seven years. In 1884, a Supplemental Convention extended the duration of the commercial treaty for another seven years with the express condition that the United States was granted exclusive access to Pearl Harbor. Article II of the Supplemental Convention states:
His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the Government of the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end the United States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other things needful to the purpose aforesaid.
The Supplemental Convention came into effect in 1887 after ratifications were exchanged and would last for seven years and further until “either of the High Contracting Parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same,” where termination would commence twelve months after the notification is received by the other High Contracting Party. Although the Hawaiian government was unlawfully overthrown by the United States on January 17, 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law continued to exist. In 1997, the Hawaiian Kingdom government was restored as a Regency serving in the absence of a Monarch.
On October 20, 2023, the Hawaiian Kingdom, by its Council of Regency, proclaimed the termination of the 1875 Commercial Reciprocity Treaty and its 1884 Supplemental Convention in accordance with Article I of the said Supplemental Convention. The following day, a notice of termination was sent, by courier United States Postal Service, to Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken. The notice of termination was received by the United States Department of State on 26 October 2023 at 5:47am ET, which consequently triggered the tolling of twelve months after which the Commercial Reciprocity Treaty and its Supplemental Convention would terminate.
The reasoning behind the notice of termination was that the United States in its unlawful and prolonged military occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom since 17 January 1893 has exploited its use of Pearl Harbor by establishing military bases and facilities throughout the Hawaiian Islands under the Indo-Pacific Command of the U.S. Department of Defense in violation of the Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land. Although the Hawaiian Kingdom is not a Contracting State to the 1907 Hague Convention (V), it is mere codification of nineteenth century customary international law. On April 7, 1855, King Kamehameha IV proclaimed the foreign policy of the Kingdom:
My policy, as regards all foreign nations, being that of peace, impartiality and neutrality, in the spirit of the Proclamation by the late King, of the 16th May last, and of the Resolutions of the Privy Council of the 15th June and 17th July, I have given to the President of the United States, at his request, my solemn adhesion to the rule, and to the principles establishing the rights of neutrals during war, contained in the Convention between his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and the United States, concluded in Washington on the 22nd July last.
This policy of neutrality remained unchanged throughout the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the policy of neutrality by the Hawaiian Kingdom as a Neutral Power were inserted as treaty provisions in the Hawaiian-Swedish/Norwegian Treaty of 1852, the Hawaiian-Spanish Treaty of 1863, and the Hawaiian-German Treaty of 1879. In its treaty with Sweden/Norway, Article XV states, “His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway engages to respect in time of war the neutral rights of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and to use his good offices with all other powers, having treaties with His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, to induce them to adopt the same policy towards the Hawaiian Kingdom.”
As a result of the termination of the treaty and its convention, all United States military forces in the Hawaiian Islands will be withdrawn in twelve months by 5:47am ET on October 26, 2024. On the withdrawal, the Council of Regency proclaimed:
And, We do require that when the United States has received this notice of termination, it shall, prior to the expiration of twelve months in accordance with Article I of the 1884 Supplemental Convention, remove all movable property at its military facilities throughout the Hawaiian Islands, including unexploded munitions, and fuel, with the exception of real property attached to the land or erected on it, including man-made objects, such as buildings, homes, structures, roads, sewers, and fences, to include on other properties that have been or are currently under its supervision and command.
Not all military forces in the Hawaiian Islands are affected by the notice of termination. There are two military forces present within the Hawaiian Kingdom today. That of the United States Federal government called Title 10 United States Code (“USC”) armed forces, and that of the State of Hawai‘i National Guard called Title 32 USC armed forces. Title 10 troops are purely American in origin while the Title 32 troops are Hawaiian in origin, and, therefore, remain in the Hawaiian Islands to be called by its original designation—the Royal Guard.
When the United States unilaterally annexed the Hawaiian Islands in violation of international law on 7 July 1898, it initiated the establishment of the United States Army Pacific, United States Marine Forces Pacific, United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Pacific Air Forces. The United States Army Pacific was established in the Hawaiian Islands in 1898 during the Spanish-American War, headquartered at its first military base called Camp McKinley on the Island of O‘ahu, and later headquartered at Fort Shafter on the Island of O‘ahu in 1921. In 1908, the Congress allocated funds to establish a Naval Station at Pearl Harbor.
In April 1942, the United States military forces in the Hawaiian Islands were organized into two commands for the Army under United States Army Forces Pacific and for the Navy as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Oceans Areas Commander-in-Chief. This command structure of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands during the Second World War was transformed into the United States Pacific Command on 1 January 1947, which is presently called the Indo-Pacific Command, whose headquarters is at Camp H.M. Smith on the Island of O‘ahu. In September 1947, the United States Air Force separated from the United States Army as a separate branch of the armed forces with its base headquartered at Hickam Air Force Base on the Island of O‘ahu, and later, in 2010, merged to become an element of Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam with the Navy.
The Indo-Pacific Command has four component commands stationed in the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom—United States Army Pacific, whose headquarters is at Fort Shafter on the Island of O‘ahu, United States Marine Forces Pacific, whose headquarters is at Camp H.M Smith on the Island of O‘ahu, United States Pacific Fleet, whose headquarters is at Naval Station Pearl Harbor on the Island of O‘ahu, and United States Pacific Air Forces, whose headquarters is at Hickam Air Force Base/Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on the Island of O‘ahu.
There is no legal basis for the presence of Title 10 USC military forces in the Hawaiian Islands by virtue of Congressional legislation because municipal laws have no extraterritorial effect. Since Congressional legislation is limited in operation to the territory of the United States, it cannot unilaterally establish military installations in the territory of a foreign State without the State’s consent through a treaty or convention. According to traditional international law, the concept of jurisdiction is linked to the State territory. As the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1927 Lotus case stated:
[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention […] all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.
The presence of all Title 10 USC military forces throughout the Hawaiian Islands has a direct nexus to the 1884 Supplemental Convention that granted the United States exclusive access to Pearl Harbor. The 1884 Supplemental Convention was a valid treaty under international law up until the Hawaiian Kingdom’s notice of intention to terminate was received by the U.S. Department of State at 5:47am ET on 26 October 2023. As a consequence of the termination, all Title 10 USC military forces shall have to be withdrawn from the Hawaiian Islands no later than 5:47am ET on 26 October 2024. The military forces that remain is the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Royal Guard that is referred to today as the Hawai‘i Army and Air National Guard.
For a comprehensive report on the termination of the 1875 Commercial Reciprocity Treaty and its 1884 Supplemental Convention go to the Royal Commission of Inquiry’s Preliminary Report on this subject.
CLARIFICATION. The 1884 Supplemental Convention began a seven-year term as of 1887 when ratifications were exchanged in Washington, D.C. It would continue after the seven-year period until either the Hawaiian Kingdom or the United States gives notification of its intention to terminate the treaty. When notice is received by the other party a twelve-month period begins for termination. Article I specifically states:
The High Contracting Parties agree, that the time fixed for the duration of the said Convention, shall be definitely extended for a term of seven years from the date of the exchange of ratifications hereof, and further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the High Contracting Parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, each of the High Contracting Parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of seven years or at any time thereafter.
In other words, the seven-year term was locked in, but it would continue in force if there was no notice of termination. A similar provision for termination of the 1849 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States was stated in Article XVI:
The present treaty shall be in force from the date of the exchange of the ratifications, for the term of ten years, and further, until the end of twelve months after either of the contracting parties shall have given notice to the other of its intention to terminate the same, each of the said contracting parties reserving to itself the right of giving such notice at the end of the said term of ten years, or at any subsequent term.
Only the 1875 Commercial Reciprocity Treaty and the 1884 Supplemental Convention have been terminated. All other treaties with the United States remain in full force and effect.
The European Convention on Nationality defines nationality as the legal bond between a person and a State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin. It is a person owing loyalty to and entitled by birth or naturalization to the protection of a given State. The terms nationality and citizenship are synonymous, and affords a person the political right to participate in government. Without it, a person is prevented from electing governmental officials or serving as a government official themselves. A political right is distinctly different from a civil right, which are basic human rights protected by the constitution and laws of the State, irregardless of a person’s citizenship. Non-citizens residing in the State are categorized as Aliens or Foreigners.
There are three ways a person could acquire citizenship within an established State depending on its national laws: (1) jus sanguinis, where a person being born outside the territory of the State acquires the citizenship of his or her parents; (2) jus soli, where the nationality is conferred upon a person by birth within the territory of the State; and (3) naturalization, where the government grants citizenship upon the application of a foreigner.
On January 21, 1868, the Minister of the Interior for the Hawaiian Kingdom, Ferdinand Hutchison, stated the criteria for Hawaiian nationality: “In the judgment of His Majesty’s Government, no one acquires citizenship in this Kingdom unless he is born here, or born abroad of Hawaiian parents, (either native or naturalized) during their temporary absence from the kingdom, or unless having been the subject of another power, he becomes a subject of this kingdom by taking the oath of allegiance.”
The position of the Hawaiian Government was founded upon Hawaiian statute. Section III, Art. I, Chap. V of an Act to Organize the Executive Departments, 1845 and 1846, provided: “All persons born within the jurisdiction of this kingdom, whether of alien foreigners, of naturalized or of native parents, and all persons born abroad of a parent native of this kingdom, and afterwards coming to reside in this, shall be deemed to owe native allegiance to His Majesty. All such persons shall be amenable to the laws of this kingdom as native subjects. All persons born abroad of foreign parents, shall unless duly naturalized, as in this article prescribed, be deemed aliens, and treated as such, pursuant to the laws.”
There are two exceptions where birth within the territory does not result in citizenship. First, where a child is born within the territory, but the child’s parents are foreign ambassadors or diplomats, that child is not a citizen of the territory of birth; and second, where a child is born of Alien enemies in an area of the territory under hostile occupation, that child will not be a citizen.
Regarding children of foreign diplomats, Frederick Turrill was an American citizen born in the Hawaiian Islands, but later got naturalized on May 21, 1888; and E.H. Wodehouse was a British subject born in the islands and later naturalized on May 7, 1892. The second exception applies to belligerent occupations.
There are numerous references to “children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation,” and one such reference is a U.S. Supreme Court decision. In 1898 during the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a decision concerning the United States citizenship of Wong Kim Ark, a person of Chinese descent. In that decision it also expounded upon the two exceptions to the acquisition of citizenship by birth as determined by the common law of England and made reference to an English case, Calvin’s case, which was decided by the English Court in the year 1608. Although the Hawaiian Kingdom courts have stated that the common law is not in force in this Kingdom, it did state that “…in construing our law the Court must be guided by those enactments and the decisions of American and English Courts.” In re Apuna, 6 Haw. 732 (1869).
In United States vs. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
“The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance, also called ‘ligealty,’ ‘obedience,’ ‘faith’ or ‘power,’ of the King. The principle embraced all persons born within the King’s allegiance and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual—as expressed in the maxim, protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem—and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance; but were predicable of aliens in amity, so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born in England, of such aliens, were therefore naturalborn subjects. but the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the King’s dominions, were not natural born subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction of the King.”
In the Calvin’s case (1608), the English Court stated: “…for if enemies should come into the realm, and possess town or fort, and have issue there, that issue is no subject of the King of England though he be born upon his soil;” and “if any of the King’s ambassadors in foreign nations have children…they are natural born subjects [of England], yet they are born out of the King’s dominion.”
Once a State is occupied, international law preserves the status quo of the occupied State as it was before the occupation began. To preserve the nationality of the occupied State from being manipulated by the occupying State to its advantage, international law only allows individuals born within the territory of the occupied State to acquire the nationality of their parents—jus sanguinis. To preserve the status quo, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention mandates that the “Occupying Power shall not…transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” For individuals, who were born within Hawaiian territory, to be a Hawaiian subjects they must be a direct descendant of a person or persons who were Hawaiian subjects prior to the American occupation that began on January 17, 1893, which is when Queen Lili‘uokalani conditionally surrendered to the United States. All individuals born after the surrender to the present are Aliens who can only acquire the nationality of their parents. According to Professor von Glahn, “children born in territory under enemy occupation possess the nationality of their parents.”
According to the 1890 government census, Hawaiian subjects numbered 48,107, with the aboriginal Hawaiian, both pure and part, numbering 40,622, being 84% of the national population, and the non-aboriginal Hawaiians numbering 7,485, being 16%. Despite the massive and illegal migrations of foreigners to the Hawaiian Islands since 1898, which, according to the State of Hawai‘i numbered 1,302,939 in 2009, the status quo of the national population of the Hawaiian Kingdom is maintained.Therefore, under the international laws of occupation, the aboriginal Hawaiian population of 322,812 in 2009 would continue to be 84% of the Hawaiian national population. The 16% of non-aboriginal Hawaiian subjects will need to be determined by a census report.
Similar to the Hawaiian Kingdom, the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were occupied by the Russians for over half a century. In 1940, Russian intervention provided for the forced incorporation of these Baltic States into the U.S.S.R. In 1991, with the breakup of the Soviet Union, these Baltic States once again regained their independence and immediately had to deal with the pressing issue of citizenship in the aftermath of prolonged Russian occupation.
Roger Brubaker, author of the article Citizenship struggles in Soviet Successor States (1992), stated that Estonia adopted a model for defining the initial body of citizens as the restored State model. States who regained their former independence are called restored States, and as these States are not new there would be no need to redefine a new body of citizens, but rather utilize the laws that existed before the occupation to determine the citizenry.
Under this model, persons born in Estonia before the 1940 annexation and their descendants were recognized as having Estonian citizenship. This also included United States citizens who were the offspring of Estonians. Regarding the citizenry of the occupier, the Estonian government also applied the same view the 1898 U.S. Supreme Court had made in U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark. It viewed all Russians who entered the country after the occupation in 1940, and their descendants, as illegal and could not claim Estonian citizenship. But if a Russian was born in Estonia before the occupation that person acquired citizenship. Latvia also adopted the restored State model. Therefore, it can be stated as a matter of law and based on contemporary examples, that the Hawaiian citizenry of today is comprised of descendants of Hawaiian subjects and those foreigners who were born in the Hawaiian Islands prior to January 17, 1893.
This exclusion of the Hawaiian citizenry is based upon precedence and law, but a restored Hawaiian government does have the authority to widen the scope of its citizenry and adopt a more inclusive model in the aftermath of prolonged American occupation. Brubaker stated that Lithuania adopted such a model. Under the inclusive model, the original citizenry of Lithuania was confirmed under the restored State model, but the foreigners, which included the Russians, were divided into two groups. The first group comprised of permanent residents who would be granted optional inclusion in the Lithuanian citizenry, while the second would be classified as aliens. The optional inclusion of the first group depended upon these residents meeting certain minimum requirements established by the Lithuanian government. (i.e. years of residency and/or language).
Despite over a century of illegal migration that exploded the Alien population from 41,873 in 1890, of which U.S. citizens merely number 1,928, to 918,639 in 2009, the population of Hawaiian subjects has remained intact with its ratio of 84% aboriginal Hawaiians, who can readily be determined, and 16% non-aboriginal Hawaiians yet to be determined. This should alleviate the concern of aboriginal Hawaiian subjects who previously thought they were the minority, when in fact and law they remain the majority of the Hawaiian citizenry. Only Hawaiian subjects, whether aboriginal or non-aboriginal, have political rights, which means they alone can participate in government. §784 of the Hawaiian Civil Code states, “No alien shall be allowed to vote for representatives of the people.”
When dealing with a 130-year crisis of a prolonged and illegal American occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom, planning is a crucial component that informs where we are today and where we want to be tomorrow. An operational plan is informed by due diligence of the situation, which is a gathering of information relevant to the situation at hand and how it got to the current situation. In the military, this is colloquially known as gathering intel before you come up with a battle plan.
Due diligence is “depending on the relative facts of the special case.” It is the assessment of a situation before a decision should be made. When due diligence is done, the person doing it must be mindful of their own biases and assumptions. To gather information through one’s own bias is what is called “confirmation bias” where the gatherer of information only selects information that would confirm his/her own biases. This is also called cherry picking.
In the Hawaiian situation, there is an abundance of assumptions that are false such as the Hawaiian Islands were colonized by the United States in the nineteenth century, and, as a colonized people, Native Hawaiians are an Indigenous People by definition of the United Nations. United Nations defines Indigenous Peoples as tribal nations that exist with an independent State not of their own making. Arriving at this conclusion was done through confirmation bias.
The Council of Regency sought to gather information through the lens of both the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom and international law that includes international humanitarian law and the law of occupation. It was through this process that revealed that the Hawaiian Kingdom, which existed as an internationally recognized sovereign and independent State continued to exist since November 28, 1843, despite the illegal overthrow of its government by the United States on January 17, 1893. This continued existence stemmed from the international principle of inalienability of sovereignty of a State, and the only way a State can alienate its sovereignty is by its consent through a treaty of cession with the acquiring State. There exists no such treaty, therefore, the Hawaiian State continues to exist.
It was based on this premise that the government was restored as a Council of Regency in 1997 to provisionally represent the Hawaiian State both domestically and abroad. The actions to be taken by the Council of Regency would be in line with its strategic plan that entailed three phases. Phase I—verification of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and a subject of international law. Phase II—exposure of Hawaiian Statehood within the framework of international law and the laws of occupation as it affects the realm of politics and economics at both the international and domestic levels. Phase III—restoration of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and a subject of international law. Phase III is when the American occupation comes to an end.
Phase I was achieved when the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), before establishing the arbitration tribunal in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom on June 9, 2000, acknowledged the continued existence of the Hawaiian State, and the Council of Regency as its government. Phase II, exposure of the Hawaiian State, was initiated during oral hearings on December 7, 8 and 11, 2000, at the PCA in The Hague. Phase II continued at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa when the Chairman of the Council of Regency, David Keanu Sai, entered the political science graduate program, where he received a master’s degree specializing in international relations and public law in 2004 and a Ph.D. degree in 2008 on the subject of the continuity of Hawaiian Statehood while under an American prolonged belligerent occupation since 1893.
The exposure through academic research also motivated historian Tom Coffman to change the title of his 1998 book from Nation Within: The Story of America’s Annexation of the Nation of Hawai‘i, to Nation Within—The History of the American Occupation of Hawai‘i. Coffman explained the change in his note on the second edition and took a quote from Dr. Sai’s law article A Slippery Path Towards Hawaiian Indigeneity. Coffman wrote:
I am compelled to add that the continued relevance of this book reflects a far-reaching political, moral and intellectual failure of the United States to recognize and deal with the takeover of Hawai‘i. In the book’s subtitle, the word Annexation has been replaced by the word Occupation, referring to America’s occupation of Hawai‘i. Where annexation connotes legality by mutual agreement, the act was not mutual and therefore not legal. Since by definition of international law there was no annexation, we are left then with the word occupation.
In making this change, I have embraced the logical conclusion of my research into the events of 1893 to 1898 in Honolulu and Washington, D.C. I am prompted to take this step by a growing body of historical work by a new generation of Native Hawaiian scholars. Dr. Keanu Sai writes, “The challenge for … the fields of political science, history, and law is to distinguish between the rule of law and the politics of power.” In the history of the Hawai‘i, the might of the United States does not make it right.
It took the Council of Regency just over 20 years to change the conversation from colonization and indigenous peoples rights to military occupation and the rights of Hawaiian subjects under the law of occupation. With the shifting of the historical lens, legal consequences began to emerge especially with the involvement of Professor Matthew Craven from the University of London, SOAS, School of Law, who authored a legal opinion on the Continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law; Professor William Schabas from Middlesex University London, School of Law, and a renowned expert in international criminal law, who authored a Legal Opinion on War Crimes related to the United States belligerent occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom; and Professor Federico Lenzerini from the University of Siena, Italy, Department of Political and International Science, who authored Legal Opinion on the authority of the Council of Regency of the Hawaiian Kingdom.
Both the Operational Plans for Transitioning the State of Hawai‘i into a Military Government and Transitioning the Military Government to the Hawaiian Kingdom Government, which will bring the prolonged American occupation to an end, is a culmination of years of research and exposure and is a subset of plans under phase II of the strategic plan. As such we are moving toward the end of phase II and preparing for phase III that will bring the 130-year crisis to an end.
The two operational plans are clear as to where we are, where we need to get to, and the path to get there. The essential tasks and the implied tasks in each of the plans are measurable, and, most importantly, flexible when achieving the tasks. They allow flexibility to adjust to issues unforeseen such as time and allocation of resources. The Council of Regency established a 3-year window for the occupation to come to an end, but it doesn’t prevent unforeseen and extenuating circumstances to adjust the timeline. When the American occupation of Japan began in 1945, it was thought that it would last 3 years. But circumstances extended the occupation an additional 4 years. The same could happen in the Hawaiian situation, but the Council of Regency needed to set an initial timeline of 3 years.
Despite the prolonged nature of the occupation and 130 years of non-compliance to the law of occupation, there are two fundamental rules that prevail: (1) to protect the sovereign rights of the legitimate government of the Occupied State; and (2) to protect the inhabitants of the Occupied State from being exploited. From these two rules, the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention circumscribe the conduct and actions of a military government, notwithstanding the failure by the occupant to protect the rights of the occupied government and the inhabitants since 1893. These rights remain vested despite over a century of violating these rights. The failure to establish a military government facilitated the violations.
The law of occupation does not give the occupant unlimited power over the inhabitants of the Occupied State. As President McKinley interpreted this customary law of occupation under General Orders No. 101 (July 18, 1898), that predates the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations during the Spanish-American War, the inhabitants of occupied territory “are entitled to security in their persons and property and in all their private rights and relations,” and it is the duty of the commander of the occupant “to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious beliefs.” The Order also stated that “the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force” and are “to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation.”
United States practice under the law of occupation acknowledges that sovereignty remains in the Occupied State, because according to the U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, “military occupation confers upon the invading force the means of exercising control for the period of occupation. It does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant, but simply the authority or power to exercise some of the rights of sovereignty” through effective control of the territory of the Occupied State.
The prolonged occupation did not diminish Hawaiian State sovereignty and the continued existence of the Hawaiian State was acknowledged by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1999 in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom. On March 22, 2023, the United Nations Human Council, at its 49th session in Geneva, was made aware of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an Occupied State and the commission of war crimes and human rights violations within its territory by the United States and the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties.
International humanitarian law is silent on a “prolonged occupation” because the authors of 1907 Hague Regulations viewed occupations to be provisional and not long term. According to Professor Scobbie, “The fundamental postulate of the regime of belligerent occupation is that it is a temporary state of affairs during which the occupant is prohibited from annexing the occupied territory. The occupant is vested only with temporary powers of administration and does not possess sovereignty over the territory.”
The effective control by the United States since Queen Lili‘uokalani’s conditional surrender on January 17, 1893, did not transfer Hawaiian sovereignty. As Professor Benvenisti explains, “Effective control by foreign military force can never bring about by itself a valid transfer of sovereignty. Because occupation does not transfer sovereignty over the territory to the occupying power, international law must regulate the inter-relationships between the occupying force, the ousted government, and the local inhabitants for the duration of the occupation. From the principle of inalienable sovereignty over a territory springs the basic structural constraints that international law imposes upon the occupant.”
Despite the prolonged nature of the American occupation, the law of occupation continues to apply because sovereignty was never ceded or transferred to the United States by the Hawaiian Kingdom. At a meeting of experts on the law occupation, that was convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the experts “pointed out that the norms of occupation law, in particular Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, had originally been designed to regulate short-term occupations. However, the [experts] agreed that [international humanitarian law] did not set any limits to the time span of an occupation. It was therefore recognized that nothing under [international humanitarian law] would prevent occupying powers from embarking on a long-term occupation and that occupation law would continue to provide the legal framework applicable in such circumstances.” They also concluded that since a prolonged occupation “could lead to transformations and changes in the occupied territory that would normally not be necessary during short-term occupation,” they “emphasized the need to interpret occupation law flexibly when an occupation persisted.” The prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom is, in fact, that case, where drastic unlawful “transformations and changes in the occupied territory” occurred.
As the occupant in effective control of 10,931 square miles of Hawaiian territory, the State of Hawai‘i, being the civilian government of the Hawaiian Kingdom that was unlawfully seized in 1893, is obligated to transform itself into a military government in order “to protect the sovereign rights of the legitimate government of the Occupied State, and…to protect the inhabitants of the Occupied State from being exploited.” The military government has centralized control, headed military governor, and by virtue of this position, according U.S. Army Field Manual 27-5, the military governor has “supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority, limited only the laws and customs of war and by directives from higher authority.”
The reasoning for the centralized control of authority is so that the military government can effectively respond to situations that are fluid in nature. Under the law of occupation, this authority by the occupant is to be shared with the Council of Regency, being the government of the Occupied State. As the last word concerning any acts relating to the administration of the occupied territory is with the occupying power, “occupation law would allow for a vertical, but not a horizontal, sharing of authority [in the sense that] this power sharing should not affect the ultimate authority of the occupier over the occupied territory.”
By virtue of this shared authority, the Council of Regency, in its meeting on August 14, 2023, approved an “Operational Plan for Transitioning the State of Hawai‘i into a Military Government.” International humanitarian law distinguishes between the “Occupying State” and the “occupant.” The law of occupation falls upon the latter and not the former, because the former’s seat of government exists outside of Hawaiian territory, while the latter’s military government exists within Hawaiian territory.
This operational plan lays out the process of transition from the State of Hawai‘i government to a Military Government in accordance with international humanitarian law, the law of occupation, and U.S. Army regulations in Field Manuals 27-5 and 27-10. The 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention shows there are four essential tasks of the Military Government. This operational plan addresses these essential tasks with their implied tasks for successful execution despite the prolonged nature of the occupation where the basic rules of occupation have been violated for over a century. The operational plan lays out governing rules of maintaining a Military Government until a peace treaty has been negotiated and agreed upon between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States of America.
The insurgents, who were not held to account for their treasonous actions in 1893, were allowed by the United States to control and exploit the resources of the Hawaiian Kingdom and its inhabitants after the Hawaiian government was unlawfully overthrown by United States troops. Some of these insurgents came to be known as the Big Five, a collection of five self-serving large businesses, that wielded considerable political and economic power after 1893. The Big Five were Castle & Cooke, Alexander & Baldwin, C. Brewer & Company, American Factors (now Amfac), and Theo H. Davies & Company. One of the Big Five, Amfac, acquired an interest in Pioneer Mill Company in 1918, and in 1960 became a wholly owned subsidiary of Amfac.
Pioneer Mill Company operated in West Maui with its headquarters in Lahaina. In 1885, Pioneer Mill Company was cultivating 600 of the 900 acres owned by the company and by 1910, 8,000 acres were devoted to growing sugar cane. In 1931, the Olowalu Company was purchased by Pioneer Mill Company, adding 1,200 acres of sugar cane land to the plantation. By 1935, over 10,000 acres, half-owned and half leased, were producing sugar cane for Pioneer Mill. To maintain its plantations, water was diverted, and certain lands of west Maui became dry.
The Lahaina wildfire’s tragic outcome also draws attention to the exploitation of the resources of west Maui and its inhabitants—water and land. West Maui Land Company, Inc., became the successor to Pioneer Mill and its subsidiary the Launiupoko Irrigation Company. When the sugar plantation closed in 1999, it was replaced with real estate development and water management. Instead of diverting water to the sugar plantation, it began to divert water to big corporations, hotels, golf courses, and luxury subdivisions. As reported by Hawai‘i Public Radio, “Lahaina was formerly the ‘Venice of the Pacific,’ an area famed for its lush environment, natural and cultural resources, and its abundant water resources in particular.” Lahaina became a deadly victim of water diversion and exploitation. It should be noted that Lahaina is but a microcosm of the exploitation of the resources of the Hawaiian Kingdom and its inhabitants throughout the Hawaiian Islands for the past century to benefit the American economy in violation of the law of occupation.
Considering the devastation and tragedy of the Lahaina wildfire, transforming the State of Hawai‘i into a military government is only amplified and made much more urgent. It has been reported that the west Maui community, to their detriment, are frustrated with the lack of centralized control by departments and agencies of the federal government, the State of Hawai‘i, and the County of Maui. The law of occupation will not change the support of these departments and agencies, but rather only change the dynamics of leadership under the centralized control by the military governor. The operational plan provides a comprehensive process of transition with essential tasks and implied tasks to be carried out. The establishment of a military government would also put an end to land developers approaching victims of the fire who lost their homes to purchase their property. While land titles were incapable of being conveyed after January 17, 1893, for want of a lawful government and its notaries public, titles are capable of being remedied under Hawaiian Kingdom law and economic relief by title insurance policies. It is unfortunate that the tragedy of Lahaina has become an urgency for the State of Hawai‘i to begin to comply with the law of occupation and establish a military government. To not do so is a war crime of omission.
After securing Phase I of the of the Council of Regency’s strategic plan where in 1999 the Permanent Court of Arbitration “verified the Hawaiian Kingdom as independent State and subject of international law,” Phase II was initiated to expose “Hawaiian Statehood within the framework of international law and the laws of occupation as it affects the realm of politics and economics at both the international and domestic levels.” This exposure has brought out many aspects of international law and the law of occupation that many have heard only for the first time.
There are terms such as international humanitarian law, which the military refers to as the law of armed conflict. International law distinguishes between a State and its government. What occurred on January 17, 1893, was that United States troops and a diplomat overthrew the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The Hawaiian State was not affected by the overthrow and remained a subject of international law with its rights and duties intact. This type of situation under international humanitarian law is called belligerent occupation where the Occupying State must administer the laws of the Occupied State until a treaty of peace comes into effect.
The only way the United States could have acquired the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom, called the Hawaiian Islands, is by way of a treaty of peace that cedes Hawaiian territory to the United States. The United States was unable to acquire Hawaiian territory by a treaty of cession because it overthrew the government. A treaty requires the government of a State to cede its territory. Instead, the United States enacted a congressional joint resolution purporting to have annexed the Hawaiian Islands at the height of the Spanish-American War in 1898. Since 1898, the United States has been unlawfully imposing its laws over Hawaiian territory, which is the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation.
In the case of Hawai‘i, we are dealing with role of the Adjutant General of the Army and Air National Guard. Under federal and State law, the National Guard can serve two commanders in chief but not at the same time. According to Article II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the President becomes the commander in chief of the National Guard “when called into the actual Service of the United States.” Until that time, the commander in chief of the National Guard is the Governor of the State.
Article V of the State of Hawai‘i Constitution provides that the Governor is the Chief Executive of the State of Hawai‘i. He is also the commander-in-chief of the Army and Air National Guard and appoints the Adjutant General who “shall be the executive head of the department of defense and commanding general of the militia of the State.” Section 121-9 of the Hawai‘i Revised Statutes states, “The adjutant general shall perform such duties as are prescribed by law and such other military duties consistent with the regulations and customs of the armed forces of the United States as required by the governor.” In other words, the Adjutant General operates under two regimes of law, that of the State of Hawai‘i and that of the United States Army.
When the National Guard is called into State active duty, not federal active duty, the Governor is the commander-in-chief and has command and control. Under him is the Adjutant General that has command and control of the forces that have been activated. This is what occurred when certain units of the Army and Air National Guard were activated in 1992 when Hurricane Iniki devastated the island of Kaua‘i. Governor John Waihe‘e was the commander-in-chief and Brigadier General Edward Richardson was the Adjutant General. When the Hawai‘i Army and Air National Guard were called to federal active duty for deployment to Iraq during Second Gulf War in 2005, the commander-in-chief changed from State of Hawai‘i Governor Linda Lingle to President George W. Bush.
These American laws, however, don’t apply in the Hawai‘i situation. Unlike the other 49 Governors of States in the Federal Union their authorities derive from American laws that include both Federal and State laws. Because the State of Hawai‘i is outside of the borders of the United States, and as such is foreign territory, the authority of the State of Hawai‘i to include its Governor is stripped. The reason for this is the authority of the Governor derives from the 1959 Statehood Act, which under international law is a war crime. What allows the State of Hawai‘i to exist, however, is international humanitarian law and the law of occupation. Under these laws, the State of Hawai‘i is a civilian armed force acting for the United States as an occupying State.
The decision to establish a military government in foreign territory is not with the U.S. President as commander-in-chief but rather with the most senior commander of the armed forces in foreign territory that has come under effective control. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states, “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.” The State of Hawai‘i, and not the Federal government, is in effective control of 94% of Hawaiian territory.
According to United States Army Field Manual 27-5—Civil Affairs Military Government, the theater commander over foreign territory to come under military occupation bears full responsibility for establishing a military government. That person is a general officer and designated as military governor and is authorized to delegate his authority and title, in whole or in part, to a subordinate commander.
Section 8 of FM 27-5 states, “In occupied territory the commander, by virtue of his position, has supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority, limited only by the laws and customs of war and by directives from higher authority.” Section 3 states that the reasons for establishing a military government “are either military necessity as a right, or as an obligation under international law.” And since military occupation “suspends the operation of the government of the occupied territory, the obligation arises under international law for the occupying force to exercise the functions of civil government looking toward the restoration of maintenance of public order.”
In this situation, it is the State of Hawai‘i Adjutant General that has the responsibility and duty to establish a military government for Hawai‘i under international law and begin to administer Hawaiian Kingdom laws and the provisional laws in accordance with 2014 Proclamation of Provisional Laws by the Council of Regency.