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MEMORANDUM

This memorandum provides the formula for determining which laws of the United States, State of Hawai‘i, and Counties, presently being imposed in the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom shall be considered the provisional laws as proclaimed by the Council of Regency on October 10, 2014.¹ The Council of Regency’s proclamation stated:

And, We do hereby proclaim that from the date of this proclamation all laws that have emanated from an unlawful legislature since the insurrection began on July 6, 1887 to the present, to include United States legislation, shall be the provisional laws of the Realm subject to ratification by the Legislative Assembly of the Hawaiian Kingdom once assembled, with the express proviso that these provisional laws do not run contrary to the express, reason and spirit of the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom prior to July 6, 1887, the international laws of occupation and international humanitarian law.

Under public international law, the laws and administrative measures of the United States that have been imposed throughout the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom have no extra-territorial effect. In *The Lotus* case, the Permanent Court of International Justice explained, “[n]ow the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.”² According to Judge Crawford,

¹ Council of Regency, *Proclamation of Provisional Laws of the Realm* (Oct. 10, 2014) (online at https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Proc_Provisional_Laws.pdf).

² *S.S. Lotus*, PCIJ Series A, No. 10, 18 (1927).

derogation of this principle will not be presumed.³ Therefore, under public international law, American municipal laws being imposed in the Hawaiian Kingdom are not laws but rather situations of facts. Within the Hawaiian constitutional order, this distinction between situations of facts and Hawaiian law is fundamental so as not to rupture the Hawaiian legal system in this extraordinary and extralegal situation of a prolonged military occupation.

As Professor Dicey once stated, “English judges never in strictness enforce the law of any country but their own, and when they are popularly said to enforce a foreign law, what they enforce is not a foreign law, but a right acquired under the law of a foreign country.”⁴ Any right acquired under American municipal laws that have been unlawfully imposed within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom, being a situation of fact and not law, must be recognized by Hawaiian law. Without it being acquired under Hawaiian law, there is no right to be recognized. Before any right can be claimed, American municipal laws must first be transformed from situations of facts into provisional laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

In determining which American municipal laws, being situation of facts, shall constitute a provisional law of the kingdom, the following questions need to be answered. If any question is answered in the affirmative, with the exception of the last question, then it shall not be considered a provisional law.

1. The first consideration begins with Hawaiian constitutional alignment. Does the American municipal law violate any provisions of the 1864 Constitution, as amended?
2. Does it run contrary to a monarchical form of government? In other words, does it promote a republican form of government.
3. If the American municipal law has no comparison to Hawaiian Kingdom law, would it run contrary to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s police power?
4. If the American municipal law is comparable to Hawaiian Kingdom law, does it run contrary to the Hawaiian statute?
5. Does the American municipal law infringe vested rights secured under Hawaiian law?
6. And finally, does it infringe the obligations of the Hawaiian Kingdom under customary international law or by virtue of it being a Contracting State to its treaties? The last question would also be applied to Hawaiian

³ James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* 41 (2nd ed. 2006).

⁴ A.V. Dicey, *The Conflict of Laws* 12 (6th ed., 1949).

Kingdom laws enumerated in the Civil Code, together with the session laws of 1884 and 1886, and the Penal Code.

*Application to State of Hawai'i statutes on
Murder, Manslaughter, and Negligent Homicide*

§707-701 Murder in the first degree. (1) A person commits the offense of murder in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of:

- (a) More than one person in the same or separate incident;
- (b) A law enforcement officer, judge, or prosecutor arising out of the performance of official duties;
- (c) A person known by the defendant to be a witness in a criminal prosecution and the killing is related to the person's status as a witness;
- (d) A person by a hired killer, in which event both the person hired and the person responsible for hiring the killer shall be punished under this section;
- (e) A person while the defendant was imprisoned;
- (f) A person from whom the defendant has been restrained, by order of any court, including an ex parte order, from contacting, threatening, or physically abusing pursuant to chapter 586;
- (g) A person who is being protected by a police officer ordering the defendant to leave the premises of that protected person pursuant to section 709-906(4), during the effective period of that order;
- (h) A person known by the defendant to be a witness in a family court proceeding and the killing is related to the person's status as a witness; or
- (i) A person whom the defendant restrained with intent to:
 - (i) Hold the person for ransom or reward; or
 - (ii) Use the person as a shield or hostage.

(2) Murder in the first degree is a felony for which the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment as provided in section 706-656. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1986, c 314, §49; am L 2001, c 91, §4; am L 2006, c 230, §27; am L 2011, c 63, §2; am L 2016, c 214, §1]

§707-701.5 Murder in the second degree. (1) Except as provided in section 707-701, a person commits the offense of murder in the second degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person; provided that this section shall not apply to actions taken under chapter 327L.

(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony for which the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment as provided in section 706-656. [L 1986, c 314, §50; am L 2018, c 2, §6]

§707-702 Manslaughter. (1) A person commits the offense of manslaughter if:

- (a) The person recklessly causes the death of another person; or

(b) The person intentionally causes another person to commit suicide; provided that this section shall not apply to actions taken under chapter 327L.

(2) In a prosecution for murder or attempted murder in the first and second degrees it is an affirmative defense, which reduces the offense to manslaughter or attempted manslaughter, that the defendant was, at the time the defendant caused the death of the other person, under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation. The reasonableness of the explanation shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be; provided that an explanation that is not otherwise reasonable shall not be determined to be reasonable because of the defendant's discovery, defendant's knowledge, or the disclosure of the other person's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the other person made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant, or in which the defendant and the other person dated or had a romantic relationship. If the defendant's explanation includes the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure of the other person's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, the court shall instruct the jury to disregard biases or prejudices regarding the other person's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation in reaching a verdict.

(3) Manslaughter is a class A felony. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1987, c 181, §8; am L 1996, c 197, §2; am L 2003, c 64, §1; am L 2006, c 230, §28; am L 2018, c 2, §7; am L 2019, c 149, §1]

§707-702.5 Negligent homicide in the first degree. (1) A person commits the offense of negligent homicide in the first degree if that person causes the death of:

(a) Another person by the operation of a vehicle in a negligent manner while under the influence of drugs or alcohol; or

(b) A vulnerable user by the operation of a vehicle in a negligent manner.

(2) A person who violates subsection (1)(a) shall be guilty of a class B felony; provided that the person shall be guilty of a class A felony when the person:

(a) Has been convicted one or more times for the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence within fifteen years of the instant offense;

(b) Is, at the time of the instant offense, engaging in conduct that would constitute a violation of section 291E-62; or

(c) Is a highly intoxicated driver as defined by section 291E-1.

(3) A person who violates subsection (1)(b) shall be guilty of a class B felony.

(4) Notwithstanding sections 706-620(2), 706-640, 706-641, 706-659, and any other law to the contrary, the sentencing court may impose a lesser sentence for a person convicted of a class A felony under this section if the court finds that strong mitigating circumstances warrant the action. Strong mitigating circumstances shall include but not be

limited to the provisions of section 706-621. The court shall provide a written opinion stating its reasons for imposing the lesser sentence.

(5) For the purposes of this section, a person “has been convicted one or more times for the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence” if the person has one or more:

(a) Convictions under section 291E-4(a), 291E-61, 291E-61.5, or 291E-64;

(b) Convictions in any other state or federal jurisdiction for an offense that is comparable to operating or being in physical control of a vehicle while having either an unlawful alcohol concentration or an unlawful drug content in the blood or urine or while under the influence of an intoxicant or habitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant; or

(c) Adjudications of a minor for a law violation that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a violation of section 291E-4(a), 291E-61, or 291E-61.5, that, at the time of the instant offense, had not been expunged by pardon, reversed, or set aside. All convictions that have been expunged by pardon, reversed, or set aside before the instant offense shall not be deemed prior convictions for the purposes of this section. [L 1988, c 292, pt of §1; am L 2012, c 316, §2; am L 2022, c 48, §2]

§707-703 Negligent homicide in the second degree. (1) A person commits the offense of negligent homicide in the second degree if that person causes the death of:

(a) Another person by the operation of a vehicle in a negligent manner; or

(b) A vulnerable user by the operation of a vehicle in a manner that constitutes simple negligence as defined in section 707-704(2).

(2) Negligent homicide in the second degree is a class C felony. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1988, c 292, §2; am L 2012, c 316, §3]

§707-704 Negligent homicide in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of the offense of negligent homicide in the third degree if that person causes the death of another person by the operation of a vehicle in a manner which is simple negligence.

(2) “Simple negligence” as used in this section:

(a) A person acts with simple negligence with respect to the person’s conduct when the person should be aware of a risk that the person engages in that conduct.

(b) A person acts with simple negligence with respect to attendant circumstances when the person should be aware of a risk that those circumstances exist.

(c) A person acts with simple negligence with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the person should be aware of a risk that the person’s conduct will cause that result.

(d) A risk is within the meaning of this subsection if the person’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of the person’s conduct and the circumstances known to the person, involves a deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation.

(3) Negligent homicide in the third degree is a misdemeanor. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1988, c 292, §3]

Hawaiian Kingdom law on Murder and Manslaughter

Penal Code, Chapter VII (As amended by the Act of 30 June 1860)

1. Murder is the killing of any human being with malice aforethought, without authority, justification or extenuation by law.
2. When the act of killing another is proved, malice aforethought shall be presumed, and the burthen shall rest upon the party who committed the killing to show that it did not exist, or a legal justification or extenuation therefor.
3. Whoever is guilty of murder shall be punished by death.
4. In every case of sentence to punishment by death, the court may, in their discretion, order the body of the convict to be dissected, and the marshal in such case shall deliver the dead body to any surgeon who may wish to have the body for dissection.
5. Whoever kills a human being without malice aforethought, and without authority, justification or extenuation by law, is guilty of the offense of manslaughter.
6. Manslaughter is of three degrees, and the jury under an indictment for murder or manslaughter may return a verdict of manslaughter in either degree, or of assault and battery, as the facts proved will warrant.
7. Whoever is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor, for a term of years not less than ten, nor more than twenty, in the discretion of the court.
8. Whoever is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor, not more than ten years or less than five years.
9. Whoever is guilty of manslaughter in the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor not more than five years, or by a fine not more than one thousand dollars, in the discretion of the court.
10. Whoever, under an indictment for murder, or manslaughter, shall be found guilty of assault and battery, as provided in section 6 of this chapter, shall be punished by

imprisonment at hard labor not more than two years, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, in the discretion of the court.

11. No person shall be adjudged to have killed another unless death ensues within a year and a day from the injury inflicted.

12. Chapter VII of the Penal Code is hereby repealed from and after the passage of this chapter: Provided, however, that such repeal shall not take affect any offense committed or penalty or forfeiture incurred under said chapter, but that the same shall remain in full force in respect to the liability of any person to be proceeded against, or against whom proceedings are pending, for any offense committed under said chapter.

General Analysis and Application of the Formula

The Hawaiian Kingdom law on murder draws from the English law—the 1752 *Murder Act*.⁵ Like the *Murder Act*, the Hawaiian statute provides that “[w]hoever is guilty of murder shall be punished by death,” and “[i]n every case of sentence to punishment by death, the court may, in their discretion, order the body of the convict to be dissected, and the marshal in such case shall deliver the dead body to any surgeon who may wish to have the body for dissection.” Section 2 of the *Murder Act* provides that after the execution, the body of the murderer be delivered “to the hall of the Surgeons Company...to be dissected and anatomized by the said Surgeons.”

Teaching human anatomy “became essential for a European medical education, with Paris, Edinburgh and London (in that order of priority) attracting fee-paying students anxious to obtain extra qualifications as physicians and surgeons from dissecting criminal corpses.”⁶ Under the *Murder Act*, post-mortem dissection was also viewed as post-mortem punishment to serve as a deterrent for the crime. In the Hawaiian Kingdom, there was no Surgeons Company but only surgeons in private practice or employed by Queen’s Hospital being a quasi-public medical institution. Unlike the *Murder Act*, the sentence to post-mortem dissection was discretionary by the court and only considered if the body was requested by a surgeon, which would appear for the purpose of medical education and not post-mortem punishment.

Under the 1850 Penal Code, the murder statute had two degrees, but this was repealed by the Legislature in 1860 to have none.⁷ Manslaughter, however, had three degrees to be considered by the jury.

⁵ 25 George II, c. 37.

⁶ Elizabeth T. Hurren, *Dissecting the Criminal Corpse: Staging Post-Execution Punishment in Early Modern England* 5 (2016).

⁷ *An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Murder and Manslaughter* (1860).

Do the State of Hawai‘i statutes on murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide violate any provisions of the 1864 Constitution, as amended? No.

Do they run contrary to a monarchical form of government? No.

If the State of Hawai‘i statutes on murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide have no comparison to Hawaiian Kingdom law, would it be authorized under the Hawaiian Kingdom’s police power? Not applicable because the Hawaiian Kingdom has a law on murder and manslaughter.

If the State of Hawai‘i statutes on murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide are comparable to Hawaiian Kingdom law, does it run contrary to the Hawaiian statute on murder and manslaughter? Under the 1850 Penal Code, the Hawaiian statute on murder provided first and second degrees. First-degree murder carried the death penalty and second-degree murder carried “imprisonment at hard labor for a term of years not less than five nor more than twenty, in the discretion of the court.” The 1850 statute on manslaughter, however, did not have degrees, which stated:

The laws should make some allowance for human infirmity; therefore whoever kills another without malice aforethought, under the sudden impulse of passion, excited by provocation or other adequate cause, whether insult, threats, violence or otherwise, by the party killed, of a nature tending to disturb the judgment and facilities, and weaken the possession of a self-control of the killing party, is not guilty of murder but manslaughter; and shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor not more than ten years, or by fine not less than one thousand dollars, nor more than ten thousand dollars.

The 1860 Legislature amended that statute to remove the degrees of murder and provide three degrees of manslaughter. The punishment for murder was death and the punishment for the degrees of manslaughter varied by years of imprisonment. The State of Hawai‘i statute has two degrees of murder, no degrees for manslaughter, and three degrees of negligent homicide.

While the punishment under Hawaiian statute is death for murder and imprisonment at hard labor, it does reflect criminal laws of other foreign States in the nineteenth century to include the United States. Hard labor is a “punishment, additional to mere imprisonment, sometimes imposed upon convicts sentenced to a penitentiary for serious crimes, or for misconduct while in prison.”⁸ However under Hawaiian Kingdom criminal statutes, all sentencing to imprisonment is at hard labor. It was not an addition to imprisonment.

⁸ Black’s Law, 717 (6th ed. 1990).

With the progressive affirmation of human rights in international law, the death penalty has started to be seen as inconsistent with the very idea of human dignity. Since then, the international community of States adopted several instruments that ban the use of the death penalty. These instruments include:

- The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty;⁹
- Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights, concerning the abolition of the death penalty, and Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances;¹⁰ and
- The Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty.¹¹

As a member of the community of States, the Hawaiian Kingdom's statute on the death penalty and imprisonment at hard labor is inconsistent with the most recent developments of international law and should no longer be enforced.

Nearly every state in the American Union and the federal government has a felony murder rule. The "rule allows a defendant to be charged with first-degree murder for a killing that occurs during a dangerous felony, even if the defendant is not the killer."¹² The felony-murder rule has been used to support murder convictions of defendants where one victim of a robbery accidentally shoots another victim,¹³ where one of the defendant's co-robbers kills another co-robber during a robbery for the latter's refusal to obey orders and not as part of the robbery transaction,¹⁴ and where the defendant (a dope addict) commits robbery of the defendant's homicide victim as an afterthought following the killing.¹⁵ The application of the felony-murder rule dispenses with the need to prove that culpability with respect to the homicidal result that is otherwise required to support a conviction for murder and therefore leads to anomalous results. Therefore, the felony murder rule is inconsistent the Hawaiian statute on murder.

Does the State of Hawai'i statutes on murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide infringe on vested rights secured under Hawaiian law? No.

⁹ General Assembly resolution 44/128.

¹⁰ Council of Europe, European Treaty Series – No. 114.

¹¹ Organization of American States, Treaty Series – No. 73.

¹² Justia, *Felony Murder* (online at: <https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/homicide/felony-murder/>).

¹³ *People v. Harrison*, 203 Cal. 587, 265 P. 230 (1928).

¹⁴ *People v. Cabaltero*, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939).

¹⁵ *People v. Arnold*, 108 Cal. App. 2d 719, 239 P.2d 449 (1952).

Does the State of Hawai‘i statutes on murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide infringe on the obligations of the Hawaiian Kingdom under customary international law or being a Contracting State to its treaties? Yes. Although not a party to any treaty banning the use of the death penalty and cruel punishment, the Hawaiian Kingdom recognizes that banning the death penalty and cruel punishment is a duty of States, in line with the recent developments in the field of international human rights law. Therefore, the Hawaiian Kingdom statute on the death penalty and imprisonment at hard labor should be considered as no longer consistent with international law.

Considering this analysis, the State of Hawai‘i laws on murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide are not “contrary to the express, reason and spirit of the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom prior to July 6, 1887, the international laws of occupation and international humanitarian law.” To the extent that the felony murder rule is omitted, the State of Hawai‘i law on murder would be consistent with the Hawaiian Kingdom law on murder.



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