On August 15, 2022, Judge Leslie Kobayashi filed an Order denying the Hawaiian Kingdom’s request to allow the Ninth Circuit to review her previous Order dated July 28, 2022, denying the Hawaiian Kingdom’s motion to reconsider her decision. Federal rules allow a party to file a motion for reconsideration within 10 days of the Order. In her August 15 Order, she stated:

“Here, whether the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a sovereign and independent state is not a controlling question of law. ‘The Ninth Circuit, this court, and Hawaii state courts have rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty.’ Although the resolution of whether the Hawaiian Kingdom exists as a sovereign and independent state could, theoretically, materially affect the outcome of litigation, the question presented does not rise to the level of an exceptional case warranting departure from the congressional directive to grant interlocutory appeals sparingly.”

The Hawaiian Kingdom does not agree with Judge Kobayashi that the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence is not a controlling question of law that would bind the Court. On August 24, 2022, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a motion for Judge Kobayashi to reconsider her decision on the grounds of judicial estoppel, and in accordance with the Lorenzo principle to schedule an evidentiary hearing in order to compel the Federal Defendants to prove that the Hawaiian Kingdom no longer exists as a State. According to the Ninth Circuit, in Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, judicial estoppel prevents “a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.”

In its recent filing, the Hawaiian Kingdom drew attention to the United States’ position in support of the Lorenzo principle in United States v. Goo in 2002 where it prevailed, and then in these proceedings regarding the Lorenzo principle they act as if it never existed. The Lorenzo principle stems from the Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) case State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo that centered on the subject of whether the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State still exists.

This case not only placed the burden of proof that the Kingdom still exists on the defendant, but it also separated the Hawaiian Kingdom from the native Hawaiian sovereignty movement and nation building. In 2014, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, explained:

“Petitioners’ theory of nation-building as a fundamental right under the ICA’s decision in Lorenzo does not appear viable. Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] ‘exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature[,]’ and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her. Thus, Lorenzo does not recognize a fundamental right to build a sovereign Hawaiian nation.”

The ICA reiterated that a defendant has to provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State and not just say it exists. In State of Hawai‘i v. Araujo, the ICA stated:

Because Araujo has not, either below or on appeal, “‘presented any factual or legal basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,’” (citing Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i at 221, 883 P.2d at 643), his point of error on appeal must fail.

The Lorenzo court, however, also acknowledged that it may have misplaced the burden of proof and what needs to be proven. It stated, “although the court’s rationale is open to question in light of international law, the record indicates that the decision was correct because Lorenzo did not meet his burden of proving his defense of lack of jurisdiction.”

Because international law provides for the presumption of the continuity of the State despite the overthrow of its government by another State, it shifts the burden of proof and what is to be proven. According to Judge Crawford, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government.” Judge Crawford also stated that belligerent occupation “does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.”

In other words, under international law, it is presumed the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists as a State despited its government being militarily overthrown by the United States on January 17 1893. Addressing the presumption of the continuity of the German State after hostilities ceased in Europe during the Second World War, Professor Brownlie explains:

“Thus, after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War the four major Allied powers assumed supreme power in Germany. The legal competence of the German state [its independence and sovereignty] did not, however, disappear. What occurred is akin to legal representation or agency of necessity. The German state continued to exist, and, indeed, the legal basis of the occupation depended on its continued existence.”

“If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.” A “valid demonstration of legal title” would be an international treaty where the Hawaiian Kingdom ceded itself to the United States. No such treaty, except for the “Big Lie” that Hawai‘i is a part of the United States.

Up until now, the State of Hawai‘i courts and the federal court in Honolulu have been placing the burden on the defendants to prove the Kingdom still exists. Whether the burden is to prove the kingdom’s existence or to prove it doesn’t exist, it is a controlling law that binds the State of Hawai‘i courts.

The Lorenzo case had become a precedent case and was cited by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court in 8 cases, and by the ICA in 45 cases. The latest Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s citation of Lorenzo was in 2020 in State of Hawai‘i v. Malave. The most recent citation of Lorenzo by the ICA was in 2021 in Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Cummings. Since 1994, Lorenzo had risen to precedent, and, therefore, is common law. Federal law mandates federal courts to apply the common law of the State where the court is.

U.S. District Judge David Ezra, who was the presiding judge in United States v. Goo, stated that he was adhering to the Lorenzo principle and that the defendant did not meet his burden of proof. The defendant was claiming that “he is immune from suit or judgment in any court of the United States or the State of Hawaii. Defendant contends that the State is illegally occupying the Kingdom, and thus the laws of the Kingdom should govern his conduct rather than any state or federal laws. Therefore, Defendant opposes an order from a federal court forcing him to pay “foreign” taxes through a foreclosure mechanism.”

In these proceedings, the Federal Defendants act as if there is no such thing as the Lorenzo principle, which is contrary to their position as the United States in the Goo case. The Federal Defendants managed to convince Judge Kobayashi that the case should be dismissed because the issue of whether the kingdom exists is a political question which does not allow the court to have jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction it wouldn’t be able to have an evidentiary hearing.

In none of the 53 cases that cited the Lorenzo principle did the courts invoke the political question doctrine. Even in the 17 federal cases that applied the Lorenzo principle, which includes Goo, did the courts invoke the political question doctrine. All stated the defendants failed to provide any evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists as a State.

The Lorenzo principle gives the State of Hawai‘i and the federal court limited jurisdiction to hear the evidence. If there is no evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists it maintains its jurisdiction. But if evidence shows that the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists, then the courts has no jurisdiction. In these proceedings, when the Federal Defendants fail to provide evidence that the Kingdom no longer exists, the Court will have to transform itself into an Article II Occupation Court in order to have jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the Hawaiian Kingdom.

The issue is not a “political question” but rather a “legal question” that the court has jurisdiction in order to hear the evidence. In another case that came before the ICA, in State of Hawai‘i v. Lee, ICA stated that the Lorenzo court “suggested that it is an open legal question whether the ‘Kingdom of Hawai‘i’ still exists.”

The Federal Defendants are attempting to make an end run on the football field and argue that the Hawaiian Kingdom cannot tackle them. It is an attempt by the Federal Defendants to overcome a difficulty without directly confronting it, which is precisely why judicial estoppel applies and judicial integrity is the primary function of judicial estoppel. Here is what federal courts of appeal say regarding judicial estoppel:

According to the First Circuit, judicial estoppel is to be used “when a litigant is ‘playing fast and loose with the courts,’ and when ‘international self-contradiction is being used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice.’”

The Second Circuit states that judicial estoppel “is supposed to protect judicial integrity by preventing litigants from playing fast and loose with courts, thereby avoiding unfair results and unseemliness.”

The Third Circuit established a requirement that “the party changed his or her position in bad faith, i.e., in a culpable manner threatening to the court’s authority and integrity.”

The Fourth Circuit applies judicial estoppel to prevent litigants from “blowing hot and cold as the occasion demands.”

According to the Fifth Circuit, “litigants undermine the integrity of the judicial process when they deliberately tailor contradictory (as opposed to alternate) positions to the exigencies of the moment.”

The Sixth Circuit states that judicial estoppel “preserves the integrity of the courts by preventing a party from abusing the judicial process through cynical gamesmanship, achieving success on one position, then arguing the opposite to suit an exigency of the moment.”

The Seventh Circuit seeks to have judicial estoppel “to protect the judicial system from being whipsawed with inconsistent arguments.”

The Eighth Circuit says, “the purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. As we read the caselaw, this is tantamount to a knowing misrepresentation to or even fraud on the court.”

The Ninth Circuit allows judicial estoppel to preclude “a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.”

Observing that for judicial estoppel to apply, according to the Eleventh Circuit, the “inconsistencies must be shown to have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.”

This inconsistent position taken by the Federal Defendants has placed the Hawaiian Kingdom in an unfair position. In its closing statement, the Hawaiian Kingdom stated:

“If the Federal Defendants are confident that “Plaintiff’s claim and assertions lack merit,” then let them make their case that the Hawaiian Kingdom “ceases to be a state” under international law pursuant to the Lorenzo principle that the Goo court adhered to. But they cannot prevail by having the Court muzzle the Plaintiff in its own case seeking justice under the rule of law.”

The United States knows that over a century of lies is coming to an end because there never was any evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom no longer exists as a State. As Sir Walter Scott wrote in 1808, “Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to deceive.” It means that when you act dishonestly you are initiating problems, and a domino structure of complications, which will eventually run out of control.

This past Friday, August 12, 2022, District Judge Leslie Kobayashi filed a Minute Order taking under advisement the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion to Certify for interlocutory appeal her Order of July 28, 2022, denying the Hawaiian Kingdom’s motion for reconsideration of her previous Order granting the Federal Defendants motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

The Federal Defendants include Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., President of the United States; Kamala Harris, Vice-President of the United States; John Aquilino, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service; Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senate Majority Leader; and Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives.

In their Motion to Dismiss, the Federal Defendants were claiming that this case presents a political question and that it should be dismissed. A political question means that since the United States has not recognized a nation as being sovereign and independent, the court’s will not adjudicate the case because the recognition of the sovereignty of that nation is first committed to the political branches of government. An example of a political question is Palestine. Because the United States has yet to recognize Palestine as an independent State, the federal courts deny access on matters relating to Palestine because it is a political question that the political branches have yet to recognize it.

The political question doctrine, however, does not apply in this case because the United States recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as a sovereign and independent State on July 6, 1844, by letter of Secretary of State John C. Calhoun on behalf of President John Tyler, and later entered into treaty relations and the establishment of embassies and consulates in the two countries.

Also, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §202, comment g, states that the United States’ “duty to treat a qualified entity as a state also implies that so long as the entity continues to meet those qualifications its statehood may not be ‘derecognized.’” The United States cannot now claim that it has de-recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom. It must show a treaty where the Hawaiian Kingdom merged with the United States, which would result in its extinguishment. No such treaty exists.

In her June 9, 2022 Order granting the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Kobayashi stated, “Plaintiff bases its claims on the proposition that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a sovereign and independent State. However, ‘Hawaii is a state of the United States…. The Ninth Circuit, this court, and Hawai‘i state courts have rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty.’” She then concludes, without reference to any evidence, “Plaintiff’s claims are ‘so patently without merit that the claims require no meaningful consideration.’”

The Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 15, 2022, because Judge Kobayashi’s Order is not in line with the court decisions she cited regarding the Hawaiian Kingdom. In its motion, the Hawaiian Kingdom brought to the attention of Judge Kobayashi the Lorenzo principle that stemmed from a 1994 appeals case, State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, that came before the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). That case centered on whether or not the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist despite the unlawful overthrow of its government by the United States on January 17, 1893.

Lorenzo lost his appeal because the ICA stated, “Lorenzo has presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” In other words, if Lorenzo did provide the evidence of the Kingdom’s existence as a State his appeal would have been granted and his criminal conviction by the trial court overturned.

In 2002, District Court Judge David Ezra, in United States v. Goo, stated, “This court sees no reason why it should not adhere to the Lorenzo principle.” What is surprising is that Judge Kobayashi was serving at the time as the Magistrate Judge under District Court Judge Ezra who made the decision that the court would “adhere to the Lorenzo principle.” The case centered on an Order issued by Magistrate Judge Kobayashi, which Judge Ezra affirmed. Judge Kobayashi cannot simply disregard the Lorenzo principle, when in fact the Lorenzo principle was used to confirm her Order as a Magistrate Judge.

In 2004, the ICA reiterated that a defendant has to provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State and not just say it exists. In State of Hawai‘i v. Araujo, the ICA stated:

Because Araujo has not, either below or on appeal, “‘presented any factual or legal basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,’” (citing Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i at 221, 883 P.2d at 643), his point of error on appeal must fail.

Finally, in 2014, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, clarified this evidentiary burden. The Supreme Court stated:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the Kingdom “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.

When Judge Kobayashi stated in her Order granting the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss that the “Ninth Circuit, this court, and Hawai‘i state courts have rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty,” this is not an accurate statement. What the courts did conclude is that the defendants in those cases did not provide any evidence of the Kingdom’s existence as a State according to the Lorenzo principle. Instead, the defendants provided argument but not any evidence to support their argument. Judge Kobayashi’s statement would appear that these courts concluded the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist as a State, which was clearly not the case.

Despite the Hawaiian Kingdom’s attempt to draw the attention of Judge Kobayashi to the Lorenzo principle and her errors, she issued an Order on July 28, 2022, denying the Hawaiian Kingdom’s request for reconsideration. She stated, “Although Plaintiff argues there are manifest errors of law in the 6/9/22 Order, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision. Plaintiff’s mere disagreement, however, does not constitute grounds for reconsideration.”

Normally, when one of the parties to a lawsuit wants to appeal a decision made by a federal judge they have to wait until the case is over. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “A district court order…is not appealable [under § 1291] unless it disposes of all claims as to all parties or unless judgment is entered in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).” In other words, an Order is appealable while a case is still pending before the district court if it is in compliance with certain rules.

Federal statute 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) allows for Orders, called interlocutory orders, to be appealable if there is a difference of opinion regarding a controlling question of law. This is precisely what Judge Kobayashi stated in her Order denying the request for reconsideration. She stated, “Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” This disagreement centers on a law that is supposed to be applied by the court in these proceedings. In this case, it would be the application of the Lorenzo principle.

Laws are not only legislative enactments but also include Appellate Court and Supreme Court decisions called common law. When there is no statute or law that would apply to a particular issue, the courts are allowed to make decisions that bind the lower courts when those type of matters come before the trial courts. Until a law is enacted on that particular matter or the highest court changes its decision, the common law would continue to apply at the district court level and bind the judges in their decisions.

The Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Motion to Certify so that the Ninth Circuit can review Judge Kobayashi’s Orders. Under §1292(b), the district court judge must first certify that the request to appeal an interlocutory order to the Ninth Circuit has met certain elements. §1292(b) states:

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order.

When a motion is filed in court proceedings, the other party, in this case the Federal Defendants, will have to file a motion to oppose or not oppose the filing. Dexter Ka‘iama, Attorney General for the Hawaiian Kingdom, spoke with the Department of Justice who is representing the Federal Defendants and told them that the Hawaiian Kingdom will be filing a motion for certification and asked if they would oppose or agree with the action. They told Attorney General Ka‘iama that they would oppose it.

The Hawaiian Kingdom was planning to respond to the Federal Defendants’ filing of their opposition with additional information it had found to support its Motion to Certify. However, when Judge Kobayashi filed her Order this past Friday, she stated, “that no response to the Certification Motion is necessary,” which means the Federal Defendants will not be filing their opposition as to why they oppose the motion to certify. They merely stated to Attorney General Ka‘iama that they will oppose it.

On Sunday, August 14, 2022, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Supplement to its Motion to Certify with the information it intended to reply to the Federal Defendants’ filing of their opposition. In its supplement to its motion, the Hawaiian Kingdom showed that there are other laws, along with the Lorenzo principle, to be the controlling law on this topic that Judge Kobayashi disregarded.

In its recent filing, the Hawaiian Kingdom expanded on the Lorenzo principle as the common law of the State of Hawai‘i. For the past 28 years, State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo was cited by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court in 8 cases, the most recent was in 2020. The ICA cited Lorenzo in 45 cases, the most recent was in 2021.

As common law of the State of Hawai‘i, Judge Kobayashi was bound to apply it in this case because of §34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, which is codified under 28 U.S.C. §1652:

The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.

Reinforcing this statute, the United States Supreme Court, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, stated that “federal courts are bound to follow decisions of the courts of the State in which the controversies arise.” Judge Kobayashi cannot simply disregard 28 years of decisions by the State of Hawai‘i courts that say defendants must provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State despite its government being unlawfully overthrown by the United States on January 17, 1893. The Hawaiian Kingdom also stated:

Further, it appears that the Court adopted a federal rule of decision to favor the United States despite its admitted illegal conduct regarding the overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom on January 17, 1893. The application of the Lorenzo principle, as the common law of the State of Hawai‘i, should not be deemed by the Court to be incompatible with federal interests because it does not promote the interest of the United States. This is problematic because the federal court did adopt the Lorenzo principle as federal law in 17 cases, but this Court adopted a rule of decision—political question doctrine, in this one instance without any basis in law or fact, that unfairly advances the interest of the United States and shields them from accountability for its admitted unlawful conduct. This gives the impression that the Court is giving one party to the controversy an unfair advantage.

The Hawaiian Kingdom concluded:

Because the Court chose to supersede the decisions of the ICA and the Hawai‘i Supreme Court regarding the evidentiary basis of Lorenzo by invoking the political question doctrine in favor of the United States, the Court should certify for interlocutory appeal so that the Ninth Circuit can address this matter in the light of §1652, Erie, and the Lorenzo principle as controlling law in this case.

For more information and resources from the ongoing 12 part series go to Hawaiian Kingdom History: The Kingdom, the Church, the Land.

On July 12, 2022, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an Order dismissing the appeal of the Hawaiian Kingdom that came before a three-judge panel comprised of Justices Silverman, Callahan, and Collins. The Order stated that the Ninth Circuit Court “lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the challenged orders are not final or appealable.” The Court explained, “A district court order is…not appealable [§1291] unless it disposes of all claims as to all parties or unless judgment is entered in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).”

The Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden proceedings are still taking place at the district court in Hawai‘i, which is why the Ninth Circuit denied the appeal. While the Ninth Circuit was deliberating, District Court Judge Leslie Kobayashi issued a third Order granting the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice because the case presents a political question. The basis for her third Order was the same regarding her previous two Orders that were before the Ninth Circuit. Without providing any supporting evidence that it is a political question, Judge Kobayashi stated:

Plaintiff bases its claims on the proposition that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a sovereign and independent state. However, “Hawaii is a state of the United States… The Ninth Circuit, this court, and Hawaii state courts have rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty.” “‘[T]here is no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.’”

As such, Plaintiff’s claims are “patently without merit that the claim[s] require[] no meaningful consideration.” In any event, to the extent that Plaintiff’s ask the Court to declare that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a sovereign territory, the United States Supreme Court made clear over 130 years ago that “[w]ho is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political, question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges….” “The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.” “This principle has always been upheld by” the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and Plaintiff’s claims against the Federal Defendants must be dismissed.

On June 15, 2022, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a motion for reconsideration with Judge Kobayashi. For the first time in these proceedings, the Hawaiian Kingdom, in its motion, addressed the Lorenzo principle and who actually has the burden of evidence and what needs to be proven. In State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, the Intermediate Court of Appeals admitted that its “rationale is open to question in light of international” by placing the burden on the defendant to provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State.

If the court applied international law, which they admitted they didn’t but could, there is a presumption that the Hawaiian Kingdom, an established and recognized State in the nineteenth century, continues to exist until there is rebuttable evidence to the contrary. In other words, when you apply international law it is not an issue of whether the Hawaiian Kingdom exists as a State, but rather an issue that the Hawaiian Kingdom no longer exists as a State under international law.

You start off with the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence until an opposing party provides evidence that the United States extinguished the existence of the Kingdom. There is no such evidence, which is why the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1999 verified the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as a “State” in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom.

It is clear that the federal court does apply the State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo case when defendants assert that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist. In 2002, U.S. District Court Judge David Ezra, in United States v. Goo, stated:

Since the Intermediate Court of Appeals for the State of Hawaii’s decision in Hawaii v. Lorenzo, the courts in Hawaii have consistently adhered to the Lorenzo court’s statements that the Kingdom of Hawaii is not recognized as a sovereign state by either the United States or the State of Hawaii. See Lorenzo; see also State of Hawaii v. French (stating that “presently there is no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognizing attributes of a state’s sovereign nature”) (quoting Lorenzo). This court sees no reason why it should not adhere to the Lorenzo principle.

In State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, the Intermediate Court of Appeals explained, it “was incumbent on Defendant to present evidence supporting his claim. Lorenzo has presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” Because Lorenzo presented no evidence is why his appeal was denied. Affirming the jurisdictional issue and the burden of providing evidence, the State of Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, explained:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.

The operative word in Judge Ezra’s decision, like the Intermediate Court of Appeals, is “presently” because of the evidentiary burden not being met. Regarding this burden to provide evidence, Judge Ezra stated, “that Defendant has failed to provide any viable legal or factual support for his claim that as a citizen of the Kingdom he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts.”

The Lorenzo principle was applied by the federal court in 17 cases since 1993 and was addressing the fact that the defendants in these cases provided no evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State. That is why the decisions had the word “presently,” because it is still an open question. Not one of these cases stated what Judge Kobayashi stated in her Order that the issue is a political question.

While the Hawaiian Kingdom did not have the burden to provide evidence of its continued existence as a State pursuant to the Lorenzo principle, it did so throughout these proceedings from the start. Whether or not who has the burden to provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence or its non-existence, the outcome is the same regarding the jurisdiction of the State of Hawai‘i court or the federal court. Simply stated, if the Hawaiian Kingdom exists then the courts have no jurisdiction.

The Lorenzo principle is called federal common law, which Black’s Law dictionary defines as a “body of decisional law developed by the federal courts.” In 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, stated that federal courts have to apply the laws and decisions of State courts where they reside. As Judge Ezra explained, the Lorenzo principle stems from the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals in State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo.

No State of Hawai‘i court applying the precedent of State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo in their decisions or the 17 federal court decisions applying the Lorenzo principle stated that the issue presents a political question. Judge Kobayashi’s statement that the issue is a political question has no basis in fact or in law.

On July 28, 2022, Judge Kobayashi denied the Hawaiian Kingdom’s motion. In her fourth Order she stated, “Plaintiff’s Motion fails to identify any new material facts not previously available, an intervening change in law, or a manifest error of law or fact. Although Plaintiff argues there are manifest errors of law in the 6/9/22 Order, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” She sums it up that it’s merely a disagreement.

It is clear that Judge Kobayashi’s opinion that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist flies in the face of an evidentiary burden in the Lorenzo principle that has and continues to be applied by the State of Hawai‘i courts since 1994 and the federal court since 1993. This is not a mere disagreement between Judge Kobayashi and the Hawaiian Kingdom, but rather a complete disregard of 29 years of court decisions that when a party is claiming the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist it must provide evidence of a factual or legal basis. Her decision is a clear “manifest error of law.”

This past Friday, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a motion to certify for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit of a non-final order. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the Ninth Circuit Court can hear a non-final order if it involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

The question of law and the difference of opinion would be the Lorenzo doctrine, which Judge Kobayashi acknowledged when she stated, “Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” The issue that it “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” is that the Hawaiian Kingdom could move for summary judgement because none of the Federal Defendants contested the allegations in the amended complaint. A summary judgment is a judgment entered by a court for one of the parties without going to trial.

There is a two-step process for a non-final Order to be taken up on appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court. First, Judge Kobayashi will have to first certify the appeal with an Order, and, second, the Hawaiian Kingdom will have to file that Order with the Ninth Circuit for their acceptance of the appeal. If Judge Kobayashi denies the certification, the Hawaiian Kingdom will appeal on this same subject when the case has come to a close. This filing of the appeal now is so that resources and money won’t be wasted by continuing the proceedings in the district court, especially when everything centers on the Lorenzo doctrine.

The issue before the federal court in Hawai‘i is no longer its status as an Article II Occupation Court, but rather the Lorenzo principle and the issue of the Hawaiian Kingdom continued existence as a State. The transformation of the federal court into an Article II Occupation Court is incidental to the Lorenzo principle and the application of international law.

The Preliminary Report on the Legal Status of Land Titles throughout the Realm of July 16, 2020, by the Royal Commission of Inquiry, is a comprehensive report as to why the majority of land titles today throughout Hawai‘i are defective. This includes properties claimed to be owned by billionaires such as Mark Zuckerberg’s claim to property on the island of Kaua‘i, and Larry Ellison’s claim to 98% of the island of Lana‘i. The Royal Commission of Inquiry also published a Supplemental Report on Title Insurance on October 20, 2020.

All titles to real estate throughout the Hawaiian Kingdom are subject to Hawaiian laws despite the unlawful overthrow of its government by the United States in 1893. As such, all titles that have since been alleged to have been conveyed after January 17, 1893, are void ab initio due to forged certificates of acknowledgment by individuals impersonating public officers. This includes all purported conveyances of Government or Crown lands after January 17, 1893, and any judicial proceedings regarding titles to land.

Hawaiian law, however, would have recognized these acts of the insurgents as being valid if Queen Lili‘uokalani was restored to office. The agreed upon conditions of restoration between the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom provided, “a general amnesty to those concerned in setting up the provisional government and a recognition of all its bona fide acts and obligations.” Regarding the “bona fide acts and obligations,” the Queen stated in her letter dated December 18, 1893, to the U.S. Minister Albert Willis, who was negotiating on behalf of President Cleveland, “I further solemnly pledge myself and my Government, if restored, to assume all the obligations created by the Provisional Government, in the proper course of administration, including all expenditures for military or police services, it being my purpose, if restored, to assume the Government precisely as it existed on the day when it was unlawfully overthrown.”

By this agreement, the United States acknowledged the acts done by the insurgency were not “bona fide” until after the Queen was restored. The Queen was not restored and, therefore, the insurgency continued to unlawfully impersonate public officers of the Hawaiian Kingdom in the chain of title. These defects in title are covered risks in the owner’s and lender’s title insurance policies as:

• forgery, fraud, undue influence, duress, incompetency, incapacity, or impersonation;
• failure of any person or Entity to have authorized a transfer or conveyance;
• a document affecting Title not properly created, executed, witnessed, sealed, acknowledged, notarized, or delivered;
• a document executed under a falsified, expired, or otherwise invalid power of attorney;
• a document not properly filed, recorded, or indexed in the Public Records including failure to perform those acts by electronic means authorized by law;
• a defective judicial or administrative proceeding.

Here’s an example of a “bona fide” Royal Patent issued on October 26, 1852.

Here is an example of a “forged” Royal Patent issued just one month after the overthrow of the Hawaiian government by the United States dated February 3, 1893. This is an example of what President Cleveland sought to remedy as a “bona fide” act by the insurgents in his agreement of restoration with Queen Lili‘uokalani.

Any property today that derives from this forged Royal Patent is void, but the loss could be covered by an owner’s policy of title insurance. Hill, Steindorff and Widener, in their “Recent Developments in Title Insurance Law,” reported that in 2012, a California Federal District Court, in Gumapac v. Deutsche Bank National Trust, found that “a title report revealed a defect of title by virtue of an executive agreement between President Grover Cleveland and Queen Lili‘uokalani of the Hawaiian Kingdom that rendered any notary actions unlawful. Thus, the deed of conveyance to the homeowners was nullified.” In Hawai‘i, claimants under both an owner’s or lender’s title insurance policy have a duty to immediately notify their insurer of any title defects that affect title to the property or the mortgage that secures the repayment of a loan.

During this time of high prices at the gas pump added on to the high cost of living in the Hawaiian Islands, watching how you spend your money is critical to surviving during this inflation crisis brought upon the residents of Hawai‘i by the United States prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom since 1893. But there is some monetary light that many people in Hawai‘i can take advantage of, which is filing a claim with their title insurance company under an owner’s policy, and notifying your bank or lender to file a claim so that your debt owed to the lender is paid off.

When individuals want to borrow money from a bank or lender, they are told by the lender to first go to an escrow company to purchase a lender’s title insurance policy in the amount to be borrowed. Prior to the issuing of a title insurance policy, the escrow company does a title search on the property that the borrower intends to use as a security instrument, also called a mortgage, to ensure the repayment of the loan. A title insurance company that works with the escrow company will then insure the accuracy of the title search. Only when the borrower purchases the title insurance policy to protect the lender from any title defect that affects the mortgaged debt is when escrow comes to a close.

There is another type of title insurance policy that is issued by the escrow company and that is an owner’s policy that protects the owner and not the lender. An owner’s policy is normally purchased when an individual borrows money for the first time and has to go to an escrow company. Many people don’t even know that they may have purchased an owner’s policy unless they look at their closing papers from escrow. Unlike a lender’s policy that covers the debt owed to the lender, an owner’s policy covers the owner’s loss, which is the appraised value of the property at the time the policy is taken out.

Most people are unaware as to what title insurance is and how it works. Typical insurance policies, such as car insurance or flood insurance, insure against a future cause of damage, that may or may not occur. Title insurance, on the other hand, insures against a past cause of damage called defects in the chain of title that affect ownership of real property. According to Burke’s Law of Title Insurance, title insurance is an agreement to indemnify the insured for losses incurred “by either on-record and off-record defects that are found in the title or interest in an insured property to have existed on the date on which the policy is issued.” And Black’s Law Dictionary defines title insurance as a “policy issued by a title company after searching the title…and insuring the accuracy of its search against claims of title defects.” As the Florida Court of Appeals, in McDaniel v. Lawyers Title Guar. Fund, stated, “One of the reasonable expectations of a policyholder who purchases title insurance is to be protected against defects in his title which appear of record.”

Title insurance is a one-time paid premium agreement under both an owner’s policy, that protects the interests of the owner of the property, and a lender’s policy, that protects the lender’s interest—the debt owed—in the mortgaged lien on the property. The owner’s policy does not exceed the amount of coverage on the policy. The lender’s policy coverage reduces as the debt is being paid by the borrower, which will eventually expire once the final payment of the loan is made. Burke explains that coverage under an owner’s policy, however, “lasts for as long as the insured has some liability for title defect, whether as the present owner or possessor, or as a vendor [grantor] and warrantor of the state of the title upon some later sale. There is no such thing as term title insurance. Its policy might, potentially, last forever.” A grantor’s covenant is explicitly stated in its warranty deed where it states, “and that the Grantor will WARRANT AND DEFEND the same unto the Grantee against the lawful claims and demands of all persons.”

Being that title insurance is an indemnity agreement, Burke states that the insurer can also act as a surety, which “is a person agreeing to be answerable for the actions of another.” According to Burke, when there is a breach of covenant and warranty of title by a grantor, the “title insurer might agree to remedy a breach of the covenant for further assurances by bringing the litigation required to cure a title, instead of letting the [grantor] do it.” The right to remedy, as a surety, is provided under Condition no. 5 of both the owner and lender policies that states the insurer “shall have the right, in addition to the options contained in Section 7 of these Conditions, at its own cost, to institute and prosecute any action or proceeding or to any other act that in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish the Title, as insured, or to prevent or reduce loss or damage to the Insured.” According to Hill, Steindorff and Widener, an Illinois Appellate Court concluded “that although the title company did not have an ownership interest in the property, the company had issued a title insurance policy and could have redeemed the taxes on the subject property on behalf of the prior owner, to whom it had issued a title policy.”

When the title insurance company is given the evidence of proof of loss of title in a claim letter by the insured, the company has thirty-days to either initiate proceedings to remedy the defect of the title or make a payment to the insured covered in the insurance policy. According to the federal court in Davis v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., “In law, a title is either good or bad.” The Missouri Supreme Court, in Kent & Obear v. Allen, stated, “the validity of the title arising, the question must be determined whether it is good or bad. We cannot object to the title of the respondent that it is doubtful or unmarketable.” The Davis court also concluded that the “liability of the insurer was definitely fixed under the terms of the policy,” to either remedy the defect or the “payment of loss was due, under the policy, ‘within 30 days thereafter.’”

To determine “on-record defects in title,” a title insurer relies on a competent title search. According to Baker, Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull’s article, “Optimal Title Search,” in the Journal of Legal Studies, “Some states have no set length but instead require that the entire title history of a parcel of land be searched back to the state’s date of patent,” which include Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North and South Dakota, Oregon, Texas and Washington. At the highest number of years for a title search are Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, and Wyoming at 187 years. At the low end of a 30-year search are New Mexico, Oklahoma and Tennessee. In a study of optimal title searches, Hawai‘i, Illinois and Indiana were excluded from the analysis because they provided “indeterminate search lengths.”

In one particular preliminary report by Title Guaranty of Hawai‘i, its title search only went back one conveyance. This lack of a full title search by Title Guaranty, who serves as an agent for title insurance companies, back to the original patent, called Royal Patents, only amplifies the purpose of title insurance as an indemnity agreement. It is not a guaranty of the state of the title. According to the Pennsylvania court, in Hicks v. Saboe, “The purpose of title insurance is to protect the insured…from loss arising from defects in the title which he acquires.” The federal court, in Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., stated, “Because title insurance [is] a contract of indemnity, the insurer does not guarantee the state of the title, but agrees to pay for any loss resulting from a defective title.” The Maryland Appeals Court, in Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. West, explained that a title insurer does not have a duty to advise “on the state of title to the property, but to insure against…loss resulting from any defects.” Therefore, “the title insurer does not ‘guarantee’ the status of the grantor’s title. As an indemnity agreement, the insurer agrees to reimburse the insured for loss or damage sustained as a result of title problems, as long as the coverage for the damages incurred is not excluded from the policy.”

Since 1994, the State of Hawai‘i courts have applied, whenever the issue of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as a State arose in court proceedings, the State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo case at the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which has come to be known as the Lorenzo doctrine in the federal courts. For 28 years, both the State of Hawai‘i courts and the federal courts have been applying the Lorenzo doctrine wrong. Under international law, which the ICA acknowledged may affect its rationale of placing the burden on the defendant to prove the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists as a State,” shifts the burden on the party opposing the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom that it “does not exist as a State.” In international arbitration proceedings at the Permanent Court of Arbitration from 1999-2001, in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, PCA case no. 1999-01, the PCA acknowledged the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State and the Council of Regency as its government. Because the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists, so do the laws that apply to real property.

In a denial letter to a title insurance claimant, Michael J. Moss, Senior Claims Counsel for Chicago Title Insurance Company, specifically referenced the Lorenzo doctrine applied in two State of Hawai‘i court cases and one federal court case as a basis to decline the insurance claim under an owner’s title insurance policy in the amount of $178,000.00. Moss stated:

The Hawaiian Courts have consistently found that the Kingdom of Hawai‘i is no longer recognized as a sovereign state by either the federal government or by the State of Hawai‘i. See State v. Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i 219, 221, 883 P.2d 641, 643 (Haw.App.1994); accord State v. French, 77 Hawai‘i 222, 228, 883 P.2d 644, 649 (Haw.App.1994); Baker v. Stehua, CIV 09-00615 ACK-BMK, 2010 WL 3528987 (D. Haw. Sept. 8, 2010).

Like the courts of the State of Hawai‘i and the federal courts, the Senior Claims Counsel incorrectly applied the Lorenzo doctrine, which should have been in favor of the title insurance claimant. The title insurance claim was that the “Owner’s deed was not lawfully executed according to Hawaiian Kingdom law [because] the notaries public and the Bureau of Conveyance weren’t part of the Hawaii[an] Kingdom, that the documents in [the claimant’s] chain of title were not lawfully executed.” In other words, the Lorenzo doctrine, when applying international law correctly, would compel the title insurance company to pay the claimant his $178,000.00 covered under the owner’s title insurance policy he had purchased to protect him in case there was a defect in the title.

To find out if you have an owner’s policy check your closing papers from escrow to see if you purchased a policy. Or you can call your escrow company or companies that you went to in the past. If you have a mortgage you did purchase a title insurance policy to protect the lender. To file a claim under your owner’s policy download this MSWord document and fill in the necessary information after you have your owner’s policy in hand. To send a letter to your lender to file an insurance claim under the lender’s policy you purchased download this MSWord document and fill in the necessary information.

Submitting an insurance claim is a private matter that is subject to the terms of your contract or policy. Under the terms of the policy you and the lender are obligated to notify the insurance company if you have been made aware that there are defects in your title. It is suggested that you carefully read over your title insurance policy before you send your claim to the insurance company by certified mail. The lender, not the borrower, has a copy of the lender’s policy that was purchased by the borrower. Once the claim, whether by the owner or the lender, is received by the insurance company you will receive a letter acknowledging your claim and assigning it a claim number. This letter by the insurance company will begin the thirty-day window to either remedy the defect in the title or pay the amount covered under the policy.

There is a common misunderstanding that if you are a direct descendent of Kamehameha I today you are an heir to the throne as well as an heir to the Crown Lands. This is incorrect.

It is true that Kamehameha I had many wives. According to the second revised edition of the book Kamehameha’s Children Today by Charles Ahlo, Rubellite Kawena Kinney Johson, and Jerry Walker, Kamehameha I had 30 wives, 18 of whom had 35 children. The other 12 did not have any children. Of the 18 was Keōpūolani who gave birth to Liholiho, who later succeeded to the throne as Kamehameha II in 1819, Kauikeaouli, who succeeded to the throne as Kamehameha III in 1824, and a daughter, Nahiʻenaʻena who died in 1836 while her brother Kamehameha III was King. Of all the wives, she had the highest chiefly rank and she was acknowledged as such by Kamehameha’s Chiefs.

The Kamehameha extended family was not the leadership of the kingdom. Rather, the leadership of the Island of Kingdom of Hawai‘i was comprised of Kamehameha as its Ali‘i Nui (King) and his most trusted Chiefs, which included Kalaʻimamahu, Chief of Hāmākua, Ke‘eaumoku, Chief of Kona, Ka‘iana, Chief of Puna, and Kame‘eiamoku, Chief of Kohala. After defeating the Maui Kingdom of Kalanikupule in 1795 and acquiring the Kaua‘i Kingdom from Kaumuali‘i in 1810, the leadership of Chiefs increased due to the acquisition of additional islands of his expanded domain. These Chiefs extended from Kamehameha’s Chiefs, while the Kamehameha Dynasty extended from the children of Keōpūolani and not from the other 17 wives who had children. The decision of which wife’s children were to be the heirs to the throne was not the decision for Kamehameha I to make on his own. It had to be sanctioned by his Council of Chiefs. Without the support of his Chiefs, Kamehameha’s kingdom would be fractured after his death.

As Kuykendal wrote, “The desertion of Kaʻiana [in 1795], the revolt of Nāmākēhā [in 1796], and Kaumuialiʻi’s dalliance with the Russians [in 1817] were overt acts showing clearly how unwillingly some of the chiefs submitted to his authority.” The Russian explorer, Lieutenant Otto von Kotzebue, who arrived in the islands in 1816 and 1817, was made aware of Kamehameha’s concerns of the longevity of his kingdom. In his 1821 book, Voyage of Discovery, Kotzebue states of a proposed division of the kingdom with Kalanimoku having O‘ahu, Ke‘eaumoku having Maui, Kaumuali‘i retaining Kaua‘i, and Liholiho, Kamehameha’s heir, having Hawai‘i island. Kamehameha took the necessary steps to prevent such breakup from happening. According to Kamakau, Kamehameha sought to strengthen the British alliance because he believed the British supported his dynasty. He was correct.

On May 18, 1824, Kamehameha II arrived in London with the Hawaiian royal retinue that included Mataio Kekūanāo‘a husband to Kamehameha II’s sister, Kīnaʻu. Before the King could meet with King George IV he and his wife Queen Kalama died of measles. High Chief Boki was the highest ranking Chief and he and the royal retinue met with King George IV. According Kekuanao‘a:

The King then asked Boki what was the business on which you and your King came to this country?

Then Boki declared to him the reason of our sailing to Great Britain We have come to confirm the words which Kamehameha I gave in charge to Vancouver thus—“Go back and tell King George to watch over me and my whole Kingdom. I acknowledge him as my landlord and myself as tenant (or him as superior and I inferior). Should the foreigners of any other nation come to take possesion of my lands, then let him help me.”

And when King George had heard he thus said to Boki, “I have heard these words, I will attend to the evils from without. The evils within your Kingdom it is not for me to regard; they are with yourselves. Return and say to the King, to Kaahumanu and to Kalaimoku, I will watch over your country, I will not take possession of it for mine, but I will watch over it, lest evils should come from others to the Kingdom. I therefore will watch over him agreeably to those ancient words.”

Kamehameha II’s body arrived in Lahaina on May 4, 1825. After the funeral and time of mourning had passed, the Council of Chiefs met on June 6, 1824, in Honolulu with Lord Byron and the British Consul. It was confirmed that Liholiho’s brother, Kauikeaouli, was to be Kamehameha III, but since he was only eleven years old, Ka‘ahumanu would continue to serve as Regent and Kalanimōkū as Premier. Kalanimōkū addressed the Council “setting forth the defects of many of their laws and customs, particularly the reversion of lands” to a new King for redistribution and assignment. The chiefs collectively agreed to forgo this ancient custom, and the lands were maintained in the hands of the original tenants in chief and their successors, subject to reversion only in times of treason. Lord Byron was invited to address the Council, and without violating his specific orders of non-intervention in the political affairs of the kingdom, he prepared eight recommendations on paper and presented it to the chiefs for their consideration.

1. That the king be head of the people.

2. That all the chiefs swear allegiance.

3. That the lands descend in hereditary succession.

4. That taxes be established to support the king.

5. That no man’s life be taken except by consent of the king or regent and twelve chiefs.

6. That the king or regent grant pardons at all times.

7. That all the people be free and not bound to one chief.

8. That a port duty be laid on all foreign vessels.

Lord Byron introduced the fundamental principles of British governance to the chiefs and set them on a course of national consolidation and uniformity. His suggestions referred “to the form of government, and the respective and relative rights of the king, chiefs, and people, and to the tenure of lands,” but not to a uniform code of laws. Since the death of Kamehameha in 1819, the Hawaiian Kingdom, as a feudal autocracy, had no uniform system of laws systematically applied throughout the islands. Rather it fell on each of the tenants in chief and their designated vassals to be both lawmaker and arbiter over their own particular tenants living on the granted lands from the King.

When the Hawaiian Kingdom was transformed into a constitutional monarchy, written laws became the legal foundation for the kingdom. Confirming that only the children of Keōpūolani were the heirs to the Throne, the 1840 Constitution stated:

The origin of the present government, and system of polity, is as follows: KAMEHAMEHA I, was the founder of the kingdom, and to him belonged all the land from one end of the Islands to the other, though it was not his own private property. It belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom Kamehameha I was the head, and had the management of the landed property. Wherefore, there was not formerly, and is not now any person who could or can convey away the smallest portion of land without consent of the one who had, or has the direction of the kingdom.

These are the persons who have had the direction of it from that time down, Kamehameha II, Kaahumanu I, and at the present time Kamehameha III. These persons have had the direction of the kingdom down to the present time, and all documents written by them, and no others are the documents of the kingdom.

The kingdom is permanently confirmed to Kamehameha III, and his heirs, and his heir shall be the person whom he and the chiefs shall appoint, during his life time, but should there be no appointment, then the decision shall rest with the chiefs and house of Representatives.

In the 1852 Constitution, Article 25 states:

The crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kamehameha III during his life, and to his successor. The successor shall be the person whom the King and the House of Nobles shall appoint and publicly proclaim as such, during the King’s life; but should there be no such appointment and proclamation, then the successor shall be chosen by the House of Nobles and the House of Representatives in joint ballot.

In the 1864 Constitution, Article 22 states:

The Crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kamehameha V, and to the Heirs of His body lawfully begotten, and to their lawful Descendants in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to Her Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kamamalu Kaahumanu, and their heirs of her body, lawfully begotten, and their lawful descendants in a direct line. The Succession shall be to the senior male child, and to the heirs of his body; failing a male child, the succession shall be to the senior female child, and the heirs of her body. In case there is no heir as above provided, then the successor shall be the person whom the Sovereign shall appoint with the consent of the Nobles, and publicly proclaim as such during the King’s life; but should there be no appointment and proclamation, and the Throne should become vacant, then the Cabinet Council, immediately after the occurring of such vacancy, shall cause a meeting of the Legislative Assembly, who shall elect by ballot some native Aliʻi of the Kingdom as Successor to the Throne; and the Successor so elected shall become a new Stirps for a Royal Family; and the succession from the Sovereign thus elected, shall be regulated by the same law as the present Royal Family.

According to this constitutional provision, the Kamehameha Dynasty would continue if Kamehameha V had “Heirs of His body lawfully begotten.” The term “lawfully begotten” is a child born in wedlock. A child born out of wedlock was called a bastard child. Kamehameha was not married, and he had no children. In that case, his sister Princess Victoria Kamamalu Kaahumanu would be the successor to the Throne should Kamehameha V not “appoint [a successor to the throne] with the consent of the Nobles, and publicly proclaim as such during the King’s life.” She never married before her death on May 29, 1866, leaving the successor to the Throne to be decided by Kamehameha V. The are some who claim that the Princess had a child. Whether this is true or not, it does not matter because the Constitution states that a child shall be “lawfully begotten,” which can only happen if the child is born in wedlock. The Princess was never married.

When Kamehameha V died on December 11, 1872, he did not appoint a successor and receive confirmation by the Nobles. This was precisely why the Cabinet of Kamehameha V, serving as a Council of Regency, stated to the Legislative Assembly on January 8, 1873, when it was convened in extraordinary session to elect a successor to the throne:

His Majesty left no Heirs.

Her late Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kamamalu Kaahumanu, to whom in the event of the death of His late Majesty without heirs, the Constitution declared that the Throne should descend, died, also without heirs, on the twenty-ninth day of May, in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-six.

His late Majesty did not appoint any successor in the mode set forth in the Constitution, with the consent of the Nobles or make a Proclamation thereof during his life. There having been no such appointment or Proclamation, the Throne became vacant, and the Cabinet Council immediately thereupon considered the form of the Constitution in such case made and provided.

There is no doubt that there are descendants of Kamehameha I from his 17 wives, other than Keōpūolani. Ahlo, Johnson and Walkerʻs book Kamehameha’s Children Today reveals that. There is no dispute.

These descendants, however, which include Ahlo, Johnson and Walker, are not a part of the Kamehameha Dynasty that headed the government from 1791, after the death of High Chief Keōua, until the death of Kamehameha V in 1872. Those children and grandchildren that headed the Hawaiian government as an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy were Kamehameha II, Kamehameha III, Kamehameha IV and Kamehameha V. The Kamehameha Dynasty was succeeded by the Lunalilo Dynasty in 1873, and the Kalākaua Dynasty replaced the Lunalilo Dynasty in 1874. In 1922, the Kalākaua Dynasty ended with the passing of Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalaniana‘ole.

The Lunalilo and Kalākaua Dynasties descended from Kamehameha Iʻs Chiefs, which are part of the nobility class of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The genealogies published throughout 1896 in the Maka‘anana newspapers reveal the families of the nobility class. To access these genealogies go to The Three Estates of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

During this time of the rising of the national consciousness of the Hawaiian Kingdom after over a century of the war crime of denationalization through Americanization, it is important for Hawaiian subjects to understand the laws of the country as they existed prior to the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom government on January 17, 1893. Especially the laws that apply to the Hawaiian Crown.

There is a common misunderstanding that the Hawaiian Crown is hereditary. This is not an accurate understanding of Hawaiian constitutional law. Hereditary descent is a part of Hawaiian law, but it works in tandem and within the limits of Hawaiian constitutional law.

Individuals claiming Hawaiian Titles of Nobility, which include Abigail Kawananakoa, Owana Salazar, Mahealani Ahsing, Windy Lorenzo, Ruth Bolomet, just to name a few, are not who they claim. There is a distinction between Titles of Nobility and noble lineage. The former derives from a sitting Monarch, while the latter is a status by virtue of chiefly genealogy called mo‘o ku‘auhau. This is not to say that these individuals are not of noble lineage. Rather the titles they claim are self-declared that have no basis under Hawaiian constitutional law.

Only a sitting Monarch can nominate an heir apparent to the Throne, which will then require confirmation by the Nobles in the Legislative Assembly. The history of Hawaiian Monarchs began with the Kamehameha Dynasty that ended in 1873, followed by the Lunalilo Dynasty that ended in 1874, and then finally the Kalākaua Dynasty that ended in 1922.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, the northern archipelago of islands consisted of four distinct kingdoms: Hawai‘i Island under Kamehameha I; Maui Island with its dependent islands of Lāna‘i and Kaho‘olawe under Kahekili; Kaua‘i Islalnd and its dependent island of Ni‘ihau under Kā‘eo; and O‘ahu Island with its dependent island of Molokaʻi under Kahahana. Kamehameha, King of Hawai‘i Island, consolidated the four kingdoms establishing the Kingdom of the Sandwich Islands in 1810, which later became the Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands. In 1829, the Kingdom of the Sandwich Islands came to be known as the Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands. By 1840, the Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands came to be known as the Hawaiian Kingdom, a constitutional monarchy.

The Kamehameha Dynasty

Kamehameha I governed his kingdom according to ancient tradition and strict religious protocol. In 1794, after voluntarily ceding the island Kingdom of Hawai‘i to Great Britain, Kamehameha and his chiefs considered themselves British subjects and recognized King George III as emperor. The cession to Great Britain did not radically change traditional governance, but principles of English governance and titles were instituted.

In 1795, Kamehameha conquered the Maui Kingdom, and in 1810 the Kaua‘i Kingdom became a vassal under Kamehameha through voluntary cession by its King, Kaumuali‘i. By 1840 all the Island Kingdoms were consolidated under the Hawaiian Kingdom. According to the 1840 Constitution:

The origin of the present government, and system of polity, is as follows: KAMEHAMEHA I, was the founder of the kingdom, and to him belonged all the land from one end of the Islands to the other, though it was not his own private property. It belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom Kamehameha I was the head, and had the management of the landed property. Wherefore, there was not formerly, and is not now any person who could or can convey away the smallest portion of land without consent of the one who had, or has the direction of the kingdom.

These are the persons who have had the direction of it from that time down, Kamehameha II, Kaahumanu I, and at the present time Kamehameha III. These persons have had the direction of the kingdom down to the present time, and all documents written by them, and no others are the documents of the kingdom.

The kingdom is permanently confirmed to Kamehameha III, and his heirs, and his heir shall be the person whom he and the chiefs shall appoint, during his life time, but should there be no appointment, then the decision shall rest with the chiefs and house of Representatives.

On June 14, 1852, a new Constitution was granted by Kamehameha III confirming the successorship of the Crown. Article 25 provides:

The crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kamehameha III during his life, and to his successor. The successor shall be the person whom the King and the House of Nobles shall appoint and publicly proclaim as such, during the King’s life; but should there be no such appointment and proclamation, then the successor shall be chosen by the House of Nobles and the House of Representatives in joint ballot.

Article 25 is tempered by Article 26 that states, “No person shall ever sit upon the throne who has been convicted of an infamous crime, or who is insane or an idiot. No person shall ever succeed to the crown, unless he be a descendant of the aboriginal stock of Aliʻis.” It would appear that Kamehameha III was aware of King George III’s insanity while the Hawaiian Kingdom was a British Protectorate and it no doubt informed Hawaiian governance.

Alexander Liholiho, the adopted son of the King, was confirmed by the House of Nobles as successor on April 6, 1853, in accordance with Article 25 of the 1852 Constitution. In 1854, after the death of the King, he succeeded to the throne as Kamehameha IV. Kamehameha IV was the biological son of Mataio Kekuūanaoʻa and Kīnaʻu, who was the half-sister to Kamehameha III. The confirmation process ensured that Alexander Liholiho was not “convicted of an infamous crime, or who is insane or an idiot.”

On November 30, 1863, Kamehameha IV died unexpectedly, and left the Kingdom without a successor. On the same day, the Kuhina Nui—Premier, Victoria Kamāmalu, in Privy Council, proclaimed Lot Kapuaiwa to be the successor to the throne in accordance with Article 25 of the Constitution of 1852, and the Nobles confirmed him. Lot Kapuaiwa was thereafter called Kamehameha V. Victoria Kamāmalu, as Kuhina Nui, provided continuity for the office of the Crown pending the appointment and confirmation of Lot Kapuaiwa.

Article 47, of the 1852 Constitution provided that “whenever the throne shall become vacant by reason of the King’s death the Kuhina Nui shall perform all the duties incumbent on the King, and shall have and exercise all the powers, which by this Constitution are vested in the King.” This provision prevented the House of Nobles and the House of Representives to choose a successor by joint ballot.

On August 20, 1864, Kamehameha V proclaimed the 1864 Constitution. The office of Kuhina Nui—Premier was removed and replaced by the Cabinet Council. Article 22 provided the successorship of the Hawaiian Crown:

The Crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kamehameha V, and to the Heirs of His body lawfully begotten, and to their lawful Descendants in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to Her Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kamamalu Kaahumanu, and their heirs of her body, lawfully begotten, and their lawful descendants in a direct line. The Succession shall be to the senior male child, and to the heirs of his body; failing a male child, the succession shall be to the senior female child, and the heirs of her body. In case there is no heir as above provided, then the successor shall be the person whom the Sovereign shall appoint wiht the consent of the Nobles, and publicly proclaim as such during the King’s life; but should there be no appointment and proclamation, and the Throne should become vacant, then the Cabinet Council, immediately after the occurring of such vacancy, shall cause a meeting of the Legislative Assembly, who shall elect by ballot some native Aliʻi of the Kingdom as Successor to the Throne; and the Successor so elected shall become a new Stirps for a Royal Family; and the succession from the Sovereign thus elected, shall be regulated by the same law as the present Royal Family.

The constraints upon the Crown was reiterated in Article 25, which stated, “No person shall ever sit upon the Throne, who has been convicted of any infamous crime, or who is insane, or an idiot.”

On December 11, 1872, Kamehameha V died without naming a successor to the throne. This caused the Cabinet Council to serve temporarily as a Council of Regency that serves in the absence of a Monarch. According to Article 22 of the 1864 Constitution, “the Cabinet Council, immediately after the occurring of such vacancy, shall cause a meeting of the Legislative Assembly, who shall elect by ballot some native Aliʻi of the Kingdom as Successor to the Throne.” Article 33 also provides that “the Cabinet Council at the time of such decease shall be a Council of Regency, until the Legislative Assembly, which shall be called immediately, may be assembled.”

The Lunalilo Dynasty

On January 8, 1873, the Cabinet serving as a Council of Regency convened the Legislative Assembly into Extraordinary Session. In its address to the Legislature, the Cabinet stated:

Documents delivered to your President, contain official evidence of the decease of His late Majesty Kamehameha V. His earthly existence terminated at Iolani Palace, in Honolulu, in the Island of Oahu, upon the forty-second anniversary of his birth, being the eleventh day of December, in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy-two.

His Majesty left no Heirs.

Her late Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kamamalu Kaahumanu, to whom in the event of the death of His late Majesty without heirs, the Constitution declared that the Throne should descend, died, also without heirs, on the twenty-ninth day of May, in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-six.

His late Majesty did not appoint any successor in the mode set forth in the Constitution, with the consent of the Nobles or make a Proclamation thereof during his life. There having been no such appointment or Proclamation, the Throne became vacant, and the Cabinet Council immediately thereupon considered the form of the Constitution in such case made and provided, and

Ordered—That a meeting of the Legislative Assembly be caused to be holden at the Court House in Honolulu, on Wednesday which will be the eighth day of January, A.D. 1873, at 12 o’clock noon; and of this order all Members of the Legislative Assembly will take notice and govern themselves accordingly.

By virtue of this Order you have been assembled, to elect by ballot, some native Aliʻi of this Kingdom as Successor to the Throne. Your present authority is limited to this duty, but the newly elected Sovereign may require your services after his accession.

The Members of the Cabinet Council devoutly ask the blessings of Heaven upon your deliberations and public acts. They have appreciated the responsibility resting upon them, and have striven to maintain tranquility and order, and, especially, to guard your proceedings against improper interference.

Acknowledging the obligation to preserve all the rights, honors and dignities appertaining to the Throne, and to transmit them unimpaired to a new Sovereign, it will become their duty, upon his accession, to surrender to him the authority conferred upon them by his late lamented predecessor.

The Legislative Assembly, empowered to elect a new monarch under the 1864 Constitution, elected William Charles Lunalilo on January 8, 1873. Lunalilo was not a descendant of Kamehameha I but his mother, Kekāuluohi, was the Queen Consort to Kamehameha I and Kamehameha II. His father was High Chief Charles Kana‘ina.

The Kalākaua Dynasty

The Hawaiian Kingdom’s first elected King died a year later without a named successor, and the Legislature was again convened by Lunaliloʻs Cabinet Council and elected David Kalākaua as King on February 12, 1874. On February 14, 1874, King Kalākaua appointed his younger brother, Prince William Pitt Leleiōhoku, his successor, and was confirmed by the Nobles. On April 10, 1877, Leleiōhoku died. The next day Kalākaua appointed his sister, Princess Lili‘uokalani, as heir-apparent and received confirmation from the Nobles.

When Kalākaua was elected, a new royal lineage replaced the Kamehameha and Lunalilo Dynasty. Kalākaua declared royal titles upon: Princess Lili‘uokalani, Queen Kapiʻolani, Princess Virginia Kapoʻoloku Poʻomaikelani, Princess Kinoiki, Princess Victoria Kawekiu Kaiʻulani Lunalilo Kalaninuiahilapalapa, Prince David Kawānanakoa, Prince Edward Abner Keliʻiahonui, and Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalanianaʻole comprised the new royal lineage. Everyone with the exception of Princess Lili‘uokalani, as heir-apparent, were heirs to the Hawaiian Throne. To move from an heir to heir-apparent is when the Monarch nominates you as successor among the other heirs, and the nominee receives confirmation from the Nobles.

When Kalākaua embarked on his world tour on January 20, 1881, Princess Lili‘uokalani served as Regent, together with the Cabinet Council. Her second time to serve as Regent with the Cabinet Council occurred when Kalākaua departed for San Francisco on November 25, 1890. Kalākaua died in San Francisco on January 20, 1891, and his body returned to Honolulu on the 29th. That day Princess Liliʻuokalani succeeded to the Throne.

The legislative and judicial branches of government had been compromised by the revolt in 1887. The Nobles became an elected body of men whose allegiance was to the foreign population, and three of the justices of the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice, participated in the revolt by drafting the 1887 constitution. The Queen was prevented from legally confirming her niece, Victoria Kawekiu Kaiʻulani Lunalilo Kalaninuiahilapalapa, as heir-apparent, because the Nobles had not been in the Legislative Assembly since 1887. Ka‘iulani died at the age of 23 on March 6, 1899.

Up to her death on November 11, 1917, Lili‘uokalani was prevented from naming a successor to the Throne and receiving confirmation by the Nobles. The last of the Kalākaua Dynasty to die was Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalanianaʻole on January 7, 1922, which ended the Kalākaua Dynasty. Royal titles are not inheriteable.

The Kamehameha, Lunalilo and Kalākaua Dynasties came to a close. There are no heirs to the Throne, and the Legislative Assembly will have to be reconvened, by the Council of Regency, after the occupation comes to an end to “elect by ballot some native Aliʻi of the Kingdom as Successor to the Throne.” A “native Aliʻi” will be drawn from those who are a direct descendant of the genealogies provided by the Board of Genealogists that were published in 1896 in the Ka Maka‘ainana newspaper. To access these genealogies go to The Three Estates of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Direct descendants of these genealogies comprise the Nobility class of the Hawaiian Kingdom and would be qualified to be elected by the Legislative Assembly after the Nobles determine that the candidate has not “been convicted of any infamous crime, or who is insane, or an idiot.”

Until such time the Council of Regency serves in the absence of the Monarch.