UPDATE for Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden: Hawaiian Kingdom Files Motion to Appeal Judge Kobayashi’s Fourth Order to the Ninth Circuit

On July 12, 2022, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an Order dismissing the appeal of the Hawaiian Kingdom that came before a three-judge panel comprised of Justices Silverman, Callahan, and Collins. The Order stated that the Ninth Circuit Court “lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the challenged orders are not final or appealable.” The Court explained, “A district court order is…not appealable [§1291] unless it disposes of all claims as to all parties or unless judgment is entered in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).”

The Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden proceedings are still taking place at the district court in Hawai‘i, which is why the Ninth Circuit denied the appeal. While the Ninth Circuit was deliberating, District Court Judge Leslie Kobayashi issued a third Order granting the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice because the case presents a political question. The basis for her third Order was the same regarding her previous two Orders that were before the Ninth Circuit. Without providing any supporting evidence that it is a political question, Judge Kobayashi stated:

Plaintiff bases its claims on the proposition that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a sovereign and independent state. However, “Hawaii is a state of the United States… The Ninth Circuit, this court, and Hawaii state courts have rejected arguments asserting Hawaiian sovereignty.” “‘[T]here is no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.’”

As such, Plaintiff’s claims are “patently without merit that the claim[s] require[] no meaningful consideration.” In any event, to the extent that Plaintiff’s ask the Court to declare that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a sovereign territory, the United States Supreme Court made clear over 130 years ago that “[w]ho is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political, question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges….” “The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.” “This principle has always been upheld by” the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and Plaintiff’s claims against the Federal Defendants must be dismissed.

On June 15, 2022, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a motion for reconsideration with Judge Kobayashi. For the first time in these proceedings, the Hawaiian Kingdom, in its motion, addressed the Lorenzo principle and who actually has the burden of evidence and what needs to be proven. In State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, the Intermediate Court of Appeals admitted that its “rationale is open to question in light of international” by placing the burden on the defendant to provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State.

If the court applied international law, which they admitted they didn’t but could, there is a presumption that the Hawaiian Kingdom, an established and recognized State in the nineteenth century, continues to exist until there is rebuttable evidence to the contrary. In other words, when you apply international law it is not an issue of whether the Hawaiian Kingdom exists as a State, but rather an issue that the Hawaiian Kingdom no longer exists as a State under international law.

You start off with the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence until an opposing party provides evidence that the United States extinguished the existence of the Kingdom. There is no such evidence, which is why the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1999 verified the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as a “State” in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom.

It is clear that the federal court does apply the State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo case when defendants assert that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist. In 2002, U.S. District Court Judge David Ezra, in United States v. Goo, stated:

Since the Intermediate Court of Appeals for the State of Hawaii’s decision in Hawaii v. Lorenzo, the courts in Hawaii have consistently adhered to the Lorenzo court’s statements that the Kingdom of Hawaii is not recognized as a sovereign state by either the United States or the State of Hawaii. See Lorenzosee also State of Hawaii v. French (stating that “presently there is no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognizing attributes of a state’s sovereign nature”) (quoting Lorenzo). This court sees no reason why it should not adhere to the Lorenzo principle.

In State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, the Intermediate Court of Appeals explained, it “was incumbent on Defendant to present evidence supporting his claim. Lorenzo has presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” Because Lorenzo presented no evidence is why his appeal was denied. Affirming the jurisdictional issue and the burden of providing evidence, the State of Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, explained:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.

The operative word in Judge Ezra’s decision, like the Intermediate Court of Appeals, is “presently” because of the evidentiary burden not being met. Regarding this burden to provide evidence, Judge Ezra stated, “that Defendant has failed to provide any viable legal or factual support for his claim that as a citizen of the Kingdom he is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts.”

The Lorenzo principle was applied by the federal court in 17 cases since 1993 and was addressing the fact that the defendants in these cases provided no evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State. That is why the decisions had the word “presently,” because it is still an open question. Not one of these cases stated what Judge Kobayashi stated in her Order that the issue is a political question.

While the Hawaiian Kingdom did not have the burden to provide evidence of its continued existence as a State pursuant to the Lorenzo principle, it did so throughout these proceedings from the start. Whether or not who has the burden to provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence or its non-existence, the outcome is the same regarding the jurisdiction of the State of Hawai‘i court or the federal court. Simply stated, if the Hawaiian Kingdom exists then the courts have no jurisdiction.

The Lorenzo principle is called federal common law, which Black’s Law dictionary defines as a “body of decisional law developed by the federal courts.” In 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, stated that federal courts have to apply the laws and decisions of State courts where they reside. As Judge Ezra explained, the Lorenzo principle stems from the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals in State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo.

No State of Hawai‘i court applying the precedent of State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo in their decisions or the 17 federal court decisions applying the Lorenzo principle stated that the issue presents a political question. Judge Kobayashi’s statement that the issue is a political question has no basis in fact or in law.

On July 28, 2022, Judge Kobayashi denied the Hawaiian Kingdom’s motion. In her fourth Order she stated, “Plaintiff’s Motion fails to identify any new material facts not previously available, an intervening change in law, or a manifest error of law or fact. Although Plaintiff argues there are manifest errors of law in the 6/9/22 Order, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” She sums it up that it’s merely a disagreement.

It is clear that Judge Kobayashi’s opinion that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist flies in the face of an evidentiary burden in the Lorenzo principle that has and continues to be applied by the State of Hawai‘i courts since 1994 and the federal court since 1993. This is not a mere disagreement between Judge Kobayashi and the Hawaiian Kingdom, but rather a complete disregard of 29 years of court decisions that when a party is claiming the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist it must provide evidence of a factual or legal basis. Her decision is a clear “manifest error of law.”

This past Friday, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a motion to certify for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit of a non-final order. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the Ninth Circuit Court can hear a non-final order if it involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

The question of law and the difference of opinion would be the Lorenzo doctrine, which Judge Kobayashi acknowledged when she stated, “Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” The issue that it “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” is that the Hawaiian Kingdom could move for summary judgement because none of the Federal Defendants contested the allegations in the amended complaint. A summary judgment is a judgment entered by a court for one of the parties without going to trial.

There is a two-step process for a non-final Order to be taken up on appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court. First, Judge Kobayashi will have to first certify the appeal with an Order, and, second, the Hawaiian Kingdom will have to file that Order with the Ninth Circuit for their acceptance of the appeal. If Judge Kobayashi denies the certification, the Hawaiian Kingdom will appeal on this same subject when the case has come to a close. This filing of the appeal now is so that resources and money won’t be wasted by continuing the proceedings in the district court, especially when everything centers on the Lorenzo doctrine.

The issue before the federal court in Hawai‘i is no longer its status as an Article II Occupation Court, but rather the Lorenzo principle and the issue of the Hawaiian Kingdom continued existence as a State. The transformation of the federal court into an Article II Occupation Court is incidental to the Lorenzo principle and the application of international law.

Dr. Keanu Sai to Start Off United Church of Christ Workshops on Hawaiian Kingdom History on August 7, 2022

A free online learning opportunity for ALL hosted by the HCUCC Justice and Witness Missional Team in collaboration with the Association of Hawaiian Evangelical Churches

Come join the HCUCC Justice and Witness Missional Team for this exciting and informative exploration of Hawaiian History. Whether you are kamaʻāina or a relative newcomer to Hawaiʻi, you will hear history that you have not heard before.

Three eminent scholars, Dr. Keanu Sai, Dr. Ron Williams Jr., and Donovan Preza, will help us delve into historic documents and events that can inform us as we seek understanding and discernment regarding fulfilling our promise made in the UCC’s apology 30 years ago to the Hawaiian people to stand with them in seeking justice.

See and hear newly translated church documents from over a century. Learn about the Hawaiian Kingdomʻs founding and continuing legal status under International law. Learn about the Mahele and privatization of Hawaiian land under Hawaiian Kingdom law and why land issues will continue unless the UCC promise is fulfilled. Learn about churches who actively resisted the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and the white oligarchy who facilitated the illegal overthrow. If as brothers and sisters in Christ we desire reconciliation, we must first acknowledge the nature of the wrongs and their continuing effects on these islands, the Hawaiian people, and our Church.

This 12-week series will be presented through Zoom beginning on Sunday, August 7, 2022, at 4:00 p.m. HST and continues each Sunday, at the same time, through October 23, 2022. Each Zoom session will be one hour long consisting of a presentation followed by questions and discussion.

To attend any or all of the sessions, please register HERE.

PART I: The Kingdom

Presenter: Dr. Keanu Sai

ABOUT THE PRESENTER: I have a Ph.D. in Political Science specializing in Hawaiian Constitutionalism and International Relations, and a founding member of the Hawaiian Society of Law & Politics. I served as lead Agent for the Hawaiian Kingdom in arbitration proceedings before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, Netherlands, from November 1999-February 2001. I also served as Agent in a Complaint against the United States of America concerning the prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom, which was filed with the United Nations Security Council on July 5, 2001. Articles on the status of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent state, the arbitration case and the complaint filed with the United Nations Security Council have been published in the following journals: American Journal of International Law, vol. 95 (2001); Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 2, issue 1, (2002), and the Hawaiian Journal of Law & Politics, vol. 1 (2004).

  1. AUGUST 7 Hōʻike ʻEkahi (Presentation 1) The importance of terminology. Is Hawaiian a nationality, which is multi-ethnic, or a native indigenous people that have been colonized by the United States?
  2. AUGUST 14 Hōʻike ʻElua (Presentation 2) The constitutional history of the Hawaiian Kingdom from King Kamehameha III to Queen Lili‘uokalani (1839-1893)
  3. AUGUST 21 Hōʻike ʻEkolu (Presentation 3) The illegal overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law
  4. AUGUST 28 Hōʻike ʻEhā (Presentation 4) The road to recovery of ending the American occupation. How to bring compliance to the rule of law in light of war crimes and human rights violations committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom since January 16, 1893

PART II: The Church

Presenter: Dr. Ronald Williams Jr.

ABOUT THE PRESENTER: Dr. Ronald Williams Jr. holds a doctorate in history from the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa with a specialization in Hawaiʻi and Native-language resources. He is a former faculty member of the Hawaiʻinuiākea School of Hawaiian Knowledge, UH Mānoa and in 2017 was the founding director of the school’s Lāhui Hawaiʻi Research Center. Dr. Williams is also a past president of the 128-year old Hawaiian Historical Society. He currently works as an archivist at the Hawaiʻi State Archives and serves as Hoʻopaʻa Kūʻauhau (Historian) for the grassroots political organization Ka ʻAhahui Hawaiʻi Aloha ʻĀina. Dr. Williams was a contributing author to the 2019 Samuel Manaiākalani Kamakau Book of the Year award-winning publication, Hoʻoulu Hawaiʻi: The Kalākaua Era. He has published in a wide variety of academic and public history venues including the Oxford Encyclopedia of Religion in America, the Hawaiian Journal of History, and Hana Hou! Magazine.

  1. SEPTEMBER 04 Hōʻike ʻEkahi (Presentation 1) The Early Mission, 1820 -1863
  2. SEPTEMBER 11 Hōʻike ʻElua (Presentation 2) Hōʻeuʻeu Hou: Sons of the Mission and the Shaping of a New “Mission,” 1863-1888
  3. SEPTEMBER 18 Hōʻike ʻEkolu (Presentation 3) Poʻe Karitiano ʻOiaʻiʻo (True Christians)
  4. SEPTEMBER 25 Hōʻike ʻEhā (Presentation 4) “I ka Wā Mamua, ka Wā Mahope” (The Future is in the Past)

PART III: The Land

Presenter: Donovan Preza MORE INFO TO COME

  1. OCTOBER 2 Hōʻike ʻEkahi (Presentation 1)
  2. OCTOBER 9 Hōʻike ʻElua (Presentation 2)
  3. OCTOBER 16 Hōʻike ʻEkolu (Presentation 3)
  4. OCTOBER 23 Hōʻike ʻEhā (Presentation 4)

Calculating Reparations for 129 years of the United States’ Violations of International Humanitarian Law since 1893

The ongoing illegal state of war between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States since 1893, and the prolonged belligerent occupation of an internationally recognized independent State has violated all norms of international law. In light of the federal lawsuit, Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden, it is timely to address another war and subsequent belligerent occupation that the United States was involved, which eventually came to an end with the payment of reparations. This was the war with Japan from 1941-51.

Here follows the reparations for war paid by the Japanese government under the 1951 Treaty of Peace.

Reparation Payments:

Reparations were made by Japan pursuant to Article 14(a), 1951 Japan Treaty of Peace, which states, “It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage suffering caused by it during the war.” Below are Japanese reparations to countries for 10 years of war (1941-51).

CountryAmount in US$Date of Treaty
Burma$200 millionNov. 5, 1955
Philippines$550 millionMay 9, 1956
Indonesia$223 millionJan. 20, 1958
Vietnam$39 millionMay 13, 1959
Average$250 millionMean year—1957
Inflation calculator$2.6 billionYear—2022

As a basis to calculate the amount of reparations that could be owed to the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States up to the year of 2022, which is 129 years of war, the Japanese reparations paid could serve as a guide by applying the years of war to the years of war with the Hawaiian Kingdom. Reparations to be paid by the United States could be calculated at $32 billion, which is $250 million annually multiplied by 129 years of war with the Hawaiian Kingdom. The inflation calculator sets $32 billion in 1957 to $337 billion in 2022.

According to the 1876 Act to Regulate the Currency, “the gold coins of the United States of America shall be the standard and a legal tender in this Kingdom in all payments of debts, at their nominal value.” Although the United States completely stopped using the gold standard in 1973, it was replaced by fiat money that the U.S. government orders its currency must be used for payments.

This measurement could also be applied to other countries who are parties to the conflict and who have been complicit in the belligerent actions taken by the United States against the Hawaiian Kingdom such as the 20 States that unlawfully recognized the United States surrogate calling itself the so-called Republic of Hawai‘i in 1894. These States, and the dates they recognized the American puppet, include:

According to renowned American jurist, Professor Ellery Stowell, Intervention in International Law (1921) at 349, n. 75, a “foreign state which intervenes in support of [insurgents] commits an act of war against the state to which it belongs, and steps outside the law of nations in time of peace.”

Seizing of Assets:

Seizure of Japanese assets in the territories of Allied Powers was also done pursuant to Article 14(a)(2)(I), 1951 Japan Treaty of Peace, which states, “Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of (a) Japan and Japanese nationals, (b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and (c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals, which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction.”

In the United States, Japanese assets seized amounted to $85 million (inflation conversion for 2022—$896 million). Pursuant to Presidential Executive Order no. 9567—Alien Property Custodian (1945), the United States took title by “vesting” of all property of Japan and Germany and their nationals. Under the 1948 War Claims Act proceeds derived from these assets would not be returned, but rather placed in a War Claims Fund from which payments would be made to United States citizens that suffered as a consequence of the war with Japan and Germany.

Assets held by the United States and other States who are parties to the conflict since January 16, 1893, to include their nationals, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom are yet to be determined. The liquidation of these assets could be utilized in similar fashion as the United States did regarding Japanese and German properties vested under Alien Property Custodian, to compensate Hawaiian subjects who were the victims of war crimes under international humanitarian law.

Land Titles Throughout the Hawaiian Islands are Defective – Filing A Claim Under Your Title Insurance Policy

The Preliminary Report on the Legal Status of Land Titles throughout the Realm of July 16, 2020, by the Royal Commission of Inquiry, is a comprehensive report as to why the majority of land titles today throughout Hawai‘i are defective. This includes properties claimed to be owned by billionaires such as Mark Zuckerberg’s claim to property on the island of Kaua‘i, and Larry Ellison’s claim to 98% of the island of Lana‘i. The Royal Commission of Inquiry also published a Supplemental Report on Title Insurance on October 20, 2020.

All titles to real estate throughout the Hawaiian Kingdom are subject to Hawaiian laws despite the unlawful overthrow of its government by the United States in 1893. As such, all titles that have since been alleged to have been conveyed after January 17, 1893, are void ab initio due to forged certificates of acknowledgment by individuals impersonating public officers. This includes all purported conveyances of Government or Crown lands after January 17, 1893, and any judicial proceedings regarding titles to land.

Hawaiian law, however, would have recognized these acts of the insurgents as being valid if Queen Lili‘uokalani was restored to office. The agreed upon conditions of restoration between the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom provided, “a general amnesty to those concerned in setting up the provisional government and a recognition of all its bona fide acts and obligations.” Regarding the “bona fide acts and obligations,” the Queen stated in her letter dated December 18, 1893, to the U.S. Minister Albert Willis, who was negotiating on behalf of President Cleveland, “I further solemnly pledge myself and my Government, if restored, to assume all the obligations created by the Provisional Government, in the proper course of administration, including all expenditures for military or police services, it being my purpose, if restored, to assume the Government precisely as it existed on the day when it was unlawfully overthrown.”

By this agreement, the United States acknowledged the acts done by the insurgency were not “bona fide” until after the Queen was restored. The Queen was not restored and, therefore, the insurgency continued to unlawfully impersonate public officers of the Hawaiian Kingdom in the chain of title. These defects in title are covered risks in the owner’s and lender’s title insurance policies as:

  • forgery, fraud, undue influence, duress, incompetency, incapacity, or impersonation;
  • failure of any person or Entity to have authorized a transfer or conveyance;
  • a document affecting Title not properly created, executed, witnessed, sealed, acknowledged, notarized, or delivered;
  • a document executed under a falsified, expired, or otherwise invalid power of attorney;
  • a document not properly filed, recorded, or indexed in the Public Records including failure to perform those acts by electronic means authorized by law;
  • a defective judicial or administrative proceeding.

Here’s an example of a “bona fide” Royal Patent issued on October 26, 1852.

Here is an example of a “forged” Royal Patent issued just one month after the overthrow of the Hawaiian government by the United States dated February 3, 1893. This is an example of what President Cleveland sought to remedy as a “bona fide” act by the insurgents in his agreement of restoration with Queen Lili‘uokalani.

Any property today that derives from this forged Royal Patent is void, but the loss could be covered by an owner’s policy of title insurance. Hill, Steindorff and Widener, in their “Recent Developments in Title Insurance Law,” reported that in 2012, a California Federal District Court, in Gumapac v. Deutsche Bank National Trust, found that “a title report revealed a defect of title by virtue of an executive agreement between President Grover Cleveland and Queen Lili‘uokalani of the Hawaiian Kingdom that rendered any notary actions unlawful. Thus, the deed of conveyance to the homeowners was nullified.” In Hawai‘i, claimants under both an owner’s or lender’s title insurance policy have a duty to immediately notify their insurer of any title defects that affect title to the property or the mortgage that secures the repayment of a loan.

During this time of high prices at the gas pump added on to the high cost of living in the Hawaiian Islands, watching how you spend your money is critical to surviving during this inflation crisis brought upon the residents of Hawai‘i by the United States prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom since 1893. But there is some monetary light that many people in Hawai‘i can take advantage of, which is filing a claim with their title insurance company under an owner’s policy, and notifying your bank or lender to file a claim so that your debt owed to the lender is paid off.

When individuals want to borrow money from a bank or lender, they are told by the lender to first go to an escrow company to purchase a lender’s title insurance policy in the amount to be borrowed. Prior to the issuing of a title insurance policy, the escrow company does a title search on the property that the borrower intends to use as a security instrument, also called a mortgage, to ensure the repayment of the loan. A title insurance company that works with the escrow company will then insure the accuracy of the title search. Only when the borrower purchases the title insurance policy to protect the lender from any title defect that affects the mortgaged debt is when escrow comes to a close.

There is another type of title insurance policy that is issued by the escrow company and that is an owner’s policy that protects the owner and not the lender. An owner’s policy is normally purchased when an individual borrows money for the first time and has to go to an escrow company. Many people don’t even know that they may have purchased an owner’s policy unless they look at their closing papers from escrow. Unlike a lender’s policy that covers the debt owed to the lender, an owner’s policy covers the owner’s loss, which is the appraised value of the property at the time the policy is taken out.

Most people are unaware as to what title insurance is and how it works. Typical insurance policies, such as car insurance or flood insurance, insure against a future cause of damage, that may or may not occur. Title insurance, on the other hand, insures against a past cause of damage called defects in the chain of title that affect ownership of real property. According to Burke’s Law of Title Insurance, title insurance is an agreement to indemnify the insured for losses incurred “by either on-record and off-record defects that are found in the title or interest in an insured property to have existed on the date on which the policy is issued.” And Black’s Law Dictionary defines title insurance as a “policy issued by a title company after searching the title…and insuring the accuracy of its search against claims of title defects.” As the Florida Court of Appeals, in McDaniel v. Lawyers Title Guar. Fund, stated, “One of the reasonable expectations of a policyholder who purchases title insurance is to be protected against defects in his title which appear of record.”

Title insurance is a one-time paid premium agreement under both an owner’s policy, that protects the interests of the owner of the property, and a lender’s policy, that protects the lender’s interest—the debt owed—in the mortgaged lien on the property. The owner’s policy does not exceed the amount of coverage on the policy. The lender’s policy coverage reduces as the debt is being paid by the borrower, which will eventually expire once the final payment of the loan is made. Burke explains that coverage under an owner’s policy, however, “lasts for as long as the insured has some liability for title defect, whether as the present owner or possessor, or as a vendor [grantor] and warrantor of the state of the title upon some later sale. There is no such thing as term title insurance. Its policy might, potentially, last forever.” A grantor’s covenant is explicitly stated in its warranty deed where it states, “and that the Grantor will WARRANT AND DEFEND the same unto the Grantee against the lawful claims and demands of all persons.”

Being that title insurance is an indemnity agreement, Burke states that the insurer can also act as a surety, which “is a person agreeing to be answerable for the actions of another.” According to Burke, when there is a breach of covenant and warranty of title by a grantor, the “title insurer might agree to remedy a breach of the covenant for further assurances by bringing the litigation required to cure a title, instead of letting the [grantor] do it.” The right to remedy, as a surety, is provided under Condition no. 5 of both the owner and lender policies that states the insurer “shall have the right, in addition to the options contained in Section 7 of these Conditions, at its own cost, to institute and prosecute any action or proceeding or to any other act that in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish the Title, as insured, or to prevent or reduce loss or damage to the Insured.” According to Hill, Steindorff and Widener, an Illinois Appellate Court concluded “that although the title company did not have an ownership interest in the property, the company had issued a title insurance policy and could have redeemed the taxes on the subject property on behalf of the prior owner, to whom it had issued a title policy.”

When the title insurance company is given the evidence of proof of loss of title in a claim letter by the insured, the company has thirty-days to either initiate proceedings to remedy the defect of the title or make a payment to the insured covered in the insurance policy. According to the federal court in Davis v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., “In law, a title is either good or bad.” The Missouri Supreme Court, in Kent & Obear v. Allen, stated, “the validity of the title arising, the question must be determined whether it is good or bad. We cannot object to the title of the respondent that it is doubtful or unmarketable.” The Davis court also concluded that the “liability of the insurer was definitely fixed under the terms of the policy,” to either remedy the defect or the “payment of loss was due, under the policy, ‘within 30 days thereafter.’”

To determine “on-record defects in title,” a title insurer relies on a competent title search. According to Baker, Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull’s article, “Optimal Title Search,” in the Journal of Legal Studies, “Some states have no set length but instead require that the entire title history of a parcel of land be searched back to the state’s date of patent,” which include Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North and South Dakota, Oregon, Texas and Washington. At the highest number of years for a title search are Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, and Wyoming at 187 years. At the low end of a 30-year search are New Mexico, Oklahoma and Tennessee. In a study of optimal title searches, Hawai‘i, Illinois and Indiana were excluded from the analysis because they provided “indeterminate search lengths.”

In one particular preliminary report by Title Guaranty of Hawai‘i, its title search only went back one conveyance. This lack of a full title search by Title Guaranty, who serves as an agent for title insurance companies, back to the original patent, called Royal Patents, only amplifies the purpose of title insurance as an indemnity agreement. It is not a guaranty of the state of the title. According to the Pennsylvania court, in Hicks v. Saboe, “The purpose of title insurance is to protect the insured…from loss arising from defects in the title which he acquires.” The federal court, in Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., stated, “Because title insurance [is] a contract of indemnity, the insurer does not guarantee the state of the title, but agrees to pay for any loss resulting from a defective title.” The Maryland Appeals Court, in Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. West, explained that a title insurer does not have a duty to advise “on the state of title to the property, but to insure against…loss resulting from any defects.” Therefore, “the title insurer does not ‘guarantee’ the status of the grantor’s title. As an indemnity agreement, the insurer agrees to reimburse the insured for loss or damage sustained as a result of title problems, as long as the coverage for the damages incurred is not excluded from the policy.”

Since 1994, the State of Hawai‘i courts have applied, whenever the issue of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as a State arose in court proceedings, the State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo case at the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which has come to be known as the Lorenzo doctrine in the federal courts. For 28 years, both the State of Hawai‘i courts and the federal courts have been applying the Lorenzo doctrine wrong. Under international law, which the ICA acknowledged may affect its rationale of placing the burden on the defendant to prove the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists as a State,” shifts the burden on the party opposing the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom that it “does not exist as a State.” In international arbitration proceedings at the Permanent Court of Arbitration from 1999-2001, in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, PCA case no. 1999-01, the PCA acknowledged the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State and the Council of Regency as its government. Because the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists, so do the laws that apply to real property.

In a denial letter to a title insurance claimant, Michael J. Moss, Senior Claims Counsel for Chicago Title Insurance Company, specifically referenced the Lorenzo doctrine applied in two State of Hawai‘i court cases and one federal court case as a basis to decline the insurance claim under an owner’s title insurance policy in the amount of $178,000.00. Moss stated:

The Hawaiian Courts have consistently found that the Kingdom of Hawai‘i is no longer recognized as a sovereign state by either the federal government or by the State of Hawai‘i. See State v. Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i 219, 221, 883 P.2d 641, 643 (Haw.App.1994); accord State v. French, 77 Hawai‘i 222, 228, 883 P.2d 644, 649 (Haw.App.1994); Baker v. Stehua, CIV 09-00615 ACK-BMK, 2010 WL 3528987 (D. Haw. Sept. 8, 2010).

Like the courts of the State of Hawai‘i and the federal courts, the Senior Claims Counsel incorrectly applied the Lorenzo doctrine, which should have been in favor of the title insurance claimant. The title insurance claim was that the “Owner’s deed was not lawfully executed according to Hawaiian Kingdom law [because] the notaries public and the Bureau of Conveyance weren’t part of the Hawaii[an] Kingdom, that the documents in [the claimant’s] chain of title were not lawfully executed.” In other words, the Lorenzo doctrine, when applying international law correctly, would compel the title insurance company to pay the claimant his $178,000.00 covered under the owner’s title insurance policy he had purchased to protect him in case there was a defect in the title.

To find out if you have an owner’s policy check your closing papers from escrow to see if you purchased a policy. Or you can call your escrow company or companies that you went to in the past. If you have a mortgage you did purchase a title insurance policy to protect the lender. To file a claim under your owner’s policy download this MSWord document and fill in the necessary information after you have your owner’s policy in hand. To send a letter to your lender to file an insurance claim under the lender’s policy you purchased download this MSWord document and fill in the necessary information.

Submitting an insurance claim is a private matter that is subject to the terms of your contract or policy. Under the terms of the policy you and the lender are obligated to notify the insurance company if you have been made aware that there are defects in your title. It is suggested that you carefully read over your title insurance policy before you send your claim to the insurance company by certified mail. The lender, not the borrower, has a copy of the lender’s policy that was purchased by the borrower. Once the claim, whether by the owner or the lender, is received by the insurance company you will receive a letter acknowledging your claim and assigning it a claim number. This letter by the insurance company will begin the thirty-day window to either remedy the defect in the title or pay the amount covered under the policy.

The Far Reach of the Lorenzo Doctrine—The Title Insurance Industry

The Lorenzo doctrine was adopted by the federal courts in the Ninth Circuit for jurisdictional purposes but it has been used in the land title insurance industry for denying insurance claims.

In 1994, the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) heard an appeal where the defendant-appellant, Anthony Lorenzo, was seeking an appeal that the trial court committed an error when his motion to dismiss his indictment was denied, which led to his conviction. Lorenzo argued that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist because the overthrow of the Hawaiian government on January 17, 1893, was illegal. And since he was a citizen of the kingdom, the trial court did not have any jurisdiction over him. The case was State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo.

For the first time ever regarding the United States overthrow, the ICA distinguished the government from a sovereign State—the Hawaiian Kingdom, or at least tried to. In the past, these two terms were interchangeable. In its decision, the ICA cited a 1991 appeals case that was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) that quoted another case in the Second Circuit, National Petro-chemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988), as well as quoting from §201 from the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987). The Second Circuit Court stated:

The [Palestine Liberation Organization] PLO first argues that it is a sovereign state and therefore immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the “FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1988). As support for this argument, it relies on its “political and governmental character and structure, its commitment to and practice of its own statehood, and its unlisted and indeterminable membership.” Brief for Appellant at 7. However, this Court has limited the definition of “state” to “‘entit[ies] that ha[ve] a defined territory and a permanent population, [that are] under the control of [their] own government, and that engage[] in, or ha[ve] the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.’” [citations omitted]. It is quite clear that the PLO meets none of those requirements.

The definition of a State includes a government and not that the government is synonymous with a State. Palestine has yet to be recognized by the United States as a sovereign and independent State, which prevented the PLO from claiming that Palestine is a State in U.S. federal courts. Therefore, whenever the issue of Palestine arises in federal court proceedings, the court itself or one of the parties to the lawsuit would invoke the “political question doctrine” and the case would be dismissed. Only until the United States recognizes Palestine as a State will the federal courts acknowledge Palestinian Statehood.

The Hawaiian Kingdom is different from the Palestinian situation in that the United States already recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State in its treaties. In other words, the Hawaiian Kingdom did “ha[ve] a defined territory and a permanent population, [that are] under the control of [their] own government, and that engage[] in, or ha[ve] the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.” In fact, the Hawaiian Kingdom had an embassy in Washington, D.C., and the United States had an embassy in Honolulu.

The question that came before the ICA in the Lorenzo appeal is whether the State continues to exist despite the overthrow of its government by the United States on January 17, 1893. The ICA stated, “The essence of the lower court’s decision is that even if, as Lorenzo contends, the 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom was illegal, that would not affect the court’s jurisdiction in this case. Although the court’s rationale is open to question in light of international law, the record indicates that the decision was correct because Lorenzo did not meet his burden of proving his lack of jurisdiction.” Here, the ICA would appear to have conflated the Hawaiian State with the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom when it stated, “the 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom was illegal.”

This distinction between the State and the government was explained in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States that the ICA cited. In §202 is states:

Recognition of state and government distinguished. Recognition of a state is a formal acknowledgment that the entity possesses the qualifications of statehood, and implies a commitment to treat the entity as a state. Recognition of a government is formal acknowledgment that a particular regime is the effective government of a state and implies a commitment to treaty that regime as the government of that state. Ordinarily, that occurs when a state is incorporated into another state, as when Montenegro in 1919 became a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia).

According to Professor Oppenheim, once recognition of a State is granted, it “is incapable of withdrawal” by the recognizing State, and Professor Schwarzenberger explains that “recognition estops the State which has recognized the title from contesting its validity an any future time.” §202 goes on to say that the “duty to treat a qualified entity as a state also implies that so long as the entity continues to meet those qualifications its statehood may not be ‘derecognized.’ If the entity ceases to meet those requirements, it ceases to be a state and derecognition is not necessary.”

So because the Hawaiian State cannot be “derecognized,” it would continue to exist despite the overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom on January 17, 1893. Evidence of “when a state is incorporated into another state” would be an international treaty, particularly a peace treaty, whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom would have ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States. Examples of foreign States ceding sovereign territory to the United States by a peace treaty include the 1848 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico that ended the Mexican-American war, and the 1898 Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain that ended the Spanish-American War.

The 1898 Joint Resolution To provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, is a municipal law of the United States without extraterritorial effect. It is not an international treaty. Under international law, to annex territory of another State is a unilateral act, as opposed to cession, which is a bilateral act between States.

In 2002, the federal court in Honolulu, in United States v. Goo, referred to the State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo and the Lorenzo doctrine. For 28 years both the State of Hawai‘i courts and the federal courts have been applying the Lorenzo doctrine wrong. Under international law, which the ICA in Lorenzo acknowledged may affect the rationale of the ICA in placing the burden on the defendant to prove the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists as a State,” shifts the burden on the party opposing the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom that it “does not exist as a State.”

When the ICA acknowledged that Lorenzo did state in his motion to dismiss the indictment that the Ha­waiian Kingdom “was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties,” it set the presumption to be the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State under international law and not the existence of the State of Hawai‘i as a political subdivision of the United States.

Under international law, it was not the burden of the defendant to provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists as a State” when the Lorenzo Court already acknowledged its existence and recognition by the United States. Rather, it was the burden of the prosecution to provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not exist as a State.” As a result, the Lorenzo Court’s ruling was wrong and all decisions that followed in State of Hawai‘i courts and federal courts applying the Lorenzo doctrine also were wrong.

The Lorenzo doctrine also has been used by the title insurance industry. In a denial letter to a title insurance claimant, Michael J. Moss, Senior Claims Counsel for Chicago Title Insurance Company, specifically referenced the Lorenzo doctrine applied in two State of Hawai‘i court cases and one federal court case as a basis to decline the insurance claim under an owner’s title insurance policy in the amount of $178,000.00. Moss stated:

The Hawaiian Courts have consistently found that the Kingdom of Hawai‘i is no longer recognized as a sovereign state by either the federal government or by the State of Hawai‘i. See State v. Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i 219, 221, 883 P.2d 641, 643 (Haw.App.1994); accord State v. French, 77 Hawai‘i 222, 228, 883 P.2d 644, 649 (Haw.App.1994); Baker v. Stehua, CIV 09-00615 ACK-BMK, 2010 WL 3528987 (D. Haw. Sept. 8, 2010).

Like the courts of the State of Hawai‘i and the federal courts, the Senior Claims Counsel incorrectly applied the Lorenzo doctrine, which should have been in favor of the title insurance claimant. The title insurance claim was that the “Owner’s deed was not lawfully executed according to Hawaiian Kingdom law [because] the notaries public and the Bureau of Conveyance weren’t part of the Hawaii[an] Kingdom, that the documents in [the claimant’s] chain of title were not lawfully executed.”

In other words, the Lorenzo doctrine, when applying international law correctly, would force the title insurance company to pay the claimant his $178,000.00 covered under the owner’s title insurance policy he had purchased to protect him in case there was a defect in the title.

All titles to property that were conveyed after January 17, 1893, are defective because the deeds were “not lawfully executed according Hawaiian Kingdom law [because] the notaries public and the Bureau fo Conveyances weren’t part of the Hawaii[an] Kingdom, [and] that the documents in [the claimant’s] chain of title were not lawfully executed.”

Defective titles to land in Hawai‘i also renders all mortgages tied to the land to be void and that title insurance also pays off the balance of the loan to the bank under the Lender’s Policy. For more information on this topic, download the Royal Commission of Inquiry’s Preliminary Report on Land Titles Throughout the Realm and its Supplemental Report on Title Insurance.

The Federal Court in Honolulu Comes Face to Face with its own Lorenzo Doctrine

The Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden federal lawsuit is still playing out at the United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i, despite the case also being heard by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.

What is before the Ninth Circuit are not the two preliminary judgments made by Judge Leslie Kobayashi, but rather the lawful authority for Judge Kobayashi to make the judgments in the first place. The proceedings before the federal court in Honolulu was to get Judge Kobayashi to transform into an Article II Occupation Court so it would have lawful authority.

Right now, the federal court in Honolulu is operating as an Article III Court which is a part of the judiciary branch of government under article III of the United States Constitution. An Article II Occupation Court is a part of the executive branch of government under article II of the U.S. Constitution headed by the President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Article II Occupation Courts are federal courts established in territory that is being occupied by the United States. Because Article III Courts operate within the territorial boundaries of the United States, they administer United States law. Article II Occupation Courts, on the other hand, administer the laws of the occupied State and the international law of occupation. Article II Occupation Courts were established in Germany after the defeat of the Nazi regime. These courts administered German law and the law of occupation.

Whenever defendants in Hawai‘i challenged the authority of the United States and the State of Hawai‘i in court, judges in State of Hawai‘i courts and in the federal court in Honolulu always referred to a 1994 State of Hawai‘i appeals case called State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo to quash the challenge. In that case, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“Lorenzo Court”) stated:

Lorenzo appeals, arguing that the lower court erred in denying his pretrial motion (Motion) to dismiss the indictment. The essence of the Motion is that the [Ha­waiian Kingdom] (Kingdom) was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties; the Kingdom was illegally overthrown in 1893 with the assistance of the United States; the Kingdom still exists as a sovereign nation; he is a citizen of the Kingdom; therefore, the courts of the State of Hawai‘i have no jurisdiction over him. Lorenzo makes the same argument on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the lower court correctly denied the Motion.

According to the Lorenzo Court it based its denial of the motion to dismiss because it “was incumbent on Defendant to present evidence supporting his claim. Lorenzo has presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.”

The Lorenzo Court’s standard of review in determining whether the Hawaiian Kingdom exists as a State placed the burden of proof on Lorenzo as the defendant. The Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, clarified this evidentiary burden. The Supreme Court stated:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.

Lorenzo became a precedent case on the subject of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State in State of Hawai‘i courts, and is known in the United States District Court in Hawai‘i, since 2002, as the Lorenzo principle or doctrine. There have been seventeen federal cases that applied the Lorenzo doctrine, two of which came before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.

The Lorenzo Court, however, did acknowledge that its “rationale is open to question in light of international law.” Whether or not the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,” international law is supposed to be applied. By placing the burden of proof on the defendant, the Lorenzo Court did not apply international law. Because international law provides for the presumption of the continuity of the State despite the overthrow of its government by another State, it shifts the burden of proof and what is to be proven.

According to Judge Crawford, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations…despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government,” and belligerent occupation “does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.” “If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.”

Evidence of “a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States” would be an international treaty, particularly a peace treaty, whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom would have ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States. Examples of foreign States ceding sovereign territory to the United States by a peace treaty include the 1848 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico that ended the Mexican-American war, and the 1898 Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain that ended the Spanish-American War.

The 1898 Joint Resolution To provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, is a municipal law of the United States without extraterritorial effect. It is not an international treaty. Under international law, to annex territory of another State is a unilateral act, as opposed to cession, which is a bilateral act between States. Under international law, annexation of an occupied State is unlawful. According to The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts:

The international law of belligerent occupation must therefore be understood as meaning that the occupying power is not sovereign, but exercises provisional and temporary control over foreign territory. The legal situation of the territory can be altered only through a peace treaty or debellatio. International law does not permit annexation of territory of another state.

When the Lorenzo Court acknowledged that Lorenzo did state in his motion to dismiss the indictment that the Ha­waiian Kingdom “was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties,” it set the presumption to be the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State under international law and not the existence of the State of Hawai‘i as a political subdivision of the United States. This would have resulted in placing the burden “on the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal.”

Under international law, it was not the burden of Lorenzo to provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists” when the Lorenzo Court already acknowledged its existence and recognition by the United States. Rather, it was the burden of the prosecution to provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not exist.” As a result, the Lorenzo Court’s ruling was wrong and all decisions that followed in State of Hawai‘i courts and Federal courts applying the Lorenzo doctrine also were wrong.

In Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Amended Complaint claiming that Hawai‘i was annexed by a joint resolution of Congress in 1898 and that Hawai‘i is the 50th State of the Union since 1959. Despite the frivolous claim by the United States that Hawai‘i was annexed by an American law, the Hawaiian Kingdom opposed the motion to dismiss because the Court has no authority to make any ruling until it transforms itself into an Article II Occupation Court. Article III Courts can only operate within the territory of the United States and not outside of it unless it is an Article II Occupation Court.

On June 9, 2022, Judge Kobayashi filed her Order granting the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Hawaiian Kingdom’s amended complaint claiming she doesn’t have to transform into an Article II Occupation Court because of the Lorenzo doctrine! Today the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Motion to Amend or Alter the Order because Judge Kobayashi used the Lorenzo doctrine in error. In its Motion, the Hawaiian Kingdom concluded with:

Without citing any rebuttable evidence to the presumption of continuity of the Hawaiian State, the Court relied on Fonoti. This case, however, is not judge-made law or federal common law like Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino regarding international relations. The Fonoti case was a decision that did not comply with the Lorenzo doctrine and, therefore, cannot be used by this Court as if it is federal common law. While the Court cited the Fonoti case in its granting of the Defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss, which was based on the Lorenzo doctrine, albeit in error, the Court willfully disregarded international law and the Lorenzo doctrine to the detriment of the Plaintiff Hawaiian Kingdom, being a manifest error of law and fact and a manifest injustice. The Court has willfully avoided the Lorenzo doctrine that calls for evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist “as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” The Lorenzo doctrine does not seek to determine whether the government of the Hawaiian State exists. Notwithstanding the restoration of the government of the Hawaiian State three years after State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo in 1994 as a Council of Regency and Plaintiff in this case, the Lorenzo doctrine’s evidentiary burden was not altered except by the application of international law.

The Court has provided no legal basis to grant Defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss first amended complaint. Therefore, this Court is bound by treaty law to take affirmative steps to transform itself into an Article II Court by virtue of Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, just as the International Bureau of the PCA established the arbitral tribunal by virtue of Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes because of the juridical fact of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State. This Court is also bound to transform itself into an Article II Court because it is situated within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom and not within the territory of the United States pursuant to the Lorenzo doctrine. Furthermore, Federal Defendants have provided no rebuttable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State was extinguished under international law other than invoking its internal laws as justification for not complying with its international obligations, which are barred by customary international law and treaty law.

For 28 years the State of Hawai‘i courts and the U.S. federal court in Hawai‘i have been applying the Lorenzo doctrine, which they created, wrong. This is not a matter of reading the fine print in the Lorenzo Court’s decision. It was in plain view when the Lorenzo Court stated that “the court’s rationale is open to question in light of international law.”

As a federal judge, Judge Kobayashi is obligated to apply international law to the Lorenzo doctrine, because the U.S. Supreme Court, in the The Paquette Habana case, stated, “International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”

Hawaiian Kingdom Petitions Ninth Circuit Court to Compel Judge Kobayashi to Transform into an Article II Occupation Court

On May 25, 2022, on behalf of the United States, President Joseph Biden, Vice-President Kamala Harris, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Aquilino, Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., filed a Response to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens.

A motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens is filed with an appellate court if the proper court of appeals is in a foreign country. In its motion the Hawaiian Kingdom is asking the Ninth Circuit Court to dismiss the appeal because the Clerk of the District Court of Hawai‘i transmitted the appeal to the Ninth Circuit in error.

When the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i on April 24, 2022, it specifically stated that the Hawaiian Kingdom was appealing to a competent Court of Appeals to be hereafter established by the United States as an Occupying Power within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom. It was the Clerk that transferred the Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco, and not the Hawaiian Kingdom.

The international laws of occupation allows the Occupying Power, in this case the United States, to establish an Article II Occupation Court in the Hawaiian Kingdom’s territory as the occupying State to administer the laws of the occupied State and the international laws of occupation. The United States established an Article II Occupation Court in Germany in 1945 until 1955 when the occupation of Germany ended.

After receiving the appeal, the Clerk of the Ninth Circuit issued an Order for the Hawaiian Kingdom to file within 21 days a motion “for voluntary dismissal of the appeal or show cause why it should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Federal appeals can only be made after the case is over at the trial court level. District Court Judge Leslie Kobayashi did not terminate the proceedings in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden.

The Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens, but in doing so asked the Ninth Circuit Court to comply with the Lorenzo principle, which is federal common law, and compel the United States to show evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist as a matter of international law. The Hawaiian Kingdom is “show[ing] cause why it should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” The Lorenzo principle has a direct nexus to a 1994 appeal that came before the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals called State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo. The Appellate Court stated:

Lorenzo appeals, arguing that the lower court erred in denying his pretrial motion (Motion) to dismiss the indictment. The essence of the Motion is that the [Ha­waiian Kingdom] (Kingdom) was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties; the Kingdom was illegally overthrown in 1893 with the assistance of the United States; the Kingdom still exists as a sovereign nation; he is a citizen of the Kingdom; therefore, the courts of the State of Hawai‘i have no jurisdiction over him. Lorenzo makes the same argument on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the lower court correctly denied the Motion.

Lorenzo became a precedent case on the subject of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State in State of Hawai‘i courts, and is known in the United States District Court in Hawai‘i, since 2002, as the Lorenzo principle. The Lorenzo principle placed the burden of proof that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State on the defendants. In 2014, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court clarified this evidentiary burden. In State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, the Supreme Court stated:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s foreign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.

There have been seventeen federal cases that applied the Lorenzo principle, two of which came before the Ninth Circuit Court. However, a careful read of the Lorenzo decision reveals a stunning shift of who has the burden of proof and what needs to be proven. The Appellate Court in Lorenzo stated that “the court’s rationale is open to question in light of international law.” Since the determination of whether a State exists is a matter of international law, what does international law say about the existence of a State?

A rule of international law is that an established State is presumed to still exist despite its government being military overthrown. This is why the German State continued to exist after the Nazi government was militarily overthrown in 1945, and why the Japanese State continued to exist despite the military overthrow of the Japanese government, both of which ended the Second World War. In other words, the Hawaiian Kingdom, as an established State under international law, like Germany and Japan, is presumed to continue to exist despite the illegal overthrow of its government on January 17, 1893.

Because the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist, the burden was not on Lorenzo as the defendant to prove the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists,” but rather the burden is placed on the prosecutor to prove that the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not exist.” The State of Hawai‘i courts that applied the Lorenzo principle in multiple cases applied it wrong.

Also, the seventeen federal cases that applied the Lorenzo principle also had it wrong, and like the State of Hawai‘i courts are rendered unlawful because of international law, so is the United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i. This means that all court decisions after 1893, whether the provisional government, the Republic of Hawai‘i, the Territory of Hawai‘i, the State of Hawai‘i, and since 1900, the federal courts, are void because the courts were never lawful to begin with.

Further implications of international law renders the State of Hawai‘i itself as unlawful. On this note, the Appellate Court in Lorenzo also stated that the “illegal overthrow leaves open the question whether the present governance system should be recognized” because a “State has an obligation not to recognize or treat as a state an entity that has attained the qualifications for statehood as a result of a threat or use of armed force.”

The State of Hawai‘i is a direct successor to the provisional government that was established through the “use of armed force.” In 1893, President Grover Cleveland concluded that the provisional government, which is a predecessor of the State of Hawai‘i, “owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States.” Secretary of State Walter Gresham stated that “the Government of Hawaii surrendered its authority under a threat of war, until such time only as the Government of the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should reinstate the constitutional sovereign.” In other words, the trial court that prosecuted Lorenzo and the Appellate Court that heard Lorenzo’s appeal were never lawful in the first place.

The Hawaiian Kingdom’s appeal that was forwarded to the Ninth Circuit by the Clerk of the District Court in Hawai‘i raised a very interesting twist regarding the Lorenzo principle and the legal standing of the Ninth Circuit. By making the Lorenzo principle into federal common law, which means judge made law at the federal level, the Ninth Circuit is bound by the Lorenzo principle, especially when the Ninth Circuit applied the Lorenzo principle in two cases that it heard on appeal.

Unlike the Hawai‘i District Court, which is currently unlawful until it transforms itself into an Article II Occupation Court, the Ninth Circuit is lawful, as an Article III Court, because it sits in the territory of the United States. As such, the Hawaiian Kingdom can invoke the Lorenzo principle that the Hawaiian Kingdom is presumed to continue to exist unless the United States, who is a defendant-appellee in this case, can provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist. Without providing a treaty of peace whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom ceded itself to the United States, the presumption of continuity remains. There is no treaty except for the unlawful imposition of American municipal laws since 1898.

Yesterday, June 2, 2022, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Reply to the United States response to its motion to dismiss that reiterated the Lorenzo principle and why the federal court in Hawai‘i is unlawful. And that since the Ninth Circuit is not unlawful because it sits within the territory of the United States in the city of San Francisco, it should apply the Lorenzo principle in this unique case that has now come before it.

In its Reply, the Hawaiian Kingdom has petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Leslie Kobayashi to transform the United States District Court in Hawai‘i into an Article II Occupation Court pursuant to the Lorenzo principle and international law. Under the All Writs Act, federal circuit courts of appeal are authorized to compel an inferior court within its circuit to do something that the law says must be done. In this case, international law requires that only Article II Occupation Courts that administer the laws of the occupied State and the law of occupation can be established in the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

With the filings of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens, the United States’ Response, and the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Reply, the issue is now in the hands of the Ninth Circuit for a decision.

State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo – The Case That Brought Down the State of Hawai‘i

One year after the United States Congress passed the joint resolution apologizing for the Unit­ed States overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom government in 1993, an appeal was heard by the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals that centered on a claim that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist. In State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, the appellate court stated:

Lorenzo appeals, arguing that the lower court erred in denying his pretrial motion (Motion) to dismiss the indictment. The essence of the Motion is that the [Ha­waiian Kingdom] (Kingdom) was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties; the Kingdom was illegally overthrown in 1893 with the assistance of the United States; the Kingdom still exists as a sovereign nation; he is a citizen of the Kingdom; therefore, the courts of the State of Hawai‘i have no jurisdiction over him. Lorenzo makes the same argument on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the lower court correctly denied the Motion.

While the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, it admitted “the court’s rationale is open to question in light of international law.” By not applying international law, the court concluded that the trial court’s decision was correct because Lorenzo “presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom [continues to exist] as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.”

In other words, the appellate court was applying the rules of evidence that applied in State of Hawai‘i courts. According to the rules of evidence, there is a presumption that the court is lawful and has jurisdiction of the case, unless the defendant provides rebuttable evidence that it doesn’t have jurisdiction. An example would be where a prosecutor files a criminal complaint against a person for committing manslaughter in traffic court. The defendant’s attorney would then file a motion to dismiss stating that the traffic court does not have jurisdiction over an allegation of manslaughter, and that the proper court would be the circuit court that has jurisdiction.

Lorenzo’s attorney filed a motion to dismiss based on the argument that his client had immunity from prosecution. So the appellate court stated that Lorenzo provided no evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom exists as a State that would have provided for his immunity because he should have been on trial in a Hawaiian Kingdom court and not a State of Hawai‘i court. Since 1994, the Lorenzo case became a precedent case that served as the basis for denying defendants’ motions to dismiss where they claimed immunity. In State of Hawai‘i v. Fergerstrom, the appellate court stated, “We affirm that relevant precedent [in State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo],” and that defendants have an evidentiary burden that shows the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist. The federal court, in 2002, referred to the Lorenzo case as the Lorenzo principle.

The Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, clarified the evidentiary burden that Lo­renzo principle placed upon defendants. The court stated:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the Kingdom of Hawai‘i “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s foreign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.

What is profound is that if the appellate court applied international law in its decision, it would have confirmed the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State and ruled in favor of Lorenzo. International law recognizes the difference between the State and its government, and that there is a presumption that the State continues to exist despite its government being militarily overthrown. As Judge James Crawford explained, “there is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations despite a period in which there is no effective government.” He also stated that “belligerent occupation does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.” In other words, all Lorenzo needed to provide was evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom “did” exist as a State, which would then shift the burden on the prosecution to provide rebuttable evidence that the United States extinguished the Hawaiian State in accordance with recognized modes of extinction under international law, a treaty of cession.

The appellate court did acknowledge that Lorenzo, in fact, provided evidence in his motion to dismiss “that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties” In other words, the “bilateral treaties” were the evidence of Hawaiian statehood. Therefore, the appellate court mistakenly placed the burden on the defendant to provide evidence of the Kingdom’s continued existence, when it should have determined from the trial records if the prosecution provided rebuttable evidence against the presumption of the Kingdom’s continued existence as a State, which was evidenced by the “bilateral treaties.” The prosecution provided no such evidence.

If, for the sake of argument, the prosecution argued before the trial court that the 1898 joint resolution of annexation extinguished Hawaiian statehood, it would be prevented from doing so under the rules of evidence because the United States Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel concluded in 1988, in a legal opinion, that it is “unclear which constitutional power Congress exercised when it acquired Hawaii by joint resolution.”

The opinion by the Department of Justice is an admission against interest, which is an out-of-court statement made by the federal government prior to the date of Lorenzo’s trial that would have bound the prosecutor from claiming otherwise. Furthermore, a congressional joint resolution or a statute are not sources of international law, and as such could not have affected Hawaiian statehood. According to the American Law Institute, a “rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the international community of states (a) in the form of customary law; (b) by international agreement; or (c) by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world.” Only by a treaty of cession, which is an “international agreement,” could the United States have extinguished the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State. Congressional laws are not treaties of cession.

The significance of the Lorenzo case is that the appellate court, when international law is applied, answered its own question in the negative as to “whether the present governance system should be recognized,” and that a “state has an obligation not to recognize or treat as a state an entity that has attained the qualifications for statehood as a result of a threat or use of armed force.” In other words, the State of Hawai‘i cannot be recognized as a State of the United States, which arose “as a result of a…use of armed force.” In 1893, President Grover Cleveland concluded that the provisional government, which is a predecessor of the State of Hawai‘i, “owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States.” Therefore, a proper interpretation of State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo renders all courts of the State of Hawai‘i to be unlawful, and that every judgment, order or decree that emanated from any court of the State of Hawai‘i is void pursuant to the Lorenzo principle.

As such, these decisions are subject to collateral attack, which is where a defendant has a right to impeach a decision previously made against him because the “court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter.” While these decisions are subject to collateral attack, there is the problem as to what court is competent to receive a motion to set aside judgment because all courts of the State of Hawai‘i are not lawful pursuant to the Lorenzo principle.

“If a person or body assumes to act as a court without any semblance of legal authority so to act and gives a purported judgment,” explains the American Law Institute, “the judgment is, of course, wholly void.” And according to Moore, “Courts that act beyond…constraints act without power; judgments of courts lacking subject matter jurisdiction are void—not de­serving of respect by other judicial bodies or by the litigants.” Furthermore, courts who were made aware of the American occupation prior to their decisions would have met the constitu­ent elements of the war crime of depriving a protected person of a fair and regular trial.

Hawaiian Kingdom Files Motion in Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to Compel United States to Prove the Hawaiian Kingdom Does Not Exist

Because people “believe” that the Hawaiian Islands are a part of the United States as the 50th State of the American Union, it does not mean that it is true, especially from a “legal” standpoint. As Abraham Lincoln once asked, how many legs does a calf have if you call its tail a leg? Five, the questioner responded. Lincoln said no. Calling a calf’s tail a leg doesn’t make it a leg.

When the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i on April 24, 2022, it specifically stated that the Hawaiian Kingdom was appealing to a competent Court of Appeals to be hereafter established by the United States as an Occupying Power here in the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom. It was the Clerk that transferred the Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco, and not the Hawaiian Kingdom.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals can only hear appeals that come from one of the District Courts within its circuit. These District Courts are located within the United States. The District Court in Honolulu is not situated in the territory of the United States but rather in the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

The Hawaiian Kingdom drew attention to the illegality of the District Court in its Amended Complaint that was filed on August 11, 2021, which led to an amicus brief filed on October 6, 2011, by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the National Lawyers Guild, and the Water Protectors Legal Collective as to why the District Court had to transform from an Article III Court to an Article II Occupation Court because it is in occupied territory of a foreign State—the Hawaiian Kingdom.

The Notice of Appeal was filed in response to District Court Judge Leslie Kobayashi’s ruling on a motion to dismiss from the Swedish Honorary Consul without first transforming into an Article II Occupation Court. Judge Kobayashi stated that she didn’t need to transform into an Article II Occupation Court because in seventeen previous cases that came before the District Court of Hawai‘i since 1993, the federal judges in these cases all ruled that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist as a State.

Her reasoning was flawed so the Hawaiian Kingdom requested Judge Kobayashi to reconsider her decision in light of international law, but she responded that the Hawaiian Kingdom just disagrees with her decision. This resulted in the filing of the Notice of Appeal to an Article II Occupation Appellate Court to be hereafter established by the United States as an Occupying State. The Hawaiian Kingdom filed the appeal so that the records of its case can be preserved for future proceedings. Kobayashi did not dismiss the case.

On May 3, 2022, the Clerk of the Ninth Circuit filed an Order that stated, “Within 21 days after the date of this order, appellant shall either move for voluntary dismissal of the appeal or show cause why it should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” In response to this Order, the Hawaiian Kingdom today, May 20th, filed a Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens. Because the Ninth Circuit is a bona fide Appellate Court in the United States, it allows the Hawaiian Kingdom to file this type of a Motion to Dismiss and can fully argue its case. Normally defendants named in an appeal would file, if appropriate, a Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens, and not the plaintiff in an appeal to dismiss its appeal. This case, however, is a truly unique situation.

This type of motion is filed when an appeals court in a foreign country should be hearing the appeal, and not, in this case, the Ninth Circuit. The appropriate court would be an Article II Occupation Appellate Court in the Hawaiian Kingdom, which hasn’t been established yet. In its Motion to Dismiss, the Hawaiian Kingdom explained:

Under international law there is a presumption that an established sovereign and independent State, being a subject of international law, continues to exist despite the overthrow of its government. See Professor Quincy Wright, “The Status of Germany and the Peace Proclamation,” 46, no. 2 American Journal of International Law 299, 307 (April 1952) (“[i]nternational law distinguishes between a government and the state it governs. This distinction makes it clear that the extinction of the Nazi Government and the temporary absence of any German Government did not necessarily mean that Germany as a state ceased to exist”); see also Professor Yejoon Rim, “State Continuity in the Absence of Government: The Underlying Rationale in International Law,” 20(20) European Journal of International Law 1, 4 (2021) (the State continues “to exist even in the factual absence of government so long as the people entitled to reconstruct the government remain”). According to Professor Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 109 (4th ed., 1990):

“Thus after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War the four major Allied powers assumed supreme power in Germany. The legal competence of the German state did not, however, disappear. What occurred is akin to legal representation or agency of necessity. The German state continued to exist, and, indeed, the legal basis of the occupation depended on its continued existence.”

Therefore, the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State is presumed to continue to exist despite its government being unlawfully overthrown by the Defendant Appellee UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’s military on January 17, 1893. As such, the District Court of Hawai‘i is not a properly constituted court in accordance with international humanitarian law, and, therefore, had to transform itself into an Article II Occupation Court.

If the U.S. District Court of Hawai‘i did not have jurisdiction or authority to rule in the case, the Ninth Circuit, as an appeals court, wouldn’t have authority as well. This is because the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State despite the unlawful overthrow of its government by the United States military on January 17, 1893. This is not the State of Hawai‘i.

According to Judge James Crawford from the International Court of Justice, “there is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations despite a period in which there is no effective government.” He also stated that “belligerent occupation does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.”

“If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Matthew Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.”

A legal title under international law would be a treaty between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States where the Hawaiian State would merge with the State of the United States called a treaty of cession. In other words, the question is not whether the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist, but rather can “the party opposing that continuity” establish factual evidence, i.e., treaty cession, that it “does not exist.” In the absence of the evidence that it “does not exist,” the Hawaiian Kingdom “continues to exist” as a State under international law.

This is precisely why the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, acknowledged the presumption of the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State when the proceedings were initiated on November 8, 1999. The PCA could find no evidence under international law that the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not exist,” therefore, it continues to exist.

The “presumption of the continuity of a State” is similar to the “presumption of innocence.” A person on trial does not have the burden to prove their innocence. Rather, the prosecutor has to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the person “is not” innocent. Without proof of guilt, the person remains innocent. In international law, a recognized sovereign and independent State does not have the burden to prove it continues be a State after its government was overthrown and subjected to being belligerently occupied for over a century. Rather, the party opposing the presumption has to prove with evidence under international law that the State was extinguished. Absent the evidence, the State continues to exist.

When the seventeen federal cases that ruled the Hawaiian Kingdom doesn’t exist as a State, it cited a precedent case in 1994 that was heard by the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals called State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo. In the federal courts it is known as the “Lorenzo principle.” As the District Court in 2002 stated, in United States v. Goo:

Since the Intermediate Court of Appeals for the State of Hawaii’s decision in Hawaii v. Lorenzo, the courts in Hawaii have consistently adhered to the Lorenzo court’s statements that the Kingdom of Hawaii is not recognized as a sovereign state by either the United States or the State of Hawaii. See Lorenzo, 77 Haw. 219, 883 P.2d 641, 643 (Haw. App. 1994); see also State of Hawaii v. French, 77 Haw. 222, 883 P.2d 644, 649 (Haw. App. 1994) (stating that “presently there is no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognizing attributes of a state’s sovereign nature”) (quoting Lorenzo, 883 P.2d at 643). This court sees no reason why it should not adhere to the Lorenzo principle.

According to the Lorenzo principle, the burden of proof was on the defendants in the seventeen cases, and that these defendants did not provide evidence of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State. In the 1994 Lorenzo decision, however, the Appellate Court did acknowledge that its “rationale is open to question in light of international law.” The federal judges in the seventeen cases were not correctly applying the Lorenzo principle with international law.

Because the presumption of State continuity is a rule of international law, the Lorenzo principle turns it into a rule of evidence that shifts the burden of proof away from the defendants to prove the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists” as a State, to those opposing the presumption of Hawaiian State continuity to prove that the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not exist” as a State under international law. The only evidence to show that the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not exist” is that there must be a treaty of cession where the Hawaiian Kingdom ceded itself to the United States. There exists no such treaty!

This is a radical shift of the burden of proof and not only were the seventeen federal cases wrongly decided, but every case that came before the federal courts in Hawai‘i since 1900 are all void because the United States did not extinguish the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law before it created, by Congressional legislation, the so-called Territory of Hawai‘i in 1900 and the so-called State of Hawai‘i in 1959. This is why in the Lorenzo decision, the Appellate Court stated that the “illegal overthrow leaves open the question whether the present governance system should be recognized” under international law. This is not just federal court decisions since 1900, Territory of Hawai‘i court decisions since 1900, and State of Hawai‘i court decisions since 1959, but all decisions made by an illegal American government that span from unlawful taxation, business regulations to land titles.

In its Motion to Dismiss, the Hawaiian Kingdom is setting the stage for the United States, as a defendant in this case, to provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom was extinguished as a State under international law. To do this, the Hawaiian Kingdom is invoking the Lorenzo principle, by applying international law, in order for the Ninth Circuit Court to schedule an evidentiary hearing that will compel the United States to provide the evidence of a treaty of cession and prove that the seventeen cases using the Lorenzo principle were “not in error.”

But here is the catch, for the United States to provide evidence is to directly acknowledge the presumption that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist and that the United States federal government and the State of Hawai‘i are unlawful. This rule of international law was triggered on January 17, 1893.

As Sir Walter Scott wrote, “Oh what a tangled web we weave/When first we practice to deceive.”

Setting the Record Straight on Descendants of Kamehameha I and Heirs to the Hawaiian Crown

There is a common misunderstanding that if you are a direct descendent of Kamehameha I today you are an heir to the throne as well as an heir to the Crown Lands. This is incorrect.

It is true that Kamehameha I had many wives. According to the second revised edition of the book Kamehameha’s Children Today by Charles Ahlo, Rubellite Kawena Kinney Johson, and Jerry Walker, Kamehameha I had 30 wives, 18 of whom had 35 children. The other 12 did not have any children. Of the 18 was Keōpūolani who gave birth to Liholiho, who later succeeded to the throne as Kamehameha II in 1819, Kauikeaouli, who succeeded to the throne as Kamehameha III in 1824, and a daughter, Nahiʻenaʻena who died in 1836 while her brother Kamehameha III was King. Of all the wives, she had the highest chiefly rank and she was acknowledged as such by Kamehameha’s Chiefs.

The Kamehameha extended family was not the leadership of the kingdom. Rather, the leadership of the Island of Kingdom of Hawai‘i was comprised of Kamehameha as its Ali‘i Nui (King) and his most trusted Chiefs, which included Kalaʻimamahu, Chief of Hāmākua, Ke‘eaumoku, Chief of Kona, Ka‘iana, Chief of Puna, and Kame‘eiamoku, Chief of Kohala. After defeating the Maui Kingdom of Kalanikupule in 1795 and acquiring the Kaua‘i Kingdom from Kaumuali‘i in 1810, the leadership of Chiefs increased due to the acquisition of additional islands of his expanded domain. These Chiefs extended from Kamehameha’s Chiefs, while the Kamehameha Dynasty extended from the children of Keōpūolani and not from the other 17 wives who had children. The decision of which wife’s children were to be the heirs to the throne was not the decision for Kamehameha I to make on his own. It had to be sanctioned by his Council of Chiefs. Without the support of his Chiefs, Kamehameha’s kingdom would be fractured after his death.

As Kuykendal wrote, “The desertion of Kaʻiana [in 1795], the revolt of Nāmākēhā [in 1796], and Kaumuialiʻi’s dalliance with the Russians [in 1817] were overt acts showing clearly how unwillingly some of the chiefs submitted to his authority.” The Russian explorer, Lieutenant Otto von Kotzebue, who arrived in the islands in 1816 and 1817, was made aware of Kamehameha’s concerns of the longevity of his kingdom. In his 1821 book, Voyage of Discovery, Kotzebue states of a proposed division of the kingdom with Kalanimoku having O‘ahu, Ke‘eaumoku having Maui, Kaumuali‘i retaining Kaua‘i, and Liholiho, Kamehameha’s heir, having Hawai‘i island. Kamehameha took the necessary steps to prevent such breakup from happening. According to Kamakau, Kamehameha sought to strengthen the British alliance because he believed the British supported his dynasty. He was correct.

On May 18, 1824, Kamehameha II arrived in London with the Hawaiian royal retinue that included Mataio Kekūanāo‘a husband to Kamehameha II’s sister, Kīnaʻu. Before the King could meet with King George IV he and his wife Queen Kalama died of measles. High Chief Boki was the highest ranking Chief and he and the royal retinue met with King George IV. According Kekuanao‘a:

The King then asked Boki what was the business on which you and your King came to this country?

Then Boki declared to him the reason of our sailing to Great Britain We have come to confirm the words which Kamehameha I gave in charge to Vancouver thus—“Go back and tell King George to watch over me and my whole Kingdom. I acknowledge him as my landlord and myself as tenant (or him as superior and I inferior). Should the foreigners of any other nation come to take possesion of my lands, then let him help me.”

And when King George had heard he thus said to Boki, “I have heard these words, I will attend to the evils from without. The evils within your Kingdom it is not for me to regard; they are with yourselves. Return and say to the King, to Kaahumanu and to Kalaimoku, I will watch over your country, I will not take possession of it for mine, but I will watch over it, lest evils should come from others to the Kingdom. I therefore will watch over him agreeably to those ancient words.”

Kamehameha II’s body arrived in Lahaina on May 4, 1825. After the funeral and time of mourning had passed, the Council of Chiefs met on June 6, 1824, in Honolulu with Lord Byron and the British Consul. It was confirmed that Liholiho’s brother, Kauikeaouli, was to be Kamehameha III, but since he was only eleven years old, Ka‘ahumanu would continue to serve as Regent and Kalanimōkū as Premier. Kalanimōkū addressed the Council “setting forth the defects of many of their laws and customs, particularly the reversion of lands” to a new King for redistribution and assignment. The chiefs collectively agreed to forgo this ancient custom, and the lands were maintained in the hands of the original tenants in chief and their successors, subject to reversion only in times of treason. Lord Byron was invited to address the Council, and without violating his specific orders of non-intervention in the political affairs of the kingdom, he prepared eight recommendations on paper and presented it to the chiefs for their consideration.

1. That the king be head of the people.

2. That all the chiefs swear allegiance.

3. That the lands descend in hereditary succession.

4. That taxes be established to support the king.

5. That no man’s life be taken except by consent of the king or regent and twelve chiefs.

6. That the king or regent grant pardons at all times.

7. That all the people be free and not bound to one chief.

8. That a port duty be laid on all foreign vessels.

Lord Byron introduced the fundamental principles of British governance to the chiefs and set them on a course of national consolidation and uniformity. His suggestions referred “to the form of government, and the respective and relative rights of the king, chiefs, and people, and to the tenure of lands,” but not to a uniform code of laws. Since the death of Kamehameha in 1819, the Hawaiian Kingdom, as a feudal autocracy, had no uniform system of laws systematically applied throughout the islands. Rather it fell on each of the tenants in chief and their designated vassals to be both lawmaker and arbiter over their own particular tenants living on the granted lands from the King.

When the Hawaiian Kingdom was transformed into a constitutional monarchy, written laws became the legal foundation for the kingdom. Confirming that only the children of Keōpūolani were the heirs to the Throne, the 1840 Constitution stated:

The origin of the present government, and system of polity, is as follows: KAMEHAMEHA I, was the founder of the kingdom, and to him belonged all the land from one end of the Islands to the other, though it was not his own private property. It belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom Kamehameha I was the head, and had the management of the landed property. Wherefore, there was not formerly, and is not now any person who could or can convey away the smallest portion of land without consent of the one who had, or has the direction of the kingdom.

These are the persons who have had the direction of it from that time down, Kamehameha II, Kaahumanu I, and at the present time Kamehameha III. These persons have had the direction of the kingdom down to the present time, and all documents written by them, and no others are the documents of the kingdom.

The kingdom is permanently confirmed to Kamehameha III, and his heirs, and his heir shall be the person whom he and the chiefs shall appoint, during his life time, but should there be no appointment, then the decision shall rest with the chiefs and house of Representatives.

In the 1852 Constitution, Article 25 states:

The crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kamehameha III during his life, and to his successor. The successor shall be the person whom the King and the House of Nobles shall appoint and publicly proclaim as such, during the King’s life; but should there be no such appointment and proclamation, then the successor shall be chosen by the House of Nobles and the House of Representatives in joint ballot.

In the 1864 Constitution, Article 22 states:

The Crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kamehameha V, and to the Heirs of His body lawfully begotten, and to their lawful Descendants in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to Her Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kamamalu Kaahumanu, and their heirs of her body, lawfully begotten, and their lawful descendants in a direct line. The Succession shall be to the senior male child, and to the heirs of his body; failing a male child, the succession shall be to the senior female child, and the heirs of her body. In case there is no heir as above provided, then the successor shall be the person whom the Sovereign shall appoint with the consent of the Nobles, and publicly proclaim as such during the King’s life; but should there be no appointment and proclamation, and the Throne should become vacant, then the Cabinet Council, immediately after the occurring of such vacancy, shall cause a meeting of the Legislative Assembly, who shall elect by ballot some native Aliʻi of the Kingdom as Successor to the Throne; and the Successor so elected shall become a new Stirps for a Royal Family; and the succession from the Sovereign thus elected, shall be regulated by the same law as the present Royal Family.

According to this constitutional provision, the Kamehameha Dynasty would continue if Kamehameha V had “Heirs of His body lawfully begotten.” The term “lawfully begotten” is a child born in wedlock. A child born out of wedlock was called a bastard child. Kamehameha was not married, and he had no children. In that case, his sister Princess Victoria Kamamalu Kaahumanu would be the successor to the Throne should Kamehameha V not “appoint [a successor to the throne] with the consent of the Nobles, and publicly proclaim as such during the King’s life.” She never married before her death on May 29, 1866, leaving the successor to the Throne to be decided by Kamehameha V. The are some who claim that the Princess had a child. Whether this is true or not, it does not matter because the Constitution states that a child shall be “lawfully begotten,” which can only happen if the child is born in wedlock. The Princess was never married.

When Kamehameha V died on December 11, 1872, he did not appoint a successor and receive confirmation by the Nobles. This was precisely why the Cabinet of Kamehameha V, serving as a Council of Regency, stated to the Legislative Assembly on January 8, 1873, when it was convened in extraordinary session to elect a successor to the throne:

His Majesty left no Heirs.

Her late Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kamamalu Kaahumanu, to whom in the event of the death of His late Majesty without heirs, the Constitution declared that the Throne should descend, died, also without heirs, on the twenty-ninth day of May, in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-six.

His late Majesty did not appoint any successor in the mode set forth in the Constitution, with the consent of the Nobles or make a Proclamation thereof during his life. There having been no such appointment or Proclamation, the Throne became vacant, and the Cabinet Council immediately thereupon considered the form of the Constitution in such case made and provided.

There is no doubt that there are descendants of Kamehameha I from his 17 wives, other than Keōpūolani. Ahlo, Johnson and Walkerʻs book Kamehameha’s Children Today reveals that. There is no dispute.

These descendants, however, which include Ahlo, Johnson and Walker, are not a part of the Kamehameha Dynasty that headed the government from 1791, after the death of High Chief Keōua, until the death of Kamehameha V in 1872. Those children and grandchildren that headed the Hawaiian government as an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy were Kamehameha II, Kamehameha III, Kamehameha IV and Kamehameha V. The Kamehameha Dynasty was succeeded by the Lunalilo Dynasty in 1873, and the Kalākaua Dynasty replaced the Lunalilo Dynasty in 1874. In 1922, the Kalākaua Dynasty ended with the passing of Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalaniana‘ole.

The Lunalilo and Kalākaua Dynasties descended from Kamehameha Iʻs Chiefs, which are part of the nobility class of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The genealogies published throughout 1896 in the Maka‘anana newspapers reveal the families of the nobility class. To access these genealogies go to The Three Estates of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Presently the Hawaiian Crown is Not Inheritable but Rather Subject to an Election by the Legislative Assembly after the U.S. Occupation Comes to an End

During this time of the rising of the national consciousness of the Hawaiian Kingdom after over a century of the war crime of denationalization through Americanization, it is important for Hawaiian subjects to understand the laws of the country as they existed prior to the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom government on January 17, 1893. Especially the laws that apply to the Hawaiian Crown.

There is a common misunderstanding that the Hawaiian Crown is hereditary. This is not an accurate understanding of Hawaiian constitutional law. Hereditary descent is a part of Hawaiian law, but it works in tandem and within the limits of Hawaiian constitutional law.

Individuals claiming Hawaiian Titles of Nobility, which include Abigail Kawananakoa, Owana Salazar, Mahealani Ahsing, Windy Lorenzo, Ruth Bolomet, just to name a few, are not who they claim. There is a distinction between Titles of Nobility and noble lineage. The former derives from a sitting Monarch, while the latter is a status by virtue of chiefly genealogy called mo‘o ku‘auhau. This is not to say that these individuals are not of noble lineage. Rather the titles they claim are self-declared that have no basis under Hawaiian constitutional law.

Only a sitting Monarch can nominate an heir apparent to the Throne, which will then require confirmation by the Nobles in the Legislative Assembly. The history of Hawaiian Monarchs began with the Kamehameha Dynasty that ended in 1873, followed by the Lunalilo Dynasty that ended in 1874, and then finally the Kalākaua Dynasty that ended in 1922.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, the northern archipelago of islands consisted of four distinct kingdoms: Hawai‘i Island under Kamehameha I; Maui Island with its dependent islands of Lāna‘i and Kaho‘olawe under Kahekili; Kaua‘i Islalnd and its dependent island of Ni‘ihau under Kā‘eo; and O‘ahu Island with its dependent island of Molokaʻi under Kahahana. Kamehameha, King of Hawai‘i Island, consolidated the four kingdoms establishing the Kingdom of the Sandwich Islands in 1810, which later became the Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands. In 1829, the Kingdom of the Sandwich Islands came to be known as the Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands. By 1840, the Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands came to be known as the Hawaiian Kingdom, a constitutional monarchy.

The Kamehameha Dynasty

Kamehameha I governed his kingdom according to ancient tradition and strict religious protocol. In 1794, after voluntarily ceding the island Kingdom of Hawai‘i to Great Britain, Kamehameha and his chiefs considered themselves British subjects and recognized King George III as emperor. The cession to Great Britain did not radically change traditional governance, but principles of English governance and titles were instituted.

In 1795, Kamehameha conquered the Maui Kingdom, and in 1810 the Kaua‘i Kingdom became a vassal under Kamehameha through voluntary cession by its King, Kaumuali‘i. By 1840 all the Island Kingdoms were consolidated under the Hawaiian Kingdom. According to the 1840 Constitution:

The origin of the present government, and system of polity, is as follows: KAMEHAMEHA I, was the founder of the kingdom, and to him belonged all the land from one end of the Islands to the other, though it was not his own private property. It belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom Kamehameha I was the head, and had the management of the landed property. Wherefore, there was not formerly, and is not now any person who could or can convey away the smallest portion of land without consent of the one who had, or has the direction of the kingdom.

These are the persons who have had the direction of it from that time down, Kamehameha II, Kaahumanu I, and at the present time Kamehameha III. These persons have had the direction of the kingdom down to the present time, and all documents written by them, and no others are the documents of the kingdom.

The kingdom is permanently confirmed to Kamehameha III, and his heirs, and his heir shall be the person whom he and the chiefs shall appoint, during his life time, but should there be no appointment, then the decision shall rest with the chiefs and house of Representatives.

On June 14, 1852, a new Constitution was granted by Kamehameha III confirming the successorship of the Crown. Article 25 provides:

The crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kamehameha III during his life, and to his successor. The successor shall be the person whom the King and the House of Nobles shall appoint and publicly proclaim as such, during the King’s life; but should there be no such appointment and proclamation, then the successor shall be chosen by the House of Nobles and the House of Representatives in joint ballot.

Article 25 is tempered by Article 26 that states, “No person shall ever sit upon the throne who has been convicted of an infamous crime, or who is insane or an idiot. No person shall ever succeed to the crown, unless he be a descendant of the aboriginal stock of Aliʻis.” It would appear that Kamehameha III was aware of King George III’s insanity while the Hawaiian Kingdom was a British Protectorate and it no doubt informed Hawaiian governance.

Alexander Liholiho, the adopted son of the King, was confirmed by the House of Nobles as successor on April 6, 1853, in accordance with Article 25 of the 1852 Constitution. In 1854, after the death of the King, he succeeded to the throne as Kamehameha IV. Kamehameha IV was the biological son of Mataio Kekuūanaoʻa and Kīnaʻu, who was the half-sister to Kamehameha III. The confirmation process ensured that Alexander Liholiho was not “convicted of an infamous crime, or who is insane or an idiot.”

On November 30, 1863, Kamehameha IV died unexpectedly, and left the Kingdom without a successor. On the same day, the Kuhina Nui—Premier, Victoria Kamāmalu, in Privy Council, proclaimed Lot Kapuaiwa to be the successor to the throne in accordance with Article 25 of the Constitution of 1852, and the Nobles confirmed him. Lot Kapuaiwa was thereafter called Kamehameha V. Victoria Kamāmalu, as Kuhina Nui, provided continuity for the office of the Crown pending the appointment and confirmation of Lot Kapuaiwa.

Article 47, of the 1852 Constitution provided that “whenever the throne shall become vacant by reason of the King’s death the Kuhina Nui shall perform all the duties incumbent on the King, and shall have and exercise all the powers, which by this Constitution are vested in the King.” This provision prevented the House of Nobles and the House of Representives to choose a successor by joint ballot.

On August 20, 1864, Kamehameha V proclaimed the 1864 Constitution. The office of Kuhina Nui—Premier was removed and replaced by the Cabinet Council. Article 22 provided the successorship of the Hawaiian Crown:

The Crown is hereby permanently confirmed to His Majesty Kamehameha V, and to the Heirs of His body lawfully begotten, and to their lawful Descendants in a direct line; failing whom, the Crown shall descend to Her Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kamamalu Kaahumanu, and their heirs of her body, lawfully begotten, and their lawful descendants in a direct line. The Succession shall be to the senior male child, and to the heirs of his body; failing a male child, the succession shall be to the senior female child, and the heirs of her body. In case there is no heir as above provided, then the successor shall be the person whom the Sovereign shall appoint wiht the consent of the Nobles, and publicly proclaim as such during the King’s life; but should there be no appointment and proclamation, and the Throne should become vacant, then the Cabinet Council, immediately after the occurring of such vacancy, shall cause a meeting of the Legislative Assembly, who shall elect by ballot some native Aliʻi of the Kingdom as Successor to the Throne; and the Successor so elected shall become a new Stirps for a Royal Family; and the succession from the Sovereign thus elected, shall be regulated by the same law as the present Royal Family.

The constraints upon the Crown was reiterated in Article 25, which stated, “No person shall ever sit upon the Throne, who has been convicted of any infamous crime, or who is insane, or an idiot.”

On December 11, 1872, Kamehameha V died without naming a successor to the throne. This caused the Cabinet Council to serve temporarily as a Council of Regency that serves in the absence of a Monarch. According to Article 22 of the 1864 Constitution, “the Cabinet Council, immediately after the occurring of such vacancy, shall cause a meeting of the Legislative Assembly, who shall elect by ballot some native Aliʻi of the Kingdom as Successor to the Throne.” Article 33 also provides that “the Cabinet Council at the time of such decease shall be a Council of Regency, until the Legislative Assembly, which shall be called immediately, may be assembled.”

The Lunalilo Dynasty

On January 8, 1873, the Cabinet serving as a Council of Regency convened the Legislative Assembly into Extraordinary Session. In its address to the Legislature, the Cabinet stated:

Documents delivered to your President, contain official evidence of the decease of His late Majesty Kamehameha V. His earthly existence terminated at Iolani Palace, in Honolulu, in the Island of Oahu, upon the forty-second anniversary of his birth, being the eleventh day of December, in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy-two.

His Majesty left no Heirs.

Her late Royal Highness the Princess Victoria Kamamalu Kaahumanu, to whom in the event of the death of His late Majesty without heirs, the Constitution declared that the Throne should descend, died, also without heirs, on the twenty-ninth day of May, in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Sixty-six.

His late Majesty did not appoint any successor in the mode set forth in the Constitution, with the consent of the Nobles or make a Proclamation thereof during his life. There having been no such appointment or Proclamation, the Throne became vacant, and the Cabinet Council immediately thereupon considered the form of the Constitution in such case made and provided, and

Ordered—That a meeting of the Legislative Assembly be caused to be holden at the Court House in Honolulu, on Wednesday which will be the eighth day of January, A.D. 1873, at 12 o’clock noon; and of this order all Members of the Legislative Assembly will take notice and govern themselves accordingly.

By virtue of this Order you have been assembled, to elect by ballot, some native Aliʻi of this Kingdom as Successor to the Throne. Your present authority is limited to this duty, but the newly elected Sovereign may require your services after his accession.

The Members of the Cabinet Council devoutly ask the blessings of Heaven upon your deliberations and public acts. They have appreciated the responsibility resting upon them, and have striven to maintain tranquility and order, and, especially, to guard your proceedings against improper interference.

Acknowledging the obligation to preserve all the rights, honors and dignities appertaining to the Throne, and to transmit them unimpaired to a new Sovereign, it will become their duty, upon his accession, to surrender to him the authority conferred upon them by his late lamented predecessor.

The Legislative Assembly, empowered to elect a new monarch under the 1864 Constitution, elected William Charles Lunalilo on January 8, 1873. Lunalilo was not a descendant of Kamehameha I but his mother, Kekāuluohi, was the Queen Consort to Kamehameha I and Kamehameha II. His father was High Chief Charles Kana‘ina.

The Kalākaua Dynasty

The Hawaiian Kingdom’s first elected King died a year later without a named successor, and the Legislature was again convened by Lunaliloʻs Cabinet Council and elected David Kalākaua as King on February 12, 1874. On February 14, 1874, King Kalākaua appointed his younger brother, Prince William Pitt Leleiōhoku, his successor, and was confirmed by the Nobles. On April 10, 1877, Leleiōhoku died. The next day Kalākaua appointed his sister, Princess Lili‘uokalani, as heir-apparent and received confirmation from the Nobles.

When Kalākaua was elected, a new royal lineage replaced the Kamehameha and Lunalilo Dynasty. Kalākaua declared royal titles upon: Princess Lili‘uokalani, Queen Kapiʻolani, Princess Virginia Kapoʻoloku Poʻomaikelani, Princess Kinoiki, Princess Victoria Kawekiu Kaiʻulani Lunalilo Kalaninuiahilapalapa, Prince David Kawānanakoa, Prince Edward Abner Keliʻiahonui, and Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalanianaʻole comprised the new royal lineage. Everyone with the exception of Princess Lili‘uokalani, as heir-apparent, were heirs to the Hawaiian Throne. To move from an heir to heir-apparent is when the Monarch nominates you as successor among the other heirs, and the nominee receives confirmation from the Nobles.

When Kalākaua embarked on his world tour on January 20, 1881, Princess Lili‘uokalani served as Regent, together with the Cabinet Council. Her second time to serve as Regent with the Cabinet Council occurred when Kalākaua departed for San Francisco on November 25, 1890. Kalākaua died in San Francisco on January 20, 1891, and his body returned to Honolulu on the 29th. That day Princess Liliʻuokalani succeeded to the Throne.

The legislative and judicial branches of government had been compromised by the revolt in 1887. The Nobles became an elected body of men whose allegiance was to the foreign population, and three of the justices of the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice, participated in the revolt by drafting the 1887 constitution. The Queen was prevented from legally confirming her niece, Victoria Kawekiu Kaiʻulani Lunalilo Kalaninuiahilapalapa, as heir-apparent, because the Nobles had not been in the Legislative Assembly since 1887. Ka‘iulani died at the age of 23 on March 6, 1899.

Up to her death on November 11, 1917, Lili‘uokalani was prevented from naming a successor to the Throne and receiving confirmation by the Nobles. The last of the Kalākaua Dynasty to die was Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalanianaʻole on January 7, 1922, which ended the Kalākaua Dynasty. Royal titles are not inheriteable.

The Kamehameha, Lunalilo and Kalākaua Dynasties came to a close. There are no heirs to the Throne, and the Legislative Assembly will have to be reconvened, by the Council of Regency, after the occupation comes to an end to “elect by ballot some native Aliʻi of the Kingdom as Successor to the Throne.” A “native Aliʻi” will be drawn from those who are a direct descendant of the genealogies provided by the Board of Genealogists that were published in 1896 in the Ka Maka‘ainana newspaper. To access these genealogies go to The Three Estates of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Direct descendants of these genealogies comprise the Nobility class of the Hawaiian Kingdom and would be qualified to be elected by the Legislative Assembly after the Nobles determine that the candidate has not “been convicted of any infamous crime, or who is insane, or an idiot.”

Until such time the Council of Regency serves in the absence of the Monarch.

Reaping the Fruits of Labor – Strategic Plan of the Council of Regency

The Council of Regency, serving as the provisional government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, was established within Hawaiian territory—in situ, and not in exile. The Hawaiian government was established in accordance with the Hawaiian constitution and the doctrine of necessity to serve in the absence of the office of Executive Monarch. Queen Lili‘uokalani was the last Executive Monarch from 1891-1917.

By virtue of this process the Hawaiian government is comprised of officers de facto. According to U.S. constitutional scholar Thomas Cooley:

A provisional government is supposed to be a government de facto for the time being; a government that in some emergency is set up to preserve order; to continue the relations of the people it acts for with foreign nations until there shall be time and opportunity for the creation of a permanent government. It is not in general supposed to have any authority beyond that of a mere temporary nature resulting from some great necessity, and its authority is limited to the necessity.

During the Second World War, like other governments formed during foreign occupations of their territory, the Hawaiian government did not receive its mandate from the Hawaiian legislature, but rather by virtue of Hawaiian constitutional law as it applies to the Cabinet Council, which is comprised of the constitutional offices of the Minister of Interior, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance and the Attorney General.  

Although Article 33 of the 1864 Constitution, as amended, provides that the Cabinet Council “shall be a Council of Regency, until the Legislative Assembly, which shall be called immediately [and] shall proceed to choose by ballot, a Regent or Council of Regency, who shall administer the Government in the name of the King, and exercise all the Powers which are constitutionally vested in the King,” the convening of the Legislative Assembly was not possible in light of the prolonged occupation. The impossibility of convening the Legislative Assembly during the occupation did not prevent the Cabinet from becoming the Council of Regency because of the operative words “shall be a Council of Regency, until…,” but only prevents, for the time being of occupation, the Legislature from electing a Regency or Regency. That election will take place when the occupation comes to an end.

Therefore, the Council was established in similar fashion to the Belgian Council of Regency after King Leopold was captured by the Germans during the Second World War. As the Belgian Council was established under Article 82 of its 1821 Constitution, as amended, in exile, the Hawaiian Council was established under Article 33 of its 1864 Constitution, as amended, not in exile but rather in situ. As Professor Oppenheim explained:

As far as Belgium is concerned, the capture of the king did not create any serious constitutional problems. According to Article 82 of the Constitution of February 7, 1821, as amended, the cabinet of ministers have to assume supreme executive power if the King is unable to govern. True, the ministers are bound to convene the House of Representatives and the Senate and to leave it to the decision of the united legislative chambers to provide for a regency; but in view of the belligerent occupation it is impossible for the two houses to function. While this emergency obtains, the powers of the King are vested in the Belgian Prime Minister and the other members of the cabinet.

The existence of the restored government in situ was not dependent upon diplomatic recognition by foreign States, but rather operated on the presumption of recognition these foreign States already afforded to the Hawaiian government as of 1893.

The recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State on November 28, 1843, was also the recognition of its government—a constitutional monarchy, as its agent. Successors in office to King Kamehameha III, who at the time of international recognition was King of the Hawaiian Kingdom, did not require diplomatic recognition. These successors included King Kamehameha IV in 1854, King Kamehameha V in 1863, King Lunalilo in 1873, King Kalākaua in 1874, and Queen Lili‘uokalani in 1891. The legal doctrines of recognition of new governments only arise “with extra-legal changes in government” of an existing State. Successors to King Kamehameha III were not established through “extra-legal changes,” but rather under the constitution and laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom. According to Professor Peterson:

A government succeeding to power according to the constitution, basic law, or established domestic custom is assumed to succeed as well to its predecessor’s status as international agent of the state. Only if there is legal discontinuity at the domestic level because a new government comes to power in some other way, as by coup d’état or revolution, is its status as an international agent of the state open to question.

The Hawaiian Council of Regency is a government restored in accordance with the constitutional laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom as they existed prior to the unlawful overthrow of the previous administration of Queen Lili‘uokalani. It was not established through “extra-legal changes,” and, therefore, did not require diplomatic recognition to give itself validity as a government. It was a successor in office to Queen Lili‘uokalani as the Executive Monarch.

According to Professor Lenzerini in his legal opinion, based on the doctrine of necessity, “the Council of Regency possesses the constitutional authority to temporarily exercise the Royal powers of the Hawaiian Kingdom.” He also concluded that the Regency “has the authority to represent the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State, which has been under a belligerent occupation by the United States of America since 17 January 1893, both at the domestic and international level.”

After all four offices of the Cabinet Council were filled on September 26, 1999, a strategic plan was adopted based on its policy: first, exposure of the prolonged occupation; second, ensure that the United States complies with international humanitarian law; and, third, prepare for an effective transition to a completely functioning government when the occupation comes to end. The Council of Regency’s strategic plan has three phases to carry out its policy.

Phase I: Verification of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and subject of International Law

Phase II: Exposure of Hawaiian Statehood within the framework of international law and the laws of occupation as it affects the realm of politics and economics at both the international and domestic levels.

Phase III: Restoration of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and a subject of International Law, which is when the occupation comes to an end.

This Grand Strategy of the Council of Regency is long term, not short term, and can be compared to China’s Grand Strategy, which is also long term. As Professors Flynt Leverett and Wu Bingbing explain in their article The New Silk Road and China’s Evolving Grand Strategy:

What is grand strategy, and what does it mean for China? In broad terms, grand strategy is the culturally shaped intellectual architecture that structures a nation’s foreign policy over time. It is, in Barry Posen’s aphoristic rendering, “a state’s theory of how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself.” Put more functionally, grand strategy is a given political order’s template for marshalling all elements of national power to achieve its self-defined long-term goals. Diplomacy—a state’s capacity to increase the number of states ready to cooperate with it and to decrease its actual and potential adversaries—is as essential to grand strategy as raw military might. So too is economic power. For any state, the most basic goal of grand strategy is to protect that state’s territorial and political integrity. Beyond this, the grand strategies of important states typically aim to improve their relative positions by enhancing their ability to shape strategic outcomes, maximize their influence, and bolster their long-term economic prospect.

Phase I was completed when the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) acknowledged the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State for the purposes of its institutional jurisdiction under Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention, I, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes prior to forming the arbitration tribunal on June 9, 2000. This acknowledgment of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State can be found at its case repository for Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom and on its website. The non-participation of the United States in the arbitration proceedings occurred “after” the PCA already acknowledged the continued existence of Hawaiian Kingdom Statehood.

On the day when the arbitration tribunal was formed, Phase II was initiated—exposure. Phase II would be guided by Section 495—Remedies of Injured Belligerent, United States Army FM 27-10, which states, “In the event of violation of the law of war, the injured party may legally resort to remedial action of…Publication of the facts, with a view to influencing public opinion against the offending belligerent.” The exposure began with the filings of the Hawaiian Kingdom in the arbitration proceedings and its oral arguments on December 8 and 11, 2000, at the PCA, in The Hague, Netherlands, which can be seen in this mini-documentary of the proceedings.

After the last day of the Larsen hearings were held at the PCA on December 11, 2000, the Council was called to an urgent meeting by Dr. Jacques Bihozagara, Ambassador for the Republic of Rwanda assigned to Belgium. Ambassador Bihozagara had been attending a hearing before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on December 8, Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium, where he became aware of the Hawaiian arbitration case taking place in the hearing room of the PCA across the hall of the Peace Palace. Both the PCA and the ICJ are housed in the same building.

The following day, the Council, which included David Keanu Sai, acting Minister of Interior and Chairman of the Council of Regency, as Agent, and two Deputy Agents, Peter Umialiloa Sai, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Kau‘i P. Sai-Dudoit, formerly known as Kau‘i P. Goodhue, acting Minister of Finance, met with Ambassador Bihozagara in Brussels. In that meeting, the Ambassador explained that since he accessed the pleadings and records of the Larsen case on December 8 from the PCA’s Secretariat, he had been in communication with his government in Kigali. This prompted our meeting where the Ambassador conveyed to the Council that his government was prepared to bring to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly the prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States and to place our situation on the agenda. The Council requested a short break from the meeting to discuss this offer.

After careful deliberation, the Council of Regency decided that it could not, in good conscience, accept this offer. The Council felt that the timing was premature because Hawai‘i’s population remained ignorant of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s profound legal position due to institutionalized denationalization through Americanization by the United States for over a century. The Council graciously thanked the Ambassador for his government’s offer but stated that the Council first needed to address over a century of denationalization. After exchanging salutations, the meeting ended, and the Council returned that afternoon to The Hague. The meeting also constituted recognition of the restored government.

Since the Council of Regency returned home from the Netherlands, it was agreed that David Keanu Sai would enter the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa to pursue a Masters Degree in Political Science, specializing in international relations and law, and then a Ph.D. Degree in Political Science with particular focus on the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State. Dr. Sai is currently a Lecturer in Political Science and Hawaiian Studies at the University of Hawai‘i Windward Community College and Affiliate Faculty of the Graduate Division of the University of Hawai‘i College of Education.

Kau‘i Sai-Dudoit would work for the Hawaiian newspaper project and she is currently Programs Director for Awaiaulu, Inc. Awaiaulu is dedicated to developing resources and resource people that can bridge Hawaiian knowledge from the past to the present and the future. Historical resources are made accessible so as to build the knowledge base of both Hawaiian and English-speaking audiences, and young scholars are trained to understand and interpret those resources for modern audiences today and tomorrow.

Since Phase II of Exposure began:

In a documentary film on the Council of Regency, Donovan Preza, an Instructor at the University of Hawai‘i Kapi‘olani Community College stated:

Keanu was a boxer. He attended New Mexico [Military Institute] on a boxing scholarship so this is where I like to use this metaphor. Keanu has been brilliant about if the ring is this big-this is the boxing ring-when you’re standing here and America is standing there you’re not going to punch, you’re not going to land your knockout punch from across the ring. And America has been evading, dancing and sidestepping, not answering the question. You bring anything up in an American court and the political strategy used by the court is to make it a political question. Political question, the courts don’t have to answer it. So they kept dancing around not answering the question and Hawai‘i has never gotten close enough to force them to answer the question. And that’s what Keanu and the acting Council of Regency has been doing is systematically making that ring smaller, and smaller, and smaller, day by day, step by step, inch by inch. Everybody wants the ring to be this small now but small steps, increments, they’ve been doing that incrementally. If you’ve been paying attention to what they’ve been doing they have been making the ring smaller. Everybody wants to watch the knockout punch. Have some patience. Watch the ring get smaller until America has to answer the question. When they have to answer the question that’s when you can knock them out.

In the latest filings in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden et al., the Hawaiian Kingdom delivered the “knockout punch.” Judge Leslie Kobayashi was forced to answer the question of whether the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as a State under international law was extinguished by the United States. Because of the international rule of the presumption of continuity of a State despite the overthrow of its government, the question was not whether the Hawaiian Kingdom “does” continue to exist but rather can Judge Kobayashi state with evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not” continue to exist.

Under international law, according to Judge James Crawford, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations despite a period in which there is no effective, government,” and that belligerent “occupation does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.”

As Professor Matthew Craven explains, “If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity, one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts sustaining its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal rights, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.” According to Craven, only by the Hawaiian Kingdom’s “incorporation, union, or submission” to the United States, which is by treaty, can the presumption of continuity be rebutted.

After eleven months of these court proceedings, the Hawaiian Kingdom was finally able to corner Judge Kobayashi to legally compel her to answer the question of extinguishment after she made it an issue in her Order of March 30, 2022 and Order of March 31, 2022. In these two Orders, Judge Kobayashi made the terse statement “there is no factual (or legal basis) for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” This statement runs counter to international law where an international rule exists regarding the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State despite the United States admitted illegal overthrow of its government on January 17, 1893. She provided no evidence to back up her one line statement in these Orders but she did, however, open the door for the Hawaiian Kingdom to respond.

The Hawaiian Kingdom responded with a Motion for Reconsideration filed on April 11, 2022, that legally compelled Judge Kobayashi to provide a “valid demonstration of legal rights, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.” In her Order of April 19, 2022, denying the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Kobayashi provided no “valid demonstration of legal rights, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States.” She simply stated, “Although Plaintiff argues there are manifest errors of law in the 3/30/22 Order and the 3/31/22 Order, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” This statement without any evidence is not a rebuttal of the presumption of the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

As a United States District Court Judge, by not providing any evidence in these proceedings that the Hawaiian Kingdom was extinguished, she simultaneously acknowledged its continued existence. This is the power of the international rule of the presumption of continuity that operates no different than the presumption of innocence in a criminal trial. Just as a defendant does not have the burden to prove his/her innocence but rather the prosecution has the burden to prove with evidence the guilt of the defendant, the Hawaiian Kingdom does not have the burden to prove its continued existence but rather the opposing party has the burden to prove with evidence that the United States extinguished the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law.

These federal proceedings have now come to a close and the records have been preserved when the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Notice of Appeal on April 24, 2022, to be taken up by an Article II Occupation Court of Appeals that has yet to be established by the United States. By preserving the record, the Hawaiian Kingdom can utilize Judge Kobayashi’s statements against the United States and the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties.

Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden: Federal Judge Acknowledges the Hawaiian Kingdom Continues to Exist under International Law

It the latest filing of a Minute Order on April 19, 2022, in the federal lawsuit, Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden, U.S. District Court Judge Leslie Kobayashi denied the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Reconsideration, but simultaneously acknowledged the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law.

Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi

In its Motion for Reconsideration, the Hawaiian Kingdom was addressing Judge Kobayashi’s terse statement in two previous Orders that “there is no factual (or legal basis) for concluding that the [Hawaiian] Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” This statement runs counter to international law where an international rule exists regarding the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State despite the United States admitted illegal overthrow of its government on January 17, 1893. She provided no evidence to back up her one line statement.

Under international law, according to Judge James Crawford, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations despite a period in which there is no effective, government,” and that belligerent “occupation does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.”

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “presumption is a rule of law, statutory or judicial, by which finding of a basic fact gives rise to existence of presumed fact, until presumption is rebutted.” In other words, presumption is a rule of international law where a recognized independent State is a basic fact that gives rise to the existence of a presumed fact, which is its continued existence until this presumed fact is rebutted with evidence. Evidence that would show the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not” continue to exist under international law is where the Hawaiian Kingdom transferred its sovereignty and territory to the United States by a treaty.

The presumption of innocence works the same as the presumption of continuity because the burden to disprove the presumption lies with the opposing party. In a criminal trial, the defendant does not have the burden to “prove” his or her innocence, but rather it is the burden of the prosecutor to “disprove” the innocence with rebuttable evidence. Likewise, the Hawaiian Kingdom does not have the burden to “prove” its continued existence, but rather it is the burden of the United States to “disprove” the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence with rebuttable evidence under international law.

Like the presumption of innocence, the presumption of continuity has a much more significant role in legal or court proceedings because it is evidence based as opposed to political venues that rely on power and rhetoric. In a court proceeding, the presumption rule is the cornerstone of the rule of law and the basis for a fair trial.

As Professor Matthew Craven explains, “If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity, one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts sustaining its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal rights, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.” According to Craven, only by the Hawaiian Kingdom’s “incorporation, union, or submission” to the United States, which is by treaty, can the presumption of continuity be rebutted.

There is no treaty, but rather a Congressional joint resolution of annexation that was signed into U.S. law on July 7, 1898, by President William McKinley. The problem is that a joint resolution is not a treaty but rather a United States municipal law that has no effect beyond the borders of the United States. Ninety years later, in 1988, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, in a legal opinion, stated, “we doubt that Congress has constitutional authority to assert either sovereignty over an extended territorial sea or jurisdiction over it under international law on behalf of the United States. It is therefore unclear which constitutional power of Congress exercised when it acquired Hawaii by joint resolution.”

Judge Kobayashi, in her latest Order, did not deny the customary international rule of the presumption of continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a sovereign and independent State as was fully explained in the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion for Reconsideration. She also did not provide any rebuttable evidence to the presumption of continuity that the Hawaiian Kingdom was extinguished as a State under international law. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, in The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) “International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”

In her Order, Judge Kobayashi disregarded international law and simply stated, “Although Plaintiff argues there are manifest errors of law in the 3/30/22 Order and the 3/31/22 Order, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” This is analogous to a defense attorney asking the presiding judge to set aside the judgment against the defendant because the prosecutor provided no evidence in trial rebutting the presumption of innocence. And the judge simply responded, “Defendant merely disagrees with the Court’s decision.” Despite the unlawfulness of such a judgment, the Defendant is still innocent.

More significantly though, in these proceedings, is that this cavalier statement by Judge Kobayashi neither denied the international rule of the presumption of continuity nor did she provide any rebuttable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not continue to exist. This is also a difficult task for Judge Kobayashi because the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, previously acknowledged the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a “State” as shown in its case repository.

Consequently, by not providing any rebuttable evidence, i.e., a treaty, Judge Kobayashi acknowledged the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a sovereign and independent State and yet disregarded her obligation under international law to transform the Court into an Article II Occupation Court.

In order to preserve the statements made by Judge Kobayashi and the defendants United States and the Swedish Consul, as well as the default entered by the Clerk for the State of Hawai‘i, to include Governor David Ige, Securities Commissioner Ty Nohara, and Director of the Department of Taxation Isaac Choy, and the twelve foreign Consulates also named as defendants in the case, which include Austria, Belgium, Chile, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, South Korea, Spain, and Thailand, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Notice of Appeal today with the Court. In its opening paragraph, the Hawaiian Kingdom stated:

TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES HEREIN:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, hereby preserves the record of these proceedings by its notice to appeal to a competent court of appeals to be hereafter established in the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States as an Occupying Power in accordance with international humanitarian law from the Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant Nervell’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF 222], Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice [ECF 223], and Minute Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Amend [ECF 227].

In its Notice of Appeal, the Hawaiian Kingdom addressed the lack of fairness by the federal Court and the legal consequences of Judge Kobayashi’s actions that constitute the war crime of “willfully” depriving the Hawaiian Kingdom of its “rights of fair and regular trial” guaranteed in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. Grave breaches are war crimes that have been codified under federal criminal law in Title 18 U.S. Code §2441(c)(1).

Although the “Occupying Power is […] free to decide whether or not the competent courts of appeal are to sit in occupied territory,” Article 66 of the Fourth Geneva Convention “states that they should ‘preferably’ sit in the occupied country; this would be likely to provide the protected persons with additional safeguards.” See Jean S. Pictet, Commentary IV Geneva Convention (1958), 341. The United States has not established “competent courts of appeal” in the Hawaiian Kingdom or in the United States to address the Hawaiian Kingdom’s instant appeal.

Consequently, the Court’s disregard of obligations mandated under international law, in its refusal to transform, and the inability of Plaintiff to appeal to an Article II appellate court has willfully deprived Plaintiff of its “rights of fair and regular trial,” thus being a “grave breach” of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 147, 6.3 U.S.T. 3516, 3618 (1955); 18 U.S.C. §2441(c)(1).

The Hawaiian Kingdom concluded in its Notice of Appeal:

This Court was not “established and organized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force” in the Hawaiian Kingdom, nor “in accordance with the recognized principles governing the administration of justice.”  Accordingly, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s notice of appeal is submitted for purposes of preserving the record of these proceedings in its appeal until this Court transforms or a competent Article II appellate court is established in compliance with international humanitarian law and Hawaiian Kingdom law.

The Court can learn from the Hawaiian Kingdom Supreme Court, in Shillaber v. Waldo et al., 1 Haw. 31, 32 (1848), where Chief Justice William Lee stated, “In the language of another, ‘Let justice be done though the heavens fall.’ Let the laws be obeyed, though it ruin every judicial and executive officer in the Kingdom. Courts may err. Clerks may err. Marshals may err—they do err in every land daily; but when they err let them correct their errors without consulting pride, expediency, or any other consequences.”

POINT OF CLARIFICATION: The Hawaiian Kingdom is not appealing to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals because it is an Article III Court situated within the territory of the United States. If the United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i was operating lawfully as an Article III Court, an appeal would be made with the 9th Circuit. However, this Court is not lawfully operating, and therefore the Hawaiian Kingdom is appealing to an Article II Appellate Court that has yet to be established. The purpose of the Notice of Appeal is also to preserve the record of these proceedings until either this Court transforms itself into an Article II Occupation Court or until the United States establishes Article II Appellate Courts.