IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT STATE OF HAWAII

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CIVIL NO. 11-1-106

ELAINE E. KAWASAKI, et al.,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

before the HONORABLE, GLENN S. HARA, Judge presiding, Second Division, on Friday, June 15, 2012.

HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

APPEARANCES:

For the plaintiff: SOFIA M. HIROSANE, ESQ. RCO HAWAII LLLC 900 Fort Street Mall Suite 800 Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

For Defendant ELAINE E. KAWASAKI (Special Appearance): DEXTER K. KAIAMA, ESO.

AGARD & KAIAMA

500 Ala Moana Boulevard

Suite 400 Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

Reported by: JENNIFER WHETSTONE, CSR 421, RMR

Official Court Reporter

Third Circuit Court, State of Hawaii

Friday, June 15, 2012

9:13 A.M.

2

1

3

7

9

8

10 11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Bank versus Elaine Kawasaki. Defendant Elaine E. Kawasaki's

motion to dismiss complaint pursuant to HRCP 12(b)(1).

--o0o--

THE CLERK: Civil number 11-1-106, Wells Fargo

MS. HIROSANE: Good morning, Your Honor; Sofia Hirosane on behalf of the plaintiff.

MR. KAIAMA: Good morning, Your Honor; Dexter Kaiama making a special appearance on behalf of Ms. Kawasaki. Ms. Kawasaki is present in the courtroom.

THE COURT: Okay, what's the scope of your special appearance?

MR. KAIAMA: The scope of my special appearance, Your Honor, is to make argument and presentation with respect to Ms. Kawasaki's 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of this court, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And how far does that extend? MR. KAIAMA: If I understand your question correctly, Your Honor, I'm making argument today, um, and after I make argument I -- my appearance would -- that -that terminates my appearance at the end of argument. So if the court were, for example, to deny the motion to dismiss an order from Ms. Hirosane to go directly to Ms. Kawasaki for her review, or if Ms. Hirosane were to submit it

pursuant to rule 23, correspondence would go directly to Ms. Kawasaki.

THE COURT: Okay, so it's just for today, and then your -- your engagement ends.

MR. KAIAMA: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mister -- I just want,

Mr. Kaiama, I just wanna make that clear, because it may, as
you indicated, I mean there are other things that's going to
fall out of this hearing that may require, you know, counsel
to act on it, if you were still counsel. And I wanna make
sure that it's clear, after today, after you leave the
courtroom today, you're not counsel of record.

MR. KAIAMA: That is correct, Your Honor. Now, if Ms. Kawasaki wishes to engage me for additional services then she would engage me at that time. But my term, my -- my appearance and my representation as counsel ends as I walk out of the courtroom.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that kind of representation makes it very difficult for the court sometimes to --

MR. KAIAMA: I can only speak to my representation today, I cannot speculate as to what might happen tomorrow or the next day as to whether she wishes to engage my services or not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. But that kind of unbundling,

if you will, makes it very difficult for the court to 1 determine, sometimes, whether an attorney is still 2 responsible for receiving material for noticing purposes. 3 So I'm gonna make it clear that, after today, unless you put in a appearance of counsel, that your -- your status as counsel in this case terminates. MR. KAIAMA: Thank you, Your Honor. That is 7 8 fine. 9 THE COURT: All right. 10 MR. KAIAMA: Okay. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. KAIAMA: Shall I begin, Your Honor? 13 THE COURT: Hold on. Let me -- so the court 14 does have Ms. Kawasaki's motion to dismiss pursuant to civil 15 rules 12(b)(1). I have plaintiff's memorandum in 16 opposition, and Ms. Kawasaki's reply that was filed on June 17 12th. Do you have the reply? 18 MS. HIROSANE: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: So was there anything else that was 20 submitted in the meantime? 21 MR. KAIAMA: My only understanding, I think the 22 court is aware, but with respect to this motion, no, she did 23

file an ex parte motion for a stay of the enforcement of the writ pending the outcome of the motion.

24

25

THE COURT: Okay. I think I granted the

ex parte motion, at least until today's hearing.

MR. KAIAMA: That is my understanding, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HIROSANE: That's my understanding. And, Your Honor, just for the record, we were only served with a copy of, uh, Ms. Kawasaki's ex parte motion yesterday.

THE COURT: Okay. I think the court instructed the staff to call your firm to let 'em know that I did sign the ex parte motion, 'cause it didn't look like you had been provided a copy.

MS. HIROSANE: That's correct, Your Honor. We -- we did appreciate that.

THE COURT: Okay. So here's the court's inclination, Mr. Kaiama. And in answer to the plaintiff's comment that maybe the motion may be delayed, it looks like the motion is one that challenges the subject matter jurisdiction. At least on its face. But -- and any time there is a jurisdictional challenge, it can be made at any time. That's my understanding. Because if the court has no jurisdiction then whatever the court does is void. Um, so I'm treating this as a motion to dismiss for the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the reasons stated. And that is that the argument is that the Kingdom of Hawaii still exists, and therefore, in essence, this court has no

jurisdiction, it's the courts of the Kingdom of Hawaii.

That's how I'm taking the motion. Mr. Kaiama?

MR. KAIAMA: And that is essentially Ms. Kawasaki's motion and our argument.

THE COURT: Okay. So the court would -- is inclined to deny the motion. I think the Hawaii case law is pretty clear that, um, the jury is still out as to whether or not the Kingdom of Hawaii still exists. That's number one.

Number two, even if it existed, there has been no definitive ruling that says that the existence of the kingdom itself would divest the court's of this state of jurisdiction.

And it is also clear -- I don't think that

Ms. Kawasaki claims to be a citizen of the Kingdom of

Hawaii? I didn't see that alleged in her, um, memorandum.

And there have been at least three or four cases, either at
the supreme court or the intermediate court of appeals, that
have held that even if you claim to be a king -- subject of
the Kingdom of Hawaii, if you violate laws within the
territorial jurisdiction of the State of Hawaii, the
criminal laws would still apply to you.

I would assume that that same principle would apply even if you don't claim to be a subject of the Kingdom of Hawaii. And if the kingdom did exist, um, that the civil

laws, as well, within the jurisdiction of the state court would also be still applicable.

And I think the most recent ICA summary disposition order touching on this was <u>Burgo</u>, B-U-R-G-O, <u>versus State of Hawaii</u>. The court of appeals number was CAAP-10-33. And it was decided May 3, 2012. And basically it cited the cases that I think are fairly familiar by now, <u>State versus Fergerstrom</u>, 106 Hawaii 43; <u>State versus</u> <u>Lorenzo</u>, 77 Hawaii, 219; <u>State versus Jim</u>, 80 Hawaii, 168, all for the proposition that being a -- or claiming to be a citizen of the Kingdom of Hawaii would not remove you from being subject to the laws of the State of Hawaii, including the statutes providing for the jurisdiction of the circuit courts.

Okay. So, Mr. Kaiama, given that inclination, I'll let you argue further.

MR. KAIAMA: Thank you, Your Honor. What continues to be controlling with the courts, Your Honor, is State of Hawaii versus Lorenzo. Even the most recent case that Your Honor cited stands, uh, follows the State of Hawaii versus Lorenzo.

Now, in <u>State of Hawaii versus Lorenzo</u>, the ruling of the court was, essentially, that the defendant in that case, Lorenzo, lost its claim that the State of Hawaii did not have jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction over

him, because Mr. Lorenzo failed to provide the court with a factual legal basis that the Kingdom of Hawaii continues to exist with the state's -- in accordance with the state's sovereign nature.

What we're doing here, Your Honor, and recently, and really for the first time, is we are presenting the court with that evidence. And those evidence are the executive agreements. That is the Liliuokulani Assignment, which mandates the President of the United States, or the office of the President of the United States to administer Hawaiian Kingdom law. And the agreement of the res -- and the agreement of restoration, which is an executive agreement which mandates the President of the United States and the office of the President to restore the Kingdom of Hawaii. That is attached as Ms. Kawasaki's -- I believe it's exhibit 4A and 4B, which is attached to the expert memorandum of Dr. Keanu Sai.

Your Honor, in the -- essentially the argument or -- or the court's inclination is undeniably intertwined with the presumption that -- that if the Kingdom of Hawaii continues to exist, this state court does not have jurisdiction, or no state court has jurisdiction. And there is a presumption that allows the court and the -- and the plaintiff to argue that there is state statute which confers jurisdiction upon this court.

Now, it's a rebuttable presumption which requires us, the defendant, to provide the court with the evidence. Once that evidence is provided, that requires the court to acknowledge the nonexistence of that presumption. The court must weigh the evidence provided and make a determination solely based on that evidence and not with any presumption involved.

Again, Your Honor, those are the executive agreements. Ms., um, Kawasaki's memorandum on the motion to dismiss, as well as the memorandum on her reply brief, provides the court with the authorities to confirm that these exchange of notes are, in fact, executive agreements.

Furthermore, Your Honor, there has been no dispute or no opposition that -- that disputes the argument that we made that these are executive agreements. Because they cannot, we believe, respectfully.

I have now been arguing, Your Honor, this motion before judges of the courts of the circuit court and district court throughout the State of Hawaii, and nearly — and probably over 20 times, and in not one instance has the plaintiff in the cases challenged the merits of the executive agreements to show that either it's not an executive agreement or that the executive agreements have been terminated. Because we believe, respectfully, again, Your Honor, they cannot.

15 16

18 19

20 21

22 23

24

25

Page four of Ms. Kawasaki's reply memorandum speaks to the Restatement, Third, Foreign Relation Laws of the United States. Essentially, Your Honor, what those foreign relation laws of the United States says is that an international agreement, which an executive agreement is, is an agreement between two or more states. And we're talking states in terms of their international relations. The executive agreements could not have occurred between President Grover Cleveland and Queen Liliuokulani unless they were states. Those agreements --

THE COURT: Mr. Kaiama, let me just interrupt for a minute. Which of the decisions is the one that I think, um, was an ICA decision? I'm trying to think of the judge who wrote it.

MR. KAIAMA: Judge Walter Heen?

THE COURT: Judge Heen's decision.

MR. KAIAMA: In State of Hawaii versus Lorenzo.

THE COURT: Lorenzo.

MR. KAIAMA: Yes.

THE COURT: And he makes the comment basically that, um, you know, what -- the -- in essence, I mean, it kinda left the door open by saying something to the effect that, you know, there may be other facts or laws out there in the future that might change this.

Now, I take his comments to mean -- and all a

these things were in existence at that time -- that what he's saying is, going forward, if there are any changes, if there are any new laws, if there are any, you know, uh, acts of congress, if there are any other kinds of acts of judicial bodies that the court needs to -- and -- and the other political entities need to respect and follow as law, um, then at that point we'll revisit what the effects are of being a citizen of the Kingdom of Hawaii is. So I'm taking all of what's happening right now and what you're arguing is kind of like res judicata. It's already been looked at. It's already been decided. And, based on that, they're saying that was not enough.

MR. KAIAMA: Your Honor, if I may respectfully disagree.

THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead.

MR. KAIAMA: And I respectfully disagree in this sense: That the executive agreements that we are bringing before the courts at this time was not available to Judge Heen at the time that motion was decided. These executive documents, while -- while official documents of the United States, were in -- little known to the public and not known to the courts at the time, so they were never presented as evidence to the court. And that's why Judge Heen says until a factual or legal basis is provided, that the Kingdom of Hawaii continues to exist. And he says until that happens

then people claiming, whether citizenship or otherwise, would be subject to the laws of the State of Hawaii.

Now, we are now meeting the requirements under Lorenzo and presenting essentially, for the first time, to the courts, the evidence that was asked for in Lorenzo. And that evidence are the executive agreements.

Now, I think the court is well aware -- and that's part of our argument -- executive agreements are the supreme law of the United States. By Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution, the supremacy clause. And part of our argument as well is that any state statute which runs contrary to the executive agreements are preempted.

So along the -- along the line of your -- our arguments, Your Honor, not only are we addressing what the court is requiring in <u>State of Hawaii versus Lorenzo</u> and presenting the evidence, the evidence we present, Your Honor, is irrefutably -- it's irrefutable that these are executive agreements and preempts state law, which is the state constitu -- I mean, excuse me, which is the state statute that plaintiff relies on in their complaint seeking to confer jurisdiction upon that court.

That state statute, Your Honor, runs contrary to the executive agreement, which calls for the administering of Hawaiian Kingdom law until the President of the United States can re -- restores the Kingdom of Hawaii, places the

queen back into its position, and the queen grants amnesty. Those are in the papers.

Now, Your Honor, what we're asking the court to do is not make a determination in its ruling that the Kingdom of Hawaii is to be restored, but what we're asking is what Lorenzo says, is that once we have met our burden, the court cannot have no other, we believe, no other recourse but to dismiss the complaint.

THE COURT: No, but, Mr. Kaiama, I think you failed -- in my mind, what you're asking the court to do is commit suicide, because once I adopt your argument, I have no jurisdiction over anything. Not only these kinds of cases where you may claim either being part of -- being the Hawaii, um, a citizen of the kingdom, but jurisdiction of the courts evaporate. All of the courts across the state, from the supreme court down, and we have no judiciary. I can't do that.

MR. KAIAMA: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I can't make that kind of a finding that basically it's, you know, like the atomic bomb for the judiciary.

MR. KAIAMA: I understand the contemplation of the consequences of the court's ruling. However, the contemplation of the consequences of the court's ruling is beyond the authority of the courts. What is in -- within

the authority of the courts is to make a determination that jurisdiction does not exist. That is within the court's authority.

Now, the actual restoration of the Kingdom of Hawaii belongs to the -- to the President of the United States and the office of the president, not to the courts. What I'm asking the court to do and what we believe is entirely correct is that the court acknowledge, which the president did in 1898, acknowledge that these are executive agreements, which binds him and his office to faithfully administer Hawaiian Kingdom law until the President of the United States is able to restore the Kingdom of Hawaii. So what we're asking the court to do is, essentially it is the, in the time being, it is the military courts, under article two, that would administer Hawaiian Kingdom law until the kingdom is restored.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAIAMA: So -- so, Your Honor, um, I know Your Honor also made an inclination concerning my client's not asserting a citizenship position.

THE COURT: No, I'm saying I didn't perceive one.

MR. KAIAMA: Right, you didn't perceive -- and actually one was not made. The reason one is not made is Ms. Kawasaki does not claim to be a citizen of the Kingdom

of Hawaii. At least not now. But what's occurring here is that the plaintiff is seeking to get writ of possession or to get an order concerning land which is part of the Kingdom of Hawaii. And judgments concerning land, including evictions and writ of possessions, belongs to the courts of the Kingdom of Hawaii, respectfully, not the circuit courts of the State of Hawaii, because of the arguments we've set forth.

Also, in the reply memorandum, Your Honor, we -Miss Kawasaki has provided the courts and sought to evoke
estoppel with respect to the defendant's arguments. Because
the court -- because the pres -- excuse me, it is a little
bit difficult to talk about. Because the United States have
already acknowledged -- already acknowledged, through the
President of the United States, that being Grover Cleveland,
that the Kingdom of Hawaii is, in fact, the de jure and
de facto government, and that the provisional government was
never de jure or never de facto, plaintiffs at this point
are estopped from making any argument, which runs contrary
to the acknowledgment of the United States. And therefore
they're estopped from making the argument -- the arguments
that they've made that this court can confer juris -- that
this court has jurisdiction pursuant to state statute.

Essentially, Your Honor, Ms. Kawasaki is asking the court to strike defendant's arguments in its entire --

excuse me, plaintiff's arguments in its entirety, because of the principles of judicial -- principles estoppel.

Ms. Kawasaki has provided, again, the authorities concerning estoppel, including, um, authority of estoppel recognized under international law.

Your Honor, what we're presenting to the courts is the evidence. What we're presenting to the courts are legal arguments that have not been refuted or cannot be refuted, we respectfully submit. Miss Kawasaki, in her motion to dismiss, asked the court to take judicial notice of documents. And it's set forth in, and just for the court's convenience --

THE COURT: Okay, let me address that right now.

MR. KAIAMA: Yes.

THE COURT: As for the request for judicial notice, I think I can go ahead and do that with respect to the, um, exhibit one, the Hawaii Kingdom Constitution. The only question I have is, was the original in English or Hawaiian, and is this a translation?

MR. KAIAMA: You know, I'm -- I'm sorry, Your Honor, I'm not able to answer this question at this time, but if the court wishes, I can clearly provide that pursuant to a declaration.

THE COURT: Well, in --

MR. KAIAMA: A supplemental --

1 THE COURT: -- any event, I'm -- I think we have a copy of this in our library, so I'm taking judicial notice 2 3 of it and, um, also chapter four of the penal code of the 4 kingdom. Was there a -- a date on that? 5 MR. KAIAMA: Okay, hold on one second, Your 6 Honor. THE COURT: I'm just -- reason I'm saying that 7 8 is I'm looking at the list that's in the memorandum, not at 9 the exhibit itself. 10 MR. KAIAMA: I'm trying to see if I can help 11 find that for you, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Part of the problem, it wasn't 13 tabbed. 14 MR. KAIAMA: Um, yeah, Penal Code of the Kingdom 15 of Hawaii from the Penal Code of 1850. It was printed at 16 the Government Press, Honolulu, Oahu, 1869. 17 THE COURT: Okay, I have it now. So we'll take 18 judicial notice of that, also chapter seven, the portion of 19 the Compiled Laws of Hawaii Kingdom relating to the 20 department of foreign affairs. 21 MR. KAIAMA: Thank you. Chapter eight, Your 22 Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. 24 MR. KAIAMA: Okay.

THE COURT: So the court will take judicial

25

notice of that. With respect to Dr. David Sai's expert memorandum, the court's not gonna take judicial notice of that. However, I'm just gonna treat that as a treatise the that the court can consider for information with respect to reaching its decision, much like a law review article. Same as the memorandum of Doctor -- there are several, but all of the Dr. Sai memorandums, that's how I'm treating it.

MR. KAIAMA: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The other matters are treaties and if they're treaties and if they're -- and they appear to be published in the authorized publications of the United States, court would also take judicial notice of the four treaties and conventions. And all of the other matters are -- appear to be reported cases, so I don't think I need to take judicial notice of that. I mean, courts are allowed to refer to other court's opinions. Okay, so I think I've addressed all of those.

MR. KAIAMA: Yes, Your Honor. If I may -- yes, Your Honor. Thank you very much. Again, and I don't know if it makes a difference to the court, of course State of Hawaii versus Lorenzo is a ICA Hawaii court decision, United States versus Belmont, versus Pink and American Association -- Insurance Association versus Garamendi, Your Honor, is a U.S. Supreme Court case, and I'm not sure if that makes a difference into whether the court will take judicial notice

of that or -- again, um, or not.

Um, my question, Your Honor, is with respect to the expert memorandum of Dr. Keanu Sai. He does, within his expert memorandum, provide four exhibits, exhibits A, B, C, and D. Again, 4A is the, uh, what we refer to as the Liliuokulani Assignment. 4B is the Grover Cleveland Agreement of Restoration. Essentially, Your Honor, those are the executive agreements. Um, exhibits C and D, Your Honor, are statements made on the floor of congress by representative Thomas Ball and Senator Agustus Bacon in 1898. Your Honor, and just for --

THE COURT: Mr. Kaiama, to the extent of the materials that represent analysis or opinions by Dr. Sai, again, I'm taking that as a treatise or a -- like a law review article. As to those matters that are apparently reported as part of the, uh, federal compendium of documents, and so forth, I'll take judicial notice of it, 'cause they're readily available, I think, not only through these exhibits but also through other sources.

MR. KAIAMA: Yes, Your Honor. They are official government publications.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KAIAMA: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Just because, well, my concern was, you know, just because Dr. Sai's memorandum may have a

government printing office number doesn't make it official 1 federal document. It's -- all it means it's cataloged. 2 MR. KAIAMA: Okay. 3 4 THE COURT: All right? 5 MR. KAIAMA: And just so that I understand, Your Honor, and forgive me for asking, my understanding was that 6 7 the court would take judicial notice of that 4A, B, C, and 8 D. 9 THE COURT: If it -- those are exhibits of other 10 -- of matters, which they appear to be, that are reported, 11 for example, in a congressional record or some other kind 12 of. um --13 MR. KAIAMA: And they are, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: -- yeah, source that's easily --15 it's easily retrievable and to determine them, yeah, I'm 16 taking judicial notice of it. 17 MR. KAIAMA: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay? 19 MR. KAIAMA: And I am happy to answer any 20 additional inclinations of the court, but I believe that 21

provides us -- provide -- outlines our argument, Your Honor.

Again, U.S. versus Pink, Garamendi -- American Association versus Garamendi, and U.S. versus Belmont support the arguments that I made earlier, Your Honor, that executive agreements are treaties under the United States

22

23

24

25

Constitution and under article six of the supreme law of the land. And those cases, Your Honor, supreme court cases, stand for the proposition that any state law which is contrary to the executive agreements are preempted.

Also in the, um, Foreign Relations Restatement of Third that I presented to the court, Your Honor, again, as international agreements, these international agreements are binding on the United States to faithful execution.

And, again, any municipal or state law to the contrary would be preempted as well.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Ms. Hirosane, any arguments?

MS. HIROSANE: Your Honor, just -- just really briefly. Just to add to what we've already briefed, uh, Ms. Kawasaki admittedly is not claiming that she's a citizen of this -- of the Kingdom of Hawaii, if it does exist. And as you stated from the outset of this hearing, we're still in -- it's an evolving issue within the court system. But our position remains if Ms. Kawasaki is admittedly not a citizen then how can she raise these arguments to defeat this court's subject matter jurisdiction in these proceedings?

THE COURT: I think what he's saying is that if -- the argument is that if, in fact, I buy into his arguments then this court has no jurisdiction over any

matter, because it's illegal. That's his analysis, I think.

MS. HIROSANE: And that's -- that's my understanding of it too, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So the court will deny the motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Having reviewed the matters and the prior court decisions, the court is of the opinion and decides that the court does have subject jurisdiction over the matter of the ejectment case and that the arguments raised by Mr. Kaiama, in essence, have been resolved by the prior appellate court decisions, and the raising of the executive agreements, in my mind, is not persuasive. Those matters were in existence at the time of the prior court decisions, they were available to the court, they were available to attorneys, and I'm not convinced that it's now something new or provides new law or new facts that would cause the prior appellate decisions to be overturned. Okay? So ---

MR. KAIAMA: Your Honor, thank you. I know she's to prepare the order. Your Honor, respectfully, I would just preserve Ms. Kawasaki's right to take exception to the court's decision today.

THE COURT: Yeah, that's not necessary.

MR. KAIAMA: And reserve her rights to file an

appeal. Your Honor, I have been asked by Ms. Kawasaki,

'cause this is an issue concerning the stay matter, she does
intend to file an appeal from the court's decision
concerning the motion to dismiss as soon as the order is
filed, and I know that's gonna take a short period a time.

I've been asked by Ms. Kawasaki to make a request to
continue the stay while she files -- while she appeals the
matter to the appellate courts.

THE COURT: Mr. Kaiama, I'm going to deny the request. I think once, you know, the whole thing about what's the final order and what you appeal from, um, it's such an art now. And I -- I hate to even venture a guess. Um, it seems to me that the -- you might have two appealable orders here. I'm not sure if this decision may be a separate appealable order as a collateral matter, because it attacks jurisdiction after the other judgment. But I'm just stating that because it may be, uh, things that counsel need to talk to Ms. Kawasaki about in terms of preserving her rights to appeal, in terms of filing notices for appeal. Uh, but, again, it's pretty clear, if you don't file your written notice of appeal timely then you're out.

MR. KAIAMA: (Nodding head.)

THE COURT: So I guess, Ms. Hirosane, you're sending the proposed order directly to Ms. Kawasaki, is that correct?

1 MR. KAIAMA: That is correct, Your Honor. MS. HIROSANE: Your Honor, may I clarify this? 2 Am I to include language with regard to Mr. Kaiama's oral 3 motion to stay pending appeal? 4 THE COURT: I'm sorry? No, I don't --5 MS. HIROSANE: Am I to include --7 THE COURT: Yeah, there is an order, motion for staying the appeal, but this is the nature of I -- I -- of a 8 9 writ of possession, right? 10 MS. HIROSANE: That's correct, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay, so is this like an injunction. 12 I mean, they have separate provisions with respect to the 13 stays on injunctive kind of relief, so is that the provision 14 that applies with respect to a stay? Or is it now, what? 15 She has to post a supersedeas bond for a stay? 16 MS. HIROSANE: That would be our position, Your 17 Honor. THE COURT: And what's the amount of the bond? 18 19 MS. HIROSANE: Well, we have been --20 THE COURT: There's no judgment other that the 21 judgment for the writ. 22 MR. KAIAMA: And, Your Honor, my understanding 23 is that she is still -- she still has the option to provide 24 the court with a written motion for stay. I am aware of 25 case law which says that the issuance of a supersedeas bond

1 is really discretionary upon the court, and the court can 2 decide the amount of the bond if it decides to require a 3 supersedeas bond. THE COURT: Okay, but that's why I'm saying I 5 don't want to rule on the stay now. 6 MR. KAIAMA: Okay. 7 THE COURT: I think the judgment should issue, 8 you file your notice of appeal and a motion for a stay, I 9 think. And that way the, hopefully, the issues will be 10 clearer as to what the requirements are for a stay, if any, 11 and, you know, what the court needs to decide with respect 12 to any issues concerning the stay. Okay? 13 MR. KAIAMA: Thank you, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: So the oral motion for a stay is 15 denied. 16 MR. KAIAMA: Thank you, Your Honor. MS. HIROSANE: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 18 THE DEFENDANT, MS. KAWASAKI: Excuse me, Your 19 Honor. Could I have a transcript of today's --MR. KAIAMA: Oh, you go down there and apply. 20 21 MS. KAWASAKI: Oh, okay. Thank you. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Next case. 23 MS. KAWASAKI: Thank you. 24 (Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 25 --000--

1	CERTIFICATE
2	STATE OF HAWAII)
3	COUNTY OF HAWAII)
4)
5	
6	I, JENNIFER WHETSTONE, a Certified Shorthand
7	Reporter in the State of Hawaii, do hereby certify that the
8	foregoing pages, 1 through 25, inclusive, comprise a full,
9	true, and correct transcript of the proceedings had on June
10	15, 2012, at 9:13 a.m., in connection with the
11	above-entitled cause.
12	Dated: June 20, 2012.
13	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
14	OTTIONIE COOKT KETOKIEK
15	JEMNI FER MHETSTONE
16	OBMINITER MIETSTONE
17	
18	
19	
20	•
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	