Author Archives: Hawaiian Kingdom

The Piercing Effect of International Criminal Culpability upon Individuals that are Outside of the United States

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When United States President Grover Cleveland admitted that the overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom was an “act of war,” it triggered international humanitarian law and the law of occupation on January 17, 1893. Instead of restoring Queen Lili‘uokalani as the Executive Monarch under a treaty called an executive agreement, by exchange of notes, between the Queen and President Cleveland, on December 18, 1893, Cleveland’s successor, President William McKinley unilaterally seized the Hawaiian Islands when he signed into American law the joint resolution of annexation on July 7, 1898. The purpose of the unilateral seizure of the Islands was to establish a military outpost to protect the west coast of the United States.

For the past 131 years, the United States has not been held to account for their violations of international law and the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom because violations of international law did not hold governmental officials of the State accountable for the actions of soldiers who committed war crimes. In 1919, there was an attempt to hold to account the German Kaiser for war crimes by an international tribunal established by the Allies of the First World War.

In its report, the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the First World War concluded, “All persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offenses against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution” by the international tribunal. The United States, however, was against this. U.S. members of the Commission stated:

In regard to the latter point, it will be observed that the American representatives did not deny the responsibility of the heads of states for acts which they may have committed in violation of law, including in so far as their country is concerned, the laws and customs of war, but they held that heads of states are, as agents of the people, in whom the sovereignty of any state resides, responsible to the people for the illegal acts which they may have committed, and that they are not and that they should not be made responsible to any other sovereignty.

In other words, the United States position was to have the countries themselves prosecute their Heads of State. This position also implied that if the country’s won’t prosecute their Heads of State, their criminal culpability would go unchecked. The United States position would change, however, after the fall of the Nazi government and the Imperial Japanese government during the Second World War. Here an international tribunal was established to try high-level officials of the Nazi regime for war crimes and high-level officials of the Imperial Japanese government. This unified system laid the groundwork for the creation of international criminal law.

As stated by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union v. Göring et al. (1948), “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” Abstract entities are countries called States. In other words, you can’t punish the State, but you can hold to account members of the government of a State, whether civilian or military, for war crimes.

In 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in The Hague, Netherlands for the prosecution of war crimes. 123 States approved the Rome Statute that established the ICC with jurisdiction over their territories. Collectively, you have 124 governmental organizations to prosecute war crimes, which are the 123 prosecutors and criminal courts of the States, and the prosecutor and courts of the ICC. Prosecutions for war crimes by the ICC are “for the most serious crimes of international concern,” while prosecution by the 123 States are for war criminal that enters into the territory. According to Article 1 of the Rome Statute:

An International Criminal Court is hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concerns, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.

The significance of Article 1 is that the primary responsibility to prosecute war criminals are the 123 States and not the ICC. The war criminal reports by the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) establish the evidentiary basis for prosecution by these States when those subjects of the reports enter their territory. As part of its mandate, it is also the duty of the RCI to ensure that these war criminals get prosecuted by all means necessary. There are no statutes of limitations to prevent the prosecution of war crimes. The Council of Regency is currently in communication with the legal counsel at the United Nations regarding the Hawaiian Kingdom’s accession to the Rome Statute that grants jurisdiction of the ICC over the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

To begin to comply with international humanitarian law and the law of occupation, the decision to be made by February 17, 2024, does not fall upon an “abstract entity” called the United States or the State of Hawai‘i but rather upon Major General Kenneth Hara and the members of the State of Hawai‘i Legislature and the County Councils themselves.

For Major General Hara, his duty under international humanitarian law and the law of occupation is to transform the State of Hawai‘i into a military government on February 17. The action to be taken by members of the State of Hawai‘i Legislature and the County Councils is to cease and desist by February 17 the commission of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation.

Their failure to comply does not affect the mandate of the RCI or the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Their failure to comply with the law of occupation merely serves as evidence of meeting the elements of the war crime and having criminal culpability.

The State of Hawai‘i finds itself at a Crossroads on February 17, 2024

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In a letter that was emailed to Major General Hara yesterday by Dr. David Keanu Sai, as Head of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, he opened with:

On behalf of the Council of Regency, I hereby make a final appeal for you to perform your duty of transforming the State of Hawai‘i into a military government on February 17, 2024, in accordance with Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and Army regulations. To not do so, you will have command responsibility for the commission of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the State of Hawai‘i.

Copied to the letter included members of the State of Hawai‘i Legislature and the County Councils. In that letter, Dr. Sai then laid out the circumstances that led to establishing the date of February 17, 2024, as the deadline for action. After 24 years of exposure of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an occupied State, the State of Hawai‘i is now at a crossroads. To continue on the path of illegality, or to change course because of legality is the question that faces officials of the State of Hawai‘i. In his letter to the members of the Legislature and County Councils on February 7, 2024, Dr. Sai wrote:

[I]f you shall not cease the enactment of American municipal laws and continue to commit the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation with impunity, you will be the subject of a war criminal report, which will provide the factual information, to include this letter of communication, that satisfies the aforementioned four elements of criminal culpability. I urge you not to take this lightly. War crimes have no statute of limitations.

These ultimatums put forth by the Royal Commission of Inquiry stems from its duty and responsibility to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed within Hawaiian territory. This responsibility is not a choice but a duty, under international law, in order to protect the population of an occupied State. On the contrary, there is no responsibility or duty to enact American laws by officials that were elected by the American citizenry in the territory that is occupied by the United States because to do so is the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation. However, to commit an international crime the act must be accompanied with mens rea or the guilty mind. In other words, the war crime must be committed with intent and knowledge.

Prior to receiving the letter from the Royal Commission of Inquiry it could be assumed that the members of the Legislature and the County Councils were not aware that their action in enacting American laws in an occupied State was unlawful under international law. But after they received the letter, the circumstances have changed, and their continued action of enacting laws would be committed with intent and knowledge.

Last year, when Germany prosecuted Irmgard Furchner, a 97-year-old woman, of being an accessory to more than 10,000 murders for her role as a secretary to the SS commander of the Nazis’ Stutthof concentration camp during the Second World War, the prosecutors had to prove intent. In the case, the judges were convinced Furchner “knew and, through her work as a stenographer in the commandant’s office of the Stutthof concentration camp from June 1, 1943, to April 1, 1945, deliberately supported the fact that 10,505 prisoners were cruelly killed by gassings, by hostile conditions in the camp,” by transportation to the Auschwitz death camp and by being sent on death marches at the end of the war.

In the Hawaiian situation, the enactment of American laws is the source of secondary war crimes such as denationalization through Americanization, unfair trial by a court that lacks lawful authority, unlawful confinement ordered by a judge without authority, destruction of property as the case of Mauna Kea, etc. Therefore, the enactment of American laws in an occupied State is not an innocent act of legislative responsibility unless there is irrefutable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom is not an occupied State. If the Hawaiian Islands constitute a part of the territory of the United States and that the State of Hawai‘i is a lawfully established government under the constitution and laws of the United States, then officials of the State of Hawai‘i have nothing to worry about.

Professor William Schabas, renowned expert on international criminal and war crimes, states that in order to establish criminal intent for war crimes, there is no requirement for a legal evaluation as to the existence of an occupation stemming from an international armed conflict. Instead, there is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances of an occupation. Conversely, a legal evaluation would be welcomed not for determining whether an act constitutes a war crime, but for providing irrefutable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not continue to exist as an occupied State.

This is why Major General Hara, after being apprised by Dr. Sai on April 17, 2023, that war crimes are being committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom as an occupied State, he tasked his Staff Judge Advocate, Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd Phelps, to investigate. He could not find any legal basis to conclude Major General Hara has no such duty to establish a military government because the Hawaiian Kingdom is not an occupied State and that the State of Hawai‘i is a lawful entity. There exists no such legal opinion.

In fact, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel does have a legal opinion on the annexation of Hawai‘i by a congressional legislation that it published in 1988. The opinion is not what you would expect from the federal government on Hawai‘i. The legal opinion was advising the State Department on the legal issues raised by a proposed Presidential proclamation to extend the territorial sea from three miles off the coast of the United Stats to twelve miles. In that legal opinion, Acting Assistant Attorney General Douglas W. Kmiec concluded,

It is therefore unclear which constitutional power Congress exercised when it acquired Hawaii by joint resolution. Accordingly it is doubtful that the acquisition of Hawaii can serve as an appropriate precedent for a congressional assertion of sovereignty over an extended territorial sea.

In support of this conclusion, Acting Assistant Attorney General Kmiec relied on statements made in 1898 by members of the Congress, and also writings of constitutional scholar Professor Westel Willoughby who stated:

The constitutionality of the annexation of Hawaii, by a simple legislative act, was strenuously contested at the time both in Congress and by the press. The right to annex by treaty was not denied, but it was denied that this might be done by a simple legislative act. … Only by means of treaties, it was asserted, can the relations between States be governed, for a legislative act is necessarily without extraterritorial force—confined in its operation to the territory of the State by whose legislature it is enacted.

If it is unclear how Congress could annex foreign territory by legislative action, it would be equally unclear how Congress could establish the State of Hawai‘i by legislative action in 1959. Without a treaty all American laws imposed in the Hawaiian Kingdom constitutes the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation.

In 2014, however, there was an attempt by an official of the State of Hawai‘i to get an answer from the State Department regarding the functions of the State of Hawai‘i in light of the 1988 legal opinion. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs top executive, Dr. Kamana‘opono Crabbe, submitted a formal request with the U.S. Department of State requesting a legal opinion from the U.S. Attorney General’s Office of Legal Counsel addressing the legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom under international law.

In his letter to Secretary of State John F. Kerry, Crabbe said, “because the Department of State is the United States’ executive department responsible for international relations and who also housed diplomatic papers and agreements with the Hawaiian Kingdom, I am respectfully submitting a formal request to have the Department of State request an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, addressing the following questions:

• First, does the Hawaiian Kingdom, as a sovereign independent State, continue to exist as a subject of international law?

• Second, if the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist, do the sole-executive agreements bind the United States today?

• Third, if the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist and the sole-executive agreements are binding on the United States, what effect would such a conclusion have on United States domestic legislation, such as the Hawai‘i Statehood Act, 73 Stat. 4, and Act 195?

• Fourth, if the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist and the sole-executive agreements are binding on the United States, have the members of the Native Hawaiian Roll Commission, Trustees and staff of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs incurred criminal liability under international law?”

This letter boxed in the Secretary of State by forcing him to answer the first question as to whether the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a subject of international law. If the Office of Legal Counsel can write a legal opinion that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not continue to exist, they don’t have to answer following three questions. The Secretary of State did not make the request for a legal opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, which affirms the 1988 legal opinion that Congress could not annex the Hawaiian Islands by legislation.

Major General Hara and members of the Legislature and the County Councils should take heed of this information as February 17, 2024, is fast approaching.

The Duty to Protect the Population in Hawai‘i from War Crimes Committed by the State of Hawai‘i

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The legal basis for the Council of Regency’s establishment under Hawaiian constitutional law and the legal doctrine of necessity was based on the continued existence of the country called the Hawaiian State. What was unlawfully overthrown on January 17, 1893, was the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom and not the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law. In fact, international law protects the State and its continuity from the continuous violations of its sovereignty by another State. What international law cannot protect, however, is the population of the Hawaiian Islands from denationalization through Americanization that began as a formal policy in 1906.

Under international criminal law, denationalization is the process of replacing the national consciousness of the Hawaiian Kingdom, to include its language, in the minds of school children with the national consciousness of the United States and its English language. Within three generations since 1906, the national consciousness of the Hawaiian Kingdom was wiped clean in the minds of the population in the Hawaiian Islands. Denationalization is a policy carried out in the school systems of the occupied States that attempts to change the national consciousness in the minds of school children. The United States and the Allied Powers in the First World War determined denationalization to be a war crime committed by Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria against the population of the Kingdom of Serbia when Serbia was occupied.

From the Allied Powers 1919 Commission on Responsibilities for the First World War, under the heading “attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory,” the Commission charged several crimes committed in Serbia by the Bulgarian authorities: “Efforts to impose their national characteristics on the population;” “Serbian language forbidden in private as well as in official relations. People beaten for saying “Good morning” in Serbian;” Inhabitants forced to give their names a Bulgarian form;” “Serbian books banned—were systematically destroyed;” “Archives of churches and law-courts destroyed;” “Schools and churches closed, sometimes destroyed;” “Bulgarian schools and churches substituted—attendance at school compulsory;” “Population forced to be present at Bulgarian national solemnities.” The Commission also stated that in Serbia the Austrian and German authorities “interfered with religious worship, by deportation of priests and requisition of churches for military purposes. Interfered with the Serbian language.” In United States v. Greifelt et al., in 1948, the war crimes tribunal specifically referred to the war crime of denationalization by German authorities in occupied territories during the Second World War. The tribunal observed:

Attempts of this nature were recognized as a war crime in view of the German policy in territories annexed by Germany in 1914, such as in Alsace and Lorraine. At that time, as during the war of 1939-1945, inhabitants of an occupied terri­tory were subjected to measures intended to deprive them of their national char­acteristics and to make the land and population affected a German province. The methods applied by the Nazis in Poland and other occupied territories, including once more Alsace and Lorraine, were of a similar nature with the sole difference that they were more ruthless and wider in scope than in 1914-1918. In this con­nection the policy of ‘Germanizing’ the populations concerned, as shown by the evidence in the trial under review, consisted partly in forcibly denationalizing given classes or groups of the local population, such as Poles, Alsace-Lorrainers, Slovenes and others eligible for Germanization under the German People’s List. As a result in these cases the programme of genocide was being achieved through acts which, in themselves, constitute war crimes.

The operative word used when describing the policy and acts of denationalization committed against the population of occupied States in both World Wars was “attempts.” The reason for the choice of this word was because the First World War only lasted for four years, and the Second World War only lasted six years. The American occupation is now at 131 years where the lies to conceal the occupation have become institutionalized and perceived to be the truth. As British novelist Dresden James wrote, “When a well-packaged web of lies has been sold gradually to the masses over generations, the truth will seem utterly preposterous and its speaker a raving lunatic.”

Another war crime committed by German, Austrian and Bulgarian authorities in occupied territories during the First World War was usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation. Usurpation of sovereignty is the imposition of the laws of the occupying State over the territory and its population of the occupied State. During the military occupation of a State, the occupying State is obligated to temporarily administer the laws of the occupied State until there is a treaty of peace. To impose the occupying State’s laws is a crime.

The Commission on Responsibility for the First World War charged that in Poland the German and Austrian forces had “prevented the populations from organising themselves to maintain order and public security” and that they had “[a]ided the Bolshevist hordes that invaded the territories.” It said that in Romania the German author­ities had “instituted German civil courts to try disputes between subjects of the Central Powers or between a subject of these powers and a Romanian, a neutral, or subjects of Germany’s en­emies.” In Serbia, the Bulgarian authorities had “[p]roclaimed that the Serbian State no longer existed, and that Serbian territory had become Bulgarian.” It listed several other war crimes of Bulgaria committed in occupied Serbia: “Serbian law, courts and administration ousted;” “Taxes collected under Bulgarian fiscal regime;” “Serbian currency suppressed;” “Public property removed or destroyed, including books, archives and MSS (e.g., from the National Library, the University Library, Serbian Legation at Sofia, French Consulate at Uskub);” “Prohibited sending Serbian Red Cross to occupied Serbia.” It also charged that in Serbia the German and Austrian authorities had committed several war crimes: “The Austrians suspended many Serbian laws and substituted their own, especially in penal matters, in procedure, judicial or­ganisation, etc.;” and “Museums belonging to the State (e.g., Belgrade, Detchani) were emptied and the contents taken to Vienna.”

The crime of “usurpation of sovereignty” was referred to by Judge Blair of the American Military Commission in a separate opinion in United States v. Alstötter et al. of 1951, “This rule is incident to military occupation and was clearly intended to protect the inhabitants of any occupied territory against the unnecessary exercise of sovereignty by a military occupant.”

When the Hawaiian government was restored by a Council of Regency in 1997, it also held vicarious liability for its actions. As a constitutional monarchy, the primary duty of the Hawaiian government is to protect the rights of its population. In Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Larsen was alleging that he was not being protected by the Regency because the Regency, he argued, was allowing the unlawful imposition of American laws over him which led to his unfair trial and incarceration. The Regency denied this allegation but used the Permanent Court of Arbitration to recognize the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State and the Regency as its government.

This duty for governments to protect its population from war crimes reached the international level in 2005. At the United Nations World Summit in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect was unanimously adopted. The principle of the Responsibility to Protect has three pillars: (1) every State has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing; (2) the wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual States in meeting that responsibility; and (3) if a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter. In 2009, the General Assembly reaffirmed the three pillars of a State’s responsibility to protect their populations from war crimes and crimes against humanity. And in 2021, the General Assembly passed a resolution on “[t]he responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” The third pillar, which may call into action State intervention, can become controversial.

Rule 158 of the International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law specifies that “States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.” This “rule that States must investigate war crimes and prosecute the suspects is set forth in numerous military manuals, with respect to grave breaches, but also more broadly with respect to war crimes in general.”

What faced the Regency was how to protect a population from the commission of war crimes when that population itself had been completely denationalized into believing that the State of Hawai‘i exists as a lawful government under United States laws. The Regency’s strategy after returning from the PCA in the Netherlands was to effectively engage the devastating effects of denationalization through academic research at the university level. Since 2000, this research made public through published peer review articles, master’s theses, doctoral dissertations, books, and classroom instruction have managed to tear down the facade that the State of Hawai‘i is lawful and that the United States is an occupying Power.

During the occupation of the territory by an occupying State, there are two legal systems that exist at the same time, that of the occupied State and that of the occupying State. As Professor Krystina Marek explains, in “the first place: of these two legal orders, that of the occupied State is regular and ‘normal,’ while that of the occupying power is exceptional and limited. At the same time, the legal order of the occupant is…strictly subject to the principle of effectiveness, while the legal order of the occupied State continues to exist notwithstanding the absence of effectiveness.” The Regency knew that while the State of Hawai‘i exercised effective, but unlawful, control of Hawaiian territory there are rules that apply called international humanitarian law and the law of occupation. To knowingly violate these international laws created criminal culpability. While the Regency has no effective control as a result of the American occupation, it does have effective control of factual and legal information that it will use to compel compliance where the prolonged occupation will eventually come to an end by a treaty of peace.

Determined to hold to account individuals who have committed war crimes and human rights violations throughout the Hawaiian Islands, being the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the Council of Regency, by proclamation on April 17, 2019, established a Royal Commission of Inquiry (“RCI”) in similar fashion to the United States proposal of establishing a Commission of Inquiry after the First World War “to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed during its course.” Dr. David Keanu Sai serves as Head of the RCI and Professor Federico Lenzerini from the University of Siena, Italy, as its Deputy Head.

On February 7, 2024, the RCI sent a letter of communication to all members of the State of Hawai‘i legislature and the County Councils regarding the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation. In the letter, Dr. Sai apprised them of his communication he’s had since April 17, 2023, with Major General Kenneth Hara, State of Hawai‘i Adjutant General, regarding his duty to transform the State of Hawai‘i into a Military Government and to begin to administer the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom as the occupied State. Dr. Sai directed Major General Hara that, in accordance with international laws and Army regulations, he will issue a proclamation transforming the State of Hawai‘i into a Military Government. Should he fail to do so would be a dereliction in the performance of his duty and the war crime of omission.

Major General Hara would also be made the subject of an RCI war criminal report for the purpose of prosecution. There are no statutes of limitation for war crimes, which means a person can be prosecuted regardless of his age. In 2022, a German court convicted a 97-year-old women for war crimes she committed during the Second World War.

Major General Hara also has the duty to protect officials and employees of the State of Hawai‘i and the Counties who, like the Legislature and County Councils, are committing the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation. The RCI has given more than enough time for Major General Hara to have completed his due diligence done by his Staff Judge Advocate Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd Phelps as to the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an occupied State. On July 27, 2023, he acknowledged that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist, which consequently triggered his duty.

A Brief History of International Law and its Application to the Hawaiian Kingdom Today

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There are two laws that distinguish themselves from each other. There are “national” laws that are established within countries called States, and there are “international” laws that are established by the States themselves. Sources of national laws include the constitution, whether written or unwritten, statutes enacted by the legislature, and decisions by the highest court if the country is a common law system, e.g. United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom. Civil law countries like Italy and Germany do not have judge made laws. An indicator of whether the country is common law is if they have jury trials.

Every State is geo-political, which means that each State has their own geographical location and unique political experience that contribute to the function of their government, whether autocratic or democratic. And foreign influences and interests is what drives government reform and survival. In this regard, no two countries are alike.

Current international law has its roots in the Middle Ages of Europe. At the time, the Holy Roman Empire had great influence over the kings and dukes called Cannon Law. However, commercial, and maritime law was developing as well. In England the Law Merchant was established that covered rules governing foreign trade, which England, because of its naval power, declared was universal. This resulted in mercantile courts being established in trading ports throughout Europe to resolve disputes between traders of goods. According to Professor Malcolm Shaw,

Such rules, growing out of the Middle Ages, constituted the seeds of international law, but before they could flourish, European thought had first to be developed by that intellectual explosion known as the Renaissance. This complex of ideas changed the face of European society and ushered in the modern era of scientific, humanistic and individualistic thought.

The eventual fall of the supremacy of the Holy Roman Empire in 1648 gave rise to the States headed by kings and dukes. With a history of interaction between themselves that grew into custom prior to the fall, the interactions escalated with the introduction of the concept of sovereignty and centralized control of government of the State by another concept called the Leviathan, especially in the States of England, France and Spain. The concept of Leviathan was espoused by Thomas Hobbs in 1651 that advocated for a centralized monarchical form of government. With the printing press invented in the fifteenth century, this Hobbsian theory reached the ruling classes across Europe, who at the time were the only ones that could read.

With the rise of States and their interaction with each other, custom became the foundation of international law, which was supplemented with treaties. Eventually, principles of law that prevailed in the different States became norms or rules of international law that was universally accepted. When the Kingdom of Hawai‘i became a British Protectorate in 1794, the Hawaiian Kingdom in the nineteenth century was very much influenced by British forms of governance and the development of international law.

As a result of the positivist movement within States, which was a movement based on a scientific approach in thought rather than on faith, the movement eventually moved into the political and legal realms of governance called legal positivism. This movement eventually created the basis for a departure from the natural law of kings and dukes that relied on cannon law and moral thought, to a legal system that is based on existing and verifiable laws established by the legislature or the judges in a common law system. It establishes logic, consistency, and measurability like the methods of science and mathematics. Most importantly, legal positivism promotes predictability. In the courts of a common law country, this is called stare decisis, which is decision making by precedent set in previous court decisions.

Legal positivism eventually advocated the rule of law and not the politics of power, which drove many countries in Europe in the mid-nineteenth century into constitutional forms of governance and the recognition of civil and political rights. The French Revolution was an extension of this movement against absolute rule by a King. The Hawaiian Kingdom was riding this wave of government reform as it spread throughout Europe, and it successfully evolved from absolute rule to a constitutional form of governance with democratic principles without suffering the pains of revolution by the people like the case of France.

Positivism eventually would reach the international realm and be the driving force in reforming international law. Since constitutionalism separated government from the person of the king, which means the king was no longer the supreme absolute ruler but now a constitutional head of government, there would now be a separation of the government from the State.

In the sixteenth century, French jurist and political philosopher Jean Bodin stressed the importance that “a clear distinction be made between the form of the state, and the form of the government, which is merely the machinery of policing the state.” Nineteenth century political philosopher Frank Hoffman also emphasizes that a government “is not a State any more than a man’s words are the man himself,” but “is simply an expression of the State, an agent for putting into execution the will of the State.” Professor Quincy Wright, a twentieth century American political scientist, also concludes that, “international law distinguishes between a government and the state it governs.” Therefore, a State would continue to exist despite its government being overthrown by military force by another State’s armed forces.

As a result, customary international law would begin to be codified into treaty law. One particular aspect of customary international law was to bring order into the chaos of war, which was recognized as a means of enforcement of international law. Codification of the international laws of war began at the Brussels Conference in 1874 where the representatives of powerful and weak States advocated the formulation of the laws of war through multilateral treaties. While the first multilateral treaties that codified the laws of war were not done until 1899 called the Hague Conventions, rules of war eventually became accepted by States as customary international law, and they were recognized by States when they were at war since the mid-nineteenth century.

When a State’s territory is “effectively” occupied, customary international law obligates the occupying State to ad­minister the laws of the occupied State. This is reflected in Articles 2 and 3 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration where, “[the occupying State] shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety [and] shall maintain the laws which were in force in the country in peacetime, and shall not modify, suspend or replace them unless necessary.” Although the Declaration failed to be signed off by the European States and become codified, it did have scholarly approval. The Institut de droit international (IDI) in 1875 declared:

[A]lthough there was room for improvement, the new rules on occupation as suggested by the 1874 Brussels Declaration were essentially more favorable to peaceful citizens and public and private ownership in occupied territories than what had been provided by practice thus far and by the teaching of most scholars. The IDI subsequently adopted the same rules in its Oxford Manual on Land Warfare (1880).

Eventually codification occurred in 1899. Article 43 of the 1899 Hague Regulations states, “The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” According to Professor Eyal Benvenisti:

The law of occupation as ultimately expressed in the 1899 Hague Regulations imposes two types of obligations on an army that seizes control of enemy land during war: the obligation to protect the life and property of the inhabitants and the obligation to respect the sovereign rights of the ousted government.

The “text of Article 43, according to Professor Benvenisti, “was accepted by scholars as mere reiteration of the older law.” Professor Doris Graber states that “nothing distinguishes the writing of the period following the 1899 Hague code from the writing prior to that code. And according to Professor Georg Schwarzenberger, “the Hague Regulations…was declaratory of international customary law.” The United States government also recognizes that Article 43 is customary international law that predates the Hague Regulations. In a 1943 legal opinion, the United States stated:

The Hague Convention clearly enunciated the principle that the laws applicable in an occupied territory remain in effect during the occupation, subject to change by the military authorities within the limits of the Convention. Article 43: … This declaration of the Hague Convention amounts only to a reaffirmation of the recognized international law prior to that time.

The administration of occupied territory is set forth in the Hague Regulations, being Section III of the Hague Regulations. The 1899 Hague Regulations was superseded by the 1907 Hague Regulations. Also, consistent with what was generally consid­ered the international law of occupation, in force at the time of the Spanish-American War that predates the codification, the “military governments established in the territories occupied by the armies of the United States were instructed to apply, as far as possible, the local laws and to utilize, as far as seemed wise, the services of the local Spanish officials.”

Commenting on the occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Professor Patrick Dumberry states:

[T]he 1907 Hague Convention protects the international personality of the oc­cupied State, even in the absence of effectiveness. Furthermore, the legal order of the occupied State remains intact, although its effectiveness is greatly diminished by the fact of occupation. As such, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV provides for the co-existence of two distinct legal orders, that of the occupier and the occupied.

Stark parallels can be drawn between what the United States did to the Hawaiian Kingdom and what Iraq did to Kuwait in 1990, commonly referred to as the First Gulf War. Just as Iraq, without justification, invaded Kuwait and overthrew the Kuwaiti government August 2, 1990, the United States did the same to the Hawaiian Kingdom and its territory. Where Kuwait was under a belligerent occupation by Iraq for 7.5 months, the Hawaiian Kingdom has been under a belligerent occupation by the United States for 131 years.

Hiding the occupation does not legalize it under international law. The international law of occupation has and continues to apply in the prolonged American occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Hawaiian national consciousness is regained through education and knowing its legal and political history.

Customary International Law, the Hawaiian Kingdom and the Permanent Court of Arbitration

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International law literally means the law between (inter) nations called States and not above these States. Domestic or municipal laws, on the other hand, are laws that reside within (intra) a State and that the persons in the territory of the State are subject to these laws. The reason why international is between and not above States is because they are considered politically independent from each other and are sovereign over their territory and their nationals abroad. This creates sovereign equality among the States. Therefore, for international law to be established, the State has to consent by international custom or by treaty.

According to article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice these are five primary sources of international law: (a) treaties between States; (b) customary international law derived from the practices of State; (c) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law; (d) judicial decisions and the writings of “the most highly and qualified publicists.”

Regarding customary international law there must be evidence that States accept the practice as law. The evidence must show a consensus among States concerning rules or actions—practices done by States as well as by international organizations that were established by States. According to Professor Ian Brownlie this evidence includes the following:

diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of official legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals of military law, executive decisions and practices, order to naval forces etc., comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, state legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly.

According to the International Court of Justice, for a rule of customary international law to exist, there needs to be “two conditions [that] must be fulfilled” where there is a “‘settled practice’ together with opinio juris,” where the practice is accepted as law by States. This acceptance can be achieved by the silence or omission of the concerned States regarding the practice. In other words, States do not always have to say “I accept as law” the practice that was done in order for it to be considered law. Opinio juris is Latin for “an opinion of law.” The opinio juris can be the creation of a “new” rule of international law, or the acceptance of an “existing” rule of international law.

An example of a “new” rule of international law was when the Hawaiian Kingdom was recognized as an independent State by Great Britain and France on November 28, 1843. As a recognized independent State, the Hawaiian Kingdom would be protected under the rules of international law, in particular, the “existing” rule that the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State would continue to exist despite the military overthrow of its government. This existing rule is called the presumption of continuity of a State, which means that the State is presumed to continue to exist despite the removal of its government by another State.

This existing rule of international law is explained by Judge James Crawford where he states, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations…despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government,” and belligerent occupation “does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.” Addressing the presumption of the German State’s continued existence despite the military overthrow of the Nazi government during the Second World War, Professor Brownlie explains:

Thus, after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War the four major Allied powers assumed supreme power in Germany. The legal competence of the German state [its independence and sovereignty] did not, however, disappear. What occurred is akin to legal representation or agency of necessity. The German state continued to exist, and, indeed, the legal basis of the occupation depended on its continued existence.

Therefore, “If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Matthew Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.” Evidence of “a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States” would be an international treaty, particularly a peace treaty, whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom would have ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States. Examples of foreign States ceding sovereign territory to the United States by a peace treaty include the 1848 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico and the 1898 Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. There is no treaty of peace where the Hawaiian Kingdom ceded its sovereignty and territory to the United States, which means the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist under international law and that the present system of government under United States domestic law called the State of Hawai‘i is illegal.

One piece of evidence of international custom is “the practice of international organs” that have been established and are managed by States like the United Nations or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The former was established by States who became Contracting States to the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, and the latter was established by States who became Contracting States to the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899 PCA Convention), which was superseded by the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1907 PCA Convention). What will eventually come before the PCA in the Hawaiian Kingdom case is whether the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State from the nineteenth century, and not whether the Hawaiian Kingdom is a new State. This brings it squarely under the existing rule of “continuity” or “discontinuity” of a State that was already established.

Because the PCA establishes ad hoc arbitral tribunals to resolve international disputes on a case by case basis, it must first have institutional jurisdiction before it can form the tribunal. For those States that are Contracting States to the 1899 PCA Convention when the PCA was established, they had automatic access to the PCA facilities. However, it was possible for non-Contracting States to have access to the PCA facilities as well.

Article 26 addressed the jurisdiction of the PCA in two parts, for Contracting States and for non-Contracting States. The first part of article 26 states, “The International Bureau at The Hague is authorized to place its premises and its staff at the disposal of the Signatory Powers for the operations of any special Board of Arbitration.” In other words, if the arbitral tribunal, being a “special Board of Arbitration,” was formed by the Contracting State or States and not by the PCA, they could still have access to the PCA “premises and its staff.”

The second part states, “The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court may, within the conditions laid down in the Regulations, be extended to disputes between non-Signatory Powers, or between Signatory Powers and non-Signatory Powers, if the parties are agreed on recourse to this Tribunal.” In other words, the second part grants access to disputes with non-Contracting States. In international law, the term “Powers” are synonymous with “States.”

At a meeting of the Contracting States in The Hague, Netherlands, it was agreed that the 1899 PCA Convention would be replaced by the 1907 PCA Convention. Article 47 reiterated the two-part institutional jurisdiction of the PCA. The first part states, “The Bureau is authorized to place its offices and staff at the disposal of the Contracting Powers for the use of any special Board of Arbitration.” The second part states, “The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court may, within the conditions laid down in the regulations, be extended to disputes between non-Contracting Powers or between Contracting Powers and non-Contracting Powers, if the parties are agreed on recourse to this Tribunal.”

Prior to the Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom case that lasted from November 8, 1999, to February 5, 2001, there were six instances where the PCA Secretary General recognized either both or one of the parties to the dispute to be a non-Contracting State to the 1899 or the 1907 PCA Conventions. The action taken by the PCA Secretary General is a practice of an “international organ” recognizable under international custom. When the PCA recognizes the State as a non-Contracting State it relies on “existing” rules of international law that provides for its existence or, in the case of the Hawaiian Kingdom, its continued existence.

In annex 2 of the PCA’s 111th Annual Report in 2011, certain cases have a footnote that states, “Pursuant to article 47 of the 1907 Convention (article 26 of the 1899 Convention).” In annex 2, the Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom is listed as the 33rd case under the jurisdiction of the PCA since its inception in 1899. If both parties to the dispute are Contracting States but the dispute involves a “special Board of Arbitration” than that created by the PCA it would be noted to have been established pursuant to article 47 of the 1907 PCA Convention or pursuant to article 26 of the 1899 PCA Convention. If the case involved a non-Contracting State, it would also be cited by the same wording of the footnote. Here is the link to the current 122 States that are Contracting States to the 1899 and 1907 PCA Conventions.

Regarding the involvement of a non-Contracting State to the dispute, the first instance was an arbitration between Norway and Sweden called The Grisbådarna Case that lasted from March 14, 1908, to October 23, 1909. The subject of the dispute was the maritime boundary between the two countries in the aftermath of the separation of the union of the Swedish-Norwegian Kingdom in 1905. Prior to the dissolution of the union, the Swedish-Norwegian Kingdom became a Contracting State to the 1899 PCA Convention on September 4, 1900. However, after the dissolution, Sweden became a Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention on January 26, 1910, and Norway became a Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention on November 18, 1910. Both countries were non-Contracting States during the arbitration, and, therefore, were allowed access to the jurisdiction of the PCA under article 47.

The second instance was a dispute between Russia and Turkey, called the Russian Claim for Interest on Indemnities case, that lasted from July 22, 1910, to November 11, 1912. While Russia became a Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention on January 26, 1910, Turkey was and continues to be a non-Contracting State.

The third instance was a dispute between the French High Commission to the States of Levant under Mandate (Syria and Lebanon) and the Egyptian Government over Egypt’s refusal to have the French Company Radio Orient in Egypt to receive any telegrams. The proceedings lasted from November 11, 1938, to April 2, 1940. Although France became a Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention on December 6, 1919, Egypt did not become a Contracting State until November 4, 1968.

The fourth instance was a dispute between France and Greece regarding the administration of light houses. The proceedings lasted from July 15, 1931, to July 24, 1956. Although France became a Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention on December 6, 1910, Greece was and continues to be a non-Contracting State.

The fifth instance was in 1997 in a dispute between Italy and Costa Rica regarding a dispute over a loan agreement between the two countries. The proceeding lasted from September 11, 1997, to June 26, 1998. While Italy is a non-Contracting State to the 1907 PCA Convention, Costa Rica did not become a Contracting State until after the arbitration on July 20, 1999.

In 1928, a precedence was set for the PCA to allow a dispute between a “private entity” and a State. In this case, there was a dispute centered on a contract between China and Radio Corporation of America—Radio Corporation of America v. China. The proceeding lasted from November 10, 1928, to April 13, 1935. The jurisdiction of the PCA was invoked by China, that became a Contracting State on January 26, 1910, according to article 47 because it involved a “special Board of Arbitration” that was not established by the PCA.

While China was the first Contracting State to have a dispute with a “private entity” that came under the jurisdiction of the PCA in 1928, the Larsen case was the first instance that the PCA had jurisdiction over a dispute between a non-Contracting State—the Hawaiian Kingdom and a “private entity”—Larsen in 1999.

Under International Law, all Members of the United Nations recognize the Continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a Independent State and the Council of Regency as its Government

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The Royal Commission of Inquiry has just published its latest memorandum on why all 193 Member States of the United Nations recognizes the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the Council of Regency as its government.

It has been 24 years since the arbitral proceedings at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) were initiated on 8 November 1999 in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom. Before the arbitral tribunal was established on 9 June 2000, the PCA Secretary General recognized the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a non-Contracting State to the 1907 Hague Convention, I, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (“PCA Convention”). The PCA Secretary General also recognized the Council of Regency as its government. The Council of Regency was not claiming to be a new State but rather it claimed the legal personality of the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom since the nineteenth century.

One of the four sources of international law is customary international law, which is a general practice by an international actor and accompanied by opinio juris. Opinio juris takes place when acts or omissions by States occur following a belief that these States are obligated as a matter of law to take action or refrain from acting in a particular way. According to the International Court of Justice, for a rule of customary international law to exist, there needs to be “two conditions [that] must be fulfilled” where there is a “‘settled practice’ together with opinio juris,” where the practice is accepted as law by States. This acceptance can be achieved by the silence or omission of the concerned States regarding the practice. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice explained:

[F]or a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned “amount to a settled practice,” but they must be accompanied by opinio juris sive neccessitatis. Either the States taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, must behave so that their conduct is evidence of a belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such belief […] the subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of opinio juris sive neccessitatis.

The relevant rule of customary international law, which is applicable to the Hawaiian Kingdom, is the presumption of continuity of the State despite the military overthrow of its government. Because international law provides for the presumption of the continuity of the State despite the overthrow of its government by another State, the burden of proof shifts as to what must be proven. According to Judge Crawford, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations […] despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government,” and belligerent occupation “does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.” Addressing the presumption of the German State’s continued existence despite the military overthrow of the Nazi government during the Second World War, Professor Brownlie explains:

Thus, after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War the four major Allied powers assumed supreme power in Germany. The legal competence of the German state [its independence and sovereignty] did not, however, disappear. What occurred is akin to legal representation or agency of necessity. The German state continued to exist, and, indeed, the legal basis of the occupation depended on its continued existence.

Therefore, “[i]f one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.” Evidence of “a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States” would be an international treaty, particularly a peace treaty, whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom would have ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States. Examples of foreign States ceding sovereign territory to the United States by a peace treaty include the 1848 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico and the 1898 Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. There is no treaty of peace where the Hawaiian Kingdom ceded its sovereignty and territory to the United States.

This practice or action taken by the PCA Secretary General was uncontested by all 122 Contracting States to the PCA Convention. This serves as evidence of their acceptance of the continuity of Hawaiian Statehood. The acceptance by the 122 States of the PCA’s recognition of continuity, as opposed to discontinuity of the Hawaiian State, established a normative character of opinio juris supporting the existence of the rule of customary international law sanctioning the presumption of continuity of a State, despite the military overthrow of its government. As the International Court of Justice explains, the behavior of these States is such “that their conduct is evidence of a belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it,” as regards the international legal rule of the presumption of State continuity despite the persistence of a status of military occupation. The significance of the Larsen case under international law cannot be underestimated.

Since the Larsen case, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Council of Regency took deliberate and incremental steps, under international law, to assure that all Member States of the United Nations would recognize the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as an independent State despite the prolonged occupation by the United States. This memorandum looks at those steps that eventually got all 193 Members States of the United Nations to acknowledge, under international law, the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State since the nineteenth century, and the Council of Regency as its government, being the successor to Queen Lili‘uokalani’s administration.

Polish Journal of Political Science Publishes Book Review of the Royal Commission of Inquiry’s eBook on Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom

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Awareness of the American occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom is spreading in academic circles throughout Europe. In 2022, the Polish Journal of Political Science published a book review by Dr. Anita Budziszewska of the Royal Commission on Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Dr. Budziszewska is a faculty member of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. In the years 2011-2020 she served as the coordinator for mobility, exchange and international cooperation at the IIR UW and at the WNPiSM UW. During the years 2016-2020 served as the Plenipotentiary of the Dean of the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies for international cooperation under the Erasmus+ program (European Union).

Dr. Budziszewska was member of the Polish mission to the United Nations during the 43rd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva (43rd session of UN HRC). In 2020-2021 external expert of the project Polska360 organized/financed by the Kresy RP. Foundation and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland. She conducts classes on Elements of Diplomatic Protocol as part of the training organized by the Polish Olympic Committee and the Polish Corporation of Sports Managers. Member of the Organizing Committee of 8th Pan-European Congress of International Relations in Warsaw (2013) co-organized with the European International Studies Association.

Dr. Budziszewska completed scientific and professional internship, e.g. at the Polish Representation to the United Nations Office in Geneva. Study and training stays, among others, at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the University of Zurich and the University of Oxford. International speeches, lectures and papers abroad, e.g. in Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Finland, Croatia, Hungary and the UK. Member of the European Research Network on Philanthropy, International Studies Association and European International Studies Association.

Here follows her book review that was published in volume 8, issue 2 of the Polish Journal of Political Science.

The subject of review here is the multi-author publication Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom, edited by Dr. David Keanu Sai, Head of the Hawaiian Royal Commission of Inquiry, published in 2020. The book is divided into three parts, i.e. Part 1 Investigating war crimes and human rights violations committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom; Part 2 The prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom; and Part 3 Hawaiian law, treaties with foreign states and international humanitarian law. This final part represents a collection of source documents in such fields as Hawaiian law, but also international-law treaties with foreign states (in fact 18 including the USA)—dating back to the 19th century. A selection of treaties from the sphere of international humanitarian law has also been made and included.

The essence of the publication nevertheless resides in its two first parts, in which the authors offer an in-depth treatment of the complicated long-time relationship between Hawaii and the United States. Nevertheless, the thesis pursued here overall is the straightforward one that Hawaii has been occupied illegally and incorporated into the United States unlawfully, with that occupation continu­ing to the present day and needing to be understood in such terms. The authors also pursue the dif­ficult thread of the story relating to war crimes.

The above main assumption of the book is emphasised from the very beginning of Part 1, which is preceded by the text of the Proclamation Establishing the Royal Commission of Inquiry, recalling that that Commission was established to “ensure a full and thorough investigation into the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawai­ian Kingdom.”

In fact, the main aim of the above institution as called into being has been to pursue any and all of­fences and violations in the spheres of humanitarian law, human rights and war crimes committed by the Americans in the course of their occupation of Hawaii—which is given to have begun on 17 January 1893.

Presented next is the genesis and history of the Commission’s activity described by its aforementioned Head—Dr. David Keanu Sai. He presents the Commission’s activity in detail, by reference to concrete examples; with this part going on to recreate the entire history of the Hawaiian-US relations, beginning with the first attempt at territorial annexation. This thread of the story is sup­plemented with examples and source texts relating to the recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain countries (e.g. the UK and France, and taken as evidence of international regard for the in­tegrity of statehood). Particularly noteworthy here is the author’s exceptionally scrupulous analysis of the history of Hawaii and its state sovereignty. No obvious flaws are to be found in the analysis presented.

It is then in the same tone that the author proceeds with an analysis relating to international law, so as to point to the aspects of Hawaii’s illegal occupation by the United States—including an un­precedentedly detailed analysis of the contents of documents, resolutions, mutual agreements and official political speeches, but also reference to other scientific research projects. This very interest­ing strand of the story is followed by Matthew Craven in Chapter 3 on the Continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under International Law. Notwithstanding the standpoint on the legality of the occupation or annexation of Hawaii by the United States, the matter of the right to self-determination keeps springing up now and again.

Considerable attention is also paid to the multi-dimensional nature of the plebiscite organised in 1959 (with regard to Hawaii’s incorporation as a state into the United States of America), with the relative lack of transparency of organisation pointed out, along with various breaches and transgres­sions that may have taken place.

In turn, in Chapter 4—on War Crimes Related to the United States’ Belligerent Occupation of the Ha­waiian Kingdom—William Schabas makes attempts to verify the assertion, explaining the term war crimes and referring to the wording of the relevant definition that international law is seen to have generated. The main problem emerging from this concerns lack of up-to-date international provi­sions as regards the above definition. The reader’s attention is also drawn to the incomplete nature of the catalogue of actions or crimes that could have constituted war crimes (in line with the observa­tions of Lemkin).

While offering narration and background, this Chapter’s author actually eschews Hawaiian-US examples. Instead, he brings the discussion around to cases beyond Hawaii, and in so doing also invokes examples from case-law (e.g. of Criminal Courts and Tribunals). While this is a very interesting choice of approach, it would still have been interesting for the valuable introduction to the subject matter to be supplemented by concrete examples relating to Hawaii, and to the events occur­ring there during the period under study.

Chapter 5—on International Human Rights Law and Self-Determination of Peoples Related to the United States’ Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom—allows its author Federico Lenzerini to contribute hugely to the analysis of the subject matter, given his consideration of the human rights protection system and its development with a focus on the right to self-determination. The author separates those dimensions of the law in question that do not relate to the Hawaiian Kingdom, as well as those that may have application to the Hawaiian society. Indeed, the process ends with Ap­plicability of the Right to Self-Determination During the American Occupation—a chapter written with exceptional thoroughness, objectivity and synthesis. The author first tells the story on how the human rights protection system came to be formulated (by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants of 1996, but also by reference to other Conventions). Rightly signalled is the institutional dimension to the protection of human rights, notably the Human Rights Committee founded to protect the rights outlined in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is of course re­called that the US is not a party to the relevant Protocols, which is preventing US citizens from assert­ing the rights singled out in the 1966 Covenants. Again rightly, attention is also paid to the regional human rights mechanism provided for by the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, which also lacks the United States as a party.

The focus here is naturally on the right to self-determination, which the author correctly terms the only officially recognised right of a collective nature (if one excludes the rights of tribal peoples). The further part of the chapter looks at the obligations of states when it comes to safeguarding their citizens’ fundamental human rights. The philosophical context underpinning the right to self-determination is considered next (with attention rightly paid first to liberty related aspects and the philosophical standpoints of Locke and Rousseau, along with the story of the formulation of this right’s ideological basis and reference to what is at times a lack of clarity regarding its shape and scope (not least in Hawaii’s case). What is therefore welcome is the wide-ranging commentary of­fered on the dimensions to the above rights that do relate to Hawaiian society as well as those that do not.

In summing up the substantive and conceptual content, it is worth pointing to the somewhat inter­disciplinary nature of the research encompassed. Somewhat simplifying things, this book can first be seen as an in-depth analysis of matters historical (with much space devoted to the roots of the relations between Hawaii and the United States, to the issue of this region’s occupation and the gen­esis of Hawaii’s incorporation into the USA). These aspects have all been discussed with exceptional thoroughness and striking scrupulousness, in line with quotations from many official documents and source texts. This is all pursued deliberately, given the authors’ presumed intention to illustrate the genesis of the whole context underpinning the Hawaiian-US relations, as well as the further context through which Hawaii’s loss of state sovereignty came about. This strand to the story gains excellent illustration thanks to Dr. Keanu Sai.

The second part is obviously international law related and it also has much space devoted to it by the authors. The publication’s core theses gain support in the analysis of many and varied international documents, be these either mutual agreements between Hawaii and the United States or international Conventions, bilateral agreements of other profiles, resolutions, instruments de­veloped under the aegis of the UN or those of a regional nature (though not only concerned with the Americas, as much space is devoted to European solutions, and European law on the protection of human rights in particular). There is also much reference to international case-law and juris­prudence in a broader sense, the aim being to indicate the precedents already arrived at, and to set these against the international situation in which Hawaii finds itself.

However, notwithstanding this publication’s title, the authors here do not seek to “force-feed” readers with their theses regarding Hawaii’s legal status. Rather, by reaching out to a wide range of sources in international law as well as from history, they provide sufficient space for independ­ent reflection and drawing of conclusions. In this regard, it would be interesting if few remarks were devoted to present-day relations between Hawaii and the rest of the USA, with a view to achieving a more-profound illustration of the state of this relationship. However, it might seem from the book’s overall context that this was done deliberately so that the foundations of this unique dispute gain proper presentation. All is then augmented further by Part 3—the collection of agreements and docu­ments considered to sustain the main assumptions of the publication under review. Were I to force myself to point out any failure of the book to meet expectations, I would choose the cultural dimen­sion. There is no way of avoiding an impression—only enhanced by cover-to-cover reading—that this publication is deeply rooted in the Hawaiians’ sense of cultural and historical identity. So it would have been interesting to see the cultural dimension addressed, including through a more in-depth analysis of social awareness. At the very least, I have in mind here Article 27 UDHR, traditionally regarded as the source of the right to culture and the right to participate in cultural life. To be added to that might be Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While (as Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted in 1970) the right in question initially meant access to high culture, there has since been a long process of change that has seen an anthropological dimension conferred upon both culture and the right thereto. A component under that right is the right to a cultural identity—which would seem to be the key space in the Hawaiian context. The UN and UNESCO have in fact been paying a great deal of attention to this matter, with the key relevant documents being the 2005 Conven­tion on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions that in general links these issues with the human rights dimension as well as the Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their Contribution to It (1976).

So a deeply-rooted cultural-identity dimension would have offered an interesting complement to the publication’s research material, all the more so as it would presumably reveal the attempts to annihilate that culture (thus striking not merely at statehood, but at national integrity of iden­tity). An interesting approach would then have been to show in details whether and to what extent this is resisted by the USA (e.g. in regard to the upholding of symbols of material and non-material cultural heritage).

However, given the assumption the book is based on—i.e. the focus on state sovereignty (not the right of cultural minorities, but the right of a nation to self-determination), the above “omission” actually takes nothing away from the value of the research presented. However, the aspect of national identity—of which cultural and historical identity is a key component—may represent an impulse for further, more in-depth research.

I regard this publication as an exceptionally valuable one that systematises matters of the legal sta­tus of the Hawaiian Kingdom, taking up the key issues surrounding the often ignored topic of a dif­ficult historical context occurring between Hawaii and the United States. The issue at stake here has been regenerated synthetically, on multiple levels, with a penetrating analysis of the regulations and norms in international law applying to Hawaii – starting from potential occupied-territory status, and moving through to multi-dimensional issues relating to both war crimes and human rights. This is one of the few books – if not the only one – to describe its subject matter so comprehensively and completely. I therefore see this work as being of exceptional value and considerable scientific impor­tance. It may serve not only as an academic source, but also a professional source of knowledge for both practicing lawyers and historians dealing with the matter on hand. The ambition of those who sought to take up this difficult topic can only be commended.

National Holiday (November 28) – Independence Day

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November 28th is the most important national holiday in the Hawaiian Kingdom. It is the day Great Britain and France formally recognized the Hawaiian Islands as an “independent state” in 1843, and has since been celebrated as “Independence Day,” which in the Hawaiian language is “La Ku‘oko‘a.” Here follows the story of this momentous event from the Hawaiian Kingdom Board of Education history textbook titled “A Brief History of the Hawaiian People” published in 1891.

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Haalilio

The First Embassy to Foreign Powers—In February, 1842, Sir George Simpson and Dr. McLaughlin, governors in the service of the Hudson Bay Company, arrived at Honolulu on business, and became interested in the native people and their government. After a candid examination of the controversies existing between their own countrymen and the Hawaiian Government, they became convinced that the latter had been unjustly accused. Sir George offered to loan the government ten thousand pounds in cash, and advised the king to send commissioners to the United States and Europe with full power to negotiate new treaties, and to obtain a guarantee of the independence of the kingdom.

George Simpson

Accordingly Sir George Simpson, Haalilio, the king’s secretary, and Mr. Richards were appointed joint ministers-plenipotentiary to the three powers on the 8th of April, 1842.

William Richards

Mr. Richards also received full power of attorney for the king. Sir George left for Alaska, whence he traveled through Siberia, arriving in England in November. Messrs. Richards and Haalilio sailed July 8th, 1842, in a chartered schooner for Mazatlan, on their way to the United States*

*Their business was kept a profound secret at the time.

Proceedings of the British Consul—As soon as these facts became known, Mr. Charlton followed the embassy in order to defeat its object. He left suddenly on September 26th, 1842, for London via Mexico, sending back a threatening letter to the king, in which he informed him that he had appointed Mr. Alexander Simpson as acting-consul of Great Britain. As this individual, who was a relative of Sir George, was an avowed advocate of the annexation of the islands to Great Britain, and had insulted and threatened the governor of Oahu, the king declined to recognize him as British consul. Meanwhile Mr. Charlton laid his grievances before Lord George Paulet commanding the British frigate “Carysfort,” at Mazatlan, Mexico. Mr. Simpson also sent dispatches to the coast in November, representing that the property and persons of his countrymen were in danger, which introduced Rear-Admiral Thomas to order the “Carysfort” to Honolulu to inquire into the matter.

Daniel Webster

Recognition by the United States—Messres. Richards and Haalilio arrived in Washington early in December, and had several interviews with Daniel Webster, the Secretary of State, from whom they received an official letter December 19th, 1842, which recognized the independence of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and declared, “as the sense of the government of the United States, that the government of the Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought to take possession of the islands, either as a conquest or for the purpose of the colonization; and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing government, or any exclusive privileges or preferences in matters of commerce.” *

*The same sentiments were expressed in President Tyler’s message to Congress of December 30th, and in the Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, written by John Quincy Adams.

Aberdeen

Success of the Embassy in Europe—The king’s envoys proceeded to London, where they had been preceded by the Sir George Simpson, and had an interview with the Earl of Aberdeen, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the 22d of February, 1843.

Lord Aberdeen at first declined to receive them as ministers from an independent state, or to negotiate a treaty, alleging that the king did not govern, but that he was “exclusively under the influence of Americans to the detriment of British interests,” and would not admit that the government of the United States had yet fully recognized the independence of the islands.

Sir George and Mr. Richards did not, however, lose heart, but went on to Brussels March 8th, by a previous arrangement made with Mr. Brinsmade. While there, they had an interview with Leopold I., king of the Belgians, who received them with great courtesy, and promised to use his influence to obtain the recognition of Hawaiian independence. This influence was great, both from his eminent personal qualities and from his close relationship to the royal families of England and France.

Encouraged by this pledge, the envoys proceeded to Paris, where, on the 17th, M. Guizot, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, received them in the kindest manner, and at once engaged, in behalf of France, to recognize the independence of the islands. He made the same statement to Lord Cowley, the British ambassador, on the 19th, and thus cleared the way for the embassy in England.

They immediately returned to London, where Sir George had a long interview with Lord Aberdeen on the 25th, in which he explained the actual state of affairs at the islands, and received an assurance that Mr. Charlton would be removed. On the 1st of April, 1843, the Earl of Aberdeen formally replied to the king’s commissioners, declaring that “Her Majesty’s Government are willing and have determined to recognize the independence of the Sandwich Islands under their present sovereign,” but insisting on the perfect equality of all foreigners in the islands before the law, and adding that grave complaints had been received from British subjects of undue rigor exercised toward them, and improper partiality toward others in the administration of justice. Sir George Simpson left for Canada April 3d, 1843.

Recognition of the Independence of the Islands—Lord Aberdeen, on the 13th of June, assured the Hawaiian envoys that “Her Majesty’s government had no intention to retain possession of the Sandwich Islands,” and a similar declaration was made to the governments of France and the United States.

At length, on the 28th of November, 1843, the two governments of France and England united in a joint declaration to the effect that “Her Majesty, the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty, the king of the French, taking into consideration the existence in the Sandwich Islands of a government capable of providing for the regularity of its relations with foreign nations have thought it right to engage reciprocally to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent state, and never to take possession, either directly or under the title of a protectorate, or under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed…”

John C Calhoun

This was the final act by which the Hawaiian Kingdom was admitted within the pale of civilized nations. Finding that nothing more could be accomplished for the present in Paris, Messrs. Richards and Haalilio returned to the United States in the spring of 1844. On the 6th of July they received a dispatch from Mr. J.C. Calhoun, the Secretary of State, informing them that the President regarded the statement of Mr. Webster and the appointment of a commissioner “as a full recognition on the part of the United States of the independence of the Hawaiian Government.”

Separating Politics from Law and the Termination of the Pearl Harbor Convention

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Many people confuse politics with law. Both terms are different, but they do work together in the governance of an independent State. According to the 6th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, politics is the “science of government; the art or practice of administering public affairs,” and the term political pertains to the “exercise of the functions vested in those charged with the conduct of government.” Law on the other hand, according to Black’s Law, “is a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force,” and “must be obeyed and followed” because it “is a solemn expression of the will of the supreme power of the State.”

From politics stem policies, which, according to Black’s Law, are “the general principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs.” The South African Community Organisers Toolbox explains that a “policy outlines what a government ministry hopes to achieve and the methods and principles it will use to achieve them. It states the goals of the ministry. A policy document is not a law but it will often identify new laws needed to achieve its goals….Laws set out standards, procedures and principles that must be followed. If a law is not followed, those responsible for breaking them can be prosecuted in court.”

In other words, laws provide the framework for politics and policies to work and not the other way around. For independent States, there are two types of laws that frame governance at the international level and at the national level. There is public international law, which, according to the American Law Institute, is “the law of the international community of states,” that consists of “specific norms and standards, and largely in practice, international law functions between states, as represented by their governments.” International law is comprised of customary law, treaties, certain principles of law found in municipal laws of States that are universal, and the writings of scholars on certain topics.

The other type of law applies within the boundaries of the State called municipal laws. These laws are comprised of a written or unwritten constitution, statutes enacted by a State’s legislature, and decisions made by a State’s highest court if there is no statute covering a particular topic. The Hawaiian Kingdom is a common law country similar in function to the United Kingdom and its municipal laws stem from the 1864 Constitution, as amended, statutes enacted by the Legislative Assembly, and the decisions made by the Supreme Court. Under the law of occupation, laws can be proclaimed by the government of the occupied State while the legislature is out of session as a result of the occupation whether as a government in exile or in situ.

When the Hawaiian government was restored in 1997 by a Regency in situ under Hawaiian constitutional law and the doctrine of necessity, its policy was laid out in a strategic plan of three phases: phase 1—verification of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and subject of international law; phase 2—exposure of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State; and phase 3—restoring the Hawaiian Kingdom to its former status before the American occupation began. The strategic plan lays out the policy of the Council of Regency that outlines what it “hopes to achieve and the methods and principles it will use to achieve them.” The Council of Regency’s primary function is to protect the population of the Hawaiian Kingdom and to ensure that the United States and the State of Hawai‘i comply with the law of occupation in order to eventually bring the occupation to an end.

Within each of the three phases there are laws that frame the approach of the Council. Phase 1 was achieved by treaty law at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom. Before the PCA could establish an arbitral tribunal to resolve the dispute between Larsen and the Hawaiian Kingdom, it first needed to have institutional jurisdiction. In the treaty that formed the PCA (1907 Convention), Article 47 states, “The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court may, within the conditions laid down in the regulations, be extended to disputes between non-Contracting Powers or between Contracting Powers and non-Contracting Powers, if the parties are agreed on recourse to this tribunal.” The term Powers refers to independent States. The PCA concluded that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a “non-Contracting Power” to the treaty. The PCA received the notice of arbitration on November 8, 1999, and after concluding it had institutional jurisdiction it established the arbitral tribunal on June 9, 2000. These proceedings came to an end when the Award was issued by the arbitral tribunal on February 5, 2001.

The action taken by the PCA was not political but rather legal. In other words, the PCA did not have any discretion or a choice as to whether to accept or not accept the dispute under its jurisdiction. It was a matter of treaty law. The continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State, according to the civil law system of Europe, is a “legal fact” that led to the “legal act” of the PCA to accept the dispute under article 47 of the 1907 Convention.

Phase 2 is being achieved through both international law and the municipal laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom. As Professor Federico Lenzerini pointed out in his legal opinion, “the Council of Regency possesses the constitutional authority to temporarily exercise the Royal powers of the Hawaiian Kingdom,” and that it “has the authority to represent the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State, which has been under a belligerent occupation by the United States of America since 17 January 1893, both at the domestic and international level.”

The proclamations made by the Council of Regency is its exercise of legislative authority under Hawaiian municipal laws, which is allowable under international law and the law of occupation. And its most recent proclamation of October 20, 2023, pronouncing the termination of the 1875 Commercial Reciprocity Treaty and its 1884 Supplemental Convention is its exercise of authority as a treaty partner with the United States under international law. The Hawaiian Kingdom, by its Council of Regency, being a treaty partner is an indisputable “legal fact,” and the notice of termination by virtue of Article 1 of the 1884 Supplemental Convention is a “legal act” with consequences under international law.

For the United States to disregard the notice of termination, as a matter of treaty law, requires it to publicly rebuke the existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State and the Council of Regency as its government. This is an impossible task.

The reason why it is impossible is because during the arbitral proceedings at the PCA, the United States explicitly acknowledged the Hawaiian Kingdom as a non-Contracting State to the 1907 Convention and the Council of Regency as its government. In its case depository on its website, the PCA stated the Hawaiian Kingdom to be a “State,” and Lance Larsen a “Private entity.” The PCA described the case as:

Lance Paul Larsen, a resident of Hawaii, brought a claim against the Hawaiian Kingdom by its Council of Regency (“Hawaiian Kingdom”) on the grounds that the Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom is in continual violation of: (a) its 1849 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the United States of America, as well as the principles of international law laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 and (b) the principles of international comity, for allowing the unlawful imposition of American municipal laws over the claimant’s person within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

An important note in the above case description is that the PCA acknowledges that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a treaty partner with the United States in the 1849 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. This treaty has not been terminated by either the Hawaiian Kingdom or the United States. Article XVI states:

The present treaty shall be in force from the date of the exchange of the ratifications for the term of ten years, and further, until the end of twelve months after either of the contracting parties shall have given notice to the other of its intention to terminate the same, each of the said contracting parties reserving to itself the right of giving such notice at the end of the said term of ten years, or at any subsequent term.

Additional evidence is the executive agreement between the Council of Regency and the United States granting them access to the pleadings and records of the case, and the PCA Annual Reports from 2001-2011, which the PCA Administrative Council publishes. In Annex 2 of its 2001 Annual Report, it stated that the Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom arbitration was established “Pursuant to article 47 of the 1907 Convention (article 26 of the 1899 Convention).” All Contracting States that have diplomatic posts in the Netherlands sit as members of the Administrative Council that meet at the PCA, which includes the United States.

The termination of the Treaty and its Supplemental Convention is not subject to negotiation with the United States. Rather, the treaties themselves were the subject of negotiations and once both countries ratified the treaties it became international law. Termination that is provided by a treaty provision becomes self-executing according to the terms of the treaty. For termination of the treaty, the only requirement is for the Hawaiian Kingdom to provide notification of its intent to terminate to the United States, and once the United States receives the notice twelve months starts.

The United States, however, does have a provision to terminate a treaty that is first subject to negotiation and mutual agreement. This treaty provision concerns Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In 1903, the newly independent State of Cuba leased Guantanamo Bay to the United States to build a Naval Station by entering into two international agreements. In the 1934 Treaty these agreements were acknowledged, and the terms of termination were explicitly stated in Article III, which states:

Until the two contracting parties agree to the modification or abrogation of the stipulations of the agreement in regard to the lease to the United States of America of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval stations signed by the President of the Republic of Cuba on February 16, 1903, and by the President of the United States of America on the 23d day of the same month and year, the stipulations of that agreement with regard to the naval station of Guantanamo shall continue in effect. The supplementary agreement in regard to naval or coaling stations signed between the two Governments on July 2, 1903, also shall continue in effect in the same form and on the same conditions with respect to the naval station at Guantanamo. So long as the United States of America shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantanamo or the two Governments shall not agree to a modification of its present limits, the station shall continue to have the territorial area that it now has, with the limits that it has on the date of the signature of the present Treaty.

What this treaty provision means is that there is no time limit for the United States’ lease of Guantanamo Bay, and the only way to terminate the lease agreement is that both the United States and Cuba must agree beforehand. The United States history has shown that it will not give its consent to terminate the lease of Guantanamo Bay Naval Station because it is in their self-interest to maintain the base despite any objection made by the Cuban government. This treaty provision has become known as Cuba’s “legal blackhole.” This is not the case for the United States naval station at Pearl Harbor.

U.S. Troops to Withdraw from the Hawaiian Islands by October 26, 2024

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In 1875, a Commercial Reciprocity Treaty was entered into between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States that was to last for seven years. In 1884, a Supplemental Convention extended the duration of the commercial treaty for another seven years with the express condition that the United States was granted exclusive access to Pearl Harbor. Article II of the Supplemental Convention states:

His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the Government of the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end the United States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other things needful to the purpose aforesaid.

The Supplemental Convention came into effect in 1887 after ratifications were exchanged and would last for seven years and further until “either of the High Contracting Parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same,” where termination would commence twelve months after the notification is received by the other High Contracting Party. Although the Hawaiian government was unlawfully overthrown by the United States on January 17, 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law continued to exist. In 1997, the Hawaiian Kingdom government was restored as a Regency serving in the absence of a Monarch.

On October 20, 2023, the Hawaiian Kingdom, by its Council of Regency, proclaimed the termination of the 1875 Commercial Reciprocity Treaty and its 1884 Supplemental Convention in accordance with Article I of the said Supplemental Convention. The following day, a notice of termination was sent, by courier United States Postal Service, to Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken. The notice of termination was received by the United States Department of State on 26 October 2023 at 5:47am ET, which consequently triggered the tolling of twelve months after which the Commercial Reciprocity Treaty and its Supplemental Convention would terminate.

The reasoning behind the notice of termination was that the United States in its unlawful and prolonged military occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom since 17 January 1893 has exploited its use of Pearl Harbor by establishing military bases and facilities throughout the Hawaiian Islands under the Indo-Pacific Command of the U.S. Department of Defense in violation of the Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land. Although the Hawaiian Kingdom is not a Contracting State to the 1907 Hague Convention (V), it is mere codification of nineteenth century customary international law. On April 7, 1855, King Kamehameha IV proclaimed the foreign policy of the Kingdom:

My policy, as regards all foreign nations, being that of peace, impartiality and neutrality, in the spirit of the Proclamation by the late King, of the 16th May last, and of the Resolutions of the Privy Council of the 15th June and 17th July, I have given to the President of the United States, at his request, my solemn adhesion to the rule, and to the principles establishing the rights of neutrals during war, contained in the Convention between his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and the United States, concluded in Washington on the 22nd July last.

This policy of neutrality remained unchanged throughout the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the policy of neutrality by the Hawaiian Kingdom as a Neutral Power were inserted as treaty provisions in the Hawaiian-Swedish/Norwegian Treaty of 1852, the Hawaiian-Spanish Treaty of 1863, and the Hawaiian-German Treaty of 1879. In its treaty with Sweden/Norway, Article XV states, “His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway engages to respect in time of war the neutral rights of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and to use his good offices with all other powers, having treaties with His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, to induce them to adopt the same policy towards the Hawaiian Kingdom.”

As a result of the termination of the treaty and its convention, all United States military forces in the Hawaiian Islands will be withdrawn in twelve months by 5:47am ET on October 26, 2024. On the withdrawal, the Council of Regency proclaimed:

And, We do require that when the United States has received this notice of termination, it shall, prior to the expiration of twelve months in accordance with Article I of the 1884 Supplemental Convention, remove all movable property at its military facilities throughout the Hawaiian Islands, including unexploded munitions, and fuel, with the exception of real property attached to the land or erected on it, including man-made objects, such as buildings, homes, structures, roads, sewers, and fences, to include on other properties that have been or are currently under its supervision and command.

Not all military forces in the Hawaiian Islands are affected by the notice of termination. There are two military forces present within the Hawaiian Kingdom today. That of the United States Federal government called Title 10 United States Code (“USC”) armed forces, and that of the State of Hawai‘i National Guard called Title 32 USC armed forces. Title 10 troops are purely American in origin while the Title 32 troops are Hawaiian in origin, and, therefore, remain in the Hawaiian Islands to be called by its original designation—the Royal Guard.

When the United States unilaterally annexed the Hawaiian Islands in violation of international law on 7 July 1898, it initiated the establishment of the United States Army Pacific, United States Marine Forces Pacific, United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Pacific Air Forces. The United States Army Pacific was established in the Hawaiian Islands in 1898 during the Spanish-American War, headquartered at its first military base called Camp McKinley on the Island of O‘ahu, and later headquartered at Fort Shafter on the Island of O‘ahu in 1921. In 1908, the Congress allocated funds to establish a Naval Station at Pearl Harbor.

In April 1942, the United States military forces in the Hawaiian Islands were organized into two commands for the Army under United States Army Forces Pacific and for the Navy as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Oceans Areas Commander-in-Chief. This command structure of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands during the Second World War was transformed into the United States Pacific Command on 1 January 1947, which is presently called the Indo-Pacific Command, whose headquarters is at Camp H.M. Smith on the Island of O‘ahu. In September 1947, the United States Air Force separated from the United States Army as a separate branch of the armed forces with its base headquartered at Hickam Air Force Base on the Island of O‘ahu, and later, in 2010, merged to become an element of Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam with the Navy.

The Indo-Pacific Command has four component commands stationed in the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom—United States Army Pacific, whose headquarters is at Fort Shafter on the Island of O‘ahu, United States Marine Forces Pacific, whose headquarters is at Camp H.M Smith on the Island of O‘ahu, United States Pacific Fleet, whose headquarters is at Naval Station Pearl Harbor on the Island of O‘ahu, and United States Pacific Air Forces, whose headquarters is at Hickam Air Force Base/Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on the Island of O‘ahu.

There is no legal basis for the presence of Title 10 USC military forces in the Hawaiian Islands by virtue of Congressional legislation because municipal laws have no extraterritorial effect. Since Congressional legislation is limited in operation to the territory of the United States, it cannot unilaterally establish military installations in the territory of a foreign State without the State’s consent through a treaty or convention. According to traditional international law, the concept of jurisdiction is linked to the State territory. As the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1927 Lotus case stated:

[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exer­cise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdic­tion is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention […] all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.

The presence of all Title 10 USC military forces throughout the Hawaiian Islands has a direct nexus to the 1884 Supplemental Convention that granted the United States exclusive access to Pearl Harbor. The 1884 Supplemental Convention was a valid treaty under international law up until the Hawaiian Kingdom’s notice of intention to terminate was received by the U.S. Department of State at 5:47am ET on 26 October 2023. As a consequence of the termination, all Title 10 USC military forces shall have to be withdrawn from the Hawaiian Islands no later than 5:47am ET on 26 October 2024. The military forces that remain is the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Royal Guard that is referred to today as the Hawai‘i Army and Air National Guard.

For a comprehensive report on the termination of the 1875 Commercial Reciprocity Treaty and its 1884 Supplemental Convention go to the Royal Commission of Inquiry’s Preliminary Report on this subject.

CLARIFICATION. The 1884 Supplemental Convention began a seven-year term as of 1887 when ratifications were exchanged in Washington, D.C. It would continue after the seven-year period until either the Hawaiian Kingdom or the United States gives notification of its intention to terminate the treaty. When notice is received by the other party a twelve-month period begins for termination. Article I specifically states:

The High Contracting Parties agree, that the time fixed for the duration of the said Convention, shall be definitely extended for a term of seven years from the date of the exchange of ratifications hereof, and further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the High Contracting Parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, each of the High Contracting Parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of seven years or at any time thereafter.

In other words, the seven-year term was locked in, but it would continue in force if there was no notice of termination. A similar provision for termination of the 1849 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States was stated in Article XVI:

The present treaty shall be in force from the date of the exchange of the ratifications, for the term of ten years, and further, until the end of twelve months after either of the contracting parties shall have given notice to the other of its intention to terminate the same, each of the said contracting parties reserving to itself the right of giving such notice at the end of the said term of ten years, or at any subsequent term.

Only the 1875 Commercial Reciprocity Treaty and the 1884 Supplemental Convention have been terminated. All other treaties with the United States remain in full force and effect.

Repealing Hawaiian Citizenship Acquired by Birthright—Jus Soli

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Today, October 2, 2023, the Council of Regency announced by proclamation that the acquisition of Hawaiian citizenship by being native or natural born within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom—jus soli, also called citizenship by birthright, has been repealed. From the date of the proclamation, the only way to acquire Hawaiian citizenship is being born in the Hawaiian Islands or abroad—jus sanguinis where at least one of the parents is a Hawaiian subject, or through naturalization by application to the Minister of the Interior. Citizenship by naturalization will not be considered until the United States occupation has come to an end. International law prohibits the acquisition of citizenship of the occupied State by birthright during the occupation because the law of occupation protects the status quo ante of the occupied State.

The proclamation’s intent is to protect the status quo ante of the population as it existed prior to the United States invasion on January 16, 1893, and its subsequent occupation that occurred the following day that is now at 130 years. According to the 1890 Government census, American citizens residing in the Hawaiian Kingdom numbered a mere 1,928, which was less than 2% of the entire population at the time, but exploded to 918,639 in 2009. Other populations of foreigners were also allowed by the United States to unlawfully migrate to the Hawaiian Islands that contributed to the radical disruption of the status quo ante of the population in 1893. The law of occupation is supposed to maintain and protect the status quo ante of the Hawaiian Kingdom, its institutions, population, and its economy but the United States did not adhere to the law of occupation for 130 years, which led to the commission of war crimes.

There are currently over thirty countries that have restricted citizenship by birthright—jus soli. In the case of India, it was in response to unlawful migration from Bangladesh.

Hawaiian Nationality: Who Comprises the Hawaiian citizenry

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The European Convention on Nationality defines nationality as the legal bond between a person and a State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin. It is a person owing loyalty to and entitled by birth or naturalization to the protection of a given State. The terms nationality and citizenship are synonymous, and affords a person the political right to participate in government. Without it, a person is prevented from electing governmental officials or serving as a government official themselves. A political right is distinctly different from a civil right, which are basic human rights protected by the constitution and laws of the State, irregardless of a person’s citizenship. Non-citizens residing in the State are categorized as Aliens or Foreigners.

There are three ways a person could acquire citizenship within an established State depending on its national laws: (1) jus sanguinis, where a person being born outside the territory of the State acquires the citizenship of his or her parents; (2) jus soli, where the nationality is conferred upon a person by birth within the territory of the State; and (3) naturalization, where the government grants citizenship upon the application of a foreigner.

On January 21, 1868, the Minister of the Interior for the Hawaiian Kingdom, Ferdinand Hutchison, stated the criteria for Hawaiian nationality: “In the judgment of His Majesty’s Government, no one acquires citizenship in this Kingdom unless he is born here, or born abroad of Hawaiian parents, (either native or naturalized) during their temporary absence from the kingdom, or unless having been the subject of another power, he becomes a subject of this kingdom by taking the oath of allegiance.”

The position of the Hawaiian Government was founded upon Hawaiian statute. Section III, Art. I, Chap. V of an Act to Organize the Executive Departments, 1845 and 1846, provided: “All persons born within the jurisdiction of this kingdom, whether of alien foreigners, of naturalized or of native parents, and all persons born abroad of a parent native of this kingdom, and afterwards coming to reside in this, shall be deemed to owe native allegiance to His Majesty. All such persons shall be amenable to the laws of this kingdom as native subjects. All persons born abroad of foreign parents, shall unless duly naturalized, as in this article prescribed, be deemed aliens, and treated as such, pursuant to the laws.”

There are two exceptions where birth within the territory does not result in citizenship. First, where a child is born within the territory, but the child’s parents are foreign ambassadors or diplomats, that child is not a citizen of the territory of birth; and second, where a child is born of Alien enemies in an area of the territory under hostile occupation, that child will not be a citizen.

Regarding children of foreign diplomats, Frederick Turrill was an American citizen born in the Hawaiian Islands, but later got naturalized on May 21, 1888; and E.H. Wodehouse was a British subject born in the islands and later naturalized on May 7, 1892. The second exception applies to belligerent occupations.

There are numerous references to “children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation,” and one such reference is a U.S. Supreme Court decision. In 1898 during the Spanish-American War, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a decision concerning the United States citizenship of Wong Kim Ark, a person of Chinese descent. In that decision it also expounded upon the two exceptions to the acquisition of citizenship by birth as determined by the common law of England and made reference to an English case, Calvin’s case, which was decided by the English Court in the year 1608. Although the Hawaiian Kingdom courts have stated that the common law is not in force in this Kingdom, it did state that “…in construing our law the Court must be guided by those enactments and the decisions of American and English Courts.” In re Apuna, 6 Haw. 732 (1869).

In United States vs. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

“The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance, also called ‘ligealty,’ ‘obedience,’ ‘faith’ or ‘power,’ of the King. The principle embraced all persons born within the King’s allegiance and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual—as expressed in the maxim, protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem—and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance; but were predicable of aliens in amity, so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born in England, of such aliens, were therefore naturalborn subjects. but the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the King’s dominions, were not natural born subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction of the King.”

In the Calvin’s case (1608), the English Court stated: “…for if enemies should come into the realm, and possess town or fort, and have issue there, that issue is no subject of the King of England though he be born upon his soil;” and “if any of the King’s ambassadors in foreign nations have children…they are natural born subjects [of England], yet they are born out of the King’s dominion.”

Once a State is occupied, international law preserves the status quo of the occupied State as it was before the occupation began. To preserve the nationality of the occupied State from being manipulated by the occupying State to its advantage, international law only allows individuals born within the territory of the occupied State to acquire the nationality of their parents—jus sanguinis. To preserve the status quo, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention mandates that the “Occupying Power shall not…transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” For individuals, who were born within Hawaiian territory, to be a Hawaiian subjects they must be a direct descendant of a person or persons who were Hawaiian subjects prior to the American occupation that began on January 17, 1893, which is when Queen Lili‘uokalani conditionally surrendered to the United States. All individuals born after the surrender to the present are Aliens who can only acquire the nationality of their parents. According to Professor von Glahn, “children born in territory under enemy occupation possess the nationality of their parents.”

According to the 1890 government census, Hawaiian subjects numbered 48,107, with the aboriginal Hawaiian, both pure and part, numbering 40,622, being 84% of the national population, and the non-aboriginal Hawaiians numbering 7,485, being 16%. Despite the massive and illegal migrations of foreigners to the Hawaiian Islands since 1898, which, according to the State of Hawai‘i numbered 1,302,939 in 2009, the status quo of the national population of the Hawaiian Kingdom is maintained.Therefore, under the international laws of occupation, the aboriginal Hawaiian population of 322,812 in 2009 would continue to be 84% of the Hawaiian national population. The 16% of non-aboriginal Hawaiian subjects will need to be determined by a census report.

Similar to the Hawaiian Kingdom, the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were occupied by the Russians for over half a century. In 1940, Russian intervention provided for the forced incorporation of these Baltic States into the U.S.S.R. In 1991, with the breakup of the Soviet Union, these Baltic States once again regained their independence and immediately had to deal with the pressing issue of citizenship in the aftermath of prolonged Russian occupation.

Roger Brubaker, author of the article Citizenship struggles in Soviet Successor States (1992), stated that Estonia adopted a model for defining the initial body of citizens as the restored State model. States who regained their former independence are called restored States, and as these States are not new there would be no need to redefine a new body of citizens, but rather utilize the laws that existed before the occupation to determine the citizenry.

Under this model, persons born in Estonia before the 1940 annexation and their descendants were recognized as having Estonian citizenship. This also included United States citizens who were the offspring of Estonians. Regarding the citizenry of the occupier, the Estonian government also applied the same view the 1898 U.S. Supreme Court had made in U.S. vs. Wong Kim Ark. It viewed all Russians who entered the country after the occupation in 1940, and their descendants, as illegal and could not claim Estonian citizenship. But if a Russian was born in Estonia before the occupation that person acquired citizenship. Latvia also adopted the restored State model. Therefore, it can be stated as a matter of law and based on contemporary examples, that the Hawaiian citizenry of today is comprised of descendants of Hawaiian subjects and those foreigners who were born in the Hawaiian Islands prior to January 17, 1893.

This exclusion of the Hawaiian citizenry is based upon precedence and law, but a restored Hawaiian government does have the authority to widen the scope of its citizenry and adopt a more inclusive model in the aftermath of prolonged American occupation. Brubaker stated that Lithuania adopted such a model. Under the inclusive model, the original citizenry of Lithuania was confirmed under the restored State model, but the foreigners, which included the Russians, were divided into two groups. The first group comprised of permanent residents who would be granted optional inclusion in the Lithuanian citizenry, while the second would be classified as aliens. The optional inclusion of the first group depended upon these residents meeting certain minimum requirements established by the Lithuanian government. (i.e. years of residency and/or language).

Despite over a century of illegal migration that exploded the Alien population from 41,873 in 1890, of which U.S. citizens merely number 1,928, to 918,639 in 2009, the population of Hawaiian subjects has remained intact with its ratio of 84% aboriginal Hawaiians, who can readily be determined, and 16% non-aboriginal Hawaiians yet to be determined. This should alleviate the concern of aboriginal Hawaiian subjects who previously thought they were the minority, when in fact and law they remain the majority of the Hawaiian citizenry. Only Hawaiian subjects, whether aboriginal or non-aboriginal, have political rights, which means they alone can participate in government. §784 of the Hawaiian Civil Code states, “No alien shall be allowed to vote for representatives of the people.”

Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics publishes Volume no. 5

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From the Editor of the Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics, Professor Kalawai‘a Moore:

Since the attempted coup of 1887, history written on Hawaiʻi has been a highly political endeavor of a specific nature. The insurgents from the time of 1887 through the time of the United States coup de main of 1893 and beyond began writing a defensive justification narrative for their illegal actions as historical narratives. One among many of the distortions of historical truth has included a re-describing of the role of American missionary advisors in the earlier part of the 19th century as the driving force and main actors behind the development and running of a constitutional government of a nation-state. The motivations for the crafting of a history against which  enormous primary evidence exists to the contrary was the aim at winning public and material support from the United States, and elsewhere to secure and maintain control over Hawaiʻi. Losing control over Hawaiʻi for the insurgents could have led to prosecution for treason under the law an offense that was punishable by death. Exemplifying this false narrative, Lorrin Thurston, one of these insurgents, wrote:

Hawaiian Christianization, civilization, commerce, education, and development are the direct product of American effort. Hawaii is in every element and quality which enters into the composition of a modern civilized community, a child of America.

As Hawaiians began to enter the battle of historical narratives in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, certain facts of history put forward in American hegemonic writings were latently taken up as foundational truths in the writings and teachings by Hawaiians themselves. One example of a false truth from the insurgents that was carried forward in Hawaiian written work was the false fact of the annexation of Hawaiʻi as a fait acompli. As a fact, the “annexation” of Hawaiʻi has been proven wrong in newer scholarship of the past 25 years. The so called annexation of Hawaiʻi is no longer an accepted fact by most Hawaiian scholars. Another example of a historical fallacy that still circulates today and still has several Hawaiian proponents, is the idea above that the early missionaries were the driving force behind the development and running of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s constitutional government. Professor Jon Osorio provides an example of a Hawaiian indigenist thesis based on this idea. He wrote:

Accordingly, the very formation of a national entity in 1840 under the rudiments of Euro-American constitutions victimized the Native Hawaiians, consigning them to unfamiliar and inferior roles as wage laborers. Caucasian newcomers proceeded to transform the economic and social systems, marginalizing the Native both demographically and symbolically.

Hawaiian indigenist writings about missionary primacy were a part of many theses that argued that the nation-state, law, and governance were western impositions and detrimental to ethnic Hawaiians in line with a thinking that these Hawaiians acquired through theoretical learning with other indigenous peoples. More recent Hawaiian written histories have unearthed primary source materials that show another vantage point that posits missionary involvement came in the middle of an already ongoing process of Hawaiian governmental and nation-state development.

The newer findings show that Hawaiʻi became a unified, centralized state under Kamehameha I with its own organized state structure, adopting features of British styled government long before missionary arrival. Under Kaʻahumanu’s rule, a set of Christian modelled laws were adopted through a dialectical process with missionary advisors, but the Prime Minister was clearly in charge. At the request of King Kamehameha III, Kauikeaouli, the government adopted a secular character. Former missionaries were taken in as advisors and played different roles in the development of Hawaiian governance and were eventually replaced during the reigns of King Kamehameha IV, Alexander Liholiho, and King Kamehameha V, Lota Kapuaiwa, by “Hawaiian chiefs and nonmissionary westerners.” The missionaries were taken on as advisors under Kaʻahumanu and Kauikeaouli, but were not the decision makers, and Hawaiian government was fashioned in a hybrid manner. The Hawaiian Kingdom government was aboriginal Hawaiian controlled and fashioned in a dialectical process based on traditional Hawaiian customs and relationships.

The first set of missionaries while trying to carry out their mission, served at the will of the chiefs. Their ability to stay on the islands was dependent on chiefly permission. The chiefs found the missionaries useful as teachers of new technologies and information. Some of these missionaries like William Richards, and Gerrit Judd left the mission and served the high chiefs full time as advisors on foreign relations and government. This first generation of missionaries spoke of themselves and were spoken of by others as  loyal servants to the chiefs and the Hawaiian Kingdom. Sai notes this distinction between this first generation of missionaries and their descendants in his article “Synergy Through Convergence: The Hawaiian State and Congregationalism,” quoting the famous author Nordhoff, who was working as a correspondent for the newspaper Hawaii Holomua,

They, the fathers, stood by the natives against all foreign aggression. The elder Judd, a very able man, gave time, ability and his own means to the restoration of Hawaiian independence when it was attacked by an English admiral; his degenerate son, the present chief justice [Albert F. Judd] was part of the conspiracy which upset the government he had sworn to support and, himself a native of Hawaii, is active in the movement to destroy the State which his father gave a long life to establish defend and maintained.

This fifth volume of the Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics contains a number of articles that engage further the agency and independence of aboriginal Hawaiian chiefly rulers, and their abilities to both stay ahead of any political intrigue, and to employ missionary knowledge of literacy and teaching to their advantage. We also see further the distinction that can be made between the first generation of missionaries and their loyalty to the Crown and government, versus some of their descendants, who formed an ideological position of white cultural supremacy, undertaking a treasonous course of action. This later generation showed a completely different attitude and approach to the Hawaiian Crown. Sai’s work further shows how aboriginal Hawaiian leadership from the Hawaiian Patriotic League clearly saw this distinction between the generations referring in testimony to many of the insurgent second and third generationers as the “faithless sons of missionaries and local politicians angered by continous political defeat.”

In the first article by Dr. Susan Corley “Liholiho’s Kauaʻi Coup,” we get an opportunity to understand better the character of King Kamehameha II, Liholiho, as ruler. Corley details an attempt by Hiram Bingham, a missionary of the first mission, to strengthen his position in the islands by enlisting the aid of Kaumualiʻi, King of the Island of Kaua‘i, suggesting the chief fund a mission to Tahiti. Liholiho intercedes using the occassion to outmaneuver both Bingham and Kaumualiʻi, taking full personal control of the island of Kauaʻi, and making it clear to the missionaries that he “held power and control over their ability to continue” their mission. Corley describes Liholihoʻs maneuvering and leadership as a matter of “guile where his father would have used force.”

In “‘He Kaula Uila’: Hawaiian Educational Policy in the 19th Century ‘Ke Aʻo Palapala ma Nā Aloaliʻi a me Nā Kuaʻāina,’” Brandi Jean Nalani Balutski starts with a more well-known excerpt from a speech made by Kauikeaouli upon ascension to the throne “he aupuni palapala koʻu” (mine is a kingdom of learning). Balutski details the chiefly adoption of the technology of literacy and education as formal policy of the early Hawaiian Kingdom and an ethos that education be taken up by all class levels. Balutski details the life journeys and roles of five aboriginal Hawaiian men who returned to Hawai‘i with these first missionaries acting as intermediaries between them and the ruling chiefs. Balutski shows how Thomas Hopu  became the personal teachers for the high chiefs and their children. Others like George Humehume, son of Kaumuali‘i, became advisors for his father and their inner circle of chiefs who saw possible advantages in adopting literacy as a political tool. Despite initial concerns about the missionaries from the United States, their value in teaching literacy and the chiefs understanding of the value of literacy as a technology in dealing with various outsiders, paved the way for the acceptance of the American missionaries because of the benefit that literacy could hold “to control the encounter with foreigners, to favor their interests and those of their lineages, to express their understanding of the world, and to shape that world to their ends.”

In “Synergy Through Convergence: The Hawaiian State and Congregationalism,” Dr. Keanu Sai details further the distinction between the role of early American missionaries in support of the Hawaiian Kingdom government, and the later generations of “faithless sons of missionaries.” He starts by examining the rhetoric in history and political writings that has built a “myth of missionary control,” and contrasts these fabrications through use of the writings by aboriginal Hawaiians and supporters from the late 19th century, including a direct response by Kauikeaouli himself refuting a question of missionary control, and affirming his use of missionaries as teachers of literacy and translators between the government and foreign representatives. Sai shows a link between the congregationalism of the American missionaries and the influence of governmental reform in the Hawaiian Kingdom calling it a synergy whereby the “forces of both coalesced and each saw the other as beneficial to their own goals.” Sai illustrates the benefits to both sides during this time period to show further the false narratives that have been put forth stating that the “continuation of Americanism [was] initiated by the missionaries since 1820.”

In “Apartheid Hawai’i: California Colony at Wahiawā,” Dr. Ronald Williams Jr. continues his work showing the rise of white supremacist thought and action in Hawaiʻi starting with the break in local protestantism from congregationalism to a philosophy of “minority, White rule over both church and state” in the 1860s and 70s. Proponents of this change fomented an outright opposition to King Kalākaua during his reign, and supported the complete seizure of the government through U.S. facilitation in 1893, and then the full establishment of white oligarchic rule into the Territorial era in the 1900’s. Williams documents the efforts to establish a California Colony of white families in Wahiawā starting in 1899. This effort was made possible through earlier legislation called the 1895 Land Act introduced by Sanford Dole utilizing the newly confiscated Crown Lands for the express purpose of promoting “the immigration of permanent settlers of a character suitable for the building up of our population.” Williams documents the push by the government of the illegal Republic to settle white families on 1,350 acres of land before the “annexation” of the islands was completed. He further details the ideological drive behind the Dole government’s push to establish and support this community, which unashamedly sought to build a community of social and educational institutions based on the idea of racial segregation expressed as an “American way” as exemplified by the American South. The Wahiawā colony ultimately fails because of the greed of some of its backers and the success of pineapple farms like the one run by James Dole, which priced other small farmers out of the market.

In “The Decline of Hawaiian Language Common Schools During the Hawaiian Kingdom From 1864 to 1893: A Statistical Analysis,” Dr. Larson Ng walks through a quantitative data study of Hawaiian Kingdom government records on Hawaiian language common schools, English language schools, and independent schools looking at funding, attendance, and population statistics. Ng walks us through a brief history of the school system in the Hawaiian Kingdom and some of the theories in circulation that have tried to link causation of the decrease in aborginal attendence at Hawaiian language common schools to ideologies of “settler colonialism.” Ng’s regression analysis shows that the most important statistical factor in the decline of Hawaiian language common school attendance was the decline in the aboriginal Hawaiian population. He noted that funding disparities were a matter of aboriginal Hawaiian governmental prioritization, rather than an ideological imposition by outsiders.

In my article I provide an analysis of Dr. Kehaulani Kauanui’s book Paradoxes of Hawaiian Sovereignty: Land, Sex, and the Colonial Politics of State Nationalism, in which I call Kauanui’s work a remonstrance against Hawaiians turning toward the Hawaiian Kingdom, and a lament over the waning of Hawaiian indigeneity. I provide a critical analysis that Kauanui lacks any “deep evidentiary work on the matters” she covers, “leaving key source perspectives and facts out in some arguments.” I provide critical comment on her continued misuse and mentoring of the term “colonization” and her focus on the “state” instead of “government” as showing a lack of political and legal disciplinary awareness, and when taken with her attempt to reinvent the term “indigenous” for use in the Hawaiian context shows a kind of paradigm paralysis. I provide additional comment that Kauanui adds no insight of value in her examination of the Mahele in her book. She simply represents old, debunked theories and facts, adding only a new form of rhetorical approach which in my words, states that, “Almost every page in this chapter by Kauanui is inaccurate, and all of her imported theories irrelevant.” On matters of gender and sexuality, Kauanui starts from that earlier mentioned perspective that the missionaries controlled and were in charge of the lives, government, and state creation of the chiefs in Hawai’i, which I disprove. I agree that there were changes that were made in laws on marriage, coverture, and sex that need to be examined and cautioned against. I add that Kauanui is really engaged in a fight over the gender and sexual politics of today seeking to head off losses or maintain rights through closing off the Hawaiian Kingdom as political possibility. Toward building her case, I show that Kauanui left out key information and misarranged key source quotes that would otherwise show subversion, and ambivalence toward conservative laws on gender and coverture. Kauanui does not reveal that coverture was fought, slowly dismantled, and then repealed. And does not reveal that her own sources show women as “jural subjects” and in one case did not show how her source stated that they could not agree that women’s status diminished with government reform. I also caution against obscuring source material to argue politics, and I point out that, “It can be said that there were heteropatriarchal forces at work in the Hawaiian Kingdom, but one cannot say that the Hawaiian Kingdom is a heteropatriarchal government, [society], nor state.”

The last two sections of this volume of the Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics include two documents recently published by the Council of Regency as the Occupied Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom. One entitled “Operational Plan for Transitioning the State of Hawai’i into a Military Government,” and the second, “Operational Plan for Transitioning the Military Government into the Hawaiian Kingdom Government.” Both documents were written by the acting Government, whose officers consist of Dr. David Keanu Sai, Kauʻi P. Sai-Dudoit, and Dexter Keʻeaumoku Kaʻiama, Esq.

In the “Operational Plan for Transitioning the State of Hawai’i into a Military Government,” the acting Government lays out in detail the historical and legal justifications for the actions needed to move from an illegal State of Hawaiʻi government to military government under international humanitarian law and the law of occupation.

A detailed history is provided from state recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1843 through the U.S. invasion and overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom government, to the U.S. military occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The Plan lays out “essential” and “implied” tasks including the setting up of a temporary administrator of the laws of the occupied state, the establishment of a military government, the proclamation of provisional laws, the disbanding of the State of Hawaiʻi Legislature and County Councils, setting up a temporary administrator of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates that belong to the occupied state, and tasks that protect the institutions of the occupied state.

In the “Operational Plan for Transitioning the Military Government into the Hawaiian Kingdom Government,” the acting Government lays out plans for the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces, dealing with the Hawaiian state territory, reparations, and the seizing of property. The plan lays out details on the transition from a military government to the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom; the creation and ratification of a Treaty of Peace, the conducting of a national census, the convening of a Legisltive Assembly, who will then, based on the Hawaiian Kingdom constitution, begin to put together the rest of the Hawaiian Kingdom government. These two plans are the only plans of action for the restoration of the Hawaiian Kingdom government. The historical importance of including these documents as part of the Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics can not be understated and it was the work of the Council of Regency that was able to get the Permanent Court of Arbitration to acknowledge the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State that generated the impetus in the formation of the Hawaiian Society of Law and Politics at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa and the establishment of the Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics.

We close these Editor’s notes with a mahalo (gratitude) to the authors for their work examining topics of interest and importance, and we look forward to more academic work and discussion that persists toward that Kuleana of Scholarship we endeavor to uphold.

The Significance and the Importance of the Two Operational Plans of the Council of Regency

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When dealing with a 130-year crisis of a prolonged and illegal American occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom, planning is a crucial component that informs where we are today and where we want to be tomorrow. An operational plan is informed by due diligence of the situation, which is a gathering of information relevant to the situation at hand and how it got to the current situation. In the military, this is colloquially known as gathering intel before you come up with a battle plan.

Due diligence is “depending on the relative facts of the special case.” It is the assessment of a situation before a decision should be made. When due diligence is done, the person doing it must be mindful of their own biases and assumptions. To gather information through one’s own bias is what is called “confirmation bias” where the gatherer of information only selects information that would confirm his/her own biases. This is also called cherry picking.

In the Hawaiian situation, there is an abundance of assumptions that are false such as the Hawaiian Islands were colonized by the United States in the nineteenth century, and, as a colonized people, Native Hawaiians are an Indigenous People by definition of the United Nations. United Nations defines Indigenous Peoples as tribal nations that exist with an independent State not of their own making. Arriving at this conclusion was done through confirmation bias.

The Council of Regency sought to gather information through the lens of both the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom and international law that includes international humanitarian law and the law of occupation. It was through this process that revealed that the Hawaiian Kingdom, which existed as an internationally recognized sovereign and independent State continued to exist since November 28, 1843, despite the illegal overthrow of its government by the United States on January 17, 1893. This continued existence stemmed from the international principle of inalienability of sovereignty of a State, and the only way a State can alienate its sovereignty is by its consent through a treaty of cession with the acquiring State. There exists no such treaty, therefore, the Hawaiian State continues to exist.

It was based on this premise that the government was restored as a Council of Regency in 1997 to provisionally represent the Hawaiian State both domestically and abroad. The actions to be taken by the Council of Regency would be in line with its strategic plan that entailed three phases. Phase I—verification of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and a subject of international law. Phase II—exposure of Hawaiian Statehood within the framework of international law and the laws of occupation as it affects the realm of politics and economics at both the international and domestic levels. Phase III—restoration of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and a subject of international law. Phase III is when the American occupation comes to an end.

Phase I was achieved when the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), before establishing the arbitration tribunal in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom on June 9, 2000, acknowledged the continued existence of the Hawaiian State, and the Council of Regency as its government. Phase II, exposure of the Hawaiian State, was initiated during oral hearings on December 7, 8 and 11, 2000, at the PCA in The Hague. Phase II continued at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa when the Chairman of the Council of Regency, David Keanu Sai, entered the political science graduate program, where he received a master’s degree specializing in international relations and public law in 2004 and a Ph.D. degree in 2008 on the subject of the continuity of Hawaiian Statehood while under an American prolonged belligerent occupation since 1893.

The exposure through academic research also motivated historian Tom Coffman to change the title of his 1998 book from Nation Within: The Story of America’s Annexation of the Nation of Hawai‘i, to Nation Within—The History of the American Occupation of Hawai‘i. Coffman explained the change in his note on the second edition and took a quote from Dr. Sai’s law article A Slippery Path Towards Hawaiian Indigeneity. Coffman wrote:

I am compelled to add that the continued relevance of this book reflects a far-reaching political, moral and intellectual failure of the United States to recognize and deal with the takeover of Hawai‘i. In the book’s subtitle, the word Annexation has been replaced by the word Occupation, referring to America’s occupation of Hawai‘i. Where annexation connotes legality by mutual agreement, the act was not mutual and therefore not legal. Since by definition of international law there was no annexation, we are left then with the word occupation.

In making this change, I have embraced the logical conclusion of my research into the events of 1893 to 1898 in Honolulu and Washington, D.C. I am prompted to take this step by a growing body of historical work by a new generation of Native Hawaiian scholars. Dr. Keanu Sai writes, “The challenge for … the fields of political science, history, and law is to distinguish between the rule of law and the politics of power.” In the history of the Hawai‘i, the might of the United States does not make it right.

It took the Council of Regency just over 20 years to change the conversation from colonization and indigenous peoples rights to military occupation and the rights of Hawaiian subjects under the law of occupation. With the shifting of the historical lens, legal consequences began to emerge especially with the involvement of Professor Matthew Craven from the University of London, SOAS, School of Law, who authored a legal opinion on the Continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law; Professor William Schabas from Middlesex University London, School of Law, and a renowned expert in international criminal law, who authored a Legal Opinion on War Crimes related to the United States belligerent occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom; and Professor Federico Lenzerini from the University of Siena, Italy, Department of Political and International Science, who authored Legal Opinion on the authority of the Council of Regency of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Both the Operational Plans for Transitioning the State of Hawai‘i into a Military Government and Transitioning the Military Government to the Hawaiian Kingdom Government, which will bring the prolonged American occupation to an end, is a culmination of years of research and exposure and is a subset of plans under phase II of the strategic plan. As such we are moving toward the end of phase II and preparing for phase III that will bring the 130-year crisis to an end.

The two operational plans are clear as to where we are, where we need to get to, and the path to get there. The essential tasks and the implied tasks in each of the plans are measurable, and, most importantly, flexible when achieving the tasks. They allow flexibility to adjust to issues unforeseen such as time and allocation of resources. The Council of Regency established a 3-year window for the occupation to come to an end, but it doesn’t prevent unforeseen and extenuating circumstances to adjust the timeline. When the American occupation of Japan began in 1945, it was thought that it would last 3 years. But circumstances extended the occupation an additional 4 years. The same could happen in the Hawaiian situation, but the Council of Regency needed to set an initial timeline of 3 years.