There is some confusion as to who or what is responsible for prosecuting war criminals, in particular, war crimes committed against the civilian population of an occupied State. The simple answer are governments who signed and ratified the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. This responsibility is further amplified when governments signed and ratified the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, Netherlands.
One such country is New Zealand. Professor Treasa Dunworth wrote a revealing law article in the New Zealand Yearbook of International Law titled “From Rhetoric to Reality: Prosecuting War Criminals in New Zealand” in 2008. According to Professor Dunworth, in order to pursue the prosecution of war criminals by New Zealand courts there are two statutory options, the Geneva ConventionsAct of 1958 and the International Crimes and International Criminal Court Actof 2000 (ICC Act). New Zealand signed the Rome Statute on October 7, 1998, and deposited its instrument of ratification with the Secretary General of the United Nations on September 7, 2000.
Prosecution of war criminals must be evidence based and not politically driven. The Geneva Conventions Act and the ICC Act allows New Zealand to prosecute any person irrespective of their nationality and where the war crime was committed.
Under the Rome Statute, the national courts of contracting States have the responsibility to deal with cases of international crimes first called complementary jurisdiction to the ICC. The ICC deals only with cases under limited circumstances. Article 1 of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this State, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”
According to the Handbook on Complementarity, there are at least four reasons for the complementary system: 1) it protects the accused if they have been prosecuted before national courts; 2) it respects national sovereignty in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction; 3) it might promote greater efficiency because the ICC cannot deal with all cases of serious crimes; and 4) it puts the onus on States to do their duty under international and national law to investigate and prosecute alleged serious crimes (that is, it is not just a matter of efficiency but a matter of law, policy, and morality).
Under New Zealand law there are two ways to get a war criminal arrested, which is separate from the prosecution, which can only take place with the consent of the Attorney-General. The most common way to get an arrest warrant is for the Attorney-General to pursue a public prosecution by seeking an arrest warrant, or by a process for a private prosecution for war crimes where a person, whether a citizen of New Zealand or not, acts as an “Informant” in order to file an application of information before a District Court. This right of a private person to file an application comes under section 345(2) of the Crimes Actof 1961. This section was repealed and replaced by section 15 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 2011 where “Any person may commence a proceeding.”
On November 27, 2006, a New Zealand District Court in Auckland issued an arrest warrant for Lieutenant General Mosche Ya’alon, former Israeli Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Force. Ya’alon approved the order of bombing a Palestinian terrorist in Gaza that also killed civilians, which is a war crime. On behalf of the family killed, Janfrie Wakim filed information with the District Court in Auckland. Wakim alleged that Ya’alon was guilty of war crimes by his participation in the decision to carry out the assassination of Salah Shehadeh. Wakim provided the District Court with compelling evidence of the war crimes.
The war crimes alleged were a breach of section 3(1) of the Geneva Conventions Act. Wakim also invoked Section 11 of the ICC Act, alleging breaches of Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute being grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions including wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to the body or health (Article 8(2)(a)(iii)); extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly (Article 8(2)(a)(iv)); intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities (Article 8(2)(b)(i) and Article 8(2)(e)(i)); and finally, intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated (Article 8(2)(b)(iv)).
Wakim filed on a Friday November 24 and the application was heard on Monday November 27. District Court Judge Deobhakta was satisfied that the Informant made a compelling case for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Ya’alon. On Tuesday November 28, after receiving Wakim’s request for consent of the Attorney-General to prosecute as required under both war crime statutes, the Attorney-General filed a warrant to put a hold on the proceedings. The District Court cancelled the arrest warrants and the proceedings eventually came to a close.
The Attorney-General justified his actions by stating in a press release that “there was insufficient evidence to support any possible prosecution.” The Attorney-General later stated, “It is the law in New Zealand that before any criminal proceedings can be commenced charging a person with war crimes the person brining the charges must obtain consent of the Attorney-General. This provision is compatible with New Zealand’s relevant international obligations.
Section 3(5) of the Geneva Conventions Act states, “No one shall be prosecuted for an offense against this section without the leave of the Attorney-General.” And section 13 of the ICC Act states, “Proceedings for an offense against section 9 [genocide] or section 10 [crimes against humanity] or section 11 [war crimes] may not be instituted in any New Zealand court without the consent of the Attorney-General.”
However, section 13 of the ICC Act also states, “a person charged with an offence against section 9 or section 10 or section 11 may be arrested, or a warrant for his or her arrest may be issued and executed, and the person may be remanded in custody or on bail, even though the consent of the Attorney-General to the institution of a prosecution for the offence has not been obtained, but no further proceedings can be taken until that consent has been obtained.”
A plain reading of section 13 of the ICC Act explicitly allowed for the arrest warrant of Ya’alon “even though the consent of the Attorney-General…has not been obtained.” While there is no exception to the consent provision in the Geneva Conventions Act, it must be read in light of section 25(2)(a) of the Prosecution of Offences Act of 1985, which provides that any such consent provision of the Attorney-General “shall not prevent the arrest without warrant, or the issue of execution of a warrant for the arrest, of person for any offence, or the remand in custody or bail of a person charged with any offense.”
The action taken by the Attorney-General in the Ya’alon case was political and not legal. For the Attorney-General to state “there was insufficient evidence to support any possible prosecution” undermines District Court Judge Deobhakta’s decision that there was enough evidence, which was the basis for the arrest warrants in the first place. Ya’alon entered and departed New Zealand territory without being arrested.
This episode was not a failure of the law but a failure to comply with the letter of the law. And more importantly, Ya’alon is still a war criminal because there is no statute of limitation for war crimes. In other words, Ya’alon may still find himself in a New Zealand courtroom. Professor Dunworth ends her article with, “New Zealand could make good on its rhetorical claim to being a champion of a true international criminal justice system.”
Individuals found to be guilty of war crimes by the Royal Commission of Inquiry’s War Criminal Reports could well find themselves before a New Zealand Court for prosecution. There are 121 other countries, like New Zealand, that are contracting States to the Rome Statute and have similar provisions in their laws for the prosecution of war criminals under complementary jurisdiction to the ICC. Most of these countries have extradition treaties and if their citizens or subjects were the victims of war crimes committed outside of their home country, like the Hawaiian Kingdom, their governments could also seek extradition warrants when the war criminals travel to an extraditing country.
On this momentous day of Hawaiian independence since November 28, 1843, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed a Response to the State of Hawai‘i’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint in the federal court in Honolulu shifting focus to the Royal Commission of Inquiry and its investigations of war criminals. The Royal Commission of Inquiry provides war criminal reports documenting evidence of perpetrators committing certain war crimes so that they can be prosecuted. There is no statute of limitation for war crimes.
When the federal court proceeding was initiated by a Complaint filed on May 21, 2021, and followed by the filing of an Amended Complaint on August 11, 2021, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s stated purpose was to have the Court put a stop to the unlawful imposition of the United States constitution, Federal and State of Hawai‘i statutes, County ordinances, common law, administrative law, and the maintenance of the U.S. military installations across the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom. This imposition of American laws is a violation of the laws of occupation and constitutes the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty.
Here follows word for word theHawaiian Kingdom’s Responseto the State of Hawai‘i’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint:
Today marks the 179th anniversary Great Britain and France jointly recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as a sovereign and independent State on November 28, 1843, at the Court of London. The United States followed on July 6, 1844. Since January 17, 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom came under belligerent occupation after Queen Lili‘uokalani conditionally surrendered by “yield[ing] to the superior force of the United States.”
As a subject of international law, the Hawaiian State would continue to exist despite its government being unlawfully overthrown by the United States on January 17, 1893. President Cleveland entered into a treaty, by exchange of notes, with Queen Lili‘uokalani on December 18, 1893, whereby the President committed to restoring the Queen as the Executive Monarch, and, thereafter, the Queen committed to granting a full pardon to the insurgents. Political wrangling in the Congress, however, prevented President Cleveland from carrying out his obligations under the executive agreement. Five years later, the United States Congress enacted a joint resolution for the purported annexation of the Hawaiian Islands that was signed into law on July 7, 1898, by President William McKinley.
Professor Wright, a renowned American political scientist, states that “international law distinguishes between a government and the state it governs.” And Judge Crawford of the International Court of Justice clearly explains that “[b]elligerent occupation does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.” Crawford’s conclusion is based on the “presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations … despite a period in which there is…no effective government (emphasis added).” Applying this principle to the Second Gulf War, Crawford explains, the
occupation of Iraq in 2003 illustrated the difference between ‘government’ and ‘State’; when Members of the Security Council, after adopting SC res 1511, 16 October 2003, called for the rapid “restoration of Iraq’s sovereignty”, they did not imply that Iraq had ceased to exist as a State but that normal governmental arrangements should be restored.
When the Hawaiian Kingdom initiated these sui generis proceedings on May 20, 2021, it sought to arrest the commission of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty by having the Court “[e]njoin Defendants from implementing or enforcing all laws of the Defendants UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and the STATE OF HAWAI‘I AND ITS COUNTIES, to include the United States constitution, State of Hawai‘i constitution, Federal and State of Hawai‘i statutes, County ordinances, common law, case law, administrative law, and the maintenance of Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’s military installations across the territory of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, to include its territorial sea.” These proceedings have now gone on for sixteen months and the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty is still being committed with impunity.
The basis of the complaint was the presumption that the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State continues to exist despite its government being militarily overthrown by the United States on January 17, 1893. The Hawaiian Kingdom as a State is a juridical fact, which was acknowledged by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom in 1999.
When these proceedings were initiated, the Hawaiian Kingdom, however, understood that it could not get relief until the Court transforms itself from an Article III Court into an Article II Occupation Court because it is situated in the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom and not the United States. In its Amended Complaint, the Hawaiian Kingdom addressed this under the heading “Jurisdiction and Venue:”
While this court is operating within the territory of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM and not within the territory of Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, its jurisdiction is found as a de facto Article II Court. According to Professor Bederman:
What, then, is distinctive about a court established under Article II of the Constitution? First, executive tribunals are established without an act of Congress or any other form of legislative concurrence. Congressional intent concerning the status of a presidential court is irrelevant because no congressional approval is needed. The fact that the President alone can create an executive court places it outside the scope of Article III of the Constitution, which demands that Congress shall establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Second, the executive courts are created pursuant only to the power and authority granted to the President in Article II of the Constitution. In practice, the only presidential power that would call for the creation of a court is that arising from his responsibility as Commander in Chief of the armed services and his subsequent war-making authority.
The authority for this Court to assume jurisdiction as a de facto Article II Court is fully elucidated in the Amicus Curiae brief previously lodged in these proceedings by virtue of the Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief on July 30, 2021 [ECF 45] by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), the National Lawyers Guild (NLG), and the Water Protector Legal Collective (WPLC). The Amicus brief is instructional for the Court to transition to a de facto Article II Court.
An Article II Court was established in Germany after hostilities ceased in 1945 during the Second World War. After the surrender, western Germany came under belligerent occupation by the United States, France and Great Britain. The military occupation officially came to an end on May 5, 1955, with the entry into force of peace treaties called the Bonn Conventions between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Occupying States. During the occupation, these Article II Courts had jurisdiction “over all persons in the occupied territory,” except for Allied armed forces, their dependents, and civilian officials, for “[a]ll offenses against the laws and usages of war[,] […] [a]ll offenses under any proclamation, law, ordinance, notice or order issued by or under the authority of the Military Government or of the Allied Forces, [and] [a]ll offenses under the laws of the occupied territory or any part thereof.”
Like the Article II Court in Germany, this Court has Jurisdiction as a de facto Article II Court because this action arises under international humanitarian law—law of armed conflict, which include the 1907 Hague Convention, IV (1907 Hague Regulations), the 1907 Hague Convention, V, the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV (1949 Fourth Geneva Convention), and Hawaiian Kingdom law. Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.
The Court is authorized to award the requested declaratory and injunctive relief as a de facto Article II Court because it is situated within the territory of the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM that has been under a prolonged belligerent occupation by the United States of America since January 17, 1893.
Venue is proper because the events giving rise to this claim occurred in this District, and the Defendants are being sued in their official capacities.
When the Amici filed their amicus curiae brief in support of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Amended Complaint on October 6, 2021, they sought to assist the Court in the understanding as to why it must transform into an Article II Occupation Court given the legal and factual situation of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The Amici stated:
Under the concept of void ab initio, there are structures that have no legal effect from inception. The United States occupation of Hawai‘i began with unclean hands, and this can only be remedied by a clean slate and a new beginning. Recognition of the prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States through Declaratory Judgment is not only a redressable claim, it is long overdue and would only be consistent with what is already known to the international community and clear under international law. Additionally, granting the Hawaiian Kingdom injunctive relief would acknowledge the Kingdom’s continuous sovereignty, mitigate the United States’ liability for its war crimes against the Hawaiian people, and apply local law as required of an occupying power by the international law of war. Acknowledging extraterritoriality and occupation would have the practical effect of applying the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom but as was the case with prior occupation courts, this would not nullify any prior decisions of any of the courts currently operating in Hawai‘i, so long as they are not inconsistent with local law.
As an Article III Court, the Court cannot claim to have jurisdiction within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom unless it can provide rebuttable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State was extinguished under international law. As Professor Craven stated, “[i]f one were to speak about a presumption of continuity, one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States.”
Without proffering any “reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States,” this Court is precluded from asserting jurisdiction as an Article III Court when it is situated within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom and any judgment it makes is void. A judgment is void “if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject-matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.” According to Justice Story, “no sovereignty can extend its process beyond its territorial limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial decisions. Every exertion of authority beyond this limit is a mere nullity.” In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Supreme Court reiterated Justice Story’s views on territorial jurisdiction. The Court stated:
[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory (citation omitted). The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists as an elementary principle that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory except so far as is allowed by comity, and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.
Since these proceedings began, neither the Court nor the Defendants provided any “reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States,” and, therefore, the presumption of the Hawaiian State remains. Their arguments, to include the arguments made in the instant motion to dismiss, relies on “the United States constitution, State of Hawai‘i constitution, Federal and State of Hawai‘i statutes, County ordinances, common law, case law, [and] administrative law,” which is the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty. The Amended Complaint clearly states:
Municipal laws of the Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA being imposed in the HAWAIIAN KINGDOM constitute a violation of the law of occupation, which, according to Professor Schabas, is the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty. The actus reus of the offense “would consist of the imposition of legislation or administrative measures by the occupying power that go beyond those required by what is necessary for military purposes of the occupation.” All war crimes committed in the Hawaiian kingdom have a direct nexus and extend from the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty.
According to Professor Schabas, the requisite elements for the following war crimes are:
Elements of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during occupation
1. The perpetrator imposed or applied legislative or administrative measures of the occupying power going beyond those required by what is necessary for military purposes of the occupation. 2. The perpetrator was aware that the measures went beyond what was required for military purposes or the protection of fundamental human rights. 3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict. 4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstance that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation
Elements of the war crime of denationalization
1. The perpetrator participated in the imposition or application of legislative or administrative measures of the occupying power directed at the destruction of the national identity and national consciousness of the population. 2. The perpetrator was aware that the measures were directed at the destruction of the national identity and national consciousness of the population. 3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict. 4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstance that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.
Elements of the war crime of pillage
1. The perpetrator appropriated certain property. 2. The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of property and to appropriate it for private or personal use. 3. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner. 4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict. 5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.
Elements of the war crime of confiscation or destruction of property
1. The perpetrator confiscated or destroyed property in an occupied territory, be it that belonging to the State or individuals. 2. The confiscation or destruction was not justified by military purposes of the occupation or by the public interest. 3. The perpetrator was aware that the owner of the property was the State or an individual and that the act of confiscation or destruction was not justified by military purposes of the occupation or by the public interest. 4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict. 5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstance that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.
Elements of the war crime of deprivation of fair and regular trial
1. The perpetrator deprived one or more persons in an occupied territory of fair and regular trial by denying judicial guarantees recognized under international law, including those of the fourth Geneva Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 2. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict. 3. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstance that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.
Elements of the war crime of deporting civilians of the occupied territory
1. The perpetrator deported or forcibly transferred, without grounds permitted under international law, one or more persons in the occupied State to another State or location, including the occupying State, or to another location within the occupied territory, by expulsion or coercive acts. 2. Such person or persons were lawfully present in the area from which they were so deported or transferred. 3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the lawfulness of such presence. 4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict. 5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.
With regard to the last two elements of the aforementioned war crimes, Schabas states:
1. There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as the existence of an armed conflict as international. 2. In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international. 3. There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.
The prohibition of war crimes is an “old norm which [has] acquired the character of jus cogens.” According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), international crimes, which include war crimes, are “universally condemned wherever they occur,” because they are “peremptory norms of international law or jus cogens.” Jus cogens norms are peremptory norms that “are nonderogable and enjoy the highest status within international law.” Schabas’ legal opinion is undeniably, and pursuant to The Paquette Habana case, a means for the determination of the rules of international criminal law.
The Duty of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State to Investigate War Crimes Committed in its Territory
While these proceedings were underway, the United Nations Human Rights Council was made aware of the prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the commission of war crimes and human rights violations. As stated by the Royal Commission of Inquiry in its War Criminal Report no. 22-0007:
On 7 February 2021, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (“IADL”), a non-governmental organization of human rights lawyers that has special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) and accredited to participate in the Human Rights Council’s sessions as Observers, passed a resolution calling upon the United States to immediately comply with international humanitarian law in its prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Islands—the Hawaiian Kingdom. In its resolution, the IADL also “supports the Hawaiian Council of Regency, who represented the Hawaiian Kingdom at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in its efforts to seek resolution in accordance with international law as well as its strategy to have the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties comply with international humanitarian law as the administration of the Occupying State.”
Together with the IADL, the American Association of Jurists—Asociación Americana de Juristas (“AAJ”), who is also a non-governmental organization with consultative status with the United Nations ECOSOC and accredited as an observer in the Human Rights Council’s sessions, sent a joint letter dated 3 March 2022 to member States of the United Nations on the status of the Hawaiian Kingdom and its prolonged occupation by the United States. In its joint letter, the AAJ also “supports the Hawaiian Council of Regency, who represented the Hawaiian Kingdom at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in its efforts to seek resolution in accordance with international law as well as its strategy to have the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties comply with international humanitarian law as the administration of the Occupying State.”
On 22 March 2022, the author delivered an oral statement, on behalf of the IADL and AAJ, to the United Nations Human Rights Council at its 49th session in Geneva. The oral statement read:
The International Association of Democratic Lawyers and the American Association of Jurists call the attention of the Council to human rights violations in the Hawaiian Islands. My name is Dr. David Keanu Sai, and I am the Minister of Foreign Affairs ad interim for the Hawaiian Kingdom. I also served as lead agent for the Hawaiian Kingdom at the Permanent Court of Arbitration from 1999-2001 where the Court acknowledged the continued existence of my country as a sovereign and independent State.
The Hawaiian Kingdom was invaded by the United States on 16 January 1893, which began its century long occupation to serve its military interests. Currently, there are 118 military sites throughout the islands and the city of Honolulu serves as the headquarters for the Indo-Pacific Combatant Command.
For the past century, the United States has and continues to commit the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty, under customary international law, by imposing its municipal laws over Hawaiian territory, which has denied Hawaiian subjects their right of internal self-determination by prohibiting them to freely access their own laws and administrative policies, which has led to the violations of their human rights, starting with the right to health, education and to choose their political leadership.
The Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA is a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council and did not oppose or object to the statement made by H.E. Dr. David Keanu Sai, Ph.D., and, therefore, acquiesced to the statement by Dr. Sai. Under international law, acquiescence “concerns a consent tacitly conveyed by a State, unilaterally, through silence or inaction, in circumstances such that a response expressing disagreement or objection in relation to the conduct of another State would be called for.” Since the United States “did not do so … thereby must be held to have acquiesced. Qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui dbuisset act potuisset.” Nevertheless, the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty continues to be committed with impunity.
Rule 158 of the International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law specifies that “States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.” This “rule that States must investigate war crimes and prosecute the suspects is set forth in numerous military manuals, with respect to grave breaches, but also more broadly with respect to war crimes in general.”
Determined to hold to account individuals who have committed war crimes and human rights violations throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the Council of Regency, by Proclamation on April 17, 2019, established a Royal Commission of Inquiry (“RCI”) in similar fashion to the United States proposal of establishing a Commission of Inquiry after the First World War “to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed during its course.”
In accordance with Hawaiian Kingdom administrative precedence in addressing crises by Royal Commissions of Inquiry, the RCI was established by “virtue of the prerogative of the Crown provisionally vested in [the Council of Regency] in accordance with Article 33 of the 1864 Constitution, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation into the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom.” His Excellency, Dr. David Keanu Sai, Ph.D., has been designated as Head of the RCI, and Dr. Federico Lenzerini, Ph.D., as Deputy Head. Pursuant to Article 3—Composition of the Royal Commission, the Head of the RCI has been authorized to seek “recognized experts in various fields.”
The RCI acquired legal opinions from the following experts in international law: on the subject of the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom under international law, Professor Matthew Craven from the University of London, SOAS, School of Law; on the subject of the elements of war crimes committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom since 1893, Professor William Schabas, Middlesex University London, School of Law; and on the subject of human rights violations in the Hawaiian Kingdom and the right of self-determination by the Hawaiian citizenry, Professor Federico Lenzerini, University of Siena, Italy, Department of Political and International Studies. These experts, to include the Head of the RCI, are the authors of chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Part II of the Royal Commission’s eBook – The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom.
According to Article 1(2), “[t]he purpose of the Royal Commission shall be to investigate the consequences of the United States’ belligerent occupation, including with regard to international law, humanitarian law and human rights, and the allegations of war crimes committed in that context. The geographical scope and time span of the investigation will be sufficiently broad and be determined by the head of the Royal Commission.”
Article 1(3) provides, “[t]he results of the investigation will be presented to the Council of Regency, the Contracting Powers of the 1907 Hague Convention, IV, respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Contracting Powers of the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the Contracting Powers of the 2002 Rome Statute, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the National Lawyers Guild in the form of a report.” All 123 countries who are State Parties to the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court have the first responsibility and right to prosecute war criminals that enter their territories under the principle of complementarity and universal jurisdiction.
In Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, it recognizes that when “determining whether a rule has become international law, substantial weight is accorded to…the writing of scholars.” According to Black’s Law, United States courts have acknowledged that the “various Restatements have been a formidable force in shaping the disciplines of the law covered [and] they represent the fruit of the labor of the best legal minds in the diverse fields of law covered.” The Restatement drew from Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations [are] subsidiary means for the determination of rules of [international law].” These “writings include treatises and other writings of authors of standing.” Professors Craven, Schabas, and Lenzerini are “authors of standing” and their legal opinions are “sources” of the rules of international law.
At its website, the RCI recently published the following War Criminal Reports:
War Criminal Report no. 22-0002 finding Derek Kawakami, as Mayor of the County of Kaua‘i, and Arryl Kaneshiro, as Chair of the Kaua‘i County Council, guilty of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty (November 17, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0002-1 finding Matthew M. Bracken and Mark L. Bradbury guilty of being accomplices to the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty committed by Mayor Kawakami and Chair Kaneshiro (November 20, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0003 finding Mitchell Roth, as Mayor of the County of Hawai‘i, and Maile David, as Chairwoman of the Hawai‘i County Council, guilty of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty (November 17, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0003-1 finding Elizabeth A. Stance, Mark D. Disher and Dakota K. Frenz guilty of being accomplices to the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty committed by Mayor Roth and Chairwoman David (November 20, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0004 finding Michael Victorino, as Mayor of the County of Maui, and Alice L. Lee, as Chairwoman of the Maui County Council, guilty of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty (November 17, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0004-1 finding Moana M. Lutey, Caleb P. Rowe and Iwalani Mountcastle Gasmen guilty of being accomplices to the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty committed by Mayor Victorino and Chairwoman Lee (November 20, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0005 finding David Yutake Ige, as Governor of the State of Hawai‘i, Ty Nohara, as Commissioner of Securities of the State of Hawai‘i, and Isaac W. Choy, as Director of the Department of Taxation of the State of Hawai‘i, guilty of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty (November 18, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0005-1 finding Holly T. Shikada and Amanda J. Watson guilty of being accomplices to the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty committed by Governor Ige, Commissioner Nohara, and Director Choy (November 20, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0006 finding Anders G.O. Nervell, as Honorary Consul for Sweden, guilty of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty (November 18, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0006-1 finding Scott I. Batterman guilty of being an accomplice to the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty committed by Swedish Honorary Consul Nervell (November 20, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0007 finding Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., as President of the United States, Kamala Harris, as Vice-President of the United States, Admiral John Aquilino, as Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Charles P. Rettig, as Commissioner U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Charles E. Schumer, as U.S. Senate Majority Leader, and Nancy Pelosi, as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, guilty of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty (November 18, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0007-1 finding Brian M. Boynton, Anthony J. Coppolino and Michael J. Gerardi guilty of being accomplices to the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty committed by President Biden, Vice-President Harris, Admiral Aquilino, Commissioner Rettig, Senator Schumer, and Representative Pelosi (November 20, 2022).
War Criminal Report no. 22-0008 finding Leslie E. Kobayashi, as United States District Judge, and Rom A. Trader, as United States Magistrate Judge, guilty of the war crimes of usurpation of sovereignty and deprivation of fair and regular trial (November 23, 2022).
The RCI, in its reports, found that the pleadings of the Defendants in this case, to include the instant motion to dismiss, and the orders issued therefrom, have met the constituent elements of usurpation of sovereignty and deprivation of fair and regular trial and mens rea.
The U.S. District Court, for the District of Hawai`i has failed and/or refuses to transform and operate as an Article II Court in defiance of the rule of law as set out in these proceedings by the Hawaiian Kingdom and affirmed in the filing of the Amicus Brief filed by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the National Lawyers Guild and the Water Protector Legal Collection. Furthermore, this Court has administered “[m]unicipal laws of the Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” in addressing all claims for relief by parties to these proceedings, in the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in complete disregard of international law.
Defendants, all of those seeking relief and dismissal of the Complaint and/or Amended Complaint, have invoked and asserted only “[m]unicipal laws of the Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” to serve their interest(s) and obtain their relief sought from this Court. In no instance, have any of these Defendants proffered evidence (rebuttable or otherwise) of the extinguishment of the Hawaiian Kingdom, as a State under international law. In fact, to the contrary and extreme detriment of Plaintiff, said defendants have intentionally asserted only “[m]unicipal laws of the Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” and relied on the Court’s extrajudicial review, consideration and application solely on “[m]unicipal laws of the Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” to grant the relief sought for said Defendants.
As now documented in the Reports of the RCI, these proceedings have been rendered moot, as the Hawaiian Kingdom is unable to get relief sought in its Complaint/Amended Complaint from the Defendants and this Court, and thereby subjecting Plaintiff, its Council of Regency, its national subjects and its territorial domain to ongoing suffering and damages brought upon by the continuing imposition of “[m]unicipal laws of the Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.”
Accordingly, as instructed by the Council of Regency, on behalf of Plaintiff Hawaiian Kingdom, I hereby give Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of its Amended Complaint and these proceedings in a manner consistent with Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) FRCP.
November 28th is the most important national holiday in the Hawaiian Kingdom. It is the day Great Britain and France formally recognized the Hawaiian Islands as an “independent state” in 1843, and has since been celebrated as “Independence Day,” which in the Hawaiian language is “La Ku‘oko‘a.” Here follows the story of this momentous event from the Hawaiian Kingdom Board of Education history textbook titled “A Brief History of the Hawaiian People” published in 1891.
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The First Embassy to Foreign Powers—In February, 1842, Sir George Simpson and Dr. McLaughlin, governors in the service of the Hudson Bay Company, arrived at Honolulu on business, and became interested in the native people and their government. After a candid examination of the controversies existing between their own countrymen and the Hawaiian Government, they became convinced that the latter had been unjustly accused. Sir George offered to loan the government ten thousand pounds in cash, and advised the king to send commissioners to the United States and Europe with full power to negotiate new treaties, and to obtain a guarantee of the independence of the kingdom.
Accordingly Sir George Simpson, Haalilio, the king’s secretary, and Mr. Richards were appointed joint ministers-plenipotentiary to the three powers on the 8th of April, 1842.
Mr. Richards also received full power of attorney for the king. Sir George left for Alaska, whence he traveled through Siberia, arriving in England in November. Messrs. Richards and Haalilio sailed July 8th, 1842, in a chartered schooner for Mazatlan, on their way to the United States*
*Their business was kept a profound secret at the time.
Proceedings of the British Consul—As soon as these facts became known, Mr. Charlton followed the embassy in order to defeat its object. He left suddenly on September 26th, 1842, for London via Mexico, sending back a threatening letter to the king, in which he informed him that he had appointed Mr. Alexander Simpson as acting-consul of Great Britain. As this individual, who was a relative of Sir George, was an avowed advocate of the annexation of the islands to Great Britain, and had insulted and threatened the governor of Oahu, the king declined to recognize him as British consul. Meanwhile Mr. Charlton laid his grievances before Lord George Paulet commanding the British frigate “Carysfort,” at Mazatlan, Mexico. Mr. Simpson also sent dispatches to the coast in November, representing that the property and persons of his countrymen were in danger, which introduced Rear-Admiral Thomas to order the “Carysfort” to Honolulu to inquire into the matter.
Recognition by the United States—Messres. Richards and Haalilio arrived in Washington early in December, and had several interviews with Daniel Webster, the Secretary of State, from whom they received an official letter December 19th, 1842, which recognized the independence of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and declared, “as the sense of the government of the United States, that the government of the Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought to take possession of the islands, either as a conquest or for the purpose of the colonization; and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing government, or any exclusive privileges or preferences in matters of commerce.” *
*The same sentiments were expressed in President Tyler’s message to Congress of December 30th, and in the Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, written by John Quincy Adams.
Success of the Embassy in Europe—The king’s envoys proceeded to London, where they had been preceded by the Sir George Simpson, and had an interview with the Earl of Aberdeen, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the 22d of February, 1843.
Lord Aberdeen at first declined to receive them as ministers from an independent state, or to negotiate a treaty, alleging that the king did not govern, but that he was “exclusively under the influence of Americans to the detriment of British interests,” and would not admit that the government of the United States had yet fully recognized the independence of the islands.
Sir George and Mr. Richards did not, however, lose heart, but went on to Brussels March 8th, by a previous arrangement made with Mr. Brinsmade. While there, they had an interview with Leopold I., king of the Belgians, who received them with great courtesy, and promised to use his influence to obtain the recognition of Hawaiian independence. This influence was great, both from his eminent personal qualities and from his close relationship to the royal families of England and France.
Encouraged by this pledge, the envoys proceeded to Paris, where, on the 17th, M. Guizot, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, received them in the kindest manner, and at once engaged, in behalf of France, to recognize the independence of the islands. He made the same statement to Lord Cowley, the British ambassador, on the 19th, and thus cleared the way for the embassy in England.
They immediately returned to London, where Sir George had a long interview with Lord Aberdeen on the 25th, in which he explained the actual state of affairs at the islands, and received an assurance that Mr. Charlton would be removed. On the 1st of April, 1843, the Earl of Aberdeen formally replied to the king’s commissioners, declaring that “Her Majesty’s Government are willing and have determined to recognize the independence of the Sandwich Islands under their present sovereign,” but insisting on the perfect equality of all foreigners in the islands before the law, and adding that grave complaints had been received from British subjects of undue rigor exercised toward them, and improper partiality toward others in the administration of justice. Sir George Simpson left for Canada April 3d, 1843.
Recognition of the Independence of the Islands—Lord Aberdeen, on the 13th of June, assured the Hawaiian envoys that “Her Majesty’s government had no intention to retain possession of the Sandwich Islands,” and a similar declaration was made to the governments of France and the United States.
At length, on the 28th of November, 1843, the two governments of France and England united in a joint declaration to the effect that “Her Majesty, the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty, the king of the French, taking into consideration the existence in the Sandwich Islands of a government capable of providing for the regularity of its relations with foreign nations have thought it right to engage reciprocally to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent state, and never to take possession, either directly or under the title of a protectorate, or under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed…”
This was the final act by which the Hawaiian Kingdom was admitted within the pale of civilized nations. Finding that nothing more could be accomplished for the present in Paris, Messrs. Richards and Haalilio returned to the United States in the spring of 1844. On the 6th of July they received a dispatch from Mr. J.C. Calhoun, the Secretary of State, informing them that the President regarded the statement of Mr. Webster and the appointment of a commissioner “as a full recognition on the part of the United States of the independence of the Hawaiian Government.”
Determined to hold to account individuals that have committed war crimes and human rights violations throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom under this prolonged occupation by the United States, the Council of Regency, by Proclamation on April 17, 2019, established a Royal Commission of Inquiry (“Royal Commission”) in similar fashion to the United States proposal of establishing a Commission of Inquiry after the First World War “to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed during its course.”
In accordance with Hawaiian administrative precedence in addressing crises, the Royal Commission was established by “virtue of the prerogative of the Crown provisionally vested in [the Council of Regency] in accordance with Article 33 of the 1864 Constitution, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation into the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom.” His Excellency, Dr. David Keanu Sai, Ph.D., was designated as Head of the Royal Commission, and Dr. Federico Lenzerini, Ph.D., as Deputy Head. Pursuant to Article 3 – Composition of the Royal Commission, the Head of the Royal Commission has been authorized to seek “recognized experts in various fields.”
The Royal Commission has acquired legal opinions from the following experts in international law: on the subject of the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom under international law, Professor Matthew Craven from the University of London, SOAS, School of Law; on the subject of the elements of war crimes committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom since 1893, Professor William Schabas, Middlesex University London, School of Law; and on the subject of human rights violations in the Hawaiian Kingdom and the right of self-determination by the Hawaiian citizenry, Professor Federico Lenzerini, University of Siena, Italy, Department of Political and International Studies. These experts, to include the Head of the Royal Commission, are the authors of chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Part II of the Royal Commission’s eBook – The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom.
According to Article 1(2), “The purpose of the Royal Commission shall be to investigate the consequences of the United States’ belligerent occupation, including with regard to international law, humanitarian law and human rights, and the allegations of war crimes committed in that context. The geographical scope and time span of the investigation will be sufficiently broad and be determined by the head of the Royal Commission.”
Article 1(3) provides, “The results of the investigation will be presented to the Council of Regency, the Contracting Powers of the 1907 Hague Convention, IV, respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Contracting Powers of the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the Contracting Powers of the 2002 Rome Statute, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the National Lawyers Guild in the form of a report.”
In Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, it recognizes that when “determining whether a rule has become international law, substantial weight is accorded to…the writing of scholars.” According to Black’s Law, 6th ed., United States courts have acknowledged that the “various Restatements have been a formidable force in shaping the disciplines of the law covered [and] they represent the fruit of the labor of the best legal minds in the diverse fields of law covered.” The Restatement drew from Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations [are] subsidiary means for the determination of rules of [international law].” These “writings include treatises and other writings of authors of standing.” Professors Craven, Schabas, and Lenzerini are “authors of standing” and their legal opinions are “sources” of the rules of international law.
The Royal Commission would first provide Preliminary Reports on various subjects relative to its mandate, followed by periodic Reports of its investigation of war crimes that meet the constituent elements of mens rea and actus reus, and human rights violations.
Criminal Report no. 22-0001
The day of reckoning has finally arrived through Hawaiian law for those individuals who have been found “guilty” of the crime of treason. After three years of preliminary reports, the Royal Commission has just published its first Criminal Report no. 22-0001 regarding the insurgency of 1893 and attainder of treason.
For over a century, members of the Provisional Government and its successor the Republic of Hawai‘i were not held accountable for their treasonous actions on January 17, 1893, in the unlawful overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom under the protection of U.S. troops that invaded Honolulu the day before. Although war crimes and human rights violations did not exist at the time under international law, the high crime of treason did under Hawaiian Kingdom law.
Some of the insurgents came to be known as the Big Five, a collection of five large businesses, that wielded considerable political and economic power after 1893 to benefit themselves. The Big Five were Castle & Cooke, Alexander & Baldwin, C. Brewer & Co., American Factors (now Amfac), and Theo H. Davies & Co. In a May 3, 1940 report on the Hawaiian Islands by Elwyn J. Eagen to the Congressional Special House Committee on the National Labor Relations Act, he stated:
Virtually every business of any importance is owned or controlled by the so-called “Big-Five.” These companies have interlocking directorships. This method of obtaining joint action extends not only to the companies named but also to various subsidiary corporations. Most of the land in the Islands is owned or controlled by the same group which manage the affairs of the “Big Five.” There are no independent banks on the Islands. All of the banks are controlled by virtually the same people who are interested in the “Big-Five.” By controlling loans, the officers of the “Big Five” are able to keep semi-independent business men from engaging in activities hostile to their interests. They are also able to know the financial condition of all the inhabitants of the Islands. Persons who do not comply with the wishes of the “Big Five” are refused loans or extension and are forced out of business.
In the Statute Laws of 1846, section 7, it was enacted: “[l]and so patented [that is purchased from the Government] shall never revert to the king of these islands, nor escheat to this government, for any other cause than attainder of high treason, as defined in the criminal code (emphasis added).” Among the prerogatives of the king that affect lands is “[t]o punish for high treason by forfeiture, if so the law decrees.” The King’s superior right to forfeiture was transferred to the government when the Hawaiian Kingdom became a constitutional monarchy. Under the treason statute, which has no degrees, the Penal Code states:
Treason is hereby defined to be any plotting or attempt to dethrone or destroy the King, or the levying of war against the King’s government, or the adhering to the enemies thereof, giving them aid and comfort, the same being done by a person owing allegiance to this kingdom.
Allegiance is the obedience and fidelity due to the kingdom from those under its protection.
An alien, whether his native country be at war or at peace with this kingdom, owes allegiance to this kingdom during his residence therein, and during such residence, is capable of committing treason against this kingdom.
Ambassadors and other ministers of foreign states, and their alien secretaries, servants and members of their families, do not owe allegiance to this kingdom, though resident therein, and are not capable of committing treason against this kingdom.
To constitute the levying of war, contemplated in the first section of this chapter, it shall be requisite that the persons concerned therein be parties to some overt act, in or towards procuring, preparing or using force, or putting themselves in a condition in readiness to use force, either by being present at such overt act, or by promoting, aiding in, or being otherwise accessory before the fact to the same.
In order to constitute the levying of war, the force must be employed or intended to be employed for the dethroning or destruction of the King or in contravention of the laws, or in opposition to the authority of the King’s government, with an intent or for an object affecting some of the branches or departments of said government general, or affecting the enactment, repeal or enforcement of laws in general, or of some general law; or affecting the people, or the public tranquility generally; in distinction from some special intent or object, affecting individuals other than the King, or a particular district.
An accessory before the fact to treason is guilty of treason, and shall be subject to prosecution, trial and punishment therefor, though the principals more directly concerned have not been convicted, or are not amendable to justice.
No person shall be convicted of treason but by the testimony of two or more lawful witnesses to the same overt act of treason whereof he stands charged, unless he shall in open court, confess such treason.
Whoever shall commit the crime of treason, shall suffer the punishment of death; and all his property shall be confiscated to the government.
If any person who shall have knowledge of the commission of treason against this kingdom, shall conceal the same, and shall not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known such treason to the Governor of the island on which he resides, he is guilty of a great crime, and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment at hard labor not exceeding ten years, in the discretion of the court.
By specific reference to the term attainder, the Hawaiian legislature adopted the English common law on high treason. In The King v. Agnee et al., the Hawaiian Supreme Court stated, “[w]e do not recognize as conclusive the common law nor the authorities of the courts of England or of the United States, any farther than the principles which they support may have become incorporated in our system of laws, and recognized by the adjudication of the Supreme Court.” In Agnee, the Court cited English common law commentators on criminal law such as Chitty and Bishop as well as English criminal cases.
Under English common law, attainder of high treason is a metaphor that has the effect of the corruption of blood resulting from the commission of high treason along with reversion of property by escheat, both real and personal, to the king or government. Attainder is under “common law, that extinction of civil rights and capacities which took place whenever a person who had committed treason or felony received sentence of death for his crime. The effect of ‘attainder’ upon such felon was, in general terms, that all his estate, real and personal, was forfeited. At the common law, attainder resulted in three ways, viz: by confession, by verdict, and by process or outlawry (emphasis added).”
By “process,” attainder resulted by an act of Parliament called a bill of attainder, which Edward Coke critiqued as a process that lacked provable evidence but acknowledged that the Parliament did have the authority to attaint for high treason. When Henry VIII ascended to the throne in 1509, “attainder by parliament was an established means of dealing with special offenders, particularly those who posed a threat to the security of the king and his realm.” John Hatsell’s Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons that was published in 1781 explains:
Although it is true, that this measure of passing Bills of Attainder…has been used as an engine of power…it is not therefore just to conclude, that no instances can occur, in which it ought to be put in practice. Cases have arisen…and may again arise, where the public safety, which is the first object of all government, has called for this extraordinary interference; and, in such instances, where can the exercise of an extraordinary power be vested with more security, than in the three branches of the legislature [Monarch, House of Lords, House of Commons]? It should, however, always be remembered, that this deviation from the more ordinary forms of proceeding by indictment or impeachment, ought never to be adopted, but in cases of absolute necessity; and in those instances only, where, from the magnitude of the crime, or the imminent danger to the state, it would be a greater public mischief to suffer the offence to pass unpunished, than even to over-step the common boundaries of law; and…by an exemplary through extraordinary proceeding, to mark with infamy and disgrace, perhaps to punish with death, even the highest and most power offenders.
In Coke’s commentary on the 1352 Statute of Treasons in the Third Institute, he explains that the term “attaint” in the statute “necessarily implieth that he be proceeded with, and attainted according to the due course, and proceedings of law, and not by absolute power.” The suspect, according to Coke, had to be attainted with direct proof of evidence and not attainted with the probability of evidence. He explains, “This doth also strengthen the former exposition of the word (provablement,) that it must be provably, by an open act, which must be manifestly proved.”
According to William Blackstone, “ANOTHER immediate consequence of attainder is the corruption of blood, both upwards and downwards; so that an attainted person can neither inherit lands or other hereditaments from his ancestors, nor retain those he is already in possession of, nor transmit them by descent to any heir; but the same shall escheat to the lord of the fee, subject to the king’s superior right of forfeiture: and the person attainted shall also obstruct all descents to his posterity, wherever they are obliged to derive a title through him to a remoter ancestor.”
Section 8 of the Hawaiian treason statute addresses the first two ways where attainder results by conviction by trial or confession without trial. The third way is by “process” or “outlawry.” The latter was a process during the medieval period in England for the county court or by writ declared a fugitive on the run for the commission of treason an “outlaw.” The former could be done by a bill ofattainder or law ofattainder enacted by the English Parliament and signed into law by the Monarch. While the United States constitutionally prohibits bills of attainder, where “[n]o bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed,” and Great Britain abolished practically all the law of forfeiture and escheat for treason and felony in 1870, the Hawaiian Kingdom has no such prohibition, which would allow bills of attainder to be enacted by the Legislative Assembly, but no such bill has ever been enacted.
While bills of attainder were a product of domestic law of a State and not the courts, they could also result as a consequence of a “process” of international law by virtue of a treaty between the governments of two States where the negotiations and agreement included, inter alia, the subject of high treason as defined by a State’s domestic law. This was precisely the case of the Agreement of Restoration entered into between Queen Lili‘uokalani and President Grover Cleveland on 18 December 1893.
Of the three modes of attainting a person or persons of the high crime of treason under English common law, the insurgents were attainted by “process” as evidenced in President Cleveland’s six-month investigation from 1 April to 18 October 1893, and acknowledged by Queen Lili‘uokalani in the Agreement of Restoration of 18 December 1893. The condition of the Agreement of Restoration for the Queen, after being restored to the throne, “to grant full amnesty as to life and property to all those persons who have been or who are now in the Provisional Government, or who have been instrumental in the overthrow of your government,” presupposes that these persons were guilty of committing the high crime of treason, and, therefore, were attainted. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, amnesty is a “sovereign act of forgiveness for past acts, granted by a government to all persons (or to certain classes of persons) who have been guilty of…treason. … Included in the concept of pardon is ‘amnesty,’ which is similar in all respects to a full pardon, insofar as when it is granted both the crime and punishment are abrogated; however, unlike pardons, an amnesty usually refers to a class of individuals irrespective of individual situations (emphasis added).” The Queen, however, was not restored and, therefore, amnesty was not granted to those found guilty of treason by a “process.”
As a person who is attainted by a conviction of treason by a court of law whereby escheat occurs at the moment of the commission of the crime so that all intervening dealings with the property are avoided, escheat for a person attainted by a “process,” like a bill of attainder or the Agreement of Restoration, occurs at the moment of the commission of the crime as well. Section 9 of the treason statute states, “[w]hoever shall commit the crime of treason, shall suffer the punishment of death; and all his property shall be confiscated to the government.” The term “property” in the statute includes both real and personal.
According to Thomas Tomlins, in the Law-Dictionary explaining the Rise, Progress, and Present State of the British Law, vol. 1 (1835), as “to Corruption of Blood, this operates upwards and downwards, so that an attainted person can neither inherit lands or other hereditaments from his ancestors, nor retain those he is already in possession of, nor transmit them by descent to any heir; but the same shall escheat to the lord of the fee, subject to the king’s superior right of forfeiture; and the person attainted shall also obstruct all descents to his posterity, wherever they are obliged to derive a title through him to a remoter ancestor.” Therefore, all persons who were guilty of the crime of high treason, their real property escheated to the Hawaiian government, and their ownership to personal property vested in the Hawaiian government at the moment they committed the crime of treason since 17 January 1893 and suffers the pains and penalties from the effects of the doctrine of the corruption of blood thereafter.
One of the Big Five is Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. The history of Alexander and Baldwin goes back to 1869 when Samuel T. Alexander and Henry P. Baldwin entered into a partnership called the Haiku Sugar Company on Maui. The Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company, formerly owned by Claus Spreckels, was later acquired by Alexander & Baldwin, as well as Kihei Plantation.
While Alexander left the islands in 1883 because of bad health and settled in Oakland, California, he continued his business relation with Baldwin in the Hawaiian Kingdom. In 1894, the partners formed a new firm in San Francisco under the name of Alexander & Baldwin, for the purpose of conducting a general commercial business and handling their plantation interests in the United States. A branch was established in Honolulu in 1897 where the main office was located. The firm was incorporated as Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., in 1900 with Baldwin as its president.
At the time of the overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Baldwin was living on the island of Kaua‘i and was an active member of the Annexation Club. In a letter to U.S. Special Commissioner James Blount dated April 25, 1893, Baldwin stated, “I have acquired considerable property and represent plantations that have this year an output of about 23,000 tons of sugar.”
On May 30, 1894, Baldwin participated in the Republic of Hawai‘i’s constitutional convention. Because Baldwin was found guilty of treason by “process,” he was attainted on May 30, 1894 when he committed the high crime and all his property, both real and personal escheated and reverted to the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Despite the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom was not restored until 1997 by a Council of Regency, the office of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom was vested with Baldwin’s property as a consequence of a breach of Hawaiian law. And under the doctrine of corruption of blood, the family of Baldwin was prevented from any lawful inheritance through or from Baldwin because he was stained with treason.
For a list of all persons found guilty of the high crime of treason download the Royal Commission’s Criminal Report no. 22-0001.
Speaking to Pacific island leaders, Reuters reported President Joe Biden said “Russia’s assault on Ukraine in pursuit of imperial ambitions is a flagrant, flagrant violation of the UN Charter, and the basic principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The world should know that this is a classic case of the pot calling the kettle black, which is an idiom that means a person should not criticize another person for a fault they themselves have.
Like Ukraine, the Hawaiian Kingdom was an internationally recognized independent State. Where Ukraine got its independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Hawaiian Kingdom achieved its independence when Great Britain and France jointly proclaimed that both countries recognized the Hawaiian Islands as an independent State in 1843. The United States explicitly acknowledged Hawaiian independence on July 6, 1844.
One of the fundamental principles of international law is the sovereignty, which is supreme authority, and territorial integrity of an independent State. Independent States have exclusive authority over its territory that is subject to its own laws and not the laws of any other State.
In 1849, a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States was signed that came into force on November 9, 1850. Territorial integrity is acknowledged in article 8 of the treaty that states “each of the two contracting parties engages that the citizens or subjects of the other residing in their respective states, shall enjoy their property and personal security, or the subjects or citizens of the most favored nation, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries respectively.”
Both Ukraine and the Hawaiian Kingdom established diplomatic relations with their treaty partners. While Ukraine maintained an embassy in Moscow, and Russia maintained an embassy in Kiev, the Hawaiian Kingdom maintained an embassy in Washington, D.C., and the United States maintained an embassy in Honolulu.
Like Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the United States invaded the Hawaiian Kingdom on January 16, 1893. In a presidential investigation, U.S. President Grover Cleveland acknowledged that the U.S. “military demonstration upon the soil of Honolulu was itself an act of war,” which led to the overthrow of the Hawaiian government the following day. The purpose of the invasion and overthrow was to secure Pearl Harbor as a naval base of operations to protect the west coast of the United States from invasion by Japan. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was to buffer an invasion by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO, which the United States is a member of.
On January 31, 1893, U.S. Captain Alfred Mahan from the Naval War College wrote a letter to the Editor of the New York Times where he advocated seizing the Hawaiian Islands. In his letter, Captain Mahan recognized the Hawaiian Islands, “with their geographical and military importance [to be] unrivaled by that of any other position in the North Pacific.” Mahan used the Hawaiian situation to bolster his argument of building a large naval fleet. He warned that a maritime power could well seize the Hawaiian Islands, and that the United States should take that first step. He wrote, “To hold [the Hawaiian Islands], whether in the supposed case or in war with a European state, implies a great extension of our naval power. Are we ready to undertake this?”
Although President Cleveland apologized for the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom government and entered into a treaty with Queen Lili‘uokalani on December 18, 1893, to restore her to the Hawaiian throne as a constitutional executive monarch, he was prevented from doing so because of the war hawks in the Congress that wanted Pearl Harbor. This consequently placed the Hawaiian Islands in civil unrest under the control of insurgents that received support from Americans in the United States. They were pretending to be a government by calling themselves the provisional government. The reason for the pretending is because President Cleveland’s investigation already concluded “that the provisional government owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States.” In other words, the insurgents were a puppet of the U.S.
Five years would lapse, and the Cleveland administration was replaced by President William McKinley. U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Young was an advocate for annexing the Hawaiian Islands. Secretary Long was influenced by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, who would later become President in 1901. On May 3, 1897, Roosevelt wrote a letter to Captain Mahan. He stated, “I need not tell you that as regards Hawaii I take your views absolutely, as indeed I do on foreign policy generally. If I had my way we would annex those islands tomorrow.” Roosevelt also stated that Cleveland’s handling of the Hawaiian situation was “a colossal crime, and we should be guilty of aiding him after the fact if we do not reverse what he did.” Roosevelt also assured Mahan, that “Secretary Long shares our views. He believes we should take the islands, and I have just been preparing some memoranda for him to use at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow.”
The opportunity for the United States to seize the Hawaiian Islands occurred at the height of the Spanish-American War. On July 6, 1898, the war hawks in the Congress passed a joint resolution declaring that the Hawaiian Islands had been annexed and President McKinley signed it into law the following day.
The opportunity for Russia to seize a portion of Ukrainian territory came after sham referendums where the people of the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia voted to be Russian and not remain Ukrainian. On September 30, 2022, Reuters reported that “Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Russia had ‘four new regions’ in a speech in the Kremliin on Friday in which he outlined Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions that Moscow’s forces have partially seized during a seven-month conflict with Ukraine.”
Despite the American annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the Russian annexation of the four Ukrainian regions, they remain illegal under international law. Because it is illegal it did not alter the territorial integrity of both the Hawaiian Kingdom and Ukraine as independent States. As Professor Malcolm Shaws wrote, “It is, however, clear today that the acquisition of territory by force alone is illegal under international law.” And according to The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (1995):
The international law of belligerent occupation must therefore be understood as meaning that the occupying power is not sovereign, but exercises provisional and temporary control over foreign territory. The legal situation of the territory can be altered only through a peace treaty. International law does not permit annexation of territory of another State.
The return of unlawfully annexed territory occurs when there are changes in the physical power of the usurping State. Since the usurping State has no lawful authority over annexed territory, its possession is based purely on power and not law. Similarly, the abductor of a kidnapped child, being an act prohibited by law, does not become the parent of the child by force despite the length of the kidnapping. And when the child is eventually rescued and the power of the abductor eliminated and taken into custody, the child can then return to the family.
Unlike Ukraine, there was no Reuters news agency in the 1890s informing the world of the illegal activities of the United States against the Hawaiian Kingdom and the illegal annexation of the Hawaiian Islands for military purposes during the Spanish-American War. While there is a difference in time, the Russian actions bear a striking resemblance to the United States actions in seizing the entire territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom. While both the American and Russian actions are unlawful, the Hawaiian Kingdom, like Ukraine, remain independent States under international law together with their territorial integrity intact despite the unlawful annexations.
In the case of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, acknowledged the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a “State” under international law in 1999, which includes its territorial integrity. In the case of Ukraine, everyone in the world already knows that Ukraine is a “State” under international law.
This is a classic case of the American pot calling the Russian kettle black.
There is a common misunderstanding among the world that Hawai‘i is the 50th state of the American union. The historical and legal revealing of evidence that Hawai‘i is not the 50th state, but rather the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State, has shattered this belief for those who have come to know. To better understand the why, here is the history of the formation of the 49 States of the American union that many don’t know.
All 49 states of the American union were acquired through international law because these territories were formerly the territories of other independent States. The first 13 states, which were formerly British Crown colonies, were acquired from the British Crown by the 1783 Treaty of Paris that brought the revolution to an end. Article I provided, “His Brittanic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz., New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, to be free sovereign and Independent States; that he treats with them as such, and for himself his Heirs & Successors, relinquishes all claims to the Government, Propriety, and Territorial Rights of the same and every Part thereof.”
In 1789, as a result of the federalist movement, these 13 sovereign and independent States collectively gave their independence to the federal government, which came to be known as the American union. These states held what was referred to as residual sovereignty but no longer retained independence. The instrument that formed this union was the federal constitution. Prior to this consolidation, these independent States were in a loose union called a confederacy according to the terms of the 1777 Articles of Confederation.
The other states of the union were formed out of territories acquired by the federal government through international treaties, with the exception of Hawai‘i, which was unilaterally annexed by a congressional statute in 1898.
There is also a common misunderstanding that the State of Texas came about as a result of a joint resolution of Congress in 1845. The truth of the matter is that this congressional action is what sparked the Mexican-American war in 1846. The State of Texas was on Mexican territory and not United States territory. In the 1848 Peace Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended the war, the new border between the two Republics began from the Gulf of Mexico along the Rio Grande river, which is the southern border of the State of Texas, then by a surveyed boundary line that runs along the southern borders of what are now States of New Mexico, Arizona and California. Article V of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo states:
The boundary line between the two Republics shall commence in the Gulf of Mexico, three leagues from land, opposite the mouth of the Rio Grande, otherwise called Rio Bravo del Norte, or Opposite the mouth of its deepest branch, if it should have more than one branch emptying directly into the sea; from thence up the middle of that river, following the deepest channel, where it has more than one, to the point where it strikes the southern boundary of New Mexico; thence, westwardly, along the whole southern boundary of New Mexico (which runs north of the town called Paso) to its western termination; thence, northward, along the western line of New Mexico, until it intersects the first branch of the river Gila; (or if it should not intersect any branch of that river, then to the point on the said line nearest to such branch, and thence in a direct line to the same); thence down the middle of the said branch and of the said river, until it empties into the Rio Colorado; thence across the Rio Colorado, following the division line between Upper and Lower California, to the Pacific Ocean.
If Texas was annexed in 1845, then the boundary would not have begun from the Gulf of Mexico, but rather from the surveyed boundary line that would have begun from the mid-southern border of what is now the State of New Mexico, which is adjacent to the city of El Paso, Texas. From El Paso, the Rio Grande river goes north into the State of New Mexico.
In 1988, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) published a legal opinion regarding the annexation of Hawai‘i. The OLC’s memorandum opinion was written for the Legal Advisor for the Department of State regarding legal issues raised by the proposed Presidential proclamation to extend the territorial sea from a three-mile limit to twelve miles. The OLC concluded that only the President and not the Congress possesses “the constitutional authority to assert either sovereignty over an extended territorial sea or jurisdiction over it under international law on behalf of the United States.” As Justice Marshall stated, “[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations,” and not the Congress.
The OLC also stated, “we doubt that Congress has constitutional authority to assert either sovereignty over an extended territorial sea or jurisdiction over it under international law on behalf of the United States.” The OLC then concluded that it is “unclear which constitutional power Congress exercised when it acquired Hawaii by joint resolution. Accordingly, it is doubtful that the acquisition of Hawaii can serve as an appropriate precedent for a congressional assertion of sovereignty over an extended territorial sea.”
That territorial sea referred to by the OLC was to be extended from three to twelve miles under the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. In other words, the Congress could not extend the territorial sea an additional nine miles by statute because its authority was limited up to the three-mile limit. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court, in The Apollon, concluded that the “laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories.”
Arriving at this conclusion, the OLC cited constitutional scholar Professor Willoughby, “The constitutionality of the annexation of Hawaii, by a simple legislative act, was strenuously contested at the time both in Congress and by the press. The right to annex by treaty was not denied, but it was denied that this might be done by a simple legislative act. …Only by means of treaties, it was asserted, can the relations between States be governed, for a legislative act is necessarily without extraterritorial force—confined in its operation to the territory of the State by whose legislature enacted it.” Professor Willoughby also stated, “The incorporation of one sovereign State, such as was Hawaii prior to annexation, in the territory of another, is…essentially a matter falling within the domain of international relations, and, therefore, beyond the reach of legislative acts.”
Under international law, what was illegally overthrown on January 17, 1893, was the Hawaiian Kingdom government and not the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State. International law distinguishes between the independent State and its government. For one State to acquire the territory of another State there needs to be a treaty like the United States treaty of cessions with Great Britain, France, Mexico, Russia and Spain. When the United States unilaterally annexed Hawai‘i by a congressional joint resolution in 1898, the act was no different than Iraq unilaterally annexing Kuwait in 1990 during the First Gulf War, or Nazi Germany unilaterally annexing Luxembourg during the Second World War. Both were illegal under international law and so is the annexation of Hawai‘i.
In 1997, the Hawaiian government was constitutionally restored by a Council of Regency that serves in the absence of the Monarch. Two years later, both the Hawaiian Kingdom, as a State, and the Council of Regency, as its government, was acknowledged in 1999 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Netherlands, in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom.
The phrase “come home to roost” means to have unfavorable repercussions for actions taken in the past, example: “You ought to have known that your lies would come home to roost in the end”—Charles West, Stage Fright. Proceedings in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden is drawing attention to the United States and State of Hawai‘i actions of the past.
When federal court proceedings for Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden were initiated on May 20, 2021, the court’s status as an Article III Court was the primary issue. Article III refers to the judicial branch of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution does not have any legal enforcement outside the United States, and, therefore, federal courts can only operate within U.S. territory. Because the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as an independent, but occupied, State, the federal court in Honolulu has no legal basis.
However, under U.S. law, a federal court can operate outside of the United States if the foreign territory is being belligerently occupied by the U.S. In this case, the authority would come under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which is the executive branch of government headed by the President. As the President is the commander-in-chief of the military that is occupying foreign territory, an Article II Occupation Court can be established to administer the laws of the occupied country and international humanitarian law—laws of war, which includes the law of occupation. The 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention regulate foreign occupations.
After the Nazi government was overthrown in 1945, the United States, along with France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union began to occupy the German State. In the United States sector of occupation, an Article II Occupation Court was established to administer German law and international humanitarian law.
When the proceedings began, the focus was on getting the federal court to transform from an Article III Court to an Article II Occupation Court. The International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the National Lawyers Guild and the Water Protector Legal Collective, co-authored an amicus curiae brief that would assist the federal court to understand what an Article II Occupation Court is and why the federal court should transform from an Article III Court. Their request to file the brief was approved by Magistrate Judge Rom Trader on September 30, 2021, and the amicus brief was filed with the court on October 6, 2021.
The focus in these proceedings have recently shifted from having the federal court transform to an Article II Occupation Court to a preliminary issue called the Lorenzo principle. The Lorenzo principle is State of Hawai‘i common lawor judge made law that centers on whether the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State despite the overthrow of its government by the United States on January 17, 1893.
The case that the Lorenzo principle is based on is State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo that came before the Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in 1994. The principle is evidence based and requires defendants in cases that have come before courts of the State of Hawai‘i since 1994 to provide evidence that the kingdom continues to exist and to not just argue that it exists. This was the case in State of Hawai‘i v.Araujo, where the ICA stated:
Because Araujo has not, either below or on appeal, “‘presented any factual or legal basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,’” (citing Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i at 221, 883 P.2d at 643), his point of error on appeal must fail.
The Lorenzo principle also separates the Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement and nation building from the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State. The Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, not only clarified the evidentiary burden but also discerned between a new Native Hawaiian nation brought about through nation-building, and the Hawaiian Kingdom that existed as a State in the nineteenth century. The Hawai‘i Supreme Court explained:
Petitioners’ theory of nation-building as a fundamental right under the ICA’s decision in Lorenzo does not appear viable. Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her. Thus, Lorenzo does not recognize a fundamental right to build a sovereign Hawaiian nation.
In these proceedings, the Hawaiian Kingdom has clearly provided irrefutable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State, especially when the Permanent Court of Arbitration acknowledged its continued existence in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom. In this type of a situation, the Lorenzo principle, when applying international law, requires the party opposing the continued existence of the kingdom to provide evidence, whether factual or legal, that the kingdom does not continue to exist.
In other words, if any of the defendants in these proceedings wants the court to dismiss this case, they are required to provide evidence that the kingdom no longer exists in accordance with the standard of evidence that the Lorenzo principle established. Clear evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom would no longer exist as a State is a treaty of cession where the Hawaiian Kingdom incorporated itself into the United States. There is no such treaty.
On June 19, 2022, the Clerk of the federal court entered defaults for the State of Hawai‘i, Governor David Ige, Securities Commissioner Ty Nohara, and Director of the Department of Taxation Isaac Choy for failing to answer the amended complaint filed on August 11, 2021.
In an attempt to have the federal court set aside the defaults, the State of Hawai‘i Attorney General’s office, on behalf of the State of Hawai‘i, Governor Ige, Securities Commissioner Nohara and the Director of Taxation Choy, filed a motion to set aside defaults on August 12, 2022.
In its memorandum in support of its motion, the State of Hawai‘i Defendants stated that once the defaults are set aside they intend to file a motion to dismiss because since the case presents a political question, the federal court has no jurisdiction over the issue and must dismiss the case. It is the same argument that the Federal Defendants are making. Both claim that the political branches of government, which are the President and Congress, no longer recognizes the Hawaiian Kingdom, and until they do federal courts cannot have jurisdiction because it is a question for the political branches to decide first.
What undercuts this argument is the United States own Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law, §202, comment g, which clearly states, “The duty to treat a qualified entity as a state also implies that so long as the entity continues to meet those qualifications its statehood may not be ‘derecognized.’ If the entity ceases to meet those requirements, it ceases to be a state and derecognition is not necessary.”
This is merely reiterating the rule of customary international law. According to Professor Oppenheim, once recognition of a State is granted, it “is incapable of withdrawal” by the recognizing State. And Professor Schwarzenberger explains that “recognition estops the State which has recognized the title from contesting its validity at any future time.”
The United States cannot simply de-recognize an independent State because it is politically convenient to do so. If it were such a case and allowable under international law, which it is not, then why wouldn’t the United States de-recognize its adversaries like China, Russia and North Korea.
Another problem that both the Federal and the State of Hawai‘i Defendants have is the Lorenzo principle that binds all State of Hawai‘i courts and the federal court in Honolulu. The Lorenzo principle states that the question as to whether the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State is a “legal question” and not a “political question.”
A legal question is where a court makes a decision based on factual or legal evidence, and in order for the court to decide that legal question it must have jurisdiction to do so. A political question prevents the court from deciding because it does not have jurisdiction in the first place. This is an absurd argument and in all 53 cases that applied the Lorenzo principle by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court and the Intermediate Court of Appeals, and the 17 case that applied the Lorenzo principle in the federal court in Honolulu and by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, not one argued the political question doctrine.
Here when the evidence is abundantly clear that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State, the Federal and State of Hawai‘i Defendants scream POLITICAL QUESTION. This baseless argument really speaks volumes as to the strength of the evidence in this case that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State.
Yesterday, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Opposition and requested that Magistrate Judge Trader schedule an evidentiary hearing so that the State of Hawai‘i Defendants can prove with evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom no longer exists as a State according to the evidentiary standard set by the Lorenzo principle. The Hawaiian Kingdom also filed a request for the Magistrate Judge to take Judicial Notice of evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State.
In its Opposition, the Hawaiian Kingdom concluded with:
For these reasons, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court schedule an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the Lorenzo principle for the State Defendants to provide rebuttable evidence, whether factual or legal, that the Hawaiian Kingdom ceases to exist as a State in light of the evidence and law in the instant motion. If the State Defendants are unable to proffer rebuttable evidence, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court transform into an Article II Occupation Court in order for the Court to possess subject matter and personal jurisdiction to consider the State Defendants’ motion to set aside defaults. The transformation to an Article II Occupation Court is fully elucidated in the brief of amici curiae the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the National Lawyers Guild, and the Water Protectors Legal Collective [ECF 96]. When the Court has jurisdiction, the Plaintiff will not oppose the State Defendants motion to set aside defaults.
Should the State Defendants proffer evidence of a treaty of cession that the Hawaiian Kingdom ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States, whereby the Hawaiian State ceased to exist under international law, the Plaintiff will withdraw its amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief [ECF 55] and bring these proceedings to a close.
Plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing and judicial notice pursuant to the Lorenzo principle is in compliance with §34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, 28 U.S.C. §1652, which provides, “The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”
As the United States Supreme Court, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, stated, “federal courts are […] bound to follow decisions of the courts of the State in which the controversies arise.” This case is manifestly governed by Erie and the Lorenzo principle. It is not governed by Baker v. Carr as to the political question doctrine.
