Monthly Archives: June 2022

Land Titles Throughout the Hawaiian Islands are Defective – Filing A Claim Under Your Title Insurance Policy

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The Preliminary Report on the Legal Status of Land Titles throughout the Realm of July 16, 2020, by the Royal Commission of Inquiry, is a comprehensive report as to why the majority of land titles today throughout Hawai‘i are defective. This includes properties claimed to be owned by billionaires such as Mark Zuckerberg’s claim to property on the island of Kaua‘i, and Larry Ellison’s claim to 98% of the island of Lana‘i. The Royal Commission of Inquiry also published a Supplemental Report on Title Insurance on October 20, 2020.

All titles to real estate throughout the Hawaiian Kingdom are subject to Hawaiian laws despite the unlawful overthrow of its government by the United States in 1893. As such, all titles that have since been alleged to have been conveyed after January 17, 1893, are void ab initio due to forged certificates of acknowledgment by individuals impersonating public officers. This includes all purported conveyances of Government or Crown lands after January 17, 1893, and any judicial proceedings regarding titles to land.

Hawaiian law, however, would have recognized these acts of the insurgents as being valid if Queen Lili‘uokalani was restored to office. The agreed upon conditions of restoration between the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom provided, “a general amnesty to those concerned in setting up the provisional government and a recognition of all its bona fide acts and obligations.” Regarding the “bona fide acts and obligations,” the Queen stated in her letter dated December 18, 1893, to the U.S. Minister Albert Willis, who was negotiating on behalf of President Cleveland, “I further solemnly pledge myself and my Government, if restored, to assume all the obligations created by the Provisional Government, in the proper course of administration, including all expenditures for military or police services, it being my purpose, if restored, to assume the Government precisely as it existed on the day when it was unlawfully overthrown.”

By this agreement, the United States acknowledged the acts done by the insurgency were not “bona fide” until after the Queen was restored. The Queen was not restored and, therefore, the insurgency continued to unlawfully impersonate public officers of the Hawaiian Kingdom in the chain of title. These defects in title are covered risks in the owner’s and lender’s title insurance policies as:

  • forgery, fraud, undue influence, duress, incompetency, incapacity, or impersonation;
  • failure of any person or Entity to have authorized a transfer or conveyance;
  • a document affecting Title not properly created, executed, witnessed, sealed, acknowledged, notarized, or delivered;
  • a document executed under a falsified, expired, or otherwise invalid power of attorney;
  • a document not properly filed, recorded, or indexed in the Public Records including failure to perform those acts by electronic means authorized by law;
  • a defective judicial or administrative proceeding.

Here’s an example of a “bona fide” Royal Patent issued on October 26, 1852.

Here is an example of a “forged” Royal Patent issued just one month after the overthrow of the Hawaiian government by the United States dated February 3, 1893. This is an example of what President Cleveland sought to remedy as a “bona fide” act by the insurgents in his agreement of restoration with Queen Lili‘uokalani.

Any property today that derives from this forged Royal Patent is void, but the loss could be covered by an owner’s policy of title insurance. Hill, Steindorff and Widener, in their “Recent Developments in Title Insurance Law,” reported that in 2012, a California Federal District Court, in Gumapac v. Deutsche Bank National Trust, found that “a title report revealed a defect of title by virtue of an executive agreement between President Grover Cleveland and Queen Lili‘uokalani of the Hawaiian Kingdom that rendered any notary actions unlawful. Thus, the deed of conveyance to the homeowners was nullified.” In Hawai‘i, claimants under both an owner’s or lender’s title insurance policy have a duty to immediately notify their insurer of any title defects that affect title to the property or the mortgage that secures the repayment of a loan.

During this time of high prices at the gas pump added on to the high cost of living in the Hawaiian Islands, watching how you spend your money is critical to surviving during this inflation crisis brought upon the residents of Hawai‘i by the United States prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom since 1893. But there is some monetary light that many people in Hawai‘i can take advantage of, which is filing a claim with their title insurance company under an owner’s policy, and notifying your bank or lender to file a claim so that your debt owed to the lender is paid off.

When individuals want to borrow money from a bank or lender, they are told by the lender to first go to an escrow company to purchase a lender’s title insurance policy in the amount to be borrowed. Prior to the issuing of a title insurance policy, the escrow company does a title search on the property that the borrower intends to use as a security instrument, also called a mortgage, to ensure the repayment of the loan. A title insurance company that works with the escrow company will then insure the accuracy of the title search. Only when the borrower purchases the title insurance policy to protect the lender from any title defect that affects the mortgaged debt is when escrow comes to a close.

There is another type of title insurance policy that is issued by the escrow company and that is an owner’s policy that protects the owner and not the lender. An owner’s policy is normally purchased when an individual borrows money for the first time and has to go to an escrow company. Many people don’t even know that they may have purchased an owner’s policy unless they look at their closing papers from escrow. Unlike a lender’s policy that covers the debt owed to the lender, an owner’s policy covers the owner’s loss, which is the appraised value of the property at the time the policy is taken out.

Most people are unaware as to what title insurance is and how it works. Typical insurance policies, such as car insurance or flood insurance, insure against a future cause of damage, that may or may not occur. Title insurance, on the other hand, insures against a past cause of damage called defects in the chain of title that affect ownership of real property. According to Burke’s Law of Title Insurance, title insurance is an agreement to indemnify the insured for losses incurred “by either on-record and off-record defects that are found in the title or interest in an insured property to have existed on the date on which the policy is issued.” And Black’s Law Dictionary defines title insurance as a “policy issued by a title company after searching the title…and insuring the accuracy of its search against claims of title defects.” As the Florida Court of Appeals, in McDaniel v. Lawyers Title Guar. Fund, stated, “One of the reasonable expectations of a policyholder who purchases title insurance is to be protected against defects in his title which appear of record.”

Title insurance is a one-time paid premium agreement under both an owner’s policy, that protects the interests of the owner of the property, and a lender’s policy, that protects the lender’s interest—the debt owed—in the mortgaged lien on the property. The owner’s policy does not exceed the amount of coverage on the policy. The lender’s policy coverage reduces as the debt is being paid by the borrower, which will eventually expire once the final payment of the loan is made. Burke explains that coverage under an owner’s policy, however, “lasts for as long as the insured has some liability for title defect, whether as the present owner or possessor, or as a vendor [grantor] and warrantor of the state of the title upon some later sale. There is no such thing as term title insurance. Its policy might, potentially, last forever.” A grantor’s covenant is explicitly stated in its warranty deed where it states, “and that the Grantor will WARRANT AND DEFEND the same unto the Grantee against the lawful claims and demands of all persons.”

Being that title insurance is an indemnity agreement, Burke states that the insurer can also act as a surety, which “is a person agreeing to be answerable for the actions of another.” According to Burke, when there is a breach of covenant and warranty of title by a grantor, the “title insurer might agree to remedy a breach of the covenant for further assurances by bringing the litigation required to cure a title, instead of letting the [grantor] do it.” The right to remedy, as a surety, is provided under Condition no. 5 of both the owner and lender policies that states the insurer “shall have the right, in addition to the options contained in Section 7 of these Conditions, at its own cost, to institute and prosecute any action or proceeding or to any other act that in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish the Title, as insured, or to prevent or reduce loss or damage to the Insured.” According to Hill, Steindorff and Widener, an Illinois Appellate Court concluded “that although the title company did not have an ownership interest in the property, the company had issued a title insurance policy and could have redeemed the taxes on the subject property on behalf of the prior owner, to whom it had issued a title policy.”

When the title insurance company is given the evidence of proof of loss of title in a claim letter by the insured, the company has thirty-days to either initiate proceedings to remedy the defect of the title or make a payment to the insured covered in the insurance policy. According to the federal court in Davis v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., “In law, a title is either good or bad.” The Missouri Supreme Court, in Kent & Obear v. Allen, stated, “the validity of the title arising, the question must be determined whether it is good or bad. We cannot object to the title of the respondent that it is doubtful or unmarketable.” The Davis court also concluded that the “liability of the insurer was definitely fixed under the terms of the policy,” to either remedy the defect or the “payment of loss was due, under the policy, ‘within 30 days thereafter.’”

To determine “on-record defects in title,” a title insurer relies on a competent title search. According to Baker, Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull’s article, “Optimal Title Search,” in the Journal of Legal Studies, “Some states have no set length but instead require that the entire title history of a parcel of land be searched back to the state’s date of patent,” which include Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North and South Dakota, Oregon, Texas and Washington. At the highest number of years for a title search are Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, and Wyoming at 187 years. At the low end of a 30-year search are New Mexico, Oklahoma and Tennessee. In a study of optimal title searches, Hawai‘i, Illinois and Indiana were excluded from the analysis because they provided “indeterminate search lengths.”

In one particular preliminary report by Title Guaranty of Hawai‘i, its title search only went back one conveyance. This lack of a full title search by Title Guaranty, who serves as an agent for title insurance companies, back to the original patent, called Royal Patents, only amplifies the purpose of title insurance as an indemnity agreement. It is not a guaranty of the state of the title. According to the Pennsylvania court, in Hicks v. Saboe, “The purpose of title insurance is to protect the insured…from loss arising from defects in the title which he acquires.” The federal court, in Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., stated, “Because title insurance [is] a contract of indemnity, the insurer does not guarantee the state of the title, but agrees to pay for any loss resulting from a defective title.” The Maryland Appeals Court, in Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. West, explained that a title insurer does not have a duty to advise “on the state of title to the property, but to insure against…loss resulting from any defects.” Therefore, “the title insurer does not ‘guarantee’ the status of the grantor’s title. As an indemnity agreement, the insurer agrees to reimburse the insured for loss or damage sustained as a result of title problems, as long as the coverage for the damages incurred is not excluded from the policy.”

Since 1994, the State of Hawai‘i courts have applied, whenever the issue of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence as a State arose in court proceedings, the State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo case at the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which has come to be known as the Lorenzo doctrine in the federal courts. For 28 years, both the State of Hawai‘i courts and the federal courts have been applying the Lorenzo doctrine wrong. Under international law, which the ICA acknowledged may affect its rationale of placing the burden on the defendant to prove the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists as a State,” shifts the burden on the party opposing the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom that it “does not exist as a State.” In international arbitration proceedings at the Permanent Court of Arbitration from 1999-2001, in Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, PCA case no. 1999-01, the PCA acknowledged the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State and the Council of Regency as its government. Because the Hawaiian Kingdom still exists, so do the laws that apply to real property.

In a denial letter to a title insurance claimant, Michael J. Moss, Senior Claims Counsel for Chicago Title Insurance Company, specifically referenced the Lorenzo doctrine applied in two State of Hawai‘i court cases and one federal court case as a basis to decline the insurance claim under an owner’s title insurance policy in the amount of $178,000.00. Moss stated:

The Hawaiian Courts have consistently found that the Kingdom of Hawai‘i is no longer recognized as a sovereign state by either the federal government or by the State of Hawai‘i. See State v. Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i 219, 221, 883 P.2d 641, 643 (Haw.App.1994); accord State v. French, 77 Hawai‘i 222, 228, 883 P.2d 644, 649 (Haw.App.1994); Baker v. Stehua, CIV 09-00615 ACK-BMK, 2010 WL 3528987 (D. Haw. Sept. 8, 2010).

Like the courts of the State of Hawai‘i and the federal courts, the Senior Claims Counsel incorrectly applied the Lorenzo doctrine, which should have been in favor of the title insurance claimant. The title insurance claim was that the “Owner’s deed was not lawfully executed according to Hawaiian Kingdom law [because] the notaries public and the Bureau of Conveyance weren’t part of the Hawaii[an] Kingdom, that the documents in [the claimant’s] chain of title were not lawfully executed.” In other words, the Lorenzo doctrine, when applying international law correctly, would compel the title insurance company to pay the claimant his $178,000.00 covered under the owner’s title insurance policy he had purchased to protect him in case there was a defect in the title.

To find out if you have an owner’s policy check your closing papers from escrow to see if you purchased a policy. Or you can call your escrow company or companies that you went to in the past. If you have a mortgage you did purchase a title insurance policy to protect the lender. To file a claim under your owner’s policy download this MSWord document and fill in the necessary information after you have your owner’s policy in hand. To send a letter to your lender to file an insurance claim under the lender’s policy you purchased download this MSWord document and fill in the necessary information.

Submitting an insurance claim is a private matter that is subject to the terms of your contract or policy. Under the terms of the policy you and the lender are obligated to notify the insurance company if you have been made aware that there are defects in your title. It is suggested that you carefully read over your title insurance policy before you send your claim to the insurance company by certified mail. The lender, not the borrower, has a copy of the lender’s policy that was purchased by the borrower. Once the claim, whether by the owner or the lender, is received by the insurance company you will receive a letter acknowledging your claim and assigning it a claim number. This letter by the insurance company will begin the thirty-day window to either remedy the defect in the title or pay the amount covered under the policy.

The Far Reach of the Lorenzo Doctrine—The Title Insurance Industry

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The Lorenzo doctrine was adopted by the federal courts in the Ninth Circuit for jurisdictional purposes but it has been used in the land title insurance industry for denying insurance claims.

In 1994, the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) heard an appeal where the defendant-appellant, Anthony Lorenzo, was seeking an appeal that the trial court committed an error when his motion to dismiss his indictment was denied, which led to his conviction. Lorenzo argued that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist because the overthrow of the Hawaiian government on January 17, 1893, was illegal. And since he was a citizen of the kingdom, the trial court did not have any jurisdiction over him. The case was State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo.

For the first time ever regarding the United States overthrow, the ICA distinguished the government from a sovereign State—the Hawaiian Kingdom, or at least tried to. In the past, these two terms were interchangeable. In its decision, the ICA cited a 1991 appeals case that was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) that quoted another case in the Second Circuit, National Petro-chemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988), as well as quoting from §201 from the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987). The Second Circuit Court stated:

The [Palestine Liberation Organization] PLO first argues that it is a sovereign state and therefore immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the “FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1988). As support for this argument, it relies on its “political and governmental character and structure, its commitment to and practice of its own statehood, and its unlisted and indeterminable membership.” Brief for Appellant at 7. However, this Court has limited the definition of “state” to “‘entit[ies] that ha[ve] a defined territory and a permanent population, [that are] under the control of [their] own government, and that engage[] in, or ha[ve] the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.’” [citations omitted]. It is quite clear that the PLO meets none of those requirements.

The definition of a State includes a government and not that the government is synonymous with a State. Palestine has yet to be recognized by the United States as a sovereign and independent State, which prevented the PLO from claiming that Palestine is a State in U.S. federal courts. Therefore, whenever the issue of Palestine arises in federal court proceedings, the court itself or one of the parties to the lawsuit would invoke the “political question doctrine” and the case would be dismissed. Only until the United States recognizes Palestine as a State will the federal courts acknowledge Palestinian Statehood.

The Hawaiian Kingdom is different from the Palestinian situation in that the United States already recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State in its treaties. In other words, the Hawaiian Kingdom did “ha[ve] a defined territory and a permanent population, [that are] under the control of [their] own government, and that engage[] in, or ha[ve] the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.” In fact, the Hawaiian Kingdom had an embassy in Washington, D.C., and the United States had an embassy in Honolulu.

The question that came before the ICA in the Lorenzo appeal is whether the State continues to exist despite the overthrow of its government by the United States on January 17, 1893. The ICA stated, “The essence of the lower court’s decision is that even if, as Lorenzo contends, the 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom was illegal, that would not affect the court’s jurisdiction in this case. Although the court’s rationale is open to question in light of international law, the record indicates that the decision was correct because Lorenzo did not meet his burden of proving his lack of jurisdiction.” Here, the ICA would appear to have conflated the Hawaiian State with the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom when it stated, “the 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom was illegal.”

This distinction between the State and the government was explained in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States that the ICA cited. In §202 is states:

Recognition of state and government distinguished. Recognition of a state is a formal acknowledgment that the entity possesses the qualifications of statehood, and implies a commitment to treat the entity as a state. Recognition of a government is formal acknowledgment that a particular regime is the effective government of a state and implies a commitment to treaty that regime as the government of that state. Ordinarily, that occurs when a state is incorporated into another state, as when Montenegro in 1919 became a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia).

According to Professor Oppenheim, once recognition of a State is granted, it “is incapable of withdrawal” by the recognizing State, and Professor Schwarzenberger explains that “recognition estops the State which has recognized the title from contesting its validity an any future time.” §202 goes on to say that the “duty to treat a qualified entity as a state also implies that so long as the entity continues to meet those qualifications its statehood may not be ‘derecognized.’ If the entity ceases to meet those requirements, it ceases to be a state and derecognition is not necessary.”

So because the Hawaiian State cannot be “derecognized,” it would continue to exist despite the overthrow of the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom on January 17, 1893. Evidence of “when a state is incorporated into another state” would be an international treaty, particularly a peace treaty, whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom would have ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States. Examples of foreign States ceding sovereign territory to the United States by a peace treaty include the 1848 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico that ended the Mexican-American war, and the 1898 Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain that ended the Spanish-American War.

The 1898 Joint Resolution To provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, is a municipal law of the United States without extraterritorial effect. It is not an international treaty. Under international law, to annex territory of another State is a unilateral act, as opposed to cession, which is a bilateral act between States.

In 2002, the federal court in Honolulu, in United States v. Goo, referred to the State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo and the Lorenzo doctrine. For 28 years both the State of Hawai‘i courts and the federal courts have been applying the Lorenzo doctrine wrong. Under international law, which the ICA in Lorenzo acknowledged may affect the rationale of the ICA in placing the burden on the defendant to prove the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists as a State,” shifts the burden on the party opposing the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom that it “does not exist as a State.”

When the ICA acknowledged that Lorenzo did state in his motion to dismiss the indictment that the Ha­waiian Kingdom “was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties,” it set the presumption to be the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State under international law and not the existence of the State of Hawai‘i as a political subdivision of the United States.

Under international law, it was not the burden of the defendant to provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists as a State” when the Lorenzo Court already acknowledged its existence and recognition by the United States. Rather, it was the burden of the prosecution to provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not exist as a State.” As a result, the Lorenzo Court’s ruling was wrong and all decisions that followed in State of Hawai‘i courts and federal courts applying the Lorenzo doctrine also were wrong.

The Lorenzo doctrine also has been used by the title insurance industry. In a denial letter to a title insurance claimant, Michael J. Moss, Senior Claims Counsel for Chicago Title Insurance Company, specifically referenced the Lorenzo doctrine applied in two State of Hawai‘i court cases and one federal court case as a basis to decline the insurance claim under an owner’s title insurance policy in the amount of $178,000.00. Moss stated:

The Hawaiian Courts have consistently found that the Kingdom of Hawai‘i is no longer recognized as a sovereign state by either the federal government or by the State of Hawai‘i. See State v. Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i 219, 221, 883 P.2d 641, 643 (Haw.App.1994); accord State v. French, 77 Hawai‘i 222, 228, 883 P.2d 644, 649 (Haw.App.1994); Baker v. Stehua, CIV 09-00615 ACK-BMK, 2010 WL 3528987 (D. Haw. Sept. 8, 2010).

Like the courts of the State of Hawai‘i and the federal courts, the Senior Claims Counsel incorrectly applied the Lorenzo doctrine, which should have been in favor of the title insurance claimant. The title insurance claim was that the “Owner’s deed was not lawfully executed according to Hawaiian Kingdom law [because] the notaries public and the Bureau of Conveyance weren’t part of the Hawaii[an] Kingdom, that the documents in [the claimant’s] chain of title were not lawfully executed.”

In other words, the Lorenzo doctrine, when applying international law correctly, would force the title insurance company to pay the claimant his $178,000.00 covered under the owner’s title insurance policy he had purchased to protect him in case there was a defect in the title.

All titles to property that were conveyed after January 17, 1893, are defective because the deeds were “not lawfully executed according Hawaiian Kingdom law [because] the notaries public and the Bureau fo Conveyances weren’t part of the Hawaii[an] Kingdom, [and] that the documents in [the claimant’s] chain of title were not lawfully executed.”

Defective titles to land in Hawai‘i also renders all mortgages tied to the land to be void and that title insurance also pays off the balance of the loan to the bank under the Lender’s Policy. For more information on this topic, download the Royal Commission of Inquiry’s Preliminary Report on Land Titles Throughout the Realm and its Supplemental Report on Title Insurance.

The Federal Court in Honolulu Comes Face to Face with its own Lorenzo Doctrine

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The Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden federal lawsuit is still playing out at the United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i, despite the case also being heard by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.

What is before the Ninth Circuit are not the two preliminary judgments made by Judge Leslie Kobayashi, but rather the lawful authority for Judge Kobayashi to make the judgments in the first place. The proceedings before the federal court in Honolulu was to get Judge Kobayashi to transform into an Article II Occupation Court so it would have lawful authority.

Right now, the federal court in Honolulu is operating as an Article III Court which is a part of the judiciary branch of government under article III of the United States Constitution. An Article II Occupation Court is a part of the executive branch of government under article II of the U.S. Constitution headed by the President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Article II Occupation Courts are federal courts established in territory that is being occupied by the United States. Because Article III Courts operate within the territorial boundaries of the United States, they administer United States law. Article II Occupation Courts, on the other hand, administer the laws of the occupied State and the international law of occupation. Article II Occupation Courts were established in Germany after the defeat of the Nazi regime. These courts administered German law and the law of occupation.

Whenever defendants in Hawai‘i challenged the authority of the United States and the State of Hawai‘i in court, judges in State of Hawai‘i courts and in the federal court in Honolulu always referred to a 1994 State of Hawai‘i appeals case called State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo to quash the challenge. In that case, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“Lorenzo Court”) stated:

Lorenzo appeals, arguing that the lower court erred in denying his pretrial motion (Motion) to dismiss the indictment. The essence of the Motion is that the [Ha­waiian Kingdom] (Kingdom) was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties; the Kingdom was illegally overthrown in 1893 with the assistance of the United States; the Kingdom still exists as a sovereign nation; he is a citizen of the Kingdom; therefore, the courts of the State of Hawai‘i have no jurisdiction over him. Lorenzo makes the same argument on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the lower court correctly denied the Motion.

According to the Lorenzo Court it based its denial of the motion to dismiss because it “was incumbent on Defendant to present evidence supporting his claim. Lorenzo has presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.”

The Lorenzo Court’s standard of review in determining whether the Hawaiian Kingdom exists as a State placed the burden of proof on Lorenzo as the defendant. The Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, clarified this evidentiary burden. The Supreme Court stated:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.

Lorenzo became a precedent case on the subject of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State in State of Hawai‘i courts, and is known in the United States District Court in Hawai‘i, since 2002, as the Lorenzo principle or doctrine. There have been seventeen federal cases that applied the Lorenzo doctrine, two of which came before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.

The Lorenzo Court, however, did acknowledge that its “rationale is open to question in light of international law.” Whether or not the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,” international law is supposed to be applied. By placing the burden of proof on the defendant, the Lorenzo Court did not apply international law. Because international law provides for the presumption of the continuity of the State despite the overthrow of its government by another State, it shifts the burden of proof and what is to be proven.

According to Judge Crawford, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations…despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government,” and belligerent occupation “does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.” “If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.”

Evidence of “a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States” would be an international treaty, particularly a peace treaty, whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom would have ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States. Examples of foreign States ceding sovereign territory to the United States by a peace treaty include the 1848 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico that ended the Mexican-American war, and the 1898 Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain that ended the Spanish-American War.

The 1898 Joint Resolution To provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, is a municipal law of the United States without extraterritorial effect. It is not an international treaty. Under international law, to annex territory of another State is a unilateral act, as opposed to cession, which is a bilateral act between States. Under international law, annexation of an occupied State is unlawful. According to The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts:

The international law of belligerent occupation must therefore be understood as meaning that the occupying power is not sovereign, but exercises provisional and temporary control over foreign territory. The legal situation of the territory can be altered only through a peace treaty or debellatio. International law does not permit annexation of territory of another state.

When the Lorenzo Court acknowledged that Lorenzo did state in his motion to dismiss the indictment that the Ha­waiian Kingdom “was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties,” it set the presumption to be the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State under international law and not the existence of the State of Hawai‘i as a political subdivision of the United States. This would have resulted in placing the burden “on the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal.”

Under international law, it was not the burden of Lorenzo to provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists” when the Lorenzo Court already acknowledged its existence and recognition by the United States. Rather, it was the burden of the prosecution to provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not exist.” As a result, the Lorenzo Court’s ruling was wrong and all decisions that followed in State of Hawai‘i courts and Federal courts applying the Lorenzo doctrine also were wrong.

In Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Amended Complaint claiming that Hawai‘i was annexed by a joint resolution of Congress in 1898 and that Hawai‘i is the 50th State of the Union since 1959. Despite the frivolous claim by the United States that Hawai‘i was annexed by an American law, the Hawaiian Kingdom opposed the motion to dismiss because the Court has no authority to make any ruling until it transforms itself into an Article II Occupation Court. Article III Courts can only operate within the territory of the United States and not outside of it unless it is an Article II Occupation Court.

On June 9, 2022, Judge Kobayashi filed her Order granting the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Hawaiian Kingdom’s amended complaint claiming she doesn’t have to transform into an Article II Occupation Court because of the Lorenzo doctrine! Today the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Motion to Amend or Alter the Order because Judge Kobayashi used the Lorenzo doctrine in error. In its Motion, the Hawaiian Kingdom concluded with:

Without citing any rebuttable evidence to the presumption of continuity of the Hawaiian State, the Court relied on Fonoti. This case, however, is not judge-made law or federal common law like Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino regarding international relations. The Fonoti case was a decision that did not comply with the Lorenzo doctrine and, therefore, cannot be used by this Court as if it is federal common law. While the Court cited the Fonoti case in its granting of the Defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss, which was based on the Lorenzo doctrine, albeit in error, the Court willfully disregarded international law and the Lorenzo doctrine to the detriment of the Plaintiff Hawaiian Kingdom, being a manifest error of law and fact and a manifest injustice. The Court has willfully avoided the Lorenzo doctrine that calls for evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist “as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” The Lorenzo doctrine does not seek to determine whether the government of the Hawaiian State exists. Notwithstanding the restoration of the government of the Hawaiian State three years after State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo in 1994 as a Council of Regency and Plaintiff in this case, the Lorenzo doctrine’s evidentiary burden was not altered except by the application of international law.

The Court has provided no legal basis to grant Defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss first amended complaint. Therefore, this Court is bound by treaty law to take affirmative steps to transform itself into an Article II Court by virtue of Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, just as the International Bureau of the PCA established the arbitral tribunal by virtue of Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes because of the juridical fact of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State. This Court is also bound to transform itself into an Article II Court because it is situated within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom and not within the territory of the United States pursuant to the Lorenzo doctrine. Furthermore, Federal Defendants have provided no rebuttable evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State was extinguished under international law other than invoking its internal laws as justification for not complying with its international obligations, which are barred by customary international law and treaty law.

For 28 years the State of Hawai‘i courts and the U.S. federal court in Hawai‘i have been applying the Lorenzo doctrine, which they created, wrong. This is not a matter of reading the fine print in the Lorenzo Court’s decision. It was in plain view when the Lorenzo Court stated that “the court’s rationale is open to question in light of international law.”

As a federal judge, Judge Kobayashi is obligated to apply international law to the Lorenzo doctrine, because the U.S. Supreme Court, in the The Paquette Habana case, stated, “International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”

Hawaiian Kingdom Petitions Ninth Circuit Court to Compel Judge Kobayashi to Transform into an Article II Occupation Court

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On May 25, 2022, on behalf of the United States, President Joseph Biden, Vice-President Kamala Harris, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Aquilino, Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., filed a Response to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens.

A motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens is filed with an appellate court if the proper court of appeals is in a foreign country. In its motion the Hawaiian Kingdom is asking the Ninth Circuit Court to dismiss the appeal because the Clerk of the District Court of Hawai‘i transmitted the appeal to the Ninth Circuit in error.

When the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i on April 24, 2022, it specifically stated that the Hawaiian Kingdom was appealing to a competent Court of Appeals to be hereafter established by the United States as an Occupying Power within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom. It was the Clerk that transferred the Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco, and not the Hawaiian Kingdom.

The international laws of occupation allows the Occupying Power, in this case the United States, to establish an Article II Occupation Court in the Hawaiian Kingdom’s territory as the occupying State to administer the laws of the occupied State and the international laws of occupation. The United States established an Article II Occupation Court in Germany in 1945 until 1955 when the occupation of Germany ended.

After receiving the appeal, the Clerk of the Ninth Circuit issued an Order for the Hawaiian Kingdom to file within 21 days a motion “for voluntary dismissal of the appeal or show cause why it should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Federal appeals can only be made after the case is over at the trial court level. District Court Judge Leslie Kobayashi did not terminate the proceedings in Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden.

The Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens, but in doing so asked the Ninth Circuit Court to comply with the Lorenzo principle, which is federal common law, and compel the United States to show evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist as a matter of international law. The Hawaiian Kingdom is “show[ing] cause why it should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” The Lorenzo principle has a direct nexus to a 1994 appeal that came before the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals called State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo. The Appellate Court stated:

Lorenzo appeals, arguing that the lower court erred in denying his pretrial motion (Motion) to dismiss the indictment. The essence of the Motion is that the [Ha­waiian Kingdom] (Kingdom) was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties; the Kingdom was illegally overthrown in 1893 with the assistance of the United States; the Kingdom still exists as a sovereign nation; he is a citizen of the Kingdom; therefore, the courts of the State of Hawai‘i have no jurisdiction over him. Lorenzo makes the same argument on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the lower court correctly denied the Motion.

Lorenzo became a precedent case on the subject of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s existence as a State in State of Hawai‘i courts, and is known in the United States District Court in Hawai‘i, since 2002, as the Lorenzo principle. The Lorenzo principle placed the burden of proof that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State on the defendants. In 2014, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court clarified this evidentiary burden. In State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage, the Supreme Court stated:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s foreign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.

There have been seventeen federal cases that applied the Lorenzo principle, two of which came before the Ninth Circuit Court. However, a careful read of the Lorenzo decision reveals a stunning shift of who has the burden of proof and what needs to be proven. The Appellate Court in Lorenzo stated that “the court’s rationale is open to question in light of international law.” Since the determination of whether a State exists is a matter of international law, what does international law say about the existence of a State?

A rule of international law is that an established State is presumed to still exist despite its government being military overthrown. This is why the German State continued to exist after the Nazi government was militarily overthrown in 1945, and why the Japanese State continued to exist despite the military overthrow of the Japanese government, both of which ended the Second World War. In other words, the Hawaiian Kingdom, as an established State under international law, like Germany and Japan, is presumed to continue to exist despite the illegal overthrow of its government on January 17, 1893.

Because the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist, the burden was not on Lorenzo as the defendant to prove the Hawaiian Kingdom “exists,” but rather the burden is placed on the prosecutor to prove that the Hawaiian Kingdom “does not exist.” The State of Hawai‘i courts that applied the Lorenzo principle in multiple cases applied it wrong.

Also, the seventeen federal cases that applied the Lorenzo principle also had it wrong, and like the State of Hawai‘i courts are rendered unlawful because of international law, so is the United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i. This means that all court decisions after 1893, whether the provisional government, the Republic of Hawai‘i, the Territory of Hawai‘i, the State of Hawai‘i, and since 1900, the federal courts, are void because the courts were never lawful to begin with.

Further implications of international law renders the State of Hawai‘i itself as unlawful. On this note, the Appellate Court in Lorenzo also stated that the “illegal overthrow leaves open the question whether the present governance system should be recognized” because a “State has an obligation not to recognize or treat as a state an entity that has attained the qualifications for statehood as a result of a threat or use of armed force.”

The State of Hawai‘i is a direct successor to the provisional government that was established through the “use of armed force.” In 1893, President Grover Cleveland concluded that the provisional government, which is a predecessor of the State of Hawai‘i, “owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States.” Secretary of State Walter Gresham stated that “the Government of Hawaii surrendered its authority under a threat of war, until such time only as the Government of the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should reinstate the constitutional sovereign.” In other words, the trial court that prosecuted Lorenzo and the Appellate Court that heard Lorenzo’s appeal were never lawful in the first place.

The Hawaiian Kingdom’s appeal that was forwarded to the Ninth Circuit by the Clerk of the District Court in Hawai‘i raised a very interesting twist regarding the Lorenzo principle and the legal standing of the Ninth Circuit. By making the Lorenzo principle into federal common law, which means judge made law at the federal level, the Ninth Circuit is bound by the Lorenzo principle, especially when the Ninth Circuit applied the Lorenzo principle in two cases that it heard on appeal.

Unlike the Hawai‘i District Court, which is currently unlawful until it transforms itself into an Article II Occupation Court, the Ninth Circuit is lawful, as an Article III Court, because it sits in the territory of the United States. As such, the Hawaiian Kingdom can invoke the Lorenzo principle that the Hawaiian Kingdom is presumed to continue to exist unless the United States, who is a defendant-appellee in this case, can provide evidence that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist. Without providing a treaty of peace whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom ceded itself to the United States, the presumption of continuity remains. There is no treaty except for the unlawful imposition of American municipal laws since 1898.

Yesterday, June 2, 2022, the Hawaiian Kingdom filed its Reply to the United States response to its motion to dismiss that reiterated the Lorenzo principle and why the federal court in Hawai‘i is unlawful. And that since the Ninth Circuit is not unlawful because it sits within the territory of the United States in the city of San Francisco, it should apply the Lorenzo principle in this unique case that has now come before it.

In its Reply, the Hawaiian Kingdom has petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Leslie Kobayashi to transform the United States District Court in Hawai‘i into an Article II Occupation Court pursuant to the Lorenzo principle and international law. Under the All Writs Act, federal circuit courts of appeal are authorized to compel an inferior court within its circuit to do something that the law says must be done. In this case, international law requires that only Article II Occupation Courts that administer the laws of the occupied State and the law of occupation can be established in the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

With the filings of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens, the United States’ Response, and the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Reply, the issue is now in the hands of the Ninth Circuit for a decision.