COUNCIL MEMBER JEN RUGGLES SAYS CORPORATION COUNSEL OPINION INADEQUATE ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES

Says Opinion Does not Conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct and Legal Standards

Hilo, HI- Council member Jen Ruggles released a letter today in response to Corporation Counsel Joe Kamelamela’s opinion regarding possible criminal liability for war crimes. In a letter on Corporation Counsel letterhead dated August 22, 2018, Kamelamela’s answer consisted of two sentences stating, “we opine that you will not incur criminal liability under state, federal and international law. See Article VI, Constitution of the United States of America (international law cannot violate federal law).”

Council member Ruggles, stated that she had been advised by her attorney that Kamelamela’s answer was inconsistent with Rule 1.1 of the Hawai‘i Rules of Professional Conduct that applies to all licensed attorneys including government lawyers such as Corporation Counsel. The rule requires, “Competent handling of a particular matter [which] includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners.”

Last week Ruggles had sent a letter to Mr. Kamelamela requesting he assure her that she was not incurring criminal liability under international humanitarian law and United States Federal law as a Council member for legislating and being complicit in the collection of taxes, foreclosures, and criminal prosecutions that appeared to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution and international humanitarian law.

Ruggles said she had retained legal counsel, Stephen Laudig, to be sure that her concerns received proper consideration. She said her attorney had advised her to refrain from legislating until Mr. Kamelamela has assured her she was not incurring criminal liability for the alleged war crime of enacting American law within the occupied territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the legal definition of “assure” is to “make certain and put beyond all doubt.”

Ruggles said Laudig advised her that Kamelamela’s answer was a conclusory statement unsupported by any facts and analysis and not a legal opinion. Therefore, Laudig stated that Kamelamela’s “letter provides no analysis, or argument making it something other than a legal opinion in the sense that it marshals no facts or law to reach a reasoned position.”

Laudig also pointed out to Kamelamela that his statement that “international law cannot violate federal law”, was not a true statement. He went on to further state that Kamelamela’s statement was a similar conclusion made by U.S. Department of Justice Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo in his now infamous legal opinion regarding Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees dated January 9, 2002. Like Council member Ruggles who is concerned of incurring criminal liability, the General Counsel for the U.S. Department of Defense was also concerned about the incurring of criminal liability under international treaties and federal laws on the treatment of individuals detained by the U.S. Armed Forces during the conflict in Afghanistan. Yoo’s conclusion in his legal opinion stated “that neither the federal War Crimes Act [18 U.S.C. §2441] nor the Geneva Conventions would apply.”

Laudig states to Kamelamela that “Yoo’s legal opinion was found to be flawed and allegations of war crimes against Yoo and those relying on his opinion, arose in Germany in 2006, Spain in 2009, and Russia in 2013. After the United States Senate Intelligence Committee Report on CIA torture was released in December 2014, Erwin Chemerinsky, who at the time was Dean of the University of California, Irvine School of Law, called for the prosecution of Yoo for his role in authoring, as well as co-authoring, what came to be known as the Torture Memos.”

Laudig cautioned Kamelamela as to how he should “answer Council member Ruggles’ inquiries, because she is not the only member of the County Council that could be affected by your legal opinion.”

Council member Ruggles’ attorney reminded Kamelamela that the Office of the Corporation Counsel is tasked with giving legal counsel on matters related to the official powers and duties of Council members. He reminded Kamelamela that her request was made in her official capacity seeking legal advice in order to assure her that she was not incurring criminal liability under international humanitarian law and United States Federal law as a Council member for:

1. Participating in legislation of the Hawai‘i County Council that would appear to be in violation of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Geneva Convention where the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom must be administered and not the laws of the United States;
2. Being complicit in the collection of taxes from protected persons that stem from legislation enacted by the Hawai‘i County Council, which would appear to be in violation of Article 28 and 47 of the Hague Regulations and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention where pillaging is prohibited;
3. Being complicit in the foreclosures of properties of protected persons for delinquent property taxes that stem from legislation enacted by the Hawai‘i County Council, which would appear to be in violation of Article 28 and 47 of the Hague Regulations and Article 33 of the Geneva Convention where pillaging is prohibited, as well as in violation of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations and Articles 50 and 53 of the Geneva Convention where private property cannot be confiscated; and
4. Being complicit in the criminal prosecution of protected persons for committing misdemeanors or felonies that stem from legislation enacted by the Hawai‘i County Council, which would appear to be in violation of 147 of the Geneva Convention where protected persons are prohibited from being unlawfully confined, and cannot be denied a fair and regular trial by a tribunal with competent jurisdiction.

Council member Ruggles stated that Corporation Counsel’s letter did not comply with her request for a legal opinion. Her attorney compared the quality of Kamelamela’s letter of the 22^nd  to a previous 5 page much more thorough opinion on a much simpler matter dated November 3, 2017 involving a grant she wanted to provide for a community center titled Orchidland Neighbors CRF Grant Follow-up that included sections on background, facts, analysis, and a conclusion. She says for this grant Kamelamela had provided a legal opinion that appeared to have met the standard of professional conduct and that she was anticipating a response of similar quality. She also referred to a 12-page opinion by Kamelamela’s predecessor, Lincoln Ashida, which also included facts, analysis, and a conclusion to then Council member Bob Jacobson dated May 26, 2004, regarding Article III, Section 3-2, Hawai‘i County Charter WRK. NO. 03-3641

During last week’s Council Committee meetings on August 21, 2018, Kamelamela admitted that he had not yet read her 9-page letter, and Ruggles says that she was taken aback by Kamelamela’s uninformed comments made, which insinuated she was involved with Native Hawaiian sovereignty groups and that is what had motivated her inquiry.

She stated Kamelamela’s comments “struck me as improper and not what I would expect from a professional tasked with the responsibilities of his office nor from an attorney speaking to an elected official in public.”

She went on to state:

“I represent my constituents from District 5, and swore to support and defend the U.S. Constitution. If Kamelamela had read the letter before voicing his opinion on my legitimate request, he would have clearly known that the native Hawaiian sovereignty movement is unrelated to the issue of potential liability for war crimes. The memorandum opinion of Dr. deZayas, was not from a sovereignty group, but from a United Nations Independent Expert. His use of the terms ‘plundering’, ‘enabling’, and ‘colluding’ are precise legal terms associated with criminal activity for violating the Hague and Geneva Conventions. I do not take this memorandum lightly, nor should he.”

In Laudig’s response to Kamelamela, he states, “This letter is in the nature of a follow up reminder and opportunity to provide what could be described as a ‘proper’ legal opinion which would include…meeting the standards of competent practitioners’ as the Hawai‘i Rules of Professional Conduct outlines.”

Ruggles says, “until Corporation Counsel provides her with a proper legal opinion responding to the statement of facts, consistent with the Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct, and the legal definition of assurance that I am not incurring criminal liability under U.S. law and international law, which includes the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV, I painfully regret I have been advised by my attorney that I must continue to refrain from legislating.”

Ruggles added, “I will be holding a townhall meeting on this issue shortly, and as always, welcome our constituents’ concerns, questions, and ideas on any issue. I am available to them and will continue to work hard in providing transparency and accountability in government.”

Click to download:

Council member Ruggles’ Letter to Corporation Counsel Joe Kamelamela, August 21, 2018

Corporation Counsel Joe Kamelamela’s Letter to Council Member Ruggles’ Letter, August 22, 2018

Council member Ruggles’ Response Letter to Corporation Counsel Joe Kamelamela, August 28, 2018

When the United States assumed control of its installed puppet regime under the new heading of Territory of Hawai‘i in 1900, and later the State of Hawai‘i in 1959, it surpassed “its limits under international law through extraterritorial prescriptions emanating from its national institutions: the legislature, government, and courts (Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (1993), p. 19).” The legislation of every state, including the United States of America and its Congress, are not sources of international law.

In The Lotus case, (1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 10, p. 18), the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that “Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.” According to Judge Crawford, derogation of this principle will not be presumed (James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2^nd ed., 2006), p. 41).

Since Congressional legislation has no extraterritorial effect, it cannot unilaterally establish governments in the territory of a foreign state. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens, and operations of the nation in such territory must be governed by treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international law (United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)).”

The U.S. Supreme Court also concluded that “[t]he laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation within its own jurisdiction (The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824)).” Therefore, the State of Hawai‘i cannot claim to be a government as its only claim to authority derives from Congressional legislation that has no extraterritorial effect. As such, international law defines the State of Hawai‘i as an organized armed group.

According to Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I (2009), p. 14, “organized armed groups … are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates.” They explain that “this definition of armed forces covers all persons who fight on behalf of a party to a conflict and who subordinate themselves to its command.” Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention, IV, states:

“The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: (1) To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (2) To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) To carry arms openly; and (4) To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”

In 2013, State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia, 128 Hawai‘i 479, 486 (2013), the State of Hawai‘i Supreme Court responded to a defendant who “contends that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his criminal prosecution because the defense proved the existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the illegitimacy of the State of Hawai‘i government, with “whatever may be said regarding the lawfulness” of its origins, “the State of Hawai‘i … is now, a lawful government.” This is a bold statement to be made by the Supreme Court without providing any evidence of its lawfulness other than declaring its lawfulness.

From a standpoint of evidence, the jurisdiction of the State of Hawai‘i court stems from its lawfulness. This lawfulness, however, is allowed to be challenged by a defendant under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Hawai‘i Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for a defendant to file a motion to dismiss based upon subject matter jurisdiction. In Nishitani v. Baker, 82 Haw. 281, 289 (1996), the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) stated,

“that although the governments of the State of Hawaii and the United States had recently acknowledged the illegality of the overthrow of the Kingdom, neither recognizes that the Kingdom exists at the present time (citations omitted).  Because the defendant had ‘presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,’ we determined that the defendant had failed to meet his burden under HRS ß 701-115(2) (1993) of proving his defense of lack of jurisdiction. … [And] where immunity claims are raised as a defense to jurisdiction, the burden is on the defendant to establish his immunity status.”

The citation by the ICA of HRS ß 701-115(2) states, “No defense may be considered by the trier of fact unless evidence of the specified fact or facts has been presented.” In other words, it is incumbent on the defendant to present the evidence if he is challenging the jurisdiction of the court. In Kaulia, there was no evidentiary hearing by the trial court because the trial court denied Kaulia his right to present ‘specified fact or facts” that conclude “the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.”

Kaulia’s attorney sought to have Dr. Keanu Sai serve as an expert witness. Dr. Sai had been admitted in both criminal and civil proceedings as an expert witness on the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law.

“[O]n March 15, 2010, Kaulia filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Motion to Dismiss) challenging the court’s jurisdiction over the case based on the existence of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i (Kingdom). At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the court confirmed that in off-the-record conferences it had denied Kaulia’s request for an evidentiary hearing to call witnesses, including one Dr. Keanu Sai, to establish the existence of the Kingdom. The court then denied Kaulia’s Motion to Dismiss.” State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia,128 Haw. 479, 482 (2013).

On appeal, the ICA held that “[t]he Circuit Court did not err in precluding Kaulia from calling a witness to present evidence concerning the Kingdom of Hawai‘i in support of his motion to dismiss case for lack of jurisdiction (State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia, 127 Haw. 414 (2012),” despite the ICA’s previous decision in State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo, 77 Haw. 219, 221 (1994), that “it was incumbent on Defendant to present evidence supporting his claim…that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.” According to The American Heritage Dictionary (2^nd ed., 1982),  the term ‘incumbent’ is defined as “[i]mposed as an obligation or duty; obligatory.” Legally, the phrase ‘incumbent on’ means “mandatory, obligatory, requisite (William C. Burton, Legal Thesaurus 754 (2^nd ed., 1992)).”

Like the ICA, the Supreme Court in blatant disregard of the ICA cases of Lorenzo and Baker, “rejected Kaulia’s argument that the circuit court erred in precluding Kaulia from calling a witness to present evidence concerning the existence of the Kingdom in support of his Motion to Dismiss (State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia, 128 Haw. 479, 487 (2013)).”

The irony of this whole matter is that the Supreme Court cited Lorenzo and Baker as its basis to deny Kaulia’s argument, which is that “it was incumbent on Defendant to present evidence supporting his claim…that the Kingdom exists as a state.” The decisions by the Circuit Court, ICA and Supreme Court in Kaulia clearly run counter to HRS ß 701-115(2). According to this flawed logic, so long as the trier of fact (judge) can prevent the defense from presenting “evidence of the specified fact or facts” it does not need to consider it. Prosecutors and plaintiff’s attorneys now cite State of Hawai‘i v. Kaulia as the precedent case to deny defendants’ motions to dismiss. This is a feeble attempt to close the door that they opened in 1994 in State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo.

The State of Hawai‘i courts have established an echo chamber to shield themselves from the precedence set by the courts themselves in Lorenzo and Baker. The term echo chamber is “widely used in today’s lexicon, that describes a situation where certain ideas, beliefs or data points are reinforced through repetition of a closed system that does not allow for the free movement of alternative or competing ideas or concepts.” As Mohajer, The Little Book of Stupidity: How We Lie to Ourselves and Don’t Believe Others 20, 7 (2015), wrote:

“The confirmation bias is so fundamental to [our] development and [our] reality that you might not even realize it is happening. We look for evidence that supports our beliefs and opinions about the world but excludes those that run contrary to our own… In an attempt to simplify the world and make it conform to our expectations, we have been blessed with the gift of cognitive biases.”

While this game of hide and seek is being played out by the State of Hawai‘i judiciary, these actions constitute violations of the 1907 Hague and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which have been codified by the Congress under 18 U.S.C. §2441—War crimes.

The United Nations Independent Expert, Dr. Alfred M. deZayas notified the State of Hawai‘i judiciary to not “plunder…enable or collude.” Plunder is another word for the war crime of pillaging, which is prohibited under Article 28 of the 1907 Hague Convention, IV, 18 U.S.C. §2441(c)(2). To deny a person of a fair and regular trial is also a war crime under Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV, 18 U.S.C. §2441(c)(2). The terms enable and collude are terms associated with conspiring to commit war crimes.