

**H.E. DAVID KEANU SAI, PH.D.**

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September 23, 2024

Lieutenant Colonel Michael I. Rosner  
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*Via electronic mail*

Re: Senator Crabbe formally requests for a legal opinion from the Attorney General regarding the Hawaiian Kingdom's continued existence under international law

Lieutenant Colonel Rosner:

The purpose of this letter is to notify you that this past Thursday, September 19, 2024, Senator Cross Makani Crabbe, who represents District 22 on the west side of O'ahu, submitted a formal request, pursuant to §28-3 Hawai'i Revised Statutes, to Attorney General Anne Lopez for a legal opinion regarding the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an occupied State, which I am enclosing. Consequently, this alleviates you from requesting a legal opinion by 12 noon on September 23, 2024, as stated in my letter to you dated September 16, 2024.

However, should Attorney General Lopez fail to show that the Hawaiian Kingdom had been extinguished by the United States under international law, you have the duty and obligation to transform the State of Hawai'i into a military government. Your duty and obligation is in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, FM 27-5, FM 27-10, and the Council of Regency's Operational Plan for Transitioning the State of Hawai'i into a Military Government.<sup>1</sup> The 322nd Civil Affairs Brigade at Fort Shafter Flats advises commanders on military government.

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<sup>1</sup> Council of Regency, *Operational Plan for Transitioning the State of Hawai'i into a Military Government* (August 14, 2024) (online at [https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/HK\\_Operational\\_Plan\\_of\\_Transition.pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/HK_Operational_Plan_of_Transition.pdf)).

It has been twenty-five years, on November 8, 1999, since the international arbitral proceedings at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) were initiated, in *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*. The subject of this arbitral dispute was the first allegation of the *war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation*.<sup>2</sup> The claimant, Lance Larsen, alleged that the Hawaiian Kingdom, by its Council of Regency, was legally liable “for allowing the unlawful imposition of American municipal laws”<sup>3</sup> over him within Hawaiian territory. This led to the *war crimes of unfair trial and unlawful confinement* by the District Court of the Third Circuit in Kea‘au.

Before the arbitral tribunal was established on June 9, 2000, the PCA Secretary General recognized, as a matter of institutional jurisdiction, the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a non-Contracting State pursuant to Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention, I, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Article 47 states, “[t]he jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, may within the conditions laid down in the regulations, be extended to disputes between non-Contracting [States] or between Contracting [States] and non-Contracting [States], if the parties are agreed on recourse to this Tribunal.”<sup>4</sup> This brought the dispute under the auspices of the PCA. The PCA Secretary General also recognized the Council of Regency as the Hawaiian Kingdom government. The Council of Regency did not claim to be the government of a new State but rather the legal personality of the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom since the nineteenth century.

The issue of the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, as a State under international law, is not a novel legal issue for the State of Hawai‘i to determine. Since 1994, this issue has been at the center of case law and precedence, regarding jurisdictional arguments that came before the courts of the State of Hawai‘i. One year after the United States Congress passed the 1993 joint resolution, apologizing for the United States overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom government,<sup>5</sup> the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals heard an appeal in 1994 that centered on a claim that the Hawaiian Kingdom continued to exist as a country despite the unlawful overthrow of its government. In *State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo*, the appellate court stated:

Lorenzo appeals, arguing that the lower court erred in denying his pretrial motion (Motion) to dismiss the indictment. The essence of the Motion is that the [Hawaiian Kingdom] (Kingdom) was recognized as an independent sovereign nation by the United States in numerous bilateral treaties; the Kingdom was

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<sup>2</sup> Memorial of Lance Paul Larsen (May 22, 2000), *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*, Permanent Court of Arbitration, para. 62-64, [https://www.alohaquest.com/arbitration/pdf/Memorial\\_Larsen.pdf](https://www.alohaquest.com/arbitration/pdf/Memorial_Larsen.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Permanent Court of Arbitration Case Repository, *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*, PCA Case no. 1999-01, <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/35/>.

<sup>4</sup> 36 Stat. 2199, 2224 (1907). The PCA Convention uses the terms non-Contracting Powers and Contracting Powers, which are synonymous with non-Contracting States and Contracting States.

<sup>5</sup> 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).

illegally overthrown in 1893 with the assistance of the United States; the Kingdom still exists as a sovereign nation; he is a citizen of the Kingdom; therefore, the courts of the State of Hawai‘i have no jurisdiction over him. Lorenzo makes the same argument on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the lower court correctly denied the Motion.<sup>6</sup>

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, but it admitted “the court’s rationale is open to question in light of international law.”<sup>7</sup> By not applying international law, the appellate court concluded that the trial court’s decision was correct because Lorenzo “presented no factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.”<sup>8</sup>

Since 1994, *Lorenzo* has become the precedent case for denying defendants’ motions to dismiss claims that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist. When the appellate court placed the burden on defendants to provide a ‘factual (or legal) basis for concluding that the Kingdom exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,’ it would require the application of international law, not the municipal law or common law of the United States and/or the State of Hawai‘i, for the defense to meet that burden.

The Supreme Court, in *State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage*, clarified the evidentiary burden that *Lorenzo* placed upon defendants. The court stated:

Lorenzo held that, for jurisdictional purposes, should a defendant demonstrate a factual or legal basis that the Kingdom of Hawai‘i “exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature[,]” and that he or she is a citizen of that sovereign state, a defendant may be able to argue that the courts of the State of Hawai‘i lack jurisdiction over him or her.<sup>9</sup>

Senator Crabbe’s letter included two legal opinions, published by the *Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics*, by experts in international law, that provide a legal basis for concluding that the Hawaiian Kingdom ‘exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature,’ as called for by the State of Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. These legal opinions were authored by two professors of international law, Matthew Craven, from the University of London, SOAS, Department of Law, and Federico Lenzerini, from the University of Siena, Department of Political and International Sciences. I am also enclosing my latest law article on the responsibility to

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<sup>6</sup> *State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo*, 77 Haw. 219, 220; 883 P.2d 641, 642 (1994).

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*, 221, 643.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.*

<sup>9</sup> *State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage*, 132 Haw. 36, 57; 319 P.3d 1044, 1065 (2014).

protect a State's population from war crimes that was published this year by the *International Review of Contemporary Law*.

Hawai'i Revised Statutes §28-3 states: "[t]he attorney general **shall**, when requested, give opinions upon questions of law submitted by the governor, the legislature, or its members, or the head of any department (emphasis added)." The legal definition of *shall* "is an imperative command, usually indicating that certain actions are mandatory, and not permissive. This contrasts with the word 'may,' which is generally used to indicate a permissive provision, ordinarily implying some degree of discretion."<sup>10</sup> In his letter, Senator Crabbe presented the Attorney General with his question for her legal opinion:

Considering the two legal opinions by Professor Craven and Professor Lenzerini, that conclude the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State under international law, which are enclosed with this request, is the State of Hawai'i within the territory of the United States or is it within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom?

Under international law, there is a presumption of continuity of the Hawaiian State despite the overthrow of its government by the United States on January 17, 1893. According to Judge James Crawford, International Court of Justice, there "is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations [...] despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government,"<sup>11</sup> and belligerent occupation "does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State."<sup>12</sup> Presumption is defined as an act or instance of taking something to be true. As a matter of law, in the absence of acceptable reasons to the contrary, presumption is an attitude adopted in law toward an action or proposal.

The presumption of State continuity shifts the burden of proof as to what is to be proven and by whom. Like the presumption of innocence, the accused does not prove their innocence, but rather the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that person's guilt. Beyond a reasonable doubt is evidence so convincing that no reasonable person would have any doubts as to the person's guilt. Matthew Craven, professor of international law, explains:

If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity, one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other

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<sup>10</sup> See Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, *shall* (online at <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/shall#:~:text=Shall%20is%20an%20imperative%20command,implying%20some%20degree%20of%20discretion.>).

<sup>11</sup> James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* 34 (2nd ed. 2006).

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*

words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.<sup>13</sup>

In other words, the Attorney General’s legal opinion would not prove the State of Hawai‘i lawfully exists, but rather, it must prove beyond any reasonable doubt, that the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist, as a State, under the rules of international law, and that the State of Hawai‘i is within the territory of the United States. Evidence of ‘a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States’ would be an international treaty, particularly a peace treaty, whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom would have ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States. Examples of foreign States ceding sovereign territory to the United States by a peace treaty include the 1848 *Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico*<sup>14</sup> and the 1898 *Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain*.<sup>15</sup>

In her legal opinion, to answer, in the affirmative, that the State of Hawai‘i is within the territory of the United States, the Attorney General must refer to a ‘valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States.’ Otherwise, the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State under international law, which triggers your duty and obligation to establish a military government. For her to claim that the question of law raises a political question and, therefore, she cannot answer the question, is an admission to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s presumed existence since the nineteenth century. The political question doctrine refers to federal courts and their inability to adjudicate disputes that have been submitted to the courts for adjudication. According to the U.S. Supreme Court:

For purposes of Article III of the Constitution, “no justiciable ‘controversy’ exists when parties seek adjudication of a political question.” But the term “political question” is a legal term of art that on its face gives little indication of what sorts of cases the doctrine bars federal courts from deciding.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, in *State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage*, precludes the Attorney General from not answering the question if it was previously demonstrated, by the two legal opinions, that “a factual or legal basis that the Kingdom of Hawai‘i ‘exists as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state’s sovereign nature.’”<sup>17</sup> According to *State of Hawai‘i v. Lorenzo*, she would have to provide rebuttable evidence that counters

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<sup>13</sup> See Professor Craven’s legal opinion, p. 513.

<sup>14</sup> 9 Stat. 922 (1848).

<sup>15</sup> 30 Stat. 1754 (1898).

<sup>16</sup> Constitution Annotated—Analysis and Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, *ArtIII.S2.C1.9.1 Overview of Political Question Doctrine* (online at [https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S2-C1-9-1/ALDE\\_00001283/](https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S2-C1-9-1/ALDE_00001283/)).

<sup>17</sup> *State of Hawai‘i v. Armitage*, 132 Haw. 36, 57; 319 P.3d 1044, 1065 (2014).

the conclusions of the two legal opinions, otherwise the presumption of the Hawaiian Kingdom's existence, as a State, remains. Therefore, all acts taken by the United States within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom, to include the creation of the State of Hawai'i by a congressional act,<sup>18</sup> is void. According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, in the *Lotus* case (France v. Turkey):

Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.<sup>19</sup>

Therefore, the United States cannot 'exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State,' such as the Hawaiian Kingdom, because it already has international treaties with.<sup>20</sup> The United States needs a treaty of cession with the Hawaiian Kingdom before it can exercise any power within the latter's territory. Consequently, the State of Hawai'i has no legal standing within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and thus, actions or conduct, taken by members of the State of Hawai'i and or its Counties, could be construed as war crimes. I am enclosing Professor William Schabas' legal opinion on war crimes currently being committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom.

Since 2020, the Royal Commission of Inquiry has published, on its website (<https://hawaiiankingdom.org/royal-commission.shtml>), the following reports and memorandums:

Preliminary Report *re* Mens Rea (March 24, 2020)

Preliminary Report *re* Authority of the Council of Regency (May 27, 2020)

Preliminary Report *re* Legal Status of Land Titles throughout the Realm (July 16, 2020)

Supplemental Report *re* Title Insurance (October 28, 2020)

Preliminary Report *re* Explicit Recognition of the Hawaiian State and of the Council of Regency as its Government by the United States of America (April 2, 2021)

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<sup>18</sup> 73 Stat. 4 (1959).

<sup>19</sup> *The Case of the S.S. Lotus* (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Series A, No. 10, 18 (1927).

<sup>20</sup> 9 Stat. 977 (1841-1851); 19 Stat. 625 (1875); and 25 Stat. 1399 (1884).

Preliminary Report *re* War Crimes of Transferring Populations in an Occupied Territory and Denationalization (September 30, 2021)

Preliminary Report *re* The Right of Self-Determination of the Hawaiian People in a State of War (October 23, 2021)

Preliminary Report *re* The Lorenzo doctrine on the Continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State (June 7, 2022)

Preliminary Report *re* Attainder of Treason and the Corruption of Blood (October 26, 2022)

Preliminary Report *re* Termination of the 1875 Commercial Reciprocity Treaty and its 1884 Supplemental Convention (October 26, 2023)

Criminal Report no. 22-0001 *re* Insurgency of 1893 and Attainder of Treason (November 4, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0002 *re* Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Derek Kawakami & Arryl Kaneshiro** (November 17, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0002-1 *re* Accomplice to Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Matthew M. Bracken & Mark L. Bradbury** (November 20, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0003 *re* Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Mitchell Roth & Maile David** (November 17, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0003-1 *re* Accomplice to Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Elizabeth A. Strance, Mark D. Disher & Dakota K. Frenz** (November 20, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0004 *re* Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Michael Victorino & Alice L. Lee** (November 17, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0004-1 *re* Accomplice to Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Moana M. Lutey, Caleb P. Rowe & Iwalani Mountcastle Gasmen** (November 20, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0005 *re* Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**David Yutake Ige, Ty Nohara, & Isaac W. Choy** (November 18, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0005-1 *re* Accomplice to Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Holly T. Shikada & Amanda J. Weston** (November 20, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0006 *re* Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Anders G.O. Nervell** (November 18, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0006-1 *re* Accomplice to Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Scott I. Batterman** (November 20, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0007 *re* Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., Kamala Harris, Admiral John Aquilino, Charles P. Rettig, Charles E. Schumer, & Nancy Pelosi** (November 18, 2022)

Amended War Criminal Report no. 22-0007—a Withdrawal of **Admiral John Aquilino** (February 23, 2024)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0007-1 *re* Accomplice to Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Brian M. Boynton, Anthony J. Coppolino & Michael J. Gerardi** (November 20, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0008 *re* Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation & Deprivation of Fair and Regular Trial—**Leslie E. Kobayashi & Rom A. Trader** (November 23, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0009 *re* Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation, Deprivation of Fair and Regular Trial, & Pillage—**Mark E. Recktenwald, Paula A. Nakayama, Sabrina S. McKenna, Richard W. Pollack, Michael D. Wilson, Todd W. Eddins, Glenn S. Hara, Greg K. Nakamura, Charles Prather, Sofia M. Hirosane, Daryl Y. Dobayashi, James E. Evers, Josiah K. Sewell, Clifford L. Nakea, Bradley R. Tamm, and Alana L. Bryant** (December 28, 2022)

War Criminal Report no. 22-0009-1 *re* Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation, Deprivation of Fair & Regular Trial—**Derrick K. Watson, J. Michael Seabright, Leslie E. Kobayashi and Jill A. Otake** (February 28, 2023)

War Criminal Report no. 23-0001 *re* Usurpation of Sovereignty during Military Occupation—**Anne E. Lopez, Craig Y. Iha, Ryan K.P. Kanaka'ole, Alyssa-Marie Y. Kau, Peter Kahana Albinio, Jr., and Joseph Kualii'i Lindsey Camara** (March 29, 2023)

War Criminal Report no. 24-0001 *re* Omission for willful failure to establish a military government—**Kenneth Hara** (August 5, 2024)



War Criminal Report no. 24-0002 *re* Omission for willful failure to establish a military government—**Stephen F. Logan** (August 12, 2024)

War Criminal Report no. 24-0003 *re* Omission for willful failure to establish a military government—**Wesley Kawakami** (August 19, 2024)

War Criminal Report no. 24-0004 *re* Omission for willful failure to establish a military government—**Fredrick Werner** (August 26, 2024)

War Criminal Report no. 24-0005 *re* Omission for willful failure to establish a military government—**Bingham Tuisamatatele, Jr.** (September 2, 2024)

War Criminal Report no. 24-0006 *re* Omission for willful failure to establish a military government—**Joshua Jacobs** (September 9, 2024)

War Criminal Report no. 24-0007 *re* Omission for willful failure to establish a military government—**Dale Balsis** (September 16, 2024)


Memorandum regarding the Hawaiian Kingdom's continuity as a State and subject of International Law (August 29, 2023)

Memorandum on why all 193 Member States of the United Nations recognize the Continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the Council of Regency (December 22, 2023)

Memorandum on Bringing the American Occupation of Hawai`i to an End by Establishing an American Military Government (June 22, 2024)

In order to understand the gravity and severity of the situation, I recommend that you view a presentation that I was invited to give to the Maui County Council's *Disaster, Resilience, International Affairs, and Planning* (DRIP) Committee on March 6, 2024 (online at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X-VIA\\_3GD2A](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X-VIA_3GD2A)). To further understand the situation, I recommend that you also view two recent podcasts of *Keep it Aloha* with Kamaka Dias, which has collectively garnered over 22k views since August 1, 2024 (Part 1—online at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvEdNx2dynE&t=6043s>), (Part 2—online at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBSFZQdC5bU&t=8466s>).

Unless the Attorney General can provide you a legal opinion that concludes the Hawaiian Kingdom does not exist 'as a state in accordance with recognized attributes of a state's sovereign nature,' you should begin to prepare for your role as military governor and transition the State of Hawai'i into a military government according to the Council of Regency's Operational Plan with essential and implied tasks. You should also begin to reach out to the 322nd Civil Affairs Brigade at Fort Shafter Flats.



David Keanu Sai, Ph.D.

Head, *Royal Commission of Inquiry*

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The Senate  
Ka 'Aha Kenekoa

STATE CAPITOL  
HONOLULU, HAWAII 96813

September 19, 2024

Attorney General Anne Lopez  
Department of the Attorney General  
425 Queen Street  
Honolulu, HI 96813

Dear Attorney General Anne Lopez:

I am in possession of a letter from the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI), dated February 7, 2024, that was sent to my predecessor, Senator Maile Shimabukuro, as well as all the Senators and Representatives of the State of Hawai'i and the Council Members of the four Counties ([https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/RCI\\_Ltr\\_to\\_SOH\\_Legislature\\_\(2.7.24\).pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/RCI_Ltr_to_SOH_Legislature_(2.7.24).pdf)). I am also in possession of another letter by the RCI, dated September 5, 2024, to Governor Josh Green and the members of his cabinet ([https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/RCI\\_Ltr\\_to\\_Gov.Green\\_Cabinet\\_\(9.5.24\).pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/RCI_Ltr_to_Gov.Green_Cabinet_(9.5.24).pdf)).

In both letters, the RCI is asserting that the laws enacted by the State of Hawai'i Legislature and ordinances enacted by the County Councils constitutes the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation. The RCI then refers to a renowned expert on international criminal law, war crimes and human rights, Professor William Schabas from Middlesex University London, Department of Law, that wrote a legal opinion on war crimes being committed in Hawai'i today ([https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/3HawJLPol334\\_\(Schabas\).pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/3HawJLPol334_(Schabas).pdf)).

In his letters, Dr. David Keanu Sai, as Head of the RCI, states that the State of Hawai'i itself is a product of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty because of the Hawai'i Statehood Act of 1959 enacted by the Congress. In Dr. Sai's letter to Governor Green, he attached two legal opinions on the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under international law by Professor Matthew Craven from the University of London SOAS, Department of Law, and Professor Federico Lenzerini from the University of Siena, Italy, Department of Political and International Sciences. Both are professors of international law.

In his legal opinion, Professor Craven states, under international law, there is a presumption that the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist, unless there can be referenced, “a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.” And Professor Lenzerini states, in his legal opinion, “The conclusion according to which the Hawaiian Kingdom cannot be considered as having been extinguished—as a State—as a result of the American occupation also allows to confirm, *de plano*, that the Hawaiian Kingdom, as an independent State, has been under uninterrupted belligerent occupation by the United States of America, from 17 January 1893 up to the moment of this writing.”

As a Senator that represents the 22nd district, I am very concerned of these allegations that the State of Hawai‘i, as a governing body, is not legal because the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as an occupied State under international law. I am also not aware of any legal opinion that conclusively explains that the State of Hawai‘i is legal under international law and that war crimes are not being committed in Hawai‘i. Therefore, I am respectfully requesting of you for a legal opinion, in accordance with Hawai‘i Revised Statutes §28-3 that states, “The attorney general shall, when requested, give opinions upon questions of law submitted by the...legislature, or its members,” to answer this question of law:

*Considering the two legal opinions by Professor Craven and Professor Lenzerini, that conclude the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as a State under international law, which are enclosed with this request, is the State of Hawai‘i within the territory of the United States or is it within the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom?*

Given the severity of this request and that I may be implicated in war crimes for enacting legislation, your earnest attention to this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully



Senator Cross Makani Crabbe  
Hawai‘i State Senate  
District 22: **Ko ‘Olina, Nānākuli, Mā‘ili, Wai‘anae, Mākaha, and Mākua**

CC: Governor Josh Green, M.D., State of Hawai‘i  
Senator Ronald D. Kouchi, President, Hawai‘i State Senate  
Representative Scott K. Saiki, Speaker, Hawai‘i State House of Representatives

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**CONTINUITY OF THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM**

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A. THE CONTINUITY OF THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM

## 2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2.1 The issue of State continuity usually arises in cases in which some element of the State has undergone some significant transformation (such as changes in its territorial compass or in its form of government). A claim as to state continuity is essentially a claim as to the continued independent existence of a State for purposes of international law in spite of such changes. It is essentially predicated, in that regard, upon an insistence that the State's legal identity has remained intact. If the State concerned retains its identity it can be considered to 'continue' and *vice versa*. Discontinuity, by contrast, supposes that the identity of the State has been lost or fundamentally altered such that it has ceased to exist as an independent state and that, as a consequence, rights of sovereignty in relation to territory and population have been assumed by another 'successor' state (to the extent provided by rules of succession). At its heart, therefore, the issue of State continuity is concerned with the parameters of a state's existence and demise (or extinction) in international law.

2.2 The implications of continuity in case of Hawai'i are several:

- a) That authority exercised by US over Hawai'i is not one of sovereignty i.e. that the US has no legally protected 'right' to exercise that control and that it has no original claim to the territory of Hawai'i or right to obedience on the part of the Hawaiian population. Furthermore, the extension of US laws to Hawai'i, apart from those that may be justified by reference to the law of (belligerent) occupation would be contrary to the terms of international law.
- b) That the Hawaiian people retain a right to self-determination in a manner prescribed by general international law. Such a right would entail, at the first instance, the removal of all attributes of foreign occupation, and a restoration of the sovereign rights of the dispossessed government.
- c) That the treaties of the Hawaiian Kingdom remain in force as regards other States in the name of the Kingdom (as opposed to the US as a successor State) except as may be affected by the principles *rebus sic stantibus* or impossibility of performance.
- d) That the Hawaiian Kingdom retains a right to all State property including that held in the territory of third

states, and is liable for the debts of the Hawaiian kingdom incurred prior to its occupation.

2.3 Bearing in mind the consequences elucidated in c) and d) above, it might be said that a claim of state continuity on the part of Hawai'i has to be opposed as against a claim by the US as to its succession. It is apparent, however, that this opposition is not a strict one. Principles of succession may operate even in cases where continuity is not called into question, such as with the cession of a portion of territory from one state to another, or occasionally in case of unification. Continuity and succession are, in other words, not always mutually exclusive but might operate in tandem. It is evident, furthermore, that the principles of continuity and succession may not actually differ a great deal in terms of their effect. Whilst State continuity certainly denies the applicability of principles of succession and holds otherwise that rights and obligations remain intact save insofar as they may be affected by the principles *rebus sic stantibus* or impossibility of performance, there is room in theory at least for a principle of universal succession to operate such as to produce exactly the same result (under the theory of universal succession).<sup>1</sup> The continuity of legal rights and obligations, in other words, does not necessarily suppose the continuity of the State as a distinct person in international law, as it is equally consistent with discontinuity followed by universal succession. Even if such a thesis remains largely theoretical, it is apparent that a distinction has to be maintained between continuity of personality on the one hand, and continuity of specific legal rights and obligations on the other. The maintenance in force of a treaty, for example, in relation to a particular territory may be evidence of State continuity, but it is far from determinative in itself.

2.4 Even if it is relatively clear as to when States may be said to come into being for purposes of international law (in many cases predicated upon recognition or admission into the United Nations),<sup>2</sup> the converse is far from being the case.<sup>3</sup> Beyond the theoretical circumstance in which a body politic has dissolved (for example by submergence of the territory or the dispersal of the population), it is apparent that all cases of putative extinction will arise in cases where certain changes of a material nature have occurred – such as a change in government and change in the territorial configuration of the State. The difficulty, however, is in determining when such changes are merely incidental, leaving intact the identity of the state, and when they are to be regarded as fundamental going to the heart

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. article 34 Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties (1978).

<sup>2</sup> See on this point Crawford J., *The Creation of States in International Law* (1979); Dugard J., *Recognition and the United Nations* (1987).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p.417.

of that identity.<sup>4</sup> The problem, in part, is the lack of any institution by which such an event may be marked: governments do not generally withdraw recognition even if circumstances might so warrant,<sup>5</sup> and there is no mechanism by which membership in international organisations may be terminated by reason of extinction. It is evident, moreover, that states are complex political communities possessing various attributes of an abstract nature which vary in space as well as time, and, as such, determining the point at which changes in those attributes are such as to affect the State's identity will inevitably call for very fine distinctions.

2.5 It is generally held, nevertheless, that there exist several uncontroversial principles that have some bearing upon the issue of continuity. These are essentially threefold, all of which assume an essentially negative form.<sup>6</sup> First that the continuity of the State is not affected by changes in government even if of a revolutionary nature.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See generally, Marek K., *The Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1968). For early recognition of this principle see Phillimore P., *Commentaries upon International Law* (1879) p. 202.

<sup>5</sup> See, Guggenheim P., *Traité de droit international public* (1953) p. 194. Lauterpacht notes that '[W]ithdrawal of recognition from a State is often obscured by the fact that, having regard to the circumstances, it does not take place through an express declaration announcing the withdrawal but through the act of recognition, express or implied, of the new authority.' Lauterpacht H., *Recognition in International Law*, (1947) pp. 350-351.

<sup>6</sup> Further principles have also been suggested, such as: i) the state does not cease to exist by reason of its entry into a personal union, Pradier-Fodéré, *Traité de droit international public Européen et Américain* (1885) s.148, p.253; ii) that the state does not expire by reason of becoming economically or politically weak, *ibid*, s. 148, p.254; iii) that the state does not cease to exist by reason of changes in its population, *ibid* p. 252; iv) that the state is not affected by changes in the social or economic system, Verzijl, *International Law in Historical Perspective*, p. 118; v) that the State is not affected by being reduced to a State of semi-sovereignty, Phillimore, *supra*, n. 4, p. 202. According to Vattel, the key to sovereignty was 'internal independence and sovereign authority' (Vattel E., *The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law* (1758, trans Fenwick C., 1916) Bk.1, s.8)- if a state maintained these, it would not lose its sovereignty by the conclusion of unequal treaties or tributary agreements or the payment of homage. Sovereign states could be subject to the same prince and yet remain sovereign e.g Prussia and Neufchatel (*ibid*, Bk.1, s.9). The formation of confederative republic of states did not destroy sovereignty because 'the obligation to fulfill agreements one has voluntarily made does not detract from one's liberty and independence' (*ibid*, bk.1, s.10) e.g. the United Provinces of Holland and the members of the Swiss Confederation.

<sup>7</sup> For early versions of this principle see, Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* Bk. II, c. xvi, p. 418. See also, Pufendorf S., *De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo* (1688, trans Oldfather C. and Oldfather W., 1934) B. VIII, c. xii, s.1, p. 1360; Rivier, *Principes du Droit des Gens*, (1896) I, p. 62; De Martens F., *Traité de Droit International* (1883) 362; Westlake J., *International Law* (1904) I, 58; Wright Q., 'The Status of Germany and the Peace Proclamation', 46 A.J.I.L. (1952) 299, p. 307; McNair A., 'Aspects of State Sovereignty' B.Y.I.L. (1949) p. 8. Jennings and Watts (Oppenheim's International Law (9<sup>th</sup> ed. 1996), p. 146) declare that:

'Mere territorial changes, whether by increase or by diminution, do not, so long as the identity of the State is preserved, affect the continuity of its existence or the obligations of its treaties.... Changes in the government or the internal polity of a State do not as a rule affect its position in international law. A monarchy may be transformed into a republic, or a republic into a monarchy; absolute

Secondly, that continuity is not affected by territorial acquisition or loss,<sup>8</sup> and finally that it is not affected by belligerent occupation (understood in its technical sense).<sup>9</sup> Each of these principles reflects upon one of the key incidents of statehood – territory, government and independence – making clear that the issue of continuity is essentially one concerned with the existence of States: unless one or more of the key constituents of statehood are entirely and permanently lost, State identity will be retained. Their negative formulation, furthermore, implies that there exists a general presumption of continuity.<sup>10</sup> As Hall was to express the point, a State retains its identity

‘so long as the corporate person undergoes no change which essentially modifies it from the point of view of its international relations, and with reference to them it is evident that no change is essential which leaves untouched the capacity of the state to give effect to its general legal obligations or to carry out its special contracts.’<sup>11</sup>

The only exception to this general principle, perhaps, is to be found in case of multiple changes of a less than total nature, such as where a revolutionary change in government is accompanied by a broad change in the territorial delimitation of the State.<sup>12</sup>

2.6 If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity, one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that

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principles may be substituted for constitutional, or the reverse; but, though the government changes, the nation remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired’.

See also, *US v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp. et al* 299 US (1936) 304, p. 316 (J. Sutherland): ‘Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government change; but sovereignty survives.’

<sup>8</sup> Westlake, *supra*, n. 7, p. 59; Pradier-Fodéré, *supra*, n. 6, s. 148, p. 252; Hall W., *A Treatise on International Law* (4<sup>th</sup> ed. 1895) p. 23; Phillimore, *supra*, n. 4, I, pp. 202-3; Rivier, *supra*, n. 7, I, pp. 63-4; Marek, *supra*, n. 4, pp. 15-24 Article 26 Harvard Research Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties 1935, 29 AJIL (1935) Supp. 655. See also, *Katz and Klump v. Yugoslavia* [1925-1926] A. D. 3 (No. 24); *Ottoman Debt Arbitration* [1925-26] A. D. 3; *Roselius and Co. v. Dr Karsten and the Turkish Republic intervening*, [1925-6] A. D. (No. 26); *In re Ungarische kriegsproduktien Aktiengesellschaft*, [1919-22] A.D. (No. 45); *Lazard Brothers and Co v. Midland Bank*, [1931-32] A.D. (No. 69). For State practice see e.g. Great Britain remained the same despite the loss of the American Colonies; France, after the loss of territory in 1814-15 and 1871; Austria after the cession of Lombardy in 1859 and Venice in 1866; Prussia after the Franco-Prussian Peace Treaty at Tilsit, 1807. See generally, Moore, J., *A Digest of International Law*, (1906), p. 248.

<sup>9</sup> See below, paras. .

<sup>10</sup> Crawford points out that ‘the presumption – in practice a strong one – is in favour of the continuance, and against the extinction, of an established state’, Crawford, *supra*, n. 2, p. 417.

<sup>11</sup> Hall, *supra*, n. 8, p. 22.

<sup>12</sup> See e.g. Marek, *supra*, n. 4.

continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States. It might be objected that formally speaking, the survival or otherwise of a State should be regarded as independent of the legitimacy of any claims to its territory on the part of other States. It is commonly recognised that a State does not cease to be such merely in virtue of the existence of legitimate claims over part or parts of its territory. Nevertheless, where those claims comprise the entirety of the territory of the State, as they do in case of Hawai'i, and when they are accompanied by effective occupation to the exclusion of the claimant, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the two questions. The survival of the Hawaiian Kingdom is, it seems, premised upon the legal ineffectiveness of present or past US claims to sovereignty over the Islands.

2.7 In light of such considerations any claim to State continuity will be dependent upon the establishment of two legal facts: first that the State in question existed as a recognised entity for purposes of international law at some relevant point in history; and secondly that intervening events have not been such as to deprive it of that status. It should be made very clear, however, that the issue is not simply one of 'observable' or 'tangible facts', but more specifically of 'legally relevant facts'. It is not a case, in other words, simply of observing how power or control has been exercised in relation to persons or territory, but of determining the scope of 'authority' (understood as 'a legal entitlement to exercise power and control'). Authority differs from mere control by not only being essentially rule governed, but also in virtue of the fact that it is not always entirely dependent upon the exercise of that control. As Arbitrator Huber noted in the *Island of Palmas Case*:

'Manifestations of sovereignty assume... different forms according to conditions of time and place. Although continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot be exercised in fact at every moment on every point of a territory. The intermittence and discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of the right necessarily differ according as inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved, or regions enclosed within territories in which sovereignty is incontestably displayed or again regions accessible from, for instance, the high seas.'<sup>13</sup>

Thus, whilst 'the continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty' remains an important measure for determining

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<sup>13</sup> *Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States)* 2 R.I.A.A. 829.

entitlements in cases where title is disputed (or where ‘no conventional line of sufficient topographical precision exists’), it is not always an indispensable prerequisite for legal title. This has become all the more apparent since the prohibition on the annexation of territory became firmly implanted in international law, and with it the acceptance that certain factual situations will not be accorded legal recognition: *ex inuria ius non oritur*.

### 3. THE STATUS OF THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM AS A SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

3.1 Whilst the Montevideo criteria<sup>14</sup> (or versions of) are now regarded as the definitive determinants of statehood, the criteria governing the ‘creation’ of states in international law in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century were somewhat less clear.<sup>15</sup> The rise of positivism and its rejection of the natural law leanings of early commentators (such as Grotius and Pufendorf) led many to posit international law less in terms of a ‘universal’ law of nations and more in terms of an international public law of European (and North American) States.<sup>16</sup> According to this view, international law was gradually extended to other portions of the globe primarily in virtue of imperialist ambition and colonial practice - much of the remainder was regarded as simply beyond the purview of international law and frequently as a result of the application of a highly suspect ‘standard of civilisation’. It was not the case, therefore, that all territories governed in a stable and effective manner would necessarily be regarded as subjects of international law and much would apparently depend upon the formal act of recognition, which signalled their ‘admittance into the family of nations’.<sup>17</sup> Thus, on the one hand commentators frequently provided impressively detailed ‘definitions’ of the State. Phillimore, for example, noted that ‘for all purposes of international law, a state... may be defined to be a people permanently occupying a fixed territory (*certam sedem*), bound together by common laws, habits and customs into one body politic, exercising, through the medium of an organized government, independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its boundaries, capable of making

<sup>14</sup> Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26<sup>th</sup> 1933, article 1:

‘The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.

<sup>15</sup> Doctrine towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century began to articulate those criteria. Rivier, for example, described the ‘essential elements of the state’ as being evidenced by ‘an independent community, organised in a permanent manner on a certain territory’ (Rivier, *supra*, n. 7). Hall similarly speaks about the ‘marks of an independent State are, that the community constituting it is permanently established for a political end, that it possesses a defined territory, and that it is independent of external control.’ *Supra*, n. 8, p. 18.

<sup>16</sup> See e.g., Lawrence T., *Principles of International Law* (4<sup>th</sup> ed. 1913) p. 83; Pradier-Fodéré, *Traité de droit international public Européen et Américain* (1885).

<sup>17</sup> Hall comments, for example, that ‘although the right to be treated as a state is independent of recognition, recognition is the necessary evidence that the right has been acquired. Hall, *supra*, n. 8, p. 87.

war and peace, and of entering into all international relations with the other communities of the globe'.<sup>18</sup> These definitions, however, were not always intended to be prescriptive. Hall maintained, for example, that whilst States were subjected to international law 'from the moment... at which they acquire the marks of a state'<sup>19</sup> he later added the qualification that States 'outside European civilisation... must formally enter into the circle of law-governed countries'.<sup>20</sup> In such circumstances recognition was apparently critical. Given the trend to which this gave rise, Oppenheim was later to conclude in 1905, that 'a State is and becomes an international person through recognition only and exclusively'.<sup>21</sup>

3.2 Whatever the general position, there is little doubt that the Hawaiian Kingdom fulfilled all requisite criteria. The Kingdom was established as an identifiable, and independent, political community at some point in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century (the precise date at which this occurred is perhaps of little importance). During the next half-Century it was formally recognised by a number of Western powers including Belgium, Great Britain,<sup>22</sup> France,<sup>23</sup> and the United States,<sup>24</sup> and received and dispatched diplomatic agents to more than 15 States (including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Norway and the United States). Secretary of State Webster declared, for example, in a letter to Hawaiian agents in 1842 that:

'the government of the Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought either to take possession of the Islands as a conquest or for purpose of colonization, and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing Government, or any exclusive privileges or preferences with it in matters of commerce.'<sup>25</sup>

This point was reiterated subsequently by President Tyler in a message to Congress.<sup>26</sup> In similar vein, Britain and France declared in a joint declaration in 1843 that they considered 'the Sandwich

<sup>18</sup> Phillimore, *supra*, n. 4, I, p. 81.

<sup>19</sup> Hall, *supra*, n. 8, p. 21.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

<sup>21</sup> *International Law: A Treatise* (1905) I, p. 109.

<sup>22</sup> Declaration of Great Britain and France relative to the Independence of the Sandwich Islands, London, Nov. 28<sup>th</sup>, 1843.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Message from the President of the United States respecting the trade and commerce of the United States with the Sandwich Islands and with diplomatic intercourse with their Government, Dec. 19<sup>th</sup> 1842. The Apology Resolution of 1993, however, maintains that the US 'recognised the independence of the Hawaiian Kingdom, extended full and complete diplomatic recognition to the Hawaiian Government 'from 1826 until 1893'.

<sup>25</sup> Letter of Dec. 19<sup>th</sup> 1842, Moore's Digest, *supra*, n. 8, I, p. 476.

<sup>26</sup> Message of President Tyler, Dec. 30<sup>th</sup> 1842, Moore's Digest, *supra*, n. 8, I, pp. 476-7.

Islands as an independent State' and vowed 'never to take possession, either directly or under the title of protectorate, or under any other form, of any part of the territory of which they are composed'.<sup>27</sup> When later in 1849, French forces took possession of government property in Honolulu, Secretary of State Webster sent a sharp missive to his French counterpart declaring the actions 'incompatible with any just regard for the Hawaiian Government as an independent State' and calling upon France to 'desist from measures incompatible with the sovereignty and independence of the Hawaiian Islands'.<sup>28</sup>

- 3.3 In addition to establishing formal diplomatic relations with other States, the Hawaiian Kingdom entered into an extensive range of treaty relations with those States. Treaties were concluded with the United States (Dec. 23<sup>rd</sup> 1826, Dec. 20<sup>th</sup> 1849, May 4<sup>th</sup> 1870, Jan. 30<sup>th</sup> 1875, Sept. 11<sup>th</sup> 1883, and Dec. 6<sup>th</sup> 1884), Britain (Nov. 16<sup>th</sup> 1836 and July 10<sup>th</sup> 1851), the Free Cities of Bremen (Aug. 7<sup>th</sup> 1851) and Hamburg (Jan. 8<sup>th</sup> 1848), France (July 17<sup>th</sup> 1839), Austria-Hungary (June 18<sup>th</sup> 1875), Belgium (Oct. 4<sup>th</sup> 1862), Denmark (Oct. 19<sup>th</sup> 1846), Germany (March 25<sup>th</sup> 1879), France (Oct. 29<sup>th</sup> 1857), Japan (Aug. 19<sup>th</sup> 1871), Portugal (May 5<sup>th</sup> 1882), Italy (July 22<sup>nd</sup> 1863), the Netherlands (Oct. 16<sup>th</sup> 1862), Russia (June 19<sup>th</sup> 1869), Samoa (March 20<sup>th</sup> 1887), Switzerland (July 20<sup>th</sup> 1864), Spain (Oct. 29<sup>th</sup> 1863), and Sweden and Norway (July 1<sup>st</sup> 1852). The Hawaiian Kingdom, furthermore, became a full member of the Universal Postal Union on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1882.
- 3.4 There is no doubt that, according to any relevant criteria (whether current or historical), the Hawaiian Kingdom was regarded as an independent State under the terms of international law for some significant period of time prior to 1893, the moment of the first occupation of the Island(s) by American troops.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, this point was explicitly accepted in the *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom* Arbitral Award.<sup>30</sup>
- 3.5 The consequences of Statehood at that time were several. States were deemed to be sovereign not only in a descriptive sense, but were also regarded as being 'entitled' to sovereignty. This entailed, amongst other things, the rights to free choice of government, territorial inviolability, self-preservation, free development of natural resources, of acquisition and of absolute jurisdiction over all persons and things within the territory of the State.<sup>31</sup> It was, however, admitted that intervention by another state was permissible in certain prescribed circumstances such as for purposes of self-preservation,

<sup>27</sup> For. Rel. 1894, App. II, p. 64.

<sup>28</sup> Letter of June 19<sup>th</sup> 1851, For. Rel. 1894, App. II, p. 97.

<sup>29</sup> For confirmation of this fact see e.g. Rivier, *supra*, n. 7, I, p. 54.

<sup>30</sup> *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*, P.C.A. Arbitral Award, Feb. 5<sup>th</sup> 2001, para. 7.4.

<sup>31</sup> Phillimore, *supra*, n. 4, I, p. 216.



for purposes of fulfilling legal engagements or of opposing wrongdoing. Although intervention was not absolutely prohibited in this regard, it was generally confined as regards the specified justifications. As Hall remarked,

‘The legality of an intervention must depend on the power of the intervening state to show that its action is sanctioned by some principle which can, and in the particular case does, take precedence of it.’<sup>32</sup>

A desire for simple aggrandisement of territory did not fall within these terms, and intervention for purposes of supporting one party in a civil war was often regarded as unlawful.<sup>33</sup> In any case, the right of independence was regarded as so fundamental that any action against it ‘must be looked upon with disfavour’.<sup>34</sup>

#### 4. RECOGNISED MODES OF EXTINCTION

4.1 In light of the evident existence of Hawai`i as a sovereign State for some period of time prior to 1898, it would seem that the issue of continuity turns upon the question whether Hawai`i can be said to have subsequently ceased to exist according to the terms of international law. Current international law recognises that a state may cease to exist in one of two scenarios: by means of that State’s integration with another in some form of union (such as the GDR’s accession to the FRG), or by its dismemberment (such as in case of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia).<sup>35</sup> As will be seen, events in Hawai`i in 1898 are capable of being construed in several ways, but it is evident that the most obvious characterisation was one of annexation (whether by cession or conquest).

4.2 The general view today is that, whilst annexation was historically a permissible mode of acquiring title to territory (as was ‘discovery’), it is now regarded as illegitimate and primarily as a consequence of the general prohibition on the use of force as expressed in article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This point has since been underscored in various forms since 1945. General Assembly Resolution 2625 on Friendly Relations, for example, provides that:

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<sup>32</sup> Hall, *supra*, n. 8, p. 298.

<sup>33</sup> See e.g. Lawrence, *supra*, n. 14, p. 134.

<sup>34</sup> Hall, *supra*, n. 8, p. 298.

<sup>35</sup> Jennings and Watts add one further category: when a State breaks up into parts all of which become part of other states (such as Poland in 1795), *supra*, n. 8, p. 204.

‘The territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat of use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognised as legal.’<sup>36</sup>

Practice also suggests that the creation of new States in violation of the principle is illegitimate (illustrated by the general refusal to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), and that the legal personality of the State subjected to illegal invasion and annexation continues despite an overriding lack of effectiveness<sup>37</sup> (confirmed in case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). Such a view is considered to flow not only from the fact of illegality, and from the peremptory nature of the prohibition on the use of force, but is also expressive of the more general principle *ex iniuria ius non oritur*.<sup>38</sup> It is also clear that where annexation takes the form of a treaty of cession, that treaty would be regarded as void if procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the UN Charter.<sup>39</sup>

4.3 Even if the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands would be regarded as unlawful according to accepted standards today, it does not necessarily follow that US claims to sovereignty are unfounded. It is generally maintained that the legality of any act should be determined in accordance with the law of the time when it was done, and not by reference to law as it might have become at a later date. This principle finds its expression in case of territorial title, as Arbitrator Huber pointed out in the *Island of Palmas* case,<sup>40</sup> in the doctrine of inter-temporal law. As far as Huber was concerned, there were two elements to this doctrine – the first of which is relatively uncontroversial, the second of which has attracted a certain amount of criticism. The first, uncontroversial, element is simply that ‘a juridical fact must be appreciated in light of the law contemporary with it, and not the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled’.<sup>41</sup> In the present context,

<sup>36</sup> Declaration of Principles of International Law, GA Resn. 2625. See Whiteman, *Digest of International Law* (1965), V, pp. 874-965.

<sup>37</sup> See, Crawford, *supra*, n. 2, p. 418.

<sup>38</sup> Such a principle has been recognised in e.g., *Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex* (2<sup>nd</sup> Phase), 1930, PCIJ, Series A, No. 24; *South-Eastern Territory of Greenland*, 1932, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 48, p. 285; *Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig*, 1933, PCIJ, Series B, No. 15, p. 26; *Legal Status of Eastern Greenland*, 1933, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 75, 95.

<sup>39</sup> Article 52 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.

<sup>40</sup> *Island of Palmas (Netherlands v. United States)* 2 R.I.A.A. (1928) 829

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

therefore, the extension of US sovereignty over Hawai'i should be analysed in terms of the terms of international law, as they existed at the relevant point(s) in time. This much cannot be disputed. The second element outlined by Huber, however, is that, notwithstanding the legitimate origins of an act creating title, the continued existence of that title – its continued manifestation – 'shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of law'. The issue in consideration, here, is whether title based upon historical discovery, or conquest, could itself survive irrespective of the fact that neither is regarded as a legitimate mode of acquisition today. Whilst some have regarded this element as a dangerous extension of the basic principle,<sup>42</sup> its practical effects are likely to be limited to those cases in which the State originally claiming sovereignty has failed to reinforce that title by means of effective occupation (acquisitive prescription). This was evident in case of the Island of Palmas, but is unlikely to be so in other cases – particularly in light of Huber's comment that sovereignty will inevitably have its discontinuities. In any case, it is apparent that, as Huber stressed, any defect in original title is capable of being remedied by means of a continuous and peaceful exercise of territorial sovereignty and that original title, whether defective or perfect, does not itself provide a definitive conclusion to the question.

4.4 Turning then to the law as it existed at the critical date of 1898, it was generally held that a State might cease to exist in one of three scenarios:

- a) By the destruction of its territory or by the extinction, dispersal or emigration of its population (a theoretical disposition).
- b) By the dissolution of the corpus of the State (cases include the dissolution of the German Empire in 1805-6; the partition of the Pays-Bas in 1831 or of the Canton of Bale in 1833).
- c) By the State's incorporation, union, or submission to another (cases include the incorporation of Cracow into Austria in 1846; the annexation of Nice and Savoy by France in 1860; the annexation of Hannover, Hesse, Nassau and Schleswig-Holstein and Frankfurt into Prussia in 1886).<sup>43</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Jessup, 22 A.J.I.L. (1928) 735.

<sup>43</sup> See e.g. Pradier-Fodere, *supra*, n. 7, I, p. 251; Phillimore, *supra*, n. 4, I, p. 201; de Martens *Traite de Droit International* (1883) I, pp. 367-370.

- 4.5 Neither a) nor b) is applicable in the current scenario. In case of c) commentators not infrequently distinguished between two processes – one of which involved a voluntary act (i.e. union or incorporation), the other of which came about by non-consensual means (i.e. conquest and submission followed by annexation).<sup>44</sup> It is evident that, as suggested above, annexation (or ‘conquest’) was regarded as a legitimate mode of acquiring title to territory<sup>45</sup> and it would seem to follow that in case of total annexation (i.e. annexation of the entirety of the territory of a State) the defeated State would cease to exist.
- 4.6 Although annexation was regarded as a legitimate means of acquiring territory, it was recognised as taking a variety of forms.<sup>46</sup> It was apparent, to begin with, that a distinction was typically drawn between those cases in which the annexation was implemented by Treaty of Peace, and those which resulted from an essentially unilateral public declaration on the part of the annexing power. The former would be governed by the particular terms of the treaty in question, and gave rise to a distinct type of title.<sup>47</sup> Since treaties were regarded as binding irrespective of the circumstances surrounding their conclusion and irrespective of the presence or absence of coercion,<sup>48</sup> title acquired in virtue of a peace treaty was considered to be essentially derivative (i.e. being transferred from one state to another).<sup>49</sup> There was little, in other words, to distinguish title acquired by means of a treaty of peace backed by force, and a voluntary purchase of territory: in each case the extent of rights enjoyed by the successor were determined by the agreement itself. In case of conquest absent an agreed settlement, by contrast, title was thought to derive simply from the fact of military subjugation and was complete ‘from the time [the conqueror] proves his ability to maintain his sovereignty over his conquest, and manifests, by some authoritative act... his intention to retain it as part of his own territory’.<sup>50</sup> What was required, in other words, was that the conflict be complete (acquisition of sovereignty *durante bello* being clearly excluded) and that the conqueror declare an intention to annex.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>44</sup> See e.g., Westlake J., ‘The Nature and Extent of the Title by Conquest’, 17 L.Q.R. (1901) 392.

<sup>45</sup> Oppenheim (*supra*, n. 31, I, p. 288) remarks that ‘[a]s long as a Law of Nations has been in existence, the states as well as the vast majority of writers have recognized subjugation as a mode of acquiring territory’.

<sup>46</sup> Halleck H., *International Law* (1861) p. 811; Wheaton H., *Elements of International Law* (1866, 8<sup>th</sup> ed.) II, c. iv, s. 165.

<sup>47</sup> See e.g. Lawrence, *supra*, n. 14, p. 165-6 (‘Title by conquest arises only when no formal international document transfers the territory to its new possessor’.)

<sup>48</sup> Cf now article 52 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.

<sup>49</sup> See e.g. Rivier, *supra*, n. 7, p. 176.

<sup>50</sup> Baker S., *Halleck’s International Law* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 1893) p. 468.

<sup>51</sup> This point was of considerable importance following the Allied occupation of Germany in 1945.

4.7 What remained a matter of some dispute, however, was whether annexation by way of subjugation should be regarded as an original or derivative title to territory and, as such, whether it gave rise to rights in virtue of mere occupation, or rather more extensive rights in virtue of succession (a point of particular importance for possessions held in foreign territory).<sup>52</sup> Rivier, for example, took the view that conquest involved a three stage process: a) the extinction of the state in virtue of *debellatio* which b) rendered the territory *terra nullius* leading to c) the acquisition of title by means of occupation.<sup>53</sup> Title, in other words, was original, and rights of the occupants were limited to those which they possessed (perhaps under the doctrine *uti possidetis de facto*). Others, by contrast, seemed to assume some form of ‘transfer of title’ as taking place (i.e. that conquest gave rise to a derivative title<sup>54</sup>), and concluded in consequence that the conqueror ‘becomes, as it were, the heir or universal successor of the defunct or extinguished State’.<sup>55</sup> Much depended, in such circumstances, as to how the successor came to acquire title.

4.8 It should be pointed out, however, that even if annexation/conquest was generally regarded as a mode of acquiring territory, US policy during this period was far more sceptical of such practice. As early as 1823 the US had explicitly opposed, in the form of the Monroe Doctrine, the practice of European colonization<sup>56</sup> and in the First Pan-American Conference of 1889 and 1890 it had proposed a resolution to the effect that ‘the principle of conquest shall not... be recognised as admissible under American public law’. It had, furthermore, later taken the lead in adopting a policy of non-recognition of ‘any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928’ (the ‘Stimson Doctrine’) which was confirmed as a legal obligation in a resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1932. Even if such a policy was not to amount to a legally binding commitment on the part of the US not to acquire territory by use or threat of force during the latter stages of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, there is room to argue that the doctrine of estoppel might operate to prevent the US subsequently relying upon forcible annexation as a basis for claiming title to the Hawaiian Islands.

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<sup>52</sup> For an early version of this idea see de Vattel E., *supra*, n. 7, bk III, ss. 193-201; Bynkershoek C., *Quaestionum Juris Publici Libri Duo* (1737, trans Frank T., 1930) Bk. I, pp. 32-46.

<sup>53</sup> Rivier, *supra*, n. 7, p. 182.

<sup>54</sup> Phillimore, *supra*, n. 4, I, p. 328.

<sup>55</sup> Baker, *supra*, n. 50, p. 495.

<sup>56</sup> ‘The American continents, by the free and independent conditions which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers.’

## 5. US ACQUISITION OF THE ISLANDS

5.1 As pointed out above, the continuity of the Kingdom of Hawaii as an independent state for purposes of international law is theoretically independent of the legitimacy of claims to sovereignty over its territory on the part of other states. By the same token, the fact that the entirety of the Hawaiian Islands have been occupied, administered, and claimed as US territory for a considerable period of time, means that attention must be given to the legitimacy of the US claims as part of the process of determining Hawaiian continuity. US claims to sovereignty over the Islands would appear to be premised upon one of three grounds: a) by the original acquisition of the Islands in 1898 (by means of ‘annexation’ or perhaps ‘cession’); b) by the confirmation of the exercise of that sovereignty by plebiscite in 1959; and c) by the continuous and effective display of sovereignty since 1898 to the present day (acquisitive prescription in the form of adverse possession). Each of these claims will be considered in turn.

### 5.2 *Acquisition of the Islands in 1898*

5.2.1 The facts giving rise to the subsequent occupation and control of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the US government are, no doubt, susceptible to various interpretations. It is relatively clear, however, that US intervention in the Islands first took place in 1893 under the guise of the protection of the US legation and consulate and ‘to secure the safety of American life and property’.<sup>57</sup> US troops landed on the Island of O’ahu on 16<sup>th</sup> January and a Provisional Government was established by a group of insurgents under their protection. On the following day, and once Queen Lili’uokalani had abdicated her authority in favour of the United States, US minister Stevens formally recognised *de facto* the Provisional Government of Hawai’i. The Provisional Government then proceeded to draft and sign a ‘treaty of annexation’ on February 14<sup>th</sup> 1893 and dispatch it to Washington D.C. for ratification by the US Senate.

5.2.2 According to the first version of events as explained by President Harrison when submitting the draft treaty to the Senate, the overthrow of the Monarchy ‘was not in any way prompted by the United States, but had its origin in what seemed to be a reactionary and revolutionary policy on the part of Queen Lili’uokalani which put in serious peril not only the large and preponderating interests of the United States in the Islands, but

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<sup>57</sup> Order of Jan. 16<sup>th</sup> 1893.

all foreign interests'.<sup>58</sup> It was further emphasised in a report of Mr Foster to the President that the US marines had taken 'no part whatever toward influencing the course of events'<sup>59</sup> and that recognition of the Provisional Government had only taken place once the Queen had abdicated, and once it was in effective possession of the government buildings, the archives, the treasury, the barracks, the police station, and all potential machinery of government. This version of events was to be contradicted in several important respects shortly after.

5.2.3 Following receipt of a letter of protest sent by Queen Lili'uokalani, newly incumbent President Cleveland withdrew the Treaty of Annexation from the Senate and dispatched US Special Commissioner James Blount to Hawai'i to investigate. The investigations of Mr Blount revealed that the presence of American troops, who had landed without permission of the existing government, were 'used for the purpose of inducing the surrender of the Queen, who abdicated under protest [to the United States and not the provisional government] with the understanding that her case would be submitted to the President of the United States.'<sup>60</sup> It was apparent, furthermore, that the Provisional Government had been recognised when it had little other than a paper existence, and 'when the legitimate government was in full possession and control of the palace, the barracks, and the police station'.<sup>61</sup> On December 18<sup>th</sup> 1893, President Cleveland addressed Congress on the findings of Commissioner Blount. He emphasised that the Provisional Government did not have 'the sanction of either popular revolution or suffrage' and that it had been recognised by the US minister pursuant to prior agreement at a time when it was 'neither a government de facto nor de jure'.<sup>62</sup> He concluded as follows:

'Hawai'i was taken possession of by United States forces without the consent or wish of the Government of the Islands, or of anybody else so far as shown, except the United States Minister. Therefore, the military occupation of Honolulu by the United States... was wholly without justification, either of an occupation by consent or as an occupation necessitated by dangers threatening American life or property'.

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<sup>58</sup> For. Rel. 1894, App. II, 198.

<sup>59</sup> Report of Mr Foster, Sec. of State, For. Rel. 1894, App. II, 198-205.

<sup>60</sup> Moore's Digest, *supra*, n. 8, I, p. 499.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 498-99.

<sup>62</sup> Moore's Digest, *supra*, n. 8, p. 501.

Given the ‘substantial wrong’ that had been committed, he concluded that ‘the United States could not, under the circumstances disclosed, annex the islands without justly incurring the imputation of acquiring them by unjustifiable methods’.

- 5.2.4 It is fairly clear then, that the position of the US government in December 1893 was that its intervention in Hawai`i was an aberration which could not be justified either by reference to US law or international law. Importantly, it was also emphasised that the Provisional Government had no legitimacy for purposes of disposing of the future of the Islands ‘as being neither a government *de facto* nor *de iure*’. At this stage there was an implicit acknowledgement of the fact that the US intervention not only conflicted with specific US commitments to the Kingdom (particularly article 1 of the 1849 Hawaiian-American Treaty which provides that ‘[t]here shall be perpetual peace and amity between the United States and the King of the Hawaiian Islands, his heirs and successors’) but also with the terms of general international law which prohibited intervention save for purpose of self-preservation, or in accordance with the doctrine of necessity.<sup>63</sup>
- 5.2.5 This latter interpretation of events has since been confirmed by the US government. In its Apology Resolution of 23<sup>rd</sup> November 1993 the US Congress and Senate admitted that the US Minister (John Stevens) had ‘conspired with a small group of non-Hawaiian residents of the Hawaiian Kingdom, including citizens of the United States, to overthrow the indigenous and lawful Government of Hawai`i’, and that in pursuance of that conspiracy had ‘caused armed naval forces of the United States to invade the sovereign Hawaiian nation on January 16<sup>th</sup> 1893’. Furthermore, it is admitted that recognition was accorded to the Provisional government without the consent of the Hawaiian people, and ‘in violation of treaties between the two nations and of international law’, and that the insurrection would not have succeeded without US diplomatic and military intervention.
- 5.2.6 Despite admitting the unlawful nature of its original intervention, the US, however, did nothing to remedy its breach of international law and was unwilling to assist in the restoration of Queen Lili-uokolani to the throne even though she had acceded to the US proposals in that regard. Rather it left control of Hawai`i in the hands of the insurgents it had effectively put in place and who clearly did not enjoy the popular support of the Hawaiian people.<sup>64</sup> Following a proclamation establishing the

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<sup>63</sup> Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (1963) pp. 46-7.

<sup>64</sup> See, Budnick R., *Stolen Kingdom: An American Conspiracy* (1992)



Republic of Hawai'i by the insurgents in 1894 – the overt purpose of which was to enter into a Treaty of Political or Commercial Union with the United States<sup>65</sup> - *de facto* recognition of the Republic was affirmed by the US<sup>66</sup> and a second Treaty of Annexation was signed in Washington by the incoming President McKinley. Despite further protest on the part of Queen Lili'uokalani and other Hawaiian organisations, the Treaty was submitted to the US Senate for ratification in 1897. On this occasion, the Senate declined to ratify the treaty. After the breakout of the Spanish-American War in 1898, however, and following advice that occupation of the Islands was of strategic military importance, a Joint Resolution was passed by US Congress purporting to provide for the annexation of Hawai'i.<sup>67</sup> A proposal requiring Hawaiians to approve the annexation was defeated in the US Senate. Following that resolution, Hawai'i was occupied by US troops and subject to direct rule by the US administration under the terms of the Organic Act of 1900. President McKinley later characterised the effect of the Resolution as follows:

‘by that resolution the Republic of Hawai'i as an independent nation was extinguished, its separate sovereignty destroyed, and its property and possessions vested in the United States...’.<sup>68</sup>

Although the Japanese minister in Washington had raised certain concerns in 1897 as regards the position of Japanese labourers emigrating to the Islands under the Hawaiian-Japanese Convention of 1888, and had insisted that ‘the maintenance of the status quo’ was essential to the ‘good understanding of the powers having interests in the Pacific’, it subsequently withdrew its opposition to annexation subject to assurances as regards the treatment of Japanese subjects.<sup>69</sup> No other state objected to the fact of annexation.

5.2.7 It is evident that there is a certain element of confusion as to how the US came to acquire the Islands of Hawai'i during this period of time. Effectively, two forms of justification seem to offer themselves: a) that the Islands were ceded by the legitimate government of Hawai'i to the United States in virtue of the treaty of annexation; or b) that the Islands were forcibly annexed by the United States in absence of agreement.

<sup>65</sup> Article 32 Constitution of the Republic of Hawai'i.

<sup>66</sup> For. Rel. 1894, pp. 358-360.

<sup>67</sup> XC B.F.S.P. 1897-8 (1901) 1248.

<sup>68</sup> President McKinley, Third Annual Message, Dec. 5<sup>th</sup> 1899, Moore's Digest, *supra*, n. 8, I, p. 511.

<sup>69</sup> See, Moore's Digest, *supra*, n. 8, I, pp. 504-9.

### 5.2.8 *The Cession of Hawai`i to the United States*

5.2.8.1 The joint resolution itself speaks of the government of the Republic of Hawai`i having signified its consent ‘to cede absolutely and without reserve to the United States of American all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind’, suggesting, as some commentators have later accepted, that the process was one of voluntary merger.<sup>70</sup> Hawai`i brought about, according to this thesis, its own demise by means of voluntary submission to the sovereignty of the United States.<sup>71</sup> This interpretation was bolstered by the fact that the government of the Republic had exercised *de facto* control over the Islands since 1893 – as President McKinley was to put it: ‘four years having abundantly sufficed to establish the right and the ability of the Republic of Hawai`i to enter, as a sovereign contractant, upon a conventional union with the United States’.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, even if it had not been formally recognised as the *de jure* government of Hawai`i by other nations,<sup>73</sup> it was effectively the only government in place (the government of Queen Lili`uokalani being forced into internal exile).

5.2.8.2 Such a thesis overlooks two facts. First of all, whilst the Republic of Hawai`i had certainly sponsored the adoption of a treaty of cession, the failure by the US to ratify that instrument meant that no legally binding commitments in that regard were ever created. This is not to say that the US actions in this regard were therefore to be regarded as unlawful for purposes of international law. Even if doubts exist as to the constitutional competence of US Congress to extend the jurisdiction of the United States in the manner prescribed by the Resolution,<sup>74</sup> this in itself does not prevent the acts in question from being effective for purposes of international law.<sup>75</sup> Indeed, as suggested above it was widely recognised that, for purposes of international law, annexation need not be accomplished by means of a treaty of peace and could equally take the form of a unilateral declaration of annexation. The significance of the failure to ratify, however, does suggest that the acquisition was achieved, if at all, by unilateral act on the part of the United States rather than being governed by the terms of the bilateral

<sup>70</sup> See e.g. Verzijl, *supra*, n. 6.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 129.

<sup>72</sup> Message of President McKinley to the Senate, June 16<sup>th</sup> 1897, Moore’s Digest, *supra*, n. 8, I, p. 503.

<sup>73</sup> Some type of recognition was provided by Great Britain in 1894, however.

<sup>74</sup> See, Willoughby W., *The Constitutional Law of the United States* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1929) I, p. 427.

<sup>75</sup> Article 7 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility (2001) provides, for example, that ‘[t]he conduct of an organ of a State... shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.’

agreement. Furthermore, and in consequence, US title to the territory would have to be regarded as original rather than derivative. This point is well illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of *Mastan Sahib v. Chief Commissioner Pondicherry*<sup>76</sup> in which it was held that Pondicherry was not to be considered as part of India, despite India's administration of the territory, until the 1954 Agreement between France and India had been ratified by France. This was the case even though both parties had signed the agreement. Similarly, albeit in a different context, the Arbitral Tribunal in the *Iloilo Claims Arbitration* took the view that the US did not fully acquire sovereignty over the Philippines despite its occupation until the date of ratification of the Peace Treaty of Paris of 1898.<sup>77</sup>

5.2.8.3 Doubts as to the validity of the voluntary merger/ cession thesis are also evident when consideration is given to the role played by US troops in installing and maintaining in power the Republican government in face of continued opposition on the part of the ousted monarchy. If, as was admitted by the US in 1893, intervention was unjustified and therefore undoubtedly in violation of its international obligations owed in respect of Hawai'i, it seems barely credible to suggest that it should be able to rely upon the result of that intervention (namely the installation of what was to become the Republican government) by way of justifying its claim that annexation was essentially consensual.

5.2.8.4 Central to the US thesis, in this respect, is the view that the government of the self-proclaimed Republic enjoyed the necessary competence to determine the future of Hawai'i. Notwithstanding the fact that the Republic was itself maintained in power by means of US military presence, and notwithstanding its recognition of the legitimate claims on the part of the Kingdom, the US recognised the former as a *de facto* government with which it could deal. This, despite the fact that US recognition policy during this period was 'based predominantly on the principle of effectiveness evidenced by an adequate expression of popular consent'.<sup>78</sup> As Secretary Seward was to indicate in 1868, revolutions 'ought not to be accepted until the people have adopted them by organic law, with the solemnities which would seem sufficient to guarantee their stability and permanence.'<sup>79</sup> The US refusal, therefore, to

<sup>76</sup> I.L.R. (1969) 49

<sup>77</sup> *Iloilo Claims Arbitration* (1925) 6 R.I.A.A. 158. To similar effect see *Forest of Central Rhodope Arbitration* (Merits, 1933) 3 R.I.A.A. 1405; *British Claims in Spanish Morocco* (1924) 2 R.I.A.A. 627.

<sup>78</sup> Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law* (1947) p. 124.

<sup>79</sup> US Diplomatic Correspondence, 1866, II, p. 630.

recognise the Rivas Government in Nicaragua in 1855 on the basis that '[i]t appears to be no more than a violent usurpation of power, brought about by an irregular self-organised military force, as yet unsanctioned by the will or acquiescence of the people',<sup>80</sup> stands in marked contrast to its willingness to offer such recognition to the government of the Republic of Hawai'i in remarkably similar circumstances. Given the precipitous recognition of the government of the Republic – itself an act of unlawful intervention - it seems unlikely that the US could legitimately rely upon the fact of its own recognition as a basis for claiming that its acquisition of sovereignty over Hawai'i issued from a valid expression of consent.

### 5.2.9 *The Annexation of Hawai'i by the United States*

5.2.9.1 If there is some doubt as to the validity of the voluntary merger thesis, an alternative interpretation of events might be to suggest that the US came to acquire the Islands by way of what was effectively conquest and subjugation. It could plausibly be maintained that annexation of the Islands came about following the installation of a puppet government intent upon committing the future of the Islands to the US and which was visibly supported by US armed forces. According to this interpretation of events, the initial act of intervention in 1893 would simply be the beginning of an extended process of *de facto* annexation which culminated in the extension of US laws to Hawai'i in 1898. Whether or not the Republican government was the legitimate government of Hawai'i mattered little, and the apparent lack of consent of the former Hawaiian government largely irrelevant. According to this thesis the unlawful nature of the initial intervention would ultimately be wiped out by the subsequent annexation of the territory and the extinction of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State (just as Britain's precipitous annexation of the Boer Republics in 1901 was subsequently rendered moot by its perfection of title under the Peace Treaty of 1902). Support for this interpretation of events comes from the fact that the Queen initially abdicated in favour of the United States, and not the Provisional Government of 1893 (although she did eventually give an oath of allegiance to the Republic in 1895) and from the persistent presence of US forces which, no doubt, reinforced the authority of the Provisional Government and subsequently the Government of the Republic.

5.2.9.2 The difficulties with this second approach are twofold. First of all, even if the Government of the Republic had been installed with the support of US troops, it is apparent that it was not

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<sup>80</sup> Mr Buchanan to Mr Rush. Moore's Digest, *supra*, n. 8, I, p. 124.

subsequently subject to the same level of control as, for example, was exercised in relation to the regime in Manchukuo by Japan in 1931.<sup>81</sup> Thus, for example, the Provisional Government refused President Cleveland's request to restore the monarchy in 1893 on the basis that it would involve an inadmissible interference in the domestic affairs of Hawai'i.<sup>82</sup> It could not easily be construed, in other words, merely as an instrument of US government. Secondly, it is apparent that whilst the threat of force was clearly present, the annexation did not follow from the defeat of the Hawaiian Kingdom on the battlefield, and was not otherwise pursuant to an armed conflict. Most authors at the time were fairly clear that conquest and subjugation were events associated with the pursuit of war and not merely with the threat of violence. Indeed Bindschedler suggests in this regard, and by reference to the purported annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908, that:

'unless preceded by war, the unilateral annexation of the territory of another State without contractual consent is illegal. It makes no difference that the territory involved may already be under the firm control of the State declaring the annexation.'<sup>83</sup>

The reason for this, no doubt, was the tendency to view international law as being comprised of two independent sets of rules applicable respectively in peacetime and in war (a differentiation which is no longer as sharp as it once was). A State of war had several effects at the time including not merely the activation of the laws and customs of war, but also the invalidation or suspension of existing treaty obligations.<sup>84</sup> This meant, in particular, that in absence of armed conflict, in other words, the US would be unable to avoid its commitments under the 1849 Treaty with Hawai'i, and would therefore be effectively prohibited from annexing the Islands by unilateral act. This, no doubt, informed President Cleveland's unwillingness to support the treaty of annexation in 1893, and meant that the only legitimate basis for pursuing annexation in the circumstances would have been by treaty of cession.

5.2.9.3 Ultimately, one might conclude that there are certain doubts, albeit not necessarily overwhelming, as to the

<sup>81</sup> See, Hackworth G., *Digest of International Law*, (1940) I, pp. 333-338.

<sup>82</sup> Moore's *Digest*, *supra*, n. 8, I, p. 500.

<sup>83</sup> Bindschedler R., 'Annexation', in *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, III, 19, p. 20.

<sup>84</sup> Brownlie, *supra*, n. , pp. 26-40.

legitimacy of the US acquisition of Hawai'i in 1898 under the terms of international law as it existed at that time. It neither possessed the hallmarks of a genuine 'cession' of territory, nor that of forcible annexation (conquest). If, however, the US neither came to acquire the Islands by way of treaty of cession, nor by way of conquest, the question then remains as to whether the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom was maintained intact. The closest parallel, in this regard, is to be found in the law governing belligerent occupation.

### 5.2.10 *Belligerent Occupation and Occupation Pacifica*

5.2.10.1 From the time of Vattel onwards it was frequently held that the mere occupation of foreign territory did not lead to the acquisition of title of any kind until the termination of hostilities.<sup>85</sup> During the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, however, this became not merely a doctrinal assertion, but a firmly maintained axiom of international law.<sup>86</sup> Up until the point at which hostilities were at an end, the control exercised over territory was regarded as a 'belligerent occupation' subject to the terms of the laws of war. The hallmark of belligerent occupation being that the occupant enjoyed *de facto* authority over the territory in question, but that sovereignty (and territorial title) remained in the hands of the displaced government. As President Polk noted in his annual message of 1846 'by the law of nations a conquered territory is subject to be governed by the conqueror during his military possession and until there is either a treaty of peace, or he shall voluntarily withdraw from it.'<sup>87</sup> In such a case '[t]he sovereignty of the enemy is in such case "suspended", and his laws can "no longer be rightfully enforced" over the occupied territory and that "[b]y the surrender, the inhabitants pass under a temporary allegiance to the conqueror.'<sup>88</sup> The suspensory, and provisional, character of belligerent occupation was further confirmed in US case law of the time,<sup>89</sup> in academic doctrine<sup>90</sup> and in

<sup>85</sup> See e.g. de Vattel *supra*, n. 6, III, s. 196.

<sup>86</sup> Graber believes this was the case following the Franco-Prussian war. Graber D., *The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation 1863-1914: A Historical Survey* (1968) 40-41.

<sup>87</sup> President Polk's Second Annual Message, 1846, Moore's Digest, *supra*, n. 8, I, p. 46.

<sup>88</sup> President Polk's Special Message, July 24<sup>th</sup>, 1848. Moore's Digest, *supra*, n. 8, I, pp. 46-7.

<sup>89</sup> *US v. Rice*, US Supreme Court, 1819, 4 Wheat. 246 (1819)

various Manuals on the Laws of War.<sup>91</sup> The general idea was subsequently recognised in Conventional form in article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations,<sup>92</sup> and in the US Military Manual of 1914.<sup>93</sup>

5.2.10.2 In essence, the doctrine of belligerent occupation placed certain limits on the capacity of the occupying power to acquire or dispose of territory *durante bello*. By inference, sovereignty remained in the hands of the occupied power and, as a consequence it was generally assumed that until hostilities were terminated, title to territory would not pass and the extinction of the state would not be complete. This doctrine was subsequently elaborated during the course of the First and Second World Wars to the effect that States would not be regarded as having been lawfully annexed even when the entirety of the territory was occupied and the government forced into exile, so long as the condition of war persisted, albeit on the part of allied States. The general prohibition on the threat or use of armed force in the Charter era since 1945 has further reinforced this regime to the point at which it might be said that ‘effective control by foreign military force can never bring about by itself a valid transfer of sovereignty’.<sup>94</sup>

5.2.10.3 Until the adoption of common article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,<sup>95</sup> however, the doctrine of

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<sup>90</sup> Heffter, *Das europäische Völkerrecht de Gengenwart* (1844) pp. 287-9; Bluntschli, *Das Moderne Völkerrecht* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 1878) pp. 303-7.

<sup>91</sup> The Oxford Manual on the Laws of War on Land, 1880 provided (article 6): ‘No invaded territory is regarded as conquered until the end of war; until that time the occupant exercises, in such territory, only a *de facto* power, essentially provisional in character.’ See also, article 2 Brussels Code of 1874.

<sup>92</sup> Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to the Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, October 18, 1907. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 provided similarly (article 2) that ‘The authority of the legitimate power being suspended and having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety’.

<sup>93</sup> Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, pp. 105-6: ‘Military occupation confers upon the invading force the right to exercise control for the period of occupation. It does not transfer the sovereignty of the occupant, but simply the authority or power to exercise some of the rights of sovereignty’.

<sup>94</sup> Benvenisti E., *The International Law of Occupation* (1993) p. 5.

<sup>95</sup> Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 75 U.N.T.S. 31 reads:

‘In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.

belligerent occupation applied primarily to time of war or armed conflict where military intervention met armed resistance. Indeed, the absence of resistance would not infrequently be construed either as an implicit acceptance of the fact of occupation, or as a signal that the original sovereign had been effectively extinguished in virtue of *debellatio*. It is evident, however, that by the turn of the century a notion of peacetime occupation (*occupatio pacifica*) was coming to be recognised.<sup>96</sup> This concept encompassed not merely occupation following the conclusion of an agreement between the parties, but also non-consensual occupation occurring outside armed conflict (but normally following the threatened use of force).<sup>97</sup> Practice in the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century suggests that even though the Hague Regulations were themselves limited to occupations *pendente bello*, their provisions should apply to peacetime occupations such as the British occupation of Egypt in 1914-18,<sup>98</sup> the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923-5<sup>99</sup> and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany in 1939.<sup>100</sup> Indeed, the Arbitral Tribunal in the *Coenca Brothers v. Germany Arbitration Case*<sup>101</sup> took the view that the Allied occupation of Greece in 1915 was governed by the terms of the law of belligerent occupation notwithstanding the fact that Greece was not a belligerent at that time, but had merely invited occupation of Salonika in order to protect

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The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.

Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.'

It would seem that the purpose of this 'extension' of the regime of military occupation was to take account of the peculiar facts surrounding the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and Denmark in 1940.

<sup>96</sup> See, Robin, *Des Occupations militaires en dehors des occupations de guerre* (1913).

<sup>97</sup> Llewellyn Jones F., 'Military Occupation of Alien Territory in Time of Peace', 9 Transactions of Grotius Soc. (1924) 150; Roberts A., 'What is a Military Occupation?', 55 B.Y.I.L. (1984) 249, p. 273; Feilchenfeld, *The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation* (1942) 116.

<sup>98</sup> *Leban and Others v. Alexandria Water Co. Ltd. and Others* Egypt, Mixed Court of Appeal, 25 March 1929, A.D. 1929/30, Case No. 286.

<sup>99</sup> See *In re Thyssen and Others* and *In re Krupp and Others*, 2 A.D. (1923-4) Case No. 191, pp. 327-8.

<sup>100</sup> See Judgment of Nurnberg Tribunal, p. 125; *Anglo-Czechoslovak and Prague Credit Bank v. Janssen* 12 A.D. (1943-5) Case No. 11, p. 47.

<sup>101</sup> 7 M.A.T., 1929, p. 683.



the Serbian State. Similarly, in the *Chevreau Case* the Arbitrator intimated that the laws of belligerent occupation would apply to the British forces occupying Persia under agreement with the latter in 1914.<sup>102</sup>

5.2.10.4 If the general terms of the Hague Regulations are to apply to peacetime occupations, it would seem to follow that the same limitations apply as regards the authority of the occupying State. In fact it is arguable that the rights of the pacific occupant are somewhat less extensive than those of the belligerent occupant. As Llewellyn Jones notes:

‘[i]n the latter case the occupant is an enemy, and has to protect himself against attack on the part of the forces of the occupied State, and he is justified in adopting measures which would justly be considered unwarranted in the case of pacific occupation...’<sup>103</sup>

Whether or not this has significance in the present context, it is apparent that the US could not, as an occupying power, take steps to acquire sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands. Nor could it be justified in attempting to avoid the strictures of the occupation regime by way of installing a sympathetic government bent on ceding Hawaiian sovereignty to it. This point has now been made perfectly clear in article 47 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV which states that protected persons shall not be deprived of the benefits of the Convention ‘by any change introduced, as a result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions of government of the said territory’.

5.2.10.5 It may certainly be maintained that there are serious doubts as to the United States’ claim to have acquired sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands in 1898 and that the emerging law at the time would suggest that, as an occupant, such a possibility was largely excluded. To the extent, furthermore, that US claims to sovereignty were essentially defective, one might conclude that the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent state was maintained intact. The importance of such a

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<sup>102</sup> *Chevreau Case* (France v. Great Britain) 27 A.J.I.L. (1931) 159, pp. 159-60.

<sup>103</sup> *Supra*, n. , p. 159.

conclusion is of course dependent upon the validity and strength of subsequent bases for the claim to sovereignty on the part of the US.

5.3 *Acquisition of the Islands in virtue of the Plebiscite of 1959*

5.3.1 An alternative basis for the acquisition of title on the part of the US government (and hence the conclusion that the Hawaiian Kingdom has ceased to exist as a State) is the Plebiscite of 1959 exercised in pursuit of article 73 of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. In 1945 Hawai'i was listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory administered by the United States together with its other overseas territories including Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, American Samoa and Alaska. Article 73 of the Charter provides that:

'Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

- a) to ensure, with due respect for culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
- b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement...
- d) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes... statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible.'

Central to this provision is the ‘advancement of the peoples concerned’ and the development of their ‘self-government’. Unlike the United Nations Trusteeship System elaborated in Chapters XII and XIII of the UN Charter, however, Chapter XI does not stipulate clearly the criteria by which it may be determined whether a people has achieved the status of self-government or whether the competence to determine that issue lies with the organs of the United Nations or with the administering State. The United Nations General Assembly, however, declared in Resolution 334(IV) that the task of determining the scope of application of Chapter XI falls ‘within the responsibility of the General Assembly’.

- 5.3.2 The General Assembly was to develop its policy in this respect during the subsequent decades through the adoption of the UN List of Factors in 1953 (Res. 742 (VIII)), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960 (Res. 1514 (XV)), supplemented by Resolutions 1541 (XV) (1960) and 2625 (XXV) in 1970. Central to this policy development was its elaboration of the meaning of self-determination in accordance with article 1(2) UN Charter (which provided that the development of ‘friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ was one of the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations). According to the General Assembly, colonial peoples must be able to ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ (Resn. 1514 (XV), and Resn. 2625 (XXV)), and primarily by way of choosing between one of three alternatives: emergence as a sovereign independent State; free association with an independent State; and integration with an independent State (Resn. 1514 (XV) and Resn. 1541 (XV) principles II, VI). The most common mode of self-determination was recognised to be full independence involving the transfer of all powers to the people of the territories ‘without any conditions or reservations’ (Resn. 1514 (XV) principles VII, VIII and IX). In case of integration with another state, it was maintained that the people of the territory should act ‘with full knowledge of the change in their status... expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage’ (Resn. 1541 (XV), principle IX). A higher level

of scrutiny was generally exercised in case of integration than in respect of other forms of self-determination. Until the time in which self-determination is exercised, furthermore, ‘the territory of a... Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State’ (Resn. 2625 (XXV) para. VI).<sup>104</sup> As the ICJ subsequently noted in its Advisory Opinion in the *Namibia case*, the ‘development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them’.<sup>105</sup> It emphasised, furthermore, in the *Western Sahara case* that ‘the application of the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned’.<sup>106</sup>

5.3.3 An initial point in question here is whether Hawai`i should have been listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory at all for such purposes. Article 73 of the Charter refers to peoples ‘who have not yet attained a full measure of self-government’ – a point which is curiously inapplicable in case of Hawai`i. That being said, the regime imposed was designed, primarily, to foster decolonisation after 1945 and it was only with some reluctance that the United States agreed to include Hawai`i on the list at all. The alternative would have been for Hawai`i to remain under the control of the United States and deprived of any obvious means by which it might re-obtain its independence. The UN Charter may be seen, in that respect, as having created a general but exclusive system of entitlements whereby only those non-State entities regarded as either Non-Self-Governing or Trust Territories would be entitled to independence by way of self-determination absent the consent of the occupying power.<sup>107</sup> It may be emphasised, furthermore, that to regard Hawai`i as being a territory entitled to self-determination was not entirely inconsistent with its claims to be the continuing State. The substance of self-determination in its external form as a right to political independence may be precisely that which may be claimed by a State under occupation. Indeed, the General Assembly Declaration on

<sup>104</sup> This follows by implication from the terms of article 74 UN Charter.

<sup>105</sup> ICJ Rep. (1971), 31, para. 51.

<sup>106</sup> ICJ Rep (1975) 12, p. 32.

<sup>107</sup> For a review of the practice in this regard see Crawford J., ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession’, 69 B.Y.I.L (1998) 85.

Friendly Relations (Resn. 2625) makes clear that the right is applicable not simply in case of colonialism, but also in relation to the 'subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation'. Crawford points out, furthermore, that self-determination applies with equal force to existing states taking 'the well-known form of the rule preventing intervention in the internal affairs of a State: this includes the right of the people of the State to choose for themselves their own form of government'.<sup>108</sup> The international community's subsequent recognition of the applicability of self-determination in case of the Baltic States, Kuwait and Afghanistan, for example, would appear merely to emphasise this point.<sup>109</sup> One may tolerate, in other words, the placing of Hawai'i on the list of non-self-governing territories governed by article 73 only to the extent that the entitlement to self-determination under that article was entirely consonant with the general entitlements to 'equal rights and self-determination' in articles 1(2) and 55 of the Charter.

5.3.4 Notwithstanding doubts as to the legality of US occupation/annexation of Hawai'i, it would seem evident that any outstanding problems would be effectively disposed of by way of a valid exercise of self-determination. In general, the principle of self-determination may be said to have three effects upon legal title. First of all it envisages a temporary legal regime that may, in effect, lead to the extinction of legal title on the part of the Metropolitan State.<sup>110</sup> Secondly, it may nullify claims to title in cases where such claims are inconsistent with the principle. Finally, and most importantly in present circumstances, it may give rise to a valid basis for title including cases where it has resulted in free integration with another State. In this third scenario, if following a valid exercise of self-determination on the part of the Hawaiian people it was decided that Hawai'i should seek integration into the United States, this would effectively bring to a close any claims that might remain as to the continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

5.3.5 Turning then to the question whether the Hawaiian people can be said to have exercised self-determination following

<sup>108</sup> Crawford, *supra*, n. 2, p. 100.

<sup>109</sup> See Cassese A., *Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal* (1995) pp. 94-5.

<sup>110</sup> Crawford, *supra*, n. 2, pp. 363-4; Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa*, pp. 149 ff.

the holding of a plebiscite on June 27<sup>th</sup> 1959. The facts themselves are not in dispute. On March 18<sup>th</sup> 1959 the United States Congress established an *Act to Provide for the admission of the State of Hawai`i into the Union* setting down, in section 7(b) the terms by which this should take place. This specified that:

‘At an election designated by proclamation of the Governor of Hawai`i ... there shall be submitted to the electors, qualified to vote in said election, for adoption or rejection, the following propositions:

1. Shall Hawai`i immediately be admitted into the Union as a State?...

An election was held on June 27<sup>th</sup> 1959 in accordance with this Act and a majority of residents voted in favour of admission into the United States. Hawai`i was formally admitted into the Union by Presidential Proclamation on August 21<sup>st</sup> 1959. A communication was then sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations informing him that Hawai`i had, in virtue of the plebiscite and proclamation, achieved self-governance. The General Assembly then decided in Resolution 1469(XIV) that the US would no longer be required to report under the terms of article 73 UN Charter as to the situation of Hawai`i.

5.3.6 Two particular concerns may be raised in this context. First, the plebiscite did not attempt to distinguish between ‘native’ Hawaiians or indeed nationals of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the resident ‘colonial’ population who vastly outnumbered them. This was certainly an extraordinary situation when compared with other cases with which the UN was dealing at the time, and has parallels with one other notoriously difficult case, namely the Falkland Islands/ Malvinas (in which the entire population is of settler origin). There is certainly nothing in the concept of self-determination as it is known today to require an administering power to differentiate between two categories of residents in this respect, and indeed in many cases it might be treated as illegitimate.<sup>111</sup> By the same token, in some cases a failure to do so may well disqualify a vote where there is evidence that the administering state had encouraged settlement as a way of manipulating the

<sup>111</sup> See, Hannum H., ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’, 34 Va.J.I.L. (1993) 1, p. 37.

subsequent result.<sup>112</sup> This latter point seems to be even more clear in a case such as Hawai'i in which the holders of the entitlement to self-determination had presumptively been established in advance by the fact of its (prior or continued) existence as an independent State. In that case, one might suggest that it was only those who were entitled to regard themselves as nationals of the Kingdom of Hawaii (in accordance with Hawaiian law prior to 1898), who were entitled to vote in exercise of the right to self-determination.

5.3.6 A second, worrying feature of the plebiscite concerns the nature of the choice being presented to the Hawaiian people. As GA Resn. 1514 makes clear, a decision in case of integration should be made 'with full knowledge of the change in their status... expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage'. It is far from clear that much, if any, information was provided as regards the 'change in status' that would occur with integration, and there is no evidence that the alternative of full independence was presented as an option. Judged in terms of the later resolutions of the General Assembly on the issue, then, it would seem that the plebiscite falls considerably short of that which would be required for purposes of a valid exercise of self-determination.<sup>113</sup>

5.3.7 An important point, here, as is evident from the discussion above, is that most of the salient resolutions by which the General Assembly 'developed' the law relating to decolonisation post-dated the plebiscite in Hawai'i, and the organisation's practice in that respect changed quite radically following the establishment of the Committee of Twenty-Four in 1961 (Resn. 1700 (XVI)). Up until that point, many took the view that Non-Self-Governing Territories were merely entitled to 'self-government' rather than full political independence, and that self-determination was little more than a political principle being, at best, *de lege farenda*.<sup>114</sup> There was, in other words, no clear obligation as far as UN practice at the time was concerned,

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<sup>112</sup> Cf. the case of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, Cassese, *supra*, n. 97, p. 242.

<sup>113</sup> Similar points have been made as regards the disputed integration of West Irian into Indonesia.

<sup>114</sup> See, Jennings R., *The Acquisition of Territory in International Law* (1963) pp. 69-87.

for the decision made in 1959 to conform to the requirements later spelled out in relation to other territories – practice was merely crystallising at that date. The US made clear, in fact, that it did not regard UN supervision as necessary for purposes of dealing with its Non-Self-Governing Territories such as Puerto Rico, Alaska or Hawai`i.<sup>115</sup> Whilst such a view was, perhaps, defensible at the time given the paucity of UN practice, it does not itself dispose of the self-determination issue. It might be said, to begin with, that in light of the subsequent development of the principle, it is not possible to maintain that the people of Hawai`i had in reality exercised their right of self-determination (as opposed to having merely been granted a measure of self-government within the Union). Such a conclusion, however, is debatable given the doctrine of inter-temporal law. More significant, however, is the fact that pre-1960 practice did not appear to be consistent with the type of claim to self-determination that would attach to independent, but occupied, States (in which one would suppose that the choice of full political independence would be the operative presumption, rebuttable only by an affirmative choice otherwise). As a consequence, there are strong arguments to suggest that the US cannot rely upon the fact of the plebiscite alone for purposes of perfecting its title to the territory of Hawai`i.

5.4 *Acquisition of Title by Reason of Effective Occupation / Acquisitive Prescription*

- 5.4.1 As pointed out above, it cannot definitively be supposed that the US did acquire valid title to the Hawaiian Islands in 1898, and even if it did so, the basis for that title may now be regarded as suspect given the current prohibition on the annexation of territory by use of force. In case of the latter, the second element of the doctrine of inter-temporal law as expounded by Arbitrator Huber in the *Island of Palmas case* may well be relevant. Huber distinguishes in that case between the acquisition of rights on the one hand (which must be founded in the law applicable at the relevant date) and their existence or continuance at a later point in time which must ‘follow the conditions required by the evolution of the law’. One interpretation of this would be to suggest that title may be lost if a later rule of international law were to arise by reference to which the original title would no longer be lawful. Thus, it might be said that since annexation is no longer a legitimate means by which title may be established,

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<sup>115</sup> US Department of State Bulletin, (1952) p. 270.



US annexation of Hawai`i (if it took place at all) would no longer be regarded as well founded. Apart from the obvious question as to who may be entitled to claim sovereignty in absence of the United States, it is apparent that Huber's *dictum* primarily requires that 'a State must continue to maintain a title, validly won, in an effective manner – no more no less.'<sup>116</sup> The US, in other words, would be entitled to maintain its claim over the Hawaiian Islands so long as it could show some basis for asserting that claim other than merely its original annexation. The strongest type of claim in this respect is the 'continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty'.

5.4.2 The emphasis given to the 'continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty' in international law derives in its origin from the doctrine of occupation which allowed states to acquire title to territory which was effectively *terra nullius*. It is apparent, however, and in line with the approach of the ICJ in the *Western Sahara Case*,<sup>117</sup> that the Islands of Hawai`i cannot be regarded as *terra nullius* for purpose of acquiring title by mere occupation. According to some, nevertheless, effective occupation may give rise to title by way of what is known as 'acquisitive prescription'.<sup>118</sup> As Hall maintained, '[t]itle by prescription arises out of a long continued possession, where no original source of proprietary right can be shown to exist, or where possession in the first instance being wrongful, the legitimate proprietor has neglected to assert his right, or has been unable to do so.'<sup>119</sup> Johnson explains in more detail:

'Acquisitive Prescription is the means by which, under international law, legal recognition is given to the right of a State to exercise sovereignty over land or sea territory in cases where that state has, in fact, exercised its authority in a continuous, uninterrupted, and peaceful manner over the area concerned for a sufficient period of time, provided that all other interested and affected states (in the case of land territory the previous possessor...) have acquiesced in this exercise of authority. Such acquiescence is implied in cases where the interested and affected states have failed within a reasonable time to refer the matter to the appropriate international organization or

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<sup>116</sup> Higgins R., 'Time and the Law: International Perspectives on an Old Problem', 46 I.C.L.Q. (1997) 501, p. 516.

<sup>117</sup> *Supra* n. 94.

<sup>118</sup> For a discussion of the various approaches to this issue see Jennings and Watts, *supra*, n. 8, pp. 705-6.

<sup>119</sup> Hall W., *A Treatise on International Law* (Pearce Higgins, 8<sup>th</sup> ed 1924) p. 143.

international tribunal or – exceptionally in cases where no such action was possible – have failed to manifest their opposition in a sufficiently positive manner through the instrumentality of diplomatic protests.’<sup>120</sup>

Although no case before an international court or tribunal has unequivocally affirmed the existence of acquisitive prescription as a mode of acquiring title to territory,<sup>121</sup> and although Judge Moreno Quintana in his dissenting opinion in the *Rights of Passage* case<sup>122</sup> found no place for the concept in international law, there is considerable evidence that points in that direction. For example, the continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty, or some variant thereof, was emphasised as the basis for title in the *Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. United Kingdom)*,<sup>123</sup> the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway)*<sup>124</sup> and in the *Island of Palmas Arbitration*.<sup>125</sup>

- 5.4.3 If a claim as to acquisitive prescription is to be maintained in relation to the Hawaiian Islands, various *indicia* have to be considered including, for example, the length of time of effective and peaceful occupation, the extent of opposition to or acquiescence in, that occupation and, perhaps, the degree of recognition provided by third states. As Jennings and Watts confirm, however, ‘no general rule [can] be laid down as regards the length of time and other circumstances which are necessary to create such a title by prescription. Everything [depends] upon the merits of the individual case’.<sup>126</sup> As regards the temporal element, the US could claim to have peacefully and continuously exercised governmental authority in relation to Hawai‘i for over a century. This is somewhat more than was required for purposes of prescription in the *British Guiana-Venezuela Boundary Arbitration*, for example,<sup>127</sup> but it is clear that time alone is certainly not determinative. Similarly, in terms of the attitude of third states, it is evident that apart from the initial protest of the Japanese Government in 1897, none has opposed the extension of US jurisdiction to the Hawaiian Islands. Indeed the majority of States may be said to have acquiesced in its claim

<sup>120</sup> Johnson, 27 B.Y.I.L. (1950) 332, pp. 353-4.

<sup>121</sup> Prescription may be said to have been recognised in the *Chamizal Arbitration*, 5 A.J.I.L. (1911) 785; the *Grisbadana Arbitration* P.C.I.J. 1909; and the *Island of Palmas Arbitration*, supra n. 13.

<sup>122</sup> ICJ Rep. 1960, p. 6.

<sup>123</sup> ICJ Rep. 1953 47

<sup>124</sup> ICJ Rep. 1951 116.

<sup>125</sup> *Supra*, n. 13.

<sup>126</sup> *Supra*, n. , p. 706.

<sup>127</sup> The arbitrators were instructed by their treaty terms of reference to allow title if based upon ‘adverse holding or prescription during a period of 50 years’. 92 BFSP (1899-1900) 160.

to sovereignty in virtue of acceding to its exercise of sovereign prerogatives in respect of the Islands (for example, in relation to the policing of territorial waters or airspace, the levying of customs duties, or the extension of treaty rights and obligations to that territory). It is important, however, not to attach too much emphasis to third party recognition. As Jennings points out, in case of adverse possession '[r]ecognition or acquiescence on the part of third States... must strictly be irrelevant'.<sup>128</sup>

- 5.4.4 More difficult, in this regard, is the issue of acquiescence/protest. In the *Chamizal Arbitration*<sup>129</sup> it was held that the US could not maintain a claim to the Chamizal tract by way of prescription in part because of the protests of the Mexican government. The Mexican government, in the view of the Commission, had done 'all that could be reasonably required of it by way of protest against the illegal encroachment'. Although it had not attempted to retrieve the land by force the Commission pointed out that:

'however much the Mexicans may have desired to take physical possession of the district, the result of any attempt to do so would have provoked scenes of violence and the Republic of Mexico can not be blamed for resorting to the milder forms of protest contained in its diplomatic correspondence.'<sup>130</sup>

It would seem, in other words, that protesting in any way that might be 'reasonably required' should effectively defeat a claim of prescription.

- 5.4.5 The difficulty of applying such considerations in the current circumstances is evident. Although the Hawaiian Kingdom (the Queen) protested vociferously at the time, and on several separate occasions, and although this protest resulted in the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the treaty of cession, from 1898 onwards no further action was taken in this regard. The reason, of course, is not hard to find. The government of the Kingdom had been effectively removed from power and the US had *de facto*, if not *de jure*, annexed the Islands. The Queen herself survived only until 1917 and did so before a successor could be confirmed in accordance with article 22 of the 1864 Constitution. This was not a case, moreover, of the occupation of merely part of the territory of Hawai'i in which case one might have expected protests to be maintained on a continuous basis by the remaining State. In the circumstances, therefore, it is entirely

<sup>128</sup> Jennings, *supra*, n. 102, p. 39.

<sup>129</sup> US v. Mexico (1911), 5 A.J.I.L. (1911) 782.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

understandable that the Queen or her government failed to pursue the matter further when it appeared exceedingly unlikely that any movement in the position of the US government would be achieved. This is not to say, of course, that the government of the Kingdom subsequently acquiesced in the US occupation of the Islands, which of course raises the question whether a claim of acquisitive prescription may be sustained. In the view of Jennings, in cases of acquisitive prescription, 'an acquiescence on the part of the State prescribed against is of the essence of the process'.<sup>131</sup> If, as he suggests, some positive indication of acquiescence is to be found, there is remarkably little evidence for it. Indeed, of significance in this respect is the admission of the United States in the 'Apology Resolution' of 1993 in which it noted that 'the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to the inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States, either through their monarchy or through a plebiscite or referendum'. By the same token, the weight of evidence in favour of prescription should not be underplayed. As Jennings and Watts point out:

'When, to give an example, a state which originally held an island *mala fide* under a title by occupation, knowing well that this land had already been occupied by another state, has succeeded in keeping up its possession undisturbed for so long a time that the former possessor has ceased to protest and has silently dropped the claim, the conviction will be prevalent among states that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order.'<sup>132</sup>

The significant issue, however, is whether such considerations apply with equal ease in cases where the occupation concerned comprises the entirety of the State concerned, and where the possibilities of protest are hampered by the fact of occupation itself. It is certainly arguable that if a presumption of continuity exists, different considerations must come into play.

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<sup>131</sup> *Supra*, n. 102, p. 39.

<sup>132</sup> *Supra*, n. 8, p. 707.



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**LEGAL OPINION ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE  
COUNCIL OF REGENCY OF THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM<sup>†</sup>**

Professor Federico Lenzerini\*

- I. INTRODUCTION
- II. DOES THE REGENCY HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM AS A STATE THAT HAS BEEN UNDER A BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SINCE 17 JANUARY 1893?
- III. ASSUMING THE REGENCY DOES HAVE THE AUTHORITY, WHAT EFFECT WOULD ITS PROCLAMATIONS HAVE ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, TO INCLUDE ITS PROCLAMATION RECOGNIZING THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I AND ITS COUNTIES AS THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPYING STATE ON 3 JUNE 2019?
- IV. COMMENT ON THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REGENCY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPYING STATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

*Editor's Note: In light of the severity of the mandate of the Royal Commission, established by the Hawaiian Council of Regency on 17 April*

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2019, to investigate war crimes and human rights violations committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the “authority” of the Council of Regency to appoint the Royal Commission is fundamental and, therefore, necessary to address within the rules of international humanitarian law, which is a component of international law. As explained by the United States Supreme Court in 1900 regarding international law and the works of jurists and commentators:

*International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.<sup>1</sup>*

According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, [are] subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Restatement Third—Foreign Relations Law of the United States, recognizes that “writings of scholars”<sup>3</sup> are a source of international law in determining, in this case, whether the Council of Regency has been established in conformity with the rules of international humanitarian law. The writing of scholars, “whether a rule has become international law,” are not prescriptive but rather descriptive “of what the law really is.”

## I. INTRODUCTION

As requested in the Letter addressed to me, on 11 May 2020, by Dr. David Keanu Sai, Ph.D., Head of the Hawaiian Royal Commission of Inquiry, I provide below a legal opinion in which I answer the three questions included in the above letter, for purposes of public awareness and clarification of the Regency’s authority.

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<sup>1</sup> *The Paquete Habana*, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).

<sup>2</sup> Article 38(1), Statute of the International Court of Justice.

<sup>3</sup> §103(2)(c), *Restatement of the Law (Third)—The Foreign Relations Law of the United States* (1987).

II. DOES THE REGENCY HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO  
REPRESENT THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM AS A STATE  
THAT HAS BEEN UNDER A BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION BY  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SINCE 17 JANUARY 1893?

1. In order to ascertain whether the Regency has the authority to represent the Hawaiian Kingdom *as a State*, it is preliminarily necessary to ascertain whether the Hawaiian Kingdom can actually be considered a State under international law. To this purpose, two issues need to be investigated, i.e.: a) whether the Hawaiian Kingdom was a State at the time when it was militarily occupied by the United States of America, on 17 January 1893; b) in the event that the solution to the first issue would be positive, whether the continuous occupation of Hawai'i by the United States, from 1893 to present times, has led the Hawaiian Kingdom to be extinguished as an independent State and, consequently, as a subject of international law.
  
2. With respect to the first of the abovementioned issues, as acknowledged by the Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the *Larsen* case, "in the nineteenth century the Hawaiian Kingdom existed as an independent State recognized as such by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and various other States, including by exchanges of diplomatic or consular representatives and the conclusion of treaties."<sup>4</sup> At the time of the American occupation, the Hawaiian Kingdom fully satisfied the four elements of statehood prescribed by customary international law, which were later codified by the *Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States* in 1933<sup>5</sup>: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. This is confirmed by the fact that "the Hawaiian Kingdom became a full member of the Universal Postal Union on 1 January 1882, maintained more than a hundred legations and consulates throughout the world, and entered into extensive diplomatic and treaty relations with other States that included Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bremen, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hamburg, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden-Norway, Switzerland and the United States"<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> See *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*, 119 *International Law Reports*, 2001, 566, at 581.

<sup>5</sup> See *Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States*, 1933, 165 *LNTS* 19, Article 1. This article codified the so-called *declarative* theory of statehood, already accepted by customary international law; see Thomas D. Grant, "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents", 37 *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 1998-1999, 403; Joshua Castellino, *International Law and Self-Determination: The Interplay of the Politics of Territorial Possession with Formulations of Post-Colonial 'National' Identity*, The Hague/Boston/London, 2000, at 77; David J. Harris (ed.), *Cases and Materials on International Law*, 6<sup>th</sup> Ed., London, 2004, at 99.

<sup>6</sup> See David Keanu Sai, "Hawaiian Constitutional Governance", in David Keanu Sai (ed.), *The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations in the Hawaiian Kingdom*, Honolulu, 2020, 58, at 64 (footnotes omitted).



It is therefore unquestionable that in the 1890s the Hawaiian Kingdom was an independent State and, consequently, a subject of international law. This presupposed that its territorial sovereignty and internal affairs could not be legitimately violated by other States.

3. Once established that the Hawaiian Kingdom was actually a State, under international law, at the time when it was militarily occupied by the United States of America, on 17 January 1893, it is now necessary to determine whether the continuous occupation of Hawai'i by the United States from 1893 to present times has led the Hawaiian Kingdom to be extinguished as an independent State and, consequently, as a subject of international law. This issue is undoubtedly controversial, and may be considered according to different perspectives. As noted by the Arbitral Tribunal established by the PCA in the *Larsen* case, in principle the question in point might be addressed by means of a careful assessment carried out through “having regard *inter alia* to the lapse of time since the annexation [by the United States], subsequent political, constitutional and international developments, and relevant changes in international law since the 1890s”.<sup>7</sup>
4. However—beyond all speculative argumentations and the consequential conjectures that might be developed depending on the different perspectives under which the issue in point could be addressed—in reality the argument which appears to overcome all the others is that a long-lasting and well-established rule of international law exists establishing that military occupation, irrespective of the length of its duration, *cannot* produce the effect of extinguishing the sovereignty and statehood of the occupied State. In fact, the validity of such a rule has *not* been affected by whatever changes occurred in international law since the 1890s. Consistently, as emphasized by the Swiss arbitrator Eugène Borel in 1925, in the famous *Affaire de la Dette publique ottomane*,

“[q]uels que soient les effets de l’occupation d’un territoire par l’adversaire avant le rétablissement de la paix, il est certain qu’à elle seule cette occupation ne pouvait opérer juridiquement le transfert de souveraineté [...] L’occupation, par l’un des belligérants, de [...] territoire de l’autre belligérant est un pur fait. C’est un état de choses essentiellement provisoire, qui ne substitue pas légalement l’autorité du belligérant envahisseur à celle du belligérant envahi”.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*, *supra* n. 1, at 9.2.

<sup>8</sup> See *Affaire de la Dette publique ottomane (Bulgarie, Irak, Palestine, Transjordanie, Grèce, Italie et Turquie)*, 18 April 1925, *Reports of International Arbitral Awards*, Volume I, 529, also available at <[https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol\\_I/529-614.pdf](https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_I/529-614.pdf)> (accessed on 16 May 2020), at 555 (“whatever are the effects of the occupation of a territory by the enemy before the re-establishment of peace, it is certain that such an occupation alone cannot legally determine the transfer of sovereignty [...] The occupation, by one of the belligerents, of [...] the territory of the other belligerent is

This position was confirmed by, among others, the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1948, holding that “[i]n belligerent occupation the occupying power does not hold enemy territory by virtue of any legal right. On the contrary, it merely exercises a precarious and temporary actual control”.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, as noted, much more recently, by Yoram Dinstein, “occupation does not affect sovereignty. The displaced sovereign loses possession of the occupied territory *de facto* but it retains title *de jure* [i.e. “as a matter of law”]”.<sup>10</sup> In this regard, as previously specified, this conclusion can in no way be influenced by the length of the occupation in time, as “[p]rolongation of the occupation does not affect its innately temporary nature”.<sup>11</sup> It follows that “‘precarious’ as it is, the sovereignty of the displaced sovereign over the occupied territory is not terminated” by belligerent occupation.<sup>12</sup> Under international law, “le transfert de souveraineté ne peut être considéré comme effectué juridiquement que par l’entrée en vigueur du Traité qui le stipule et à dater du jour de cette mise en vigueur”,<sup>13</sup> which means, in the words of the famous jurist Oppenheim, that “[t]he only form in which a cession [of sovereignty] can be effected is an agreement embodied in a treaty between the ceding and the acquiring State. Such treaty may be the outcome of peaceable negotiations or of war”.<sup>14</sup> Such a conclusion corresponds to “a universally recognized rule which is endorsed by jurists and confirmed by numerous rulings of international and national courts”.<sup>15</sup>

5. The United States has taken possession of the territory of Hawai‘i solely through *de facto* occupation and unilateral annexation, without concluding any treaty with the Hawaiian Kingdom. Furthermore, it

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nothing but a pure fact. It is a state of things essentially provisional, which does not legally substitute the authority of the invading belligerent to that of the invaded belligerent”).

<sup>9</sup> See *USA v. Otto Ohlendorf et al. (Einsatzgruppen Trial)*, 10 April 1948, (1948) *LRTWC* 411, at 492.

<sup>10</sup> See Yoram Dinstein, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., Cambridge, 2019, at 58.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* (footnotes omitted). See also, consistently, Peter M.R. Stirk, *The Politics of Military Occupation*, Edinburgh, 2009, at 168 and 230.

<sup>13</sup> See *Affaire de la Dette publique ottomane*, *supra* n. 5, at 555 (“the transfer of sovereignty can only be considered legally effected by the entry into force of a treaty which establishes it and from the date of such entry into force”).

<sup>14</sup> See Lassa FL Oppenheim, *Oppenheim’s International Law*, 7<sup>th</sup> Ed., vol. 1, 1948, at 500.

<sup>15</sup> See Jean S. Pictet, *Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949*, Geneva, 1958, at 275.

appears that such an annexation has taken place in contravention of the rule of *estoppel*. At it is known, in international law “the doctrine of estoppel protects legitimate expectations of States induced by the conduct of another State”.<sup>16</sup> On 18 December 1893 President Cleveland concluded with Queen Lili‘uokalani a treaty, by executive agreement, which obligated the President to restore the Queen as the Executive Monarch, and the Queen thereafter to grant clemency to the insurgents.<sup>17</sup> Such a treaty, which was never carried into effect by the United States, would have precluded the latter from claiming to have acquired Hawaiian territory, because it had evidently induced in the Hawaiian Kingdom the legitimate expectation that the sovereignty of the Queen would have been reinstated, an expectation which was unduly frustrated through the annexation. It follows from the foregoing that, according to a plain and correct interpretation of the relevant legal rules, the Hawaiian Kingdom cannot be considered, by virtue of the prolonged US occupation, as extinguished as an independent State and a subject of international law, despite the long and effective exercise of the attributes of government by the United States over Hawaiian territory.<sup>18</sup> In fact, in the event of illegal annexation, “the legal existence of [...] States [is] preserved from extinction”,<sup>19</sup> since “illegal occupation cannot of itself terminate statehood”.<sup>20</sup> The possession of the attribute of statehood by the Hawaiian Kingdom was substantially confirmed by the PCA, which, before establishing the Arbitral Tribunal for the *Larsen* case, had to get assured that one of the parties of the arbitration was a State, as a necessary precondition for its jurisdiction to exist. In that case, the Hawaiian Kingdom was actually qualified as a “State”, while the Claimant—Lance Paul Larsen—as a “Private entity.”<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See Thomas Cottier, Jörg Paul Müller, “Estoppel”, *Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law*, April 2007, available at <<https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1401>> (accessed on 20 May 2020).

<sup>17</sup> See United States House of Representatives, 53rd Congress, *Executive Documents on Affairs in Hawai‘i: 1894-95*, 1895, at 1269, available at <[https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Willis\\_to\\_Gresham\\_\(12.20.1893\).pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Willis_to_Gresham_(12.20.1893).pdf)> (accessed on 20 May 2020).

<sup>18</sup> In this respect, it is to be emphasized that “a sovereign State would continue to exist despite its government being overthrown by military force”; see David Keanu Sai, “The Royal Commission of Inquiry”, in David Keanu Sai (ed.), *The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations in the Hawaiian Kingdom*, Honolulu, 2020, 12, at 14.

<sup>19</sup> See James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., Oxford, 2006, at 702.

<sup>20</sup> See Ian Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law*, 7<sup>th</sup> Ed., Oxford, 2008, at 78.

<sup>21</sup> See <<https://pcacases.com/web/view/35>> (accessed on 16 May 2020).

6. The conclusion according to which the Hawaiian Kingdom cannot be considered as having been extinguished—as a State—as a result of the American occupation also allows to confirm, *de plano*, that the Hawaiian Kingdom, as an independent State, has been under uninterrupted belligerent occupation by the United States of America, from 17 January 1893 up to the moment of this writing. This conclusion cannot be validly contested, even by virtue of the hypothetical consideration according to which, since the American occupation of Hawai`i has not substantially involved the use of military force, and has not encountered military resistance by the Hawaiian Kingdom,<sup>22</sup> it consequently could not be considered as “belligerent”. In fact, a territory is considered occupied “when it is placed under the authority of the hostile army [...] The law on occupation applies to all cases of partial or total occupation, even if such occupation does not encounter armed resistance. The essential ingredient for applicability of the law of occupation is therefore the actual control exercised by the occupying forces”.<sup>23</sup> This is consistent with the rule expressed in Article 42 of the Regulations annexed to the *Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land* of 1907—affirming that a “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army” — as well as with Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, establishing that such Conventions apply “to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, *even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance*” (emphasis added).
7. Once having ascertained that, under international law, the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as an independent State, it is now time to assess the legitimacy and powers of the Regency. According to the *Lexico Oxford Dictionary*, a “regency” is “[t]he office of or period of government by a regent”.<sup>24</sup> In a more detailed manner, the *Black’s Law Dictionary*, which is the most trusted and widely used legal dictionary in the United States, defines the term in point as “[t]he man or body of men intrusted with the vicarious government of a kingdom during the

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<sup>22</sup> It is to be noted, in this respect, that no armed resistance was opposed to the occupation despite the fact that, as acknowledged by US President Cleveland, the Queen “had at her command at least five hundred fully armed men and several pieces of artillery. Indeed, the whole military force of her kingdom was on her side and at her disposal”; see United States House of Representatives, 53rd Congress, *Executive Documents on Affairs in Hawai`i: 1894-95*, 1895, at 453, available at <[https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Willis\\_to\\_Gresham\\_\(12.20.1893\).pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Willis_to_Gresham_(12.20.1893).pdf)> (accessed on 20 May 2020).

<sup>23</sup> See International Committee of the Red Cross, “The Law of Armed Conflict. Belligerent Occupation”, Geneva, June 2002, available at <[https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/law9\\_final.pdf](https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/law9_final.pdf)> (accessed on 17 May 2020), at 3.

<sup>24</sup> See <<https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/regency>> (accessed on 17 May 2020).

minority, absence, insanity, or other disability of the king”.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, it appears that, in consideration of the current situation of the Hawaiian Kingdom, a regency is the right body entitled to provisionally exercise the powers of the Hawaiian Executive Monarch in the absence of the latter, an absence which forcibly continues at present due to the persistent situation of military occupation to which the Hawaiian territory is subjected.

8. In legal terms, the legitimacy of the Hawaiian Council of Regency is grounded on Articles 32 and 33 of the *Hawaiian Kingdom Constitution* of 1864. In particular, Article 32 states that “[w]henever, upon the decease of the Reigning Sovereign, the Heir shall be less than eighteen years of age, the Royal Power shall be exercised by a Regent Council of Regency; as hereinafter provided”. As far as Article 33 is concerned, it affirms that “[i]t shall be lawful for the King at any time when he may be about to absent himself from the Kingdom, to appoint a Regent or Council of Regency, who shall administer the Government in His name; and likewise the King may, by His last Will and Testament, appoint a Regent or Council of Regency to administer the Government during the minority of any Heir to the Throne; and should a Sovereign decease, leaving a Minor Heir, and having made no last Will and Testament, the Cabinet Council at the time of such decease shall be a Council of Regency, until the Legislative Assembly, which shall be called immediately, may be assembled, and the Legislative Assembly immediately that it is assembled shall proceed to choose by ballot, a Regent of Council of Regency, who shall administer the Government in the name of the King, and exercise all the powers which are Constitutionally vested in the King, until he shall have attained the age of eighteen years, which age is declared to be the Legal Majority of such Sovereign”.

The Council of Regency was established by proclamation on February 28, 1997, by virtue of the offices made vacant in the Cabinet Council, on the basis of the doctrine of necessity, the application of which was justified by the absence of a Monarch. Therefore, the Council of Regency possesses the constitutional authority to temporarily exercise the Royal powers of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The Council of Regency, composed by *de facto* officers, is actually serving as the provisional government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and, should the military occupation come to an end, it shall immediately convene the Legislative Assembly, which “shall proceed to choose by ballot, a Regent of Council of Regency, who shall administer the Government in the name of the King, and exercise all the powers which are Constitutionally vested in the King” until it shall not be possible to nominate a Monarch, pursuant to Article 33 of the Hawaiian Kingdom Constitution of 1864.

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<sup>25</sup> See <<https://thelawdictionary.org/regency/>> (accessed on 17 May 2020).

9. In light of the foregoing—particularly in consideration of the fact that, under international law, the Hawaiian Kingdom continues to exist as an independent State, although subjected to a foreign occupation, and that the Council of Regency has been established consistently with the constitutional principles of the Hawaiian Kingdom and, consequently, possesses the legitimacy of temporarily exercising the functions of the Monarch of the Kingdom—it is possible to conclude that the Regency actually has the authority to represent the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State, which has been under a belligerent occupation by the United States of America since 17 January 1893, both at the domestic and international level.

III. ASSUMING THE REGENCY DOES HAVE THE AUTHORITY, WHAT EFFECT WOULD ITS PROCLAMATIONS HAVE ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, TO INCLUDE ITS PROCLAMATION RECOGNIZING THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I AND ITS COUNTIES AS THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPYING STATE ON 3 JUNE 2019?

10. As previously ascertained, the Council of Regency actually possesses the constitutional authority to temporarily exercise the Royal powers of the Hawaiian Kingdom and, consequently, has the authority to represent the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State pending the American occupation and, in any case, up to the moment when it shall be possible to convene the Legislative Assembly pursuant to Article 33 of the Hawaiian Kingdom Constitution of 1864. This means that the Council of Regency is exactly in the same position of a government of a State under military occupation, and is vested with the rights and powers recognized to governments of occupied States pursuant to international humanitarian law.
11. In principle, however, such rights and powers are quite limited, by reason of the fact that the governmental authority of a government of a State under military occupation has been replaced by that of the occupying power, “[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant”.<sup>26</sup> At the same time, the ousted government retains the function and the duty of, to the extent possible, preserving order, protecting the rights and prerogatives of local people and continuing to promote the relations between its people and foreign countries. In the *Larsen* case, the claimant even asserted that the Council of Regency had “an obligation and a responsibility under international law, to take steps to protect Claimant’s nationality as a Hawaiian subject”;<sup>27</sup> the Arbitral Tribunal

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<sup>26</sup> See Article 43 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907.

<sup>27</sup> See *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*, *supra* n. 1, at 12.8.

established by the PCA, however, did not provide a response regarding this claim. In any event, leaving aside the latter specific aspect, in light of its position the Council of Regency may to a certain extent interact with the exercise of the authority by the occupying power. This is consistent with the fact that the occupant is under an international obligation to “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country”.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, as noted by the eminent jurist Robert Y. Jennings in an influential article published in 1946,<sup>29</sup> one of the main purposes of the law of belligerent occupation is to protect the sovereign rights of the legitimate government of the occupied territory, and the obligations of the occupying power in this regard continue to exist “even when, in disregard of the rules of international law, it claims [...] to have annexed all or part of an occupied territory”.<sup>30</sup> It follows that, the ousted government being the entity which represents the “legitimate government” of the occupied territory, it may “attempt to influence life in the occupied area out of concern for its nationals, to undermine the occupant’s authority, or both. One way to accomplish such goals is to legislate for the occupied population”.<sup>31</sup> In fact, “occupation law does not require an exclusive exercise of authority by the Occupying Power. It allows for authority to be shared by the Occupying Power and the occupied government, provided the former continues to bear the ultimate and overall responsibility for the occupied territory”.<sup>32</sup> While in several cases occupants have maintained the inapplicability to the occupied territory of new legislation enacted by the occupied government, for the reason that it “could undermine their authority [...] the majority of post-World War II scholars, also relying on the practice of various national courts, have agreed that the occupant should give effect to the sovereign’s new legislation as long as it addresses those issues in which the occupant has no power to amend the local law, most notably in matters of personal status”.<sup>33</sup> The Swiss Federal Tribunal has even held that “[e]nactments by the [exiled government] are constitutionally laws of the [country] and applied *ab*

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<sup>28</sup> See Article 43 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907.

<sup>29</sup> See “Government in Commission”, 23 *British Year Book of International Law*, 1946, 112.

<sup>30</sup> See Pictet, *Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949*, *supra* n. 12, at 276.

<sup>31</sup> See Eyal Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., Oxford, 2012, at 104.

<sup>32</sup> See Philip Spoerri, “The Law of Occupation”, in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict*, Oxford, 2014, 182, at 190.

<sup>33</sup> See Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, *supra* n. 28, at 104-105.

*initio* to the territory occupied [...] even though they could not be effectively implemented until the liberation”.<sup>34</sup> Although this position was taken with specific regard to exiled governments, and the Council of Regency was not established *in exile* but *in situ*, the conclusion, to the extent that it is considered valid, would not substantially change as regards the Council of Regency itself.

12. It follows from the foregoing that, under international humanitarian law, the proclamations of the Council of Regency are not divested of effects as regards the civilian population of the Hawaiian Islands. In fact, considering these proclamations as included in the concept of “legislation” referred to in the previous paragraph,<sup>35</sup> they might even, if the concrete circumstances of the case so allow, apply retroactively at the end of the occupation, irrespective of whether or not they must be respected by the occupying power during the occupation, on the condition that the legislative acts in point do not “disregard the rights and expectations of the occupied population”.<sup>36</sup> It is therefore necessary that the occupied government refrains “from using the national law as a vehicle to undermine public order and civil life in the occupied area”.<sup>37</sup> In other words, in exercising the legislative function during the occupation, the ousted government is subjected to the condition of not undermining the rights and interests of the civilian population. However, once the latter requirement is actually respected, the proclamations of the ousted government—including, in the case of Hawai‘i, those of the Council of Regency—may be considered applicable to local people, unless such applicability is explicitly refuted by the occupying authority, in its position of an entity bearing “the ultimate and overall responsibility for the occupied territory”.<sup>38</sup> In this regard, however, it is reasonable to assume that the occupying power should not deny the applicability of the above proclamations when they do not undermine, or significantly interfere with the exercise of, its authority. This would be consistent with the obligation of the occupying power “to maintain the status quo ante (i.e. as it was

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<sup>34</sup> See *Ammon v. Royal Dutch Co.*, 21 *International Law Reports*, 1954, 25, at 27.

<sup>35</sup> This is consistent with the assumption that the expression “laws in force in the country”, as used by Article 43 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 (see *supra*, text corresponding to n. 25), “refers not only to laws in the strict sense of the word, but also to the constitution, decrees, ordinances, court precedents [...] as well as administrative regulations and executive orders”; see Marco Sassòli, “Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers”, 16 *European Journal of International Law*, 2005, 661, at 668-69.

<sup>36</sup> See Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, *supra* n. 28, at 105.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, at 106.

<sup>38</sup> See *supra*, text corresponding to n. 29.



before) in the occupied territory as far as is practically possible”,<sup>39</sup> considering that local authorities are better placed to know what are the actual needs of the local population and of the occupied territory, in view of guaranteeing that the status quo ante is effectively maintained.

13. As regards, specifically, the Council of Regency’s Proclamation recognizing the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties as the administration of the occupying State of 3 June 2019,<sup>40</sup> it reads as follows:

“Whereas, in order to account for the present circumstances of the prolonged illegal occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom and to provide a temporary measure of protection for its territory and the population residing therein, the public safety requires action to be taken in order for the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties to begin to comply with the 1907 Hague Convention, IV, the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV, and international humanitarian law:

Now, therefore, We, the acting Council of Regency of the Hawaiian Kingdom, serving in the absence of the Monarch and temporarily exercising the Royal Power of the Kingdom, do hereby recognize the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties, for international law purposes, as the administration of the Occupying Power whose duties and obligations are enumerated in the 1907 Hague Convention, IV, the 1949 Geneva Convention, IV, and international humanitarian law;

And, We do hereby further proclaim that the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties shall preserve the sovereign rights of the Hawaiian Kingdom government, and to protect the local population from exploitation of their persons and property, both real and personal, as well as their civil and political rights under Hawaiian Kingdom law”.

As it is evident from a plain reading of its text, this Proclamation pursues the clear purpose of ensuring the protection of the Hawaiian territory and the people residing therein against the prejudicial effects which may arise from the occupation to which such a territory is actually subjected. Therefore, it represents a legislative act aimed at furthering the interests of the civilian population through ensuring the correct administration of their rights and of the land. As a consequence, it has the nature of an act that is equivalent, in its rationale and purpose (although not in its precise subject), to a piece of legislation concerning matters of personal status of the local

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<sup>39</sup> See International Committee of the Red Cross, “The Law of Armed Conflict. Belligerent Occupation”, *supra* n. 20, at 9.

<sup>40</sup> Available at <[https://www.hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Proc\\_Recognizing\\_State\\_of\\_HI.pdf](https://www.hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Proc_Recognizing_State_of_HI.pdf)> (accessed on 18 May 2020).

population, requiring the occupant to give effect to it.<sup>41</sup> It is true that the Proclamation of 3 June 2019 takes a precise position on the status of the occupying power, the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties being a direct emanation of the United States of America. However, in doing so, the said Proclamation simply reiterates an aspect that is self-evident, since the fact that the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties belong to the political organization of the occupying power, and that they are de facto administering the Hawaiian territory, is objectively irrefutable. It follows that the Proclamation in discussion simply restates rules already existing under international humanitarian law. In fact, the latter clearly establishes the obligation of the occupying power to preserve the sovereign rights of the occupied government (as previously ascertained in this opinion),<sup>42</sup> the “overarching principle [of the law of occupation being] that an occupant does not acquire sovereignty over an occupied territory and therefore any occupation must only be a temporary situation”.<sup>43</sup> Also, it is beyond any doubts that an occupying power is bound to guarantee and protect the human rights of the local population, as defined by the international human rights treaties of which it is a party as well as by customary international law. This has been authoritatively confirmed, *inter alia*, by the International Court of Justice.<sup>44</sup> While the Proclamation makes reference to the duty of the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties to protect the human rights of the local population “under Hawaiian Kingdom law”, and not pursuant to applicable international law, this is consistent with the obligation of the occupying power to respect, to the extent possible, the law in force in the occupied territory. In this regard, respecting the domestic laws which protect the human rights of the local population undoubtedly falls within “the extent possible”, because it certainly does not undermine, or significantly interfere with the exercise of, the authority of the occupying power, and is consistent with existing international obligations. In other words, the occupying

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<sup>41</sup> See *supra* text corresponding to n. 30.

<sup>42</sup> See, in particular, *supra*, para. 11.

<sup>43</sup> See United Nations, Officer of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “Belligerent Occupation: Duties and Obligations of Occupying Powers”, September 2017, available at <[https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ohchr\\_syria\\_-\\_belligerent\\_occupation\\_-\\_legal\\_note\\_en.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ohchr_syria_-_belligerent_occupation_-_legal_note_en.pdf)> (accessed on 19 May 2020), at 3.

<sup>44</sup> See, in particular, *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, *ICJ Reports*, 2004, at 111-113; *Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda)*, Judgement of 19 December 2005, at 178. For a more comprehensive assessment of this issue see Federico Lenzerini, “International Human Rights Law and Self-Determination of Peoples Related to the United States Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom”, in David Keanu Sai (ed.), *The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations in the Hawaiian Kingdom*, Honolulu, 2020, 173, at 203-205.

power cannot be considered “absolutely prevented”<sup>45</sup> from applying the domestic laws protecting the human rights of the local population, unless it is demonstrated that the level of protection of human rights guaranteed by Hawaiian Kingdom law is less advanced than human rights standards established by international law. Only in this case, the occupying power would be under a duty to ensure in favour of the local population the higher level of protection of human rights guaranteed by international law. In sum, the Council of Regency’s Proclamation of 3 June 2019 may be considered as a domestic act implementing international rules at the internal level, which should be effected by the occupying power pursuant to international humanitarian law, since it does not undermine, or significantly interfere with the exercise of, its authority.

14. It may be concluded that, under international humanitarian law, the proclamations of the Council of Regency—including the Proclamation recognizing the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties as the administration of the occupying State on 3 June 2019—have on the civilian population the effect of acts of domestic legislation aimed at protecting their rights and prerogatives, which should be, to the extent possible, respected and implemented by the occupying power.

### III. COMMENT ON THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REGENCY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPYING STATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

15. As previously noted, “occupation law [...] allows for authority to be shared by the Occupying Power and the occupied government, provided the former continues to bear the ultimate and overall responsibility for the occupied territory”.<sup>46</sup> This said, it is to be kept well in mind that belligerent occupation necessarily has a *non-consensual nature*. In fact, “[t]he absence of consent from the state whose territory is subject to the foreign forces’ presence [...] [is] a precondition for the existence of a state of belligerent occupation. Without this condition, the situation would amount to a ‘pacified occupation’ not subject to the law of occupation”.<sup>47</sup> At the same time, we also need to remember that the absence of armed resistance by the territorial government can in no way be interpreted as determining the existence of an implied consent to the occupation, consistently with the principle enshrined by Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.<sup>48</sup> On the contrary, the consent, “for the

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<sup>45</sup> See *supra*, text corresponding to n. 25.

<sup>46</sup> See *supra*, text corresponding to n. 29.

<sup>47</sup> See Spoerri, “The Law of Occupation”, *supra* n. 29, at 190.

<sup>48</sup> See *supra*, para. 6.

purposes of occupation law, [...] [must] be genuine, valid and explicit”.<sup>49</sup> It is evident that such a consent has never been given by the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom. On the contrary, the Hawaiian government opposed the occupation since its very beginning. In particular, Queen Lili‘uokalani, executive monarch of the Hawaiian Kingdom, on 17 January 1893 stated that, “to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands”.<sup>50</sup>

The opposition to the occupation has never been abandoned up to the time of this writing, although for some long decades it was stifled by the policy of *Americanization* brought about by the US government in the Hawaiian Islands. It has eventually revived in the last three lustrums, with the establishment of the Council of Regency.

16. Despite the fact that the occupation inherently configures as a situation unilaterally imposed by the occupying power—any kind of consent of the ousted government being totally absent—there still is some space for “cooperation” between the occupying and the occupied government—in the specific case of Hawai‘i between the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties and the Council of Regency. Before trying to specify the characteristics of such a cooperation, it is however important to reiterate that, under international humanitarian law, the last word concerning any acts relating to the administration of the occupied territory is with the occupying power. In other words, “occupation law would allow for a vertical, but not a horizontal, sharing of authority [...] [in the sense that] this power sharing should not affect the ultimate authority of the occupier over the occupied territory”.<sup>51</sup> This vertical sharing of authority would reflect “the hierarchical relationship between the occupying power and the local authorities, the former maintaining a form of control over the latter through a top-down approach in the allocation of responsibilities”.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> See Spoerri, “The Law of Occupation”, *supra* n. 29, at 190.

<sup>50</sup> See United States House of Representatives, 53rd Congress, *Executive Documents on Affairs in Hawai‘i: 1894-95*, 1895, at 586.

<sup>51</sup> See International Committee of the Red Cross, *Expert Meeting. Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory. Report*, Geneva, 2012, available at <<https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4094.pdf>> (accessed on 20 May 2020), at 20.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, at footnote 7.

17. The cooperation referred to in the previous paragraph is implied or explicitly established in some provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. In particular, Article 47 states that

“Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory”.

Through referring to possible agreements “concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power”, this provision clearly implies the possibility of establishing cooperation between the occupying and the occupied government. More explicitly, Article 50 affirms that “[t]he Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children”, while Article 56 establishes that, “[t]o the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory [...]”.

As far as United States practice is concerned, it acknowledges that “[t]he functions of the [occupied] government—whether of a general, provincial, or local character—continue only to the extent they are sanctioned”.<sup>53</sup> With specific regard to cooperation with the occupied government, it is also recognized that “[t]he occupant may, while retaining its paramount authority, permit the government of the country to perform some or all of its normal functions”.<sup>54</sup>

18. Importantly, the provisions referred to in the previous paragraph exactly refer to issues related to the protection of civilian persons and of their rights, which is one of the two main aspects (together with the preservation of the sovereign rights of the Hawaiian Kingdom government) dealt with by the Council of Regency’s Proclamation recognizing the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties as the administration of the occupying State of 3 June 2019.<sup>55</sup> In practice, the cooperation advocated by the provisions in point may take different forms, one of which translates into the possibility for the ousted government to adopt

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<sup>53</sup> See “The Law of Land Warfare”, *United States Army Field Manual 27-10*, July 1956, Section 367(a).

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, Section 367(b).

<sup>55</sup> See *supra*, text following n. 37.

legislative provisions concerning the above aspects. As previously seen, the occupying power has, *vis-à-vis* the ensuing legislation, a duty not to oppose to it, because it normally does not undermine, or significantly interfere with the exercise of, its authority. Further to this, it is reasonable to assume that—in light of the spirit and the contents of the provisions referred to in the previous paragraph—the occupying power has a duty to cooperate in giving realization to the legislation in point, unless it is “absolutely prevented” to do so. This duty to cooperate appears to be reciprocal, being premised on both the Council of Regency and the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law.

19. The latter conclusion is consistent with the logical (and legally grounded) assumption that the ousted government is better placed than the occupying power in order to know what are the real needs of the civilian population and what are the concrete measures to be taken to guarantee an effective response to such needs. It follows that, through allowing the legislation in discussion to be applied—and through contributing in its effective application—the occupying power would better comply with its obligation, existing under international humanitarian law and human rights law, to guarantee and protect the human rights of the local population. It follows that the occupying power has a duty—if not a proper legal obligation—to cooperate with the ousted government to better realize the rights and interest of the civilian population, and, more in general, to guarantee the correct administration of the occupied territory.
  
20. In light of the foregoing, it may be concluded that the working relationship between the Regency and the administration of the occupying State should have the form of a cooperative relationship aimed at guaranteeing the realization of the rights and interests of the civilian population and the correct administration of the occupied territory, provided that there are no objective obstacles for the occupying power to cooperate and that, in any event, the “supreme” decision-making power belongs to the occupying power itself. This conclusion is consistent with the position of the latter as “administrator” of the Hawaiian territory, as stated in the Council of Regency’s Proclamation recognizing the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties as the administration of the occupying State of 3 June 2019 and presupposed by the pertinent rules of international humanitarian law.

24 May 2020

Professor Federico Lenzerini



# 77ème anniversaire de la Charte des Nations Unies 77 Years of the United Nations Charter

Graphics by Marylia Cabane, Chitro Shihabuddin, the Movement for Palestine





### Daniel Lagot

Daniel Lagot après ses études à l'École Polytechnique, a fait une carrière scientifique au cours de laquelle il a présidé plusieurs grandes conférences scientifiques internationales. Depuis les années 2000, il s'est orienté vers les questions de la guerre et la paix et a publié ou dirigé la publication d'une douzaine de livres dans ce domaine.

### Non-agression et intangibilité des frontières : quel rôle pour l'ONU ? Les cas du Kosovo, de la guerre en Ukraine et de Taiwan

Après une discussion sur les trois principes énumérés par l'auteur ( Non agression et intangibilité des frontières, le droit à l'autodétermination et la responsabilité de protéger) et sur ce que pourrait ou devrait être le rôle de l'ONU, sont évoquées la manière dont les guerres se terminent et les solutions éventuelles pour le Kosovo, Taïwan et pour la paix en Ukraine, le jour où les parties seraient prêtes à négocier, dont la solution proposée par le présent auteur.

### Dr. David Keanu Sai

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### The Responsibility of the Hawaiian Kingdom to Protect its Population from War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

This article address the first pillar of the principle of Responsibility to Protect: "every State has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing" and the legal struggle for its application in the the Hawaiian Kingdom.

### Jean-Pierre PAGE

Ancien responsable du Département international de la CGT.

Derniers ouvrages parus :

- "La Chine sans oeillères", 2021, Editions Delga . Ouvrage collectif, co-dirigé avec Maxime Vivas.
- "Les divagations des antichinois en France, 2022, Editions Delga. Avec Aymeric Monville et Maxime Vivas.
- "La Russie sans oeillères", 2022, Editions Delga. Ouvrage collectif, co-dirigé avec Aymeric Monville et Maxime Vivas.

### Les pays occidentaux aggravent leur déclin en suivant aveuglément Washington - La Charte des Nations Unies comme but et moyen de la coopération internationale

C'est une contribution de l'auteur lors d'un forum international qui a réuni des délégations venant de 100 pays à Pékin Les 14 et 15 juin 2023 sur le thème "International cooperation and global human rights governance"





# All States have a Responsibility to Protect their Population from War Crimes — Usurpation of Sovereignty During Military Occupation of the Hawaiian Islands

David Keanu Sai

At the United Nations World Summit in 2005, the *Responsibility to Protect* was unanimously adopted.<sup>1</sup> The principle of the *Responsibility to Protect* has three pillars: (1) every State has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing; (2) the wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual States in meeting that responsibility; and (3) if a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter. In 2009, the General Assembly reaffirmed the three pillars of a State's responsibility to protect their populations from war crimes and crimes against humanity.<sup>2</sup> And in 2021, the General Assembly passed a resolution on “The responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”<sup>3</sup> The third pillar, which may call into action State intervention, can become controversial.<sup>4</sup>

Rule 158 of the International Committee of the Red Cross Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law specifies that “States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction and, if appropriate, prosecute

the suspects.”<sup>5</sup> This “rule that States must investigate war crimes and prosecute the suspects is set forth in numerous military manuals, with respect to grave breaches, but also more broadly with respect to war crimes in general.”<sup>6</sup>

Determined to hold to account individuals who have committed war crimes and human rights violations throughout the Hawaiian Islands, being the territory of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the Council of Regency, by proclamation on 17 April 2019,<sup>7</sup> established a Royal Commission of Inquiry (“RCI”) in similar fashion to the United States proposal of establishing a Commission of Inquiry after the First World War “to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed during its course.” The author serves as Head of the RCI and Professor Federico Lenzerini from the University of Siena, Italy, as its Deputy Head. This article will address the first pillar of the principle of *Responsibility to Protect*.

On 22 March 2022, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers and the American Association of Jurists notified the United Nations Human Rights Council at its 49th session that war crimes and human rights violations are taking place in the Hawaiian Islands through the unlawful imposition of American laws over Hawaiian territory since 1898.<sup>8</sup> This imposition of American laws

1 2005 World Summit Outcome A/60/L.1

2 G.A. Resolution 63/308 The responsibility to protect, A/63/308.

3 G.A. Resolution 75/277 The responsibility to protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, A/RES/75/277.

4 Marjorie Cohn, “The Responsibility to Protect – the Cases of Libya and Ivory Coast,” *Truthout* (16 May 2011) (online at <https://truthout.org/articles/the-responsibility-to-protect-the-cases-of-libya-and-ivory-coast/>).

5 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds.), *Customary International Humanitarian Law*, vol. I: Rules, 607 (2009).

6 *Id.*, 608.

7 Proclamation: Establishment of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (17 April 2019) (online at [https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Proc\\_Royal\\_Commission\\_of\\_Inquiry.pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Proc_Royal_Commission_of_Inquiry.pdf)).

8 IADL, Video: Dr. Keanu Sai's oral statement to the UN Human Rights Council on the U.S. occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom (online at <https://>



constitutes the war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* under particular customary international law, which has denied Hawaiian subjects their right to self-determination for over a century. The thought that Hawai'i, which is called the Hawaiian Kingdom, has been under a prolonged occupation by the United States for over a century would come as a shock to many who don't know Hawaiian history.

On 28 November 1843, both Great Britain and France jointly recognized the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State making it the first country in Oceania to join the international community of States. As a progressive constitutional monarchy, the Hawaiian Kingdom had compulsory education, universal health care, land reform and a representative democracy.<sup>9</sup> The Hawaiian Kingdom treaty partners include Austria and Hungary, Belgium, Bremen, Denmark, France, Germany, Hamburg, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>10</sup> By 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom maintained over 90 Legations and Consulates throughout the world.

Driven by the desire to attain naval superiority in the Pacific, U.S. troops, without cause, invaded the Hawaiian Kingdom on 16 January 1893 and unlawfully overthrew its Hawaiian government and replaced it with their puppet the following day with the prospect of militarizing the islands. The State of Hawai'i today is the successor to this puppet government. However, despite the unlawful overthrow of its government, the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State would continue to exist as a subject of international law and come under the regime of international humanitarian law and the law of occupation. The military occupation is now at 130 years.

According to Professor Oppenheim, once recognition of

a State is granted, it “is incapable of withdrawal”<sup>11</sup> by the recognizing State, and that “recognition estops the State which has recognized the title from contesting its validity at any future time.”<sup>12</sup> And the “duty to treat a qualified entity as a state also implies that so long as the entity continues to meet those qualifications its statehood may not be ‘derecognized.’”<sup>13</sup>

Because international law provides for the presumption of the continuity of the State despite the overthrow of its government by another State, it shifts the burden of proof and what is to be proven. According to Judge Crawford, there “is a presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations [...] despite a period in which there is no, or no effective, government,”<sup>14</sup> and belligerent occupation “does not affect the continuity of the State, even where there exists no government claiming to represent the occupied State.”<sup>15</sup> Addressing the presumption of the German State's continued existence despite the military overthrow of the Nazi government during the Second World War, Professor Brownlie explains:

Thus, after the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War the four major Allied powers assumed supreme power in Germany. The legal competence of the German state did not, however, disappear. What occurred is akin to legal representation or agency of necessity. The German state continued to exist, and, indeed, the legal basis of the occupation depended on its continued existence.<sup>16</sup>

“If one were to speak about a presumption of continuity,” explains Professor Craven, “one would suppose that an obligation would lie upon the party opposing that continuity to establish the facts substantiating its rebuttal. The continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom, in other words, may be refuted only by reference to a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States, absent of which the presumption remains.”<sup>17</sup> Evidence of

[iadllaw.org/2022/03/video-dr-keanu-sais-oral-statement-to-the-un-human-rights-council-on-the-u-s-occupation-of-the-hawaiian-kingdom/](https://iadllaw.org/2022/03/video-dr-keanu-sais-oral-statement-to-the-un-human-rights-council-on-the-u-s-occupation-of-the-hawaiian-kingdom/)).

9 David Keanu Sai, “Hawaiian Constitutional Governance,” in David Keanu Sai, ed., *The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom* 58-94 (2020) (online at [https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Hawaiian\\_Royal\\_Commission\\_of\\_Inquiry\\_\(2020\).pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Hawaiian_Royal_Commission_of_Inquiry_(2020).pdf)).

10 “Treaties with Foreign States,” in David Keanu Sai, ed., *The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom* 237-310 (2020).

11 Lassa Oppenheim, *International Law* 137 (3rd ed. 1920).

12 Georg Schwarzenberger, “Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge,” 51(2) *American Journal of International Law* 308, 316 (1957).

13 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §202, comment g.

14 James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* 34 (2nd ed. 2006).

15 *Id.*

16 Ian Brownlie, *Principles of Public International Law* 109 (4th ed. 1990).

17 Matthew Craven, “Continuity of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State under International Law,” in David Keanu Sai, ed., *The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom* 128 (2020).



“a valid demonstration of legal title, or sovereignty, on the part of the United States” would be an international treaty, particularly a peace treaty, whereby the Hawaiian Kingdom would have ceded its territory and sovereignty to the United States. Examples of foreign States ceding sovereign territory to the United States by a peace treaty include the 1848 *Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico*<sup>18</sup> and the 1898 *Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain*.<sup>19</sup>

The United States purportedly annexed the Hawaiian Islands in 1898 by a municipal law called the *joint resolution to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States*.<sup>20</sup> As a municipal law of the United States, it is without extraterritorial effect. It is not an international treaty. Annex “is to tie or bind[,] [t]o attach.”<sup>21</sup> Under international law, to annex territory of another State is a unilateral act, as opposed to cession, which is a bilateral act between States. Under international law, annexation of an occupied State is unlawful. According to *The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts*:

The international law of belligerent occupation must therefore be understood as meaning that the occupying power is not sovereign but exercises provisional and temporary control over foreign territory. The legal situation of the territory can be altered only through a peace treaty or *debellatio*.<sup>22</sup> International law does not permit annexation of territory of another state.<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, in 1988, the United States Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) published a legal opinion that addressed, *inter alia*, the annexation of Hawai‘i. The OLC’s memorandum opinion was written for the Legal Advisor for the Department of State regarding legal issues raised by the proposed Presidential proclamation to extend the territorial sea from a three-mile limit to twelve.<sup>24</sup> The OLC concluded that only the President

and not the Congress possesses “the constitutional authority to assert either sovereignty over an extended territorial sea or jurisdiction over it under international law on behalf of the United States.”<sup>25</sup> As Justice Marshall stated, the “President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations,”<sup>26</sup> and not the Congress.

The OLC further opined, “we doubt that Congress has constitutional authority to assert either sovereignty over an extended territorial sea or jurisdiction over it under international law on behalf of the United States.”<sup>27</sup> Therefore, the OLC concluded it is “unclear which constitutional power Congress exercised when it acquired Hawaii by joint resolution. Accordingly, it is doubtful that the acquisition of Hawaii can serve as an appropriate precedent for a congressional assertion of sovereignty over an extended territorial sea.”<sup>28</sup> That territorial sea was to be extended from three to twelve miles under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention and since the United States is not a Contracting State, the OLC looked into it being accomplished by the President’s proclamation. In other words, the Congress could not extend the territorial sea an additional nine miles by statute because its authority was limited up to the three-mile limit. This is not rebuttable evidence as to the presumption of the continuity of the Hawaiian State. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court, in *The Apollon*, concluded that the “laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories.”<sup>29</sup>

Arriving at this conclusion, the OLC cited constitutional scholar Professor Willoughby who stated the “constitutionality of the annexation of Hawaii, by a simple legislative act, was strenuously contested at the time both in Congress and by the press. The right to annex by treaty was not denied, but it was denied that this might be done by a simple legislative act. ... Only by means of treaties, it was asserted, can the relations between States be gov-

18 9 Stat. 922 (1848).

19 30 Stat. 1754 (1898).

20 30 Stat. 750 (1898).

21 *Black’s Law Dictionary* 88 (6th ed. 1990).

22 There was no extinction of the Hawaiian State by *debellatio* because the Permanent Court of Arbitration acknowledged the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a State in *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*, PCA Case no. 1999-01.

23 Dieter Fleck (ed.), *The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts*, Section 525, 242 (1995).

24 Douglas Kmiec, “Legal Issues Raised by Proposed Presidential Proclamation to Extend the Territorial Sea,” 12 *Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel* 238 (1988).

25 *Id.*, 242.

26 *Id.*, 242.

27 *Id.*

28 *Id.*, 262.

29 *The Apollon*, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824).



erned, for a legislative act is necessarily without extraterritorial force—confined in its operation to the territory of the State by whose legislature enacted it.”<sup>30</sup> Professor Willoughby also stated that the “incorporation of one sovereign State, such as was Hawaii prior to annexation, in the territory of another, is [...] essentially a matter falling within the domain of international relations, and, therefore, beyond the reach of legislative acts.”<sup>31</sup>

In 1906, the United States implemented a policy of denationalization through Americanization in the schools throughout the Hawaiian Islands and within three generations the national consciousness of the Hawaiian Kingdom was obliterated.<sup>32</sup> Notwithstanding the devastating effects that erased the Hawaiian Kingdom in the minds of its nationals and nationals of countries of the world, the Hawaiian government was restored *in situ* by a Council of Regency under Hawaiian constitutional law and the doctrine of necessity in 1997.<sup>33</sup> Under Hawaiian law, the Council of Regency serves in the absence of the Executive Monarch. The last Executive Monarch was Queen Lili‘uokalani who died on 11 November 1917.

On 8 November 1999, arbitral proceedings were instituted at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) in *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*, PCA Case no. 1999-01, where Larsen, a Hawaiian subject, claimed that the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, by its Council of Regency, should be liable for allowing the unlawful imposition of American laws that denied him a fair trial and led to his incarceration.<sup>34</sup> Prior to the establishment of an *ad hoc* tribunal, the PCA acknowledged the Hawaiian Kingdom as a non-Contracting State under Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes that brought the dispute under the auspices of the PCA.

In determining the continued existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a non-Contracting State, the relevant rules of international law that apply to established States must

be considered, and not those rules of international law that would apply to new States such as the case with Palestine. Professor Lenzerini concluded that “according to a plain and correct interpretation of the relevant rules, the Hawaiian Kingdom cannot be considered, by virtue of the prolonged US occupation, as extinguished as an independent State and subject of international law. In fact, in the event of illegal annexation, ‘the legal existence of [...] States [is] preserved from extinction,’ since ‘illegal occupation cannot of itself terminate statehood.’”<sup>35</sup>

Because the State is a juristic person, it requires a government to speak on its behalf, without which the State is silent, and, therefore, there could be no arbitral tribunal to be established by the PCA. On the contrary, the PCA did form a tribunal after confirming the existence of the Hawaiian State and its government, the Council of Regency, pursuant to Article 47. In international intercourse, which includes arbitration at the PCA, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in *German Settlers in Poland*, explained that “States can act only by and through their agents and representatives.”<sup>36</sup> As Professor Talmon states, the “government, consequently, possesses the *jus repraesentationis omnimoda*, i.e. plenary and exclusive competence in international law to represent its State in the international sphere. [Professor Talmon submits] that this is the case irrespective of whether the government is *in situ* or in exile.”<sup>37</sup>

After the PCA verified the continued existence of the Hawaiian State, as a juristic person, it also simultaneously ascertained that the Hawaiian State was represented by its government—the Council of Regency. The PCA identified the international dispute in *Larsen* as between a “State” and a “Private entity” in its case repository.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, the PCA described the dispute between the Council of Regency and Larsen as between a government and a resident of Hawai‘i.

30 Kmiec, 252.

31 Westel Woodbury Willoughby, *The Constitutional Law of the United States*, vol. 1, 345 (1910).

32 David Keanu Sai, “United States Belligerent Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom,” in David Keanu Sai’s (ed.), *The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom* 114 (2020).

33 David Keanu Sai, “The Royal Commission of Inquiry,” in David Keanu Sai’s (ed.), *The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom* 18-23 (2020); see also Federico Lenzerini, “Legal Opinion on the Authority of the Council of Regency of the Hawaiian Kingdom,” 3 *Hawaiian Journal of Law and Politics* 317-333 (2021).

34 *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*, PCA Case no. 1999-01 (online at <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/35/>).

35 Lenzerini, 322.

36 *German Settlers in Poland*, 1923, PCIJ, Series B, No. 6, 22.

37 Stefan Talmon, *Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile* 115 (1998).

38 Permanent Court of Arbitration Case Repository, *Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom*, PCA Case no. 1999-01 (online at <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/35/>).



Lance Paul Larsen, a resident of Hawaii, brought a claim against the Hawaiian Kingdom by its Council of Regency (“Hawaiian Kingdom”) on the grounds that the Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom is in continual violation of: (a) its 1849 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the United States of America, as well as the principles of international law laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 and (b) the principles of international comity, for allowing the unlawful imposition of American municipal laws over the claimant’s person within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom (emphasis added).<sup>39</sup>

Furthermore, the United States, by its embassy in The Hague, entered into an agreement with the Hawaiian Kingdom to have access to the pleadings of the arbitration. This agreement was brokered by Deputy Secretary General Phyllis Hamilton of the Permanent Court of Arbitration prior to the formation of the arbitral tribunal on 9 June 2000.<sup>40</sup>

There was no legal requirement for the Council of Regency, being the successor in office to Queen Lili‘uokalani under Hawaiian constitutional law, to get recognition from the United States as the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The United States’ recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State on 6 July 1844,<sup>41</sup> was also the recognition of its government—a constitutional monarchy. Successors in office to King Kamehameha III, who at the time of international recognition was King of the Hawaiian Kingdom, did not require diplomatic recognition. These successors included King Kamehameha IV in 1854, King Kamehameha V in 1863, King Lunalilo in 1873, King Kalākaua in 1874, Queen Lili‘uokalani in 1891, and the Council of Regency in 1997. The legal doctrines of recognition of new governments only arise “with extra-legal changes in government” of an existing State.<sup>42</sup> Successors to King Kamehameha III were not established through “extra-legal changes,” but rather under the constitution and laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom. According to United States foreign relations law, “Where a new administration succeeds to power in accordance with a state’s constitutional processes, no issue of recognition or acceptance arises; continued recognition is assumed.”<sup>43</sup>

*Usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* was listed as a war crime in 1919 by the Commission on Responsibilities of the Paris Peace Conference that was established by the Allied and Associated Powers at war with Germany and its allies. The Commission was especially concerned with acts perpetrated in occupied territories against non-combatants and civilians. *Usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* is the imposition of the laws and administrative policies of the Occupying State over the territory of the Occupied State. Usurpation “is the “unlawful encroachment or assumption of the use of property, power or authority which belongs to another.”<sup>44</sup>

While the Commission did not provide the source of this crime in treaty law, it appears to be Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which states, “The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” Article 43 is the codification of customary international law that existed on 17 January 1893, when the United States unlawfully overthrew the government of the Hawaiian Kingdom.

The Commission charged that in Poland the German and Austrian forces had “prevented the populations from organising themselves to maintain order and public security” and that they had “[a]ided the Bolshevik hordes that invaded the territories.” It said that in Romania the German authorities had instituted German civil courts to try disputes between subjects of the Central Powers or between a subject of these powers and a Romanian, a neutral, or subjects of Germany’s enemies. In Serbia, the Bulgarian authorities had “[p]roclaimed that the Serbian State no longer existed, and that Serbian territory had become Bulgarian.” It listed several other war crimes committed by Bulgaria in occupied Serbia: “Serbian law, courts and administration ousted;” “Taxes collected under Bulgarian fiscal regime;” “Serbian currency suppressed;” “Public property removed or destroyed, including books, archives and MSS (e.g., from the National Library, the University Library, Serbian Legation at Sofia, French Consulate

39 *Id.*

40 Sai, *The Royal Commission of Inquiry*, 25-26.

41 U.S. Secretary of State Calhoun to Hawaiian Commissioners (6 July 1844) (online at: [https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/US\\_Recognition.pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/US_Recognition.pdf)).

42 M.J. Peterson, *Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrines and State Practice, 1815-1995* 26 (1997).

43 *Restatement (Third)*, §203, comment c.

44 Black’s Law 1545.



at Uskub);” “Prohibited sending Serbian Red Cross to occupied Serbia.” It also charged that in Serbia the German and Austrian authorities had committed several war crimes: “The Austrians suspended many Serbian laws and substituted their own, especially in penal matters, in procedure, judicial organisation, etc.,” “Museums belonging to the State (e.g., Belgrade, Detchani) were emptied and the contents taken to Vienna.”<sup>45</sup>

The crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* was referred to by Judge Blair of the American Military Commission in a separate opinion in the *Justice Case*, holding that this “rule is incident to military occupation and was clearly intended to protect the inhabitants of any occupied territory against the unnecessary exercise of sovereignty by a military occupant.”<sup>46</sup> Australia, Netherlands and China enacted laws making *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* a war crime. In the case of Australia, the Parliament enacted the Australian War Crimes Act in 1945 that included the war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation*.

The war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* has not been included in more recent codifications of war crimes, casting some doubt on its status as a crime under customary international law. According to Professor Schabas, “there do not appear to have been any prosecutions for that crime by international criminal tribunals.”<sup>47</sup> However, the war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* is a war crime under “particular” customary international law. According to the International Law Commission, “A rule of particular customary international law, whether regional, local or other, is a rule of customary international law that applies only among a limited number of States.”<sup>48</sup> In the 1919 report of the Commission, the United States, as a member of the commission, did not contest the listing of the war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation*, but rather only disagreed, *inter alia*, with the Commission’s position on the means of prosecuting Heads of State for the listed war crimes by conduct or omission.

The RCI views *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupa-*

*tion* as a war crime under particular customary international law and binding upon the Allied and Associated Powers of the First World War—United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, principal Allied Powers and Associated Powers that include Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, formerly known as Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.

In the Hawaiian situation, *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* serves as a source for the commission of secondary war crimes within the territory of an occupied State, *i.e.* *compulsory enlistment, denationalization, pillage, destruction of property, deprivation of fair and regular trial, deporting civilians of the occupied territory, and transferring populations into an occupied territory*. The reasoning for the prohibition of imposing extraterritorial prescriptions or measures of the occupying State is addressed by Professor Eyal Benvenisti:

The occupant may not surpass its limits under international law through extraterritorial prescriptions emanating from its national institutions: the legislature, government, and courts. The reason for this rule is, of course, the functional symmetry, with respect to the occupied territory, among the various lawmaking authorities of the occupying state. Without this symmetry, Article 43 could become meaningless as a constraint upon the occupant, since the occupation administration would then choose to operate through extraterritorial prescription of its national institutions.

In the situation of Hawai‘i, the *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* would appear to have been total since the beginning of the twentieth century. This is an ongoing crime where the criminal act would consist of the imposition of legislation or administrative measures by the occupying power that goes beyond what is required necessary for military purposes of the occupation. Since 1898, when the United States Congress enacted an American municipal law purporting to have annexed the Hawaiian Islands, it began to impose its legislation and administrative measures to the present in violation of the

45 *Violation of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports*, Annex, TNA FO 608/245/4 (1919).

46 *United States v. Alstötter et al.*, Opinion of Mallory B. Blair, Judge of Military Tribunal III, III TWC 1178, 1181 (1951).

47 William Schabas, “War Crimes Related to the United States Belligerent Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom,” in David Keanu Sai’s (ed.), *The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom* 156 (2020).

48 Conclusion 16—Particular customary international law, International Law Commission’s Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law, with commentaries (2018) (A/73/10).



laws of occupation.

Given that this is essentially a crime involving government action or policy or the action or policies of an occupying State's proxies such as the State of Hawai'i and its Counties, a perpetrator who participated in the act would be required to do so intentionally and with knowledge that the act went beyond what was required for military purposes or the protection of fundamental human rights. *Usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* has not only victimized the civilian population in the Hawaiian Islands for over a century, but it has also victimized the civilians of other countries that have visited the islands since 1898 who were unlawfully subjected to American municipal laws and administrative measures. These include State of Hawai'i sales tax on goods purchased in the islands but also taxes placed exclusively on tourists' accommodations collected by the State of Hawai'i and the Counties.

The Counties have recently added 3% surcharges to the State of Hawai'i's 10.25% transient accommodations tax. Added with the State of Hawai'i's general excise tax of 4% in addition to the 0.5% County general excise tax surcharges, tourists will be paying a total of 17.75% to the occupying power. In addition, those civilians of foreign countries doing business in the Hawaiian Islands are also subjected to paying American duties on goods that are imported to the United States destined to Hawai'i. These duty rates are collected by the United States according to the United States Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.

The Council of Regency's strategic plan entails three phases. Phase I—verification of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and a subject of international law. Phase II—exposure of Hawaiian Statehood within the framework of international law and the laws of occupation as it affects the realm of politics and economics at both the international and domestic levels.<sup>49</sup> Phase III—restoration of the Hawaiian Kingdom as an independent State and a subject of international. Phase III is when the American occupation comes to an end. After the PCA verified the continued existence of Hawaiian Statehood prior to forming the arbitral tribunal in *Larsen v. Hawaiian*

*Kingdom*,<sup>50</sup> Phase II was initiated, which would contribute to ascertaining the *mens rea* and satisfying the element of awareness of factual circumstances that established the existence of the military occupation.

Implementation of phase II was initiated at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa when the author of this article entered the political science graduate program, where he received a master's degree specializing in international relations and public law in 2004 and a Ph.D. degree in 2008 on the subject of the continuity of Hawaiian Statehood while under an American prolonged belligerent occupation since 17 January 1893. This prompted other master's theses, doctoral dissertations, peer review articles and publications about the American occupation. The exposure through academic research also motivated historian Tom Coffman to change the title of his 1998 book from *Nation Within: The Story of America's Annexation of the Nation of Hawai'i*,<sup>51</sup> to *Nation Within—The History of the American Occupation of Hawai'i*.<sup>52</sup> Coffman explained the change in his note on the second edition:

I am compelled to add that the continued relevance of this book reflects a far-reaching political, moral and intellectual failure of the United States to recognize and deal with the takeover of Hawai'i. In the book's subtitle, the word Annexation has been replaced by the word Occupation, referring to America's occupation of Hawai'i. Where annexation connotes legality by mutual agreement, the act was not mutual and therefore not legal. Since by definition of international law there was no annexation, we are left then with the word occupation.

In making this change, I have embraced the logical conclusion of my research into the events of 1893 to 1898 in Honolulu and Washington, D.C. I am prompted to take this step by a growing body of historical work by a new generation of Native Hawaiian scholars. Dr. Keanu Sai writes, "The challenge for ... the fields of political science, history, and law is to distinguish between the rule of law and the politics of power." In the history of the Hawai'i, the might of the United States does not make it right.<sup>53</sup>

49 Strategic Plan of the Council of Regency (online at [https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/HK\\_Strategic\\_Plan.pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/HK_Strategic_Plan.pdf)).

50 David Keanu Sai, "Backstory—Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (1999-2001)," 4 *Haw. J.L. Pol.* 133-161 (2022).

51 Tom Coffman, *Nation Within: The Story of America's Annexation of the Nation of Hawai'i* (1998).

52 Tom Coffman, *Nation Within: The History of the American Occupation of Hawai'i* (2nd ed. 2009). Duke University Press published the second edition in 2016.

53 *Id.*, xvi.



As a result of the exposure, United Nations Independent Expert, Dr. Alfred deZayas sent a communication from Geneva to Judge Gary W.B. Chang, Judge Jeannette H. Castagnetti, and members of the judiciary of the State of Hawai'i dated 25 February 2018.<sup>54</sup> Dr. deZayas stated:

I have come to understand that the lawful political status of the Hawaiian Islands is that of a sovereign nation-state in continuity; but a nation-state that is under a strange form of occupation by the United States resulting from an illegal military occupation and a fraudulent annexation. As such, international laws (the Hague and Geneva Conventions) require that governance and legal matters within the occupied territory of the Hawaiian Islands must be administered by the application of the laws of the occupied state (in this case, the Hawaiian Kingdom), not the domestic laws of the occupier (the United States).

The exposure also prompted the U.S. National Lawyers Guild (“NLG”) to adopt a resolution in 2019 calling upon the United States of America to begin to comply immediately with international humanitarian law in its long and illegal occupation of the Hawaiian Islands.<sup>55</sup> Among its positions statement, the “NLG supports the Hawaiian Council of Regency, who represented the Hawaiian Kingdom at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in its efforts to seek resolution in accordance with international law as well as its strategy to have the State of Hawai'i and its Counties comply with international humanitarian law as the administration of the Occupying State.”<sup>56</sup>

In a letter to Governor David Ige, Governor of the State of Hawai'i, dated 10 November 2020, the NLG called upon the governor to begin to comply with international humanitarian by administering the laws of the occupied State. The NLG letter concluded:

As an organization committed to the mission that human rights and the rights of ecosystems are more sacred than property interests, the NLG is deeply concerned that international humanitarian law continues to be flagrantly violated with apparent impunity by the State of Hawai'i and

its County governments. This has led to the commission of war crimes and human rights violations of a colossal scale throughout the Hawaiian Islands. International criminal law recognizes that the civilian inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands are “protected persons” who are afforded protection under international humanitarian law and their rights are vested in international treaties. There are no statutes of limitation for war crimes, as you must be aware.

We urge you, Governor Ige, to proclaim the transformation of the State of Hawai'i and its Counties into an occupying government pursuant to the Council of Regency's proclamation of June 3, 2019, in order to administer the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom. This would include carrying into effect the Council of Regency's proclamation of October 10, 2014 that bring the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom in the nineteenth century up to date. We further urge you and other officials of the State of Hawai'i and its Counties to familiarize yourselves with the contents of the recent eBook published by the RCI and its reports that comprehensively explains the current situation of the Hawaiian Islands and the impact that international humanitarian law and human rights law have on the State of Hawai'i and its inhabitants.

On 7 February 2021, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (“IADL”), a non-governmental organization (NGO) of human rights lawyers that has special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) and accredited to participate in the Human Rights Council's sessions as Observers, passed a resolution calling upon the United States to immediately comply with international humanitarian law in its prolonged occupation of the Hawaiian Islands—the Hawaiian Kingdom.<sup>57</sup> In its resolution, the IADL also “supports the Hawaiian Council of Regency, who represented the Hawaiian Kingdom at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in its efforts to seek resolution in accordance with international law as well as its strategy to have the State of Hawai'i and its Counties comply with international humanitarian law as the administration of

54 Letter of Dr. Alfred deZayas to Judge Gary W.B. Chang, Judge Jeannette H. Castagnetti, and Members of the Judiciary of the State of Hawai'i (25 February 2018) (online at [https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Dr\\_deZayas\\_Memo\\_2\\_25\\_2018.pdf](https://hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Dr_deZayas_Memo_2_25_2018.pdf)).

55 Resolution of the National Lawyers Guild Against the Illegal Occupation of the Hawaiian Islands (2019) (online at <https://www.nlg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Hawaiian-Subcommittee-Resolution-Final.pdf>).

56 National Lawyers Guild, *NLG Calls Upon US to Immediately Comply with International Humanitarian Law in its Illegal Occupation of the Hawaiian Islands* (13 January 2020) (online at <https://www.nlg.org/nlg-calls-upon-us-to-immediately-comply-with-international-humanitarian-law-in-its-illegal-occupation-of-the-hawaiian-islands/>).

57 International Association of Democratic Lawyers, *IADL Resolution on the US Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom* (7 February 2021) (online at <https://iadllaw.org/2021/03/iadl-resolution-on-the-us-occupation-of-the-hawaiian-kingdom/>).





the Occupying State.”

Together with the IADL, the American Association of Jurists—Asociación Americana de Juristas (“AAJ”), who is also an NGO with consultative status with the United Nations ECOSOC and accredited as an observer in the Human Rights Council’s sessions, sent a joint letter dated 3 March 2022 to member States of the United Nations on the status of the Hawaiian Kingdom and its prolonged occupation by the United States.<sup>58</sup> In its joint letter, the IADL and the AAJ also “supports the Hawaiian Council of Regency, who represented the Hawaiian Kingdom at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in its efforts to seek resolution in accordance with international law as well as its strategy to have the State of Hawai‘i and its Counties comply with international humanitarian law as the administration of the Occupying State.”

On 22 March 2022, the author delivered an oral statement, on behalf of the IADL and AAJ, to the United Nations Human Rights Council (“HRC”) at its 49th session in Geneva. The oral statement read:

The International Association of Democratic Lawyers and the American Association of Jurists call the attention of the Council to human rights violations in the Hawaiian Islands. My name is Dr. David Keanu Sai, and I am the Minister of Foreign Affairs *ad interim* for the Hawaiian Kingdom. I also served as lead agent for the Hawaiian Kingdom at the Permanent Court of Arbitration from 1999-2001 where the Court acknowledged the continued existence of my country as a sovereign and independent State.

The Hawaiian Kingdom was invaded by the United States on 16 January 1893, which began its century long occupation to serve its military interests. Currently, there are 118 military sites throughout the islands and the city of Honolulu serves as the headquarters for the Indo-Pacific Combatant Command.

For the past century, the United States has and continues to commit the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty,

under customary international law, by imposing its municipal laws over Hawaiian territory, which has denied Hawaiian subjects their right of internal self-determination by prohibiting them to freely access their own laws and administrative policies, which has led to the violations of their human rights, starting with the right to health, education and to choose their political leadership.

None of the 47 member States of the HRC, which includes the United States, protested, or objected to the oral statement of war crimes being committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States. Under international law, acquiescence “concerns a consent tacitly conveyed by a State, unilaterally, through silence or inaction, in circumstances such that a response expressing disagreement or objection in relation to the conduct of another State would be called for.”<sup>59</sup> Silence conveys consent. Since they “did not do so [they] thereby must be held to have acquiesced. *Qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset.*”<sup>60</sup>

In mid-November of 2022, the RCI published thirteen war criminal reports finding that the senior leadership of the United States and the State of Hawai‘i, which includes President Joseph Biden Jr., Governor David Ige, Hawai‘i Mayor Mitchell Roth, Maui Mayor Michael Victorino and Kaua‘i Mayor Derek Kawakami, are guilty of the war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation*, and all of the named perpetrators have met the requisite element of *mens rea*.<sup>61</sup> In these reports, the RCI has concluded that these perpetrators have met the requisite elements of the war crime and are guilty *dolus directus* of the first degree. “It is generally assumed that an offender acts with *dolus directus* of the first degree if he desires to bring about the result. In this type of intent, the actor’s ‘will’ is directed finally towards the accomplishment of that result.”<sup>62</sup>

Professor Schabas states three elements of the war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* are:

1. The perpetrators imposed or applied legislative or administrative measures of the occupying power going beyond those required by what is necessary for mili-

58 International Association of Democratic Lawyers, *IADL and AAJ deliver joint letter on Hawaiian Kingdom to UN ambassadors* (3 March 2022) (online at <https://iadllaw.org/2022/03/iadl-and-aaj-deliver-joint-letter-on-hawaiian-kingdom-to-un-ambassadors/>).

59 Nuno Sérgio Marques Antunes, “Acquiescence”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law* para. 2 (2006).

60 See International Court of Justice, *Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)*, Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962, *I.C.J. Reports* 1962, p. 6, at 23.

61 Website of the Royal Commission of Inquiry at <https://hawaiiankingdom.org/royal-commission.shtml>.

62 Mohamed Elewa Badar, *The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law: The Case for a Unified Approach* 535 (2013).



tary purposes of the occupation.

2. The perpetrators were aware that the measures went beyond what was required for military purposes or the protection of fundamental human rights.
3. Their conduct took place in the context of and was associated with a military occupation.
4. The perpetrators were aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the military occupation.

With respect to the last two elements of war crimes, Professor Schabas explains:

1. There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as international or non-international;
2. In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international or non-international;
3. There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstance that established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms “took place in the context of and was associated with.”<sup>63</sup>

The evidence of the *actus reus* and *mens rea* or guilty mind were drawn from the perpetrators’ own pleadings and the rulings by the court in a U.S. federal district court case in Honolulu, *Hawaiian Kingdom v. Biden et al.*, civil no. 1:21:cv-00243-LEK-RT. The perpetrators were being sued not in their individual or private capacities but rather in their official capacities as State actors because the war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* involves “State action or policy or the action or policies of an occupying State’s proxies” and not the private actions of individuals. The perpetrators are subject to prosecution and there is no statute of limitation for war crimes.<sup>64</sup>

The 123 countries who are State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court have primary responsibility to prosecute war criminals under universal jurisdiction, but the perpetrator would have to enter the territory of the State Party to be apprehended and prosecuted. Under the principle of complementary jurisdiction under the Rome Statute, State Parties have the first

responsibility to prosecute individuals for international crimes to include the war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* without regard to the place the war crime was committed or the nationality of the perpetrator. The ICC is a court of last resort. Except for the United States, China, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Thailand, the Allied Powers and Associated Powers of the First World War are State Parties to the Rome Statute.

In the situation where the citizens of these countries have become victims of the war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* and its secondary war crimes such as *pillage*, these citizens can seek extradition warrants in their national courts for their governments to prosecute these perpetrators under the passive personality jurisdiction and not universal jurisdiction. The passive personality jurisdiction provides countries with jurisdiction for crimes committed against their nationals while they were abroad in the Hawaiian Islands. This has the potential of opening the floodgate of criminal proceedings from all over the world.

The commission of the war crime of *usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation* can cease when the United States, the State of Hawai‘i and the Counties begin to comply with Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and administer the laws of the Occupied State—the Hawaiian Kingdom. At present, this is not the case, and the Hawaiian Kingdom has now entered 130 years of occupation being the longest occupation in the history of international relations.

<sup>63</sup> Schabas, 167.

<sup>64</sup> United Nations General Assembly Res. 3 (I); United Nations General Assembly Res. 170 (II); United Nations General Assembly Res. 2583 (XXIV); United Nations General Assembly Res. 2712 (XXV); United Nations General Assembly Res. 2840 (XXVI); United Nations General Assembly Res. 3020 (XXVII); United Nations General Assembly Res. 3074 (XXVIII).



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**LEGAL OPINION ON WAR CRIMES RELATED TO THE UNITED STATES  
OCCUPATION OF THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM SINCE 17 JANUARY 1893<sup>†</sup>**

Professor William Schabas\*

- I. INTRODUCTION
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- VI. CONCLUSION

*Editor's Note: In light of the severity of the mandate of the Royal Commission, established by the Hawaiian Council of Regency on 17 April 2019, to investigate war crimes and human rights violations committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the*

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<sup>†</sup> This article is reproduced with permission from Dr. David Keanu Sai, Head of the Royal Commission of Inquiry © and editor of *The Royal Commission of Inquiry: Investigating War Crimes and Human Rights Violations Committed in the Hawaiian Kingdom* (2020). There has been no change in the citation format from its original print except where needed.

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*“authority” of the Council of Regency to appoint the Royal Commission is fundamental and, therefore, necessary to address within the rules of international humanitarian law, which is a component of international law. As explained by the United States Supreme Court in 1900 regarding international law and the works of jurists and commentators:*

*International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.<sup>1</sup>*

*According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, [are] subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Restatement Third—Foreign Relations Law of the United States, recognizes that “writings of scholars”<sup>3</sup> are a source of international law in determining, in this case, whether the Council of Regency has been established in conformity with the rules of international humanitarian law. The writing of scholars, “whether a rule has become international law,” are not prescriptive but rather descriptive “of what the law really is.”*

## I. INTRODUCTION

This legal opinion is made at the request of the head of the Hawaiian Royal Commission of Inquiry, Dr. David Keanu Sai, in his letter of 28 May 2019, requesting of me “a legal opinion addressing the applicable international law, main facts and their related assessment, allegations of war crimes, and defining the material elements of the war crimes in order to identify mens rea and actus reus”. It is premised on the assumption that the Hawaiian Kingdom was occupied by the United States in 1893 and that it remained so since that time. Reference has been made to the expert report produced by Prof. Matthew Craven dealing with the legal status of Hawai‘i and the view that it has been and remains in a situation of belligerent occupation resulting in application of the relevant rules of international law,

<sup>1</sup> *The Paquete Habana*, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).

<sup>2</sup> Article 38(1), Statute of the International Court of Justice.

<sup>3</sup> §103(2)(c), *Restatement of the Law (Third)—The Foreign Relations Law of the United States* (1987).

particularly those set out in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. This legal opinion is confined to the definitions and application of international criminal law to a situation of occupation. The terms “Hawaiian Kingdom” and “Hawai‘i” are synonymous in this legal opinion.

## II. APPLICABLE LAW

For the purposes of this opinion, the relevant treaties appear to be the following: Hague Convention II on the Laws and Customs of War, 1899; Hague Convention IV on the Laws and Customs of War, 1907; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 (‘fourth Geneva Convention’). All of these treaties have been ratified by the United States. They codify obligations that are imposed upon an occupying power. Only the fourth Geneva Convention contains provisions that can be described as penal or criminal, by which liability is imposed upon individuals. Article 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention provides a list of ‘grave breaches’, that is, violations of the Convention that incur individual criminal responsibility and that are known colloquially as ‘war crimes’: ‘wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’.

There are other treaties that codify war crimes relevant to the conduct of an occupying power but these have not been ratified by the United States. Article 85 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 defines as ‘grave breaches’ subject to individual criminal liability when perpetrated against ‘persons in the power of an adverse Party’, including situations of occupation:

- a) the transfer by the occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory, in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Convention;
- b) unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;
- c) practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination;
- d) making the clearly-recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples and to which special protection has been given by special arrangement, for

- example, within the framework of a competent international organization, the object of attack, causing as a result extensive destruction thereof, where there is no evidence of the violation by the adverse Party of Article 53, subparagraph (b), and when such historic monuments, works of art and places of worship are not located in the immediate proximity of military objectives;
- e) depriving a person protected by the Conventions or referred to in paragraph 2 or this Article of the rights of fair and regular trial.

Some of these war crimes are listed in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court but it, too, has not been ratified by the United States.

In addition to crimes listed in applicable treaties, war crimes are also recognized under customary international law. Customary international law applies generally to States regardless of whether they have ratified relevant treaties. The customary law of war crimes is thus applicable to the situation in Hawai‘i. Many of the war crimes set out in the first Additional Protocol and in the Rome Statute codify customary international law and are therefore applicable to the United States despite its failure to ratify the treaties.

Crimes under customary international law have been recognized in judicial decisions of both national and international criminal courts. Such recognition may take place in the context of a prosecution for such crimes, although it is relatively unusual for criminal courts, be they national or international, to exercise jurisdiction over crimes under customary law that have not been codified.<sup>4</sup> Frequently, crimes under customary international law are also recognized in litigation concerning the principle of legality, that is, the rule against retroactive prosecution. Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘[n]o one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed’. Applying this provision or texts derived from it, tribunals have recognized ‘a penal offence, under national or international law’ where the crime was not codified but rather was recognized under international law.

The International Military Tribunal (‘the Nuremberg Tribunal’) was empowered to exercise jurisdiction over ‘violations of the laws or customs of war’. Article VI(b) of the Charter of the Tribunal provided a list of war crimes but specified that ‘[s]uch violations shall include, but not be limited to’, confirming that the Tribunal had authority to convict persons for crimes under customary international law. The United States is a party to

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<sup>4</sup> See the examples provided in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, *Customary International Law, Vol. I: Rules*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, ‘Rule 156. Definition of War Crimes’, pp. 568-603.

the London Agreement, to which the Charter of the International Military Tribunal is annexed. The corresponding provision in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East ('the Tokyo Tribunal') does not even provide a list of war crimes, confining itself to authorizing the prosecution of 'violations of the laws or customs of war'.

More recently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was empowered to exercise jurisdiction over 'violations of the laws or customs of war'. Like the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, the Statute of the Tribunal, which was contained in a Security Council Resolution, listed several such violations but specified that the enumeration was not limited. Two of the listed crimes are of relevance to the situation of occupation: seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science; plunder of public or private property. The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal explained that not all violations of the laws or customs of war could amount to war crimes. In order for a violation of the laws or customs of war to incur individual criminal responsibility, the Tribunal said that the 'violation must be serious, that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim'. As an example of a violation that would not be serious enough, it provided the example of the appropriation of a loaf of bread belonging to a private individual by a combatant in occupied territory. It said that to meet the threshold of seriousness, it was not necessary for violations to result in death or physical injury, or even the risk thereof, although breaches of rules protecting important values often result in distress and anxiety for the victims.<sup>5</sup> Although the Hague Conventions prohibit compelling inhabitants of an occupied territory to swear allegiance to the occupying power,<sup>6</sup> there is no authority to support this rule being considered a war crime for which individuals are punishable. Moreover, the incidents of coerced swearing of allegiance in Hawai'i appear to date to the late nineteenth century, making criminal prosecution today entirely theoretical, as explained further below.

Evidence of recognition of crimes under customary international law may also be derived from documents of international conferences, national military manuals, and similar sources. The first authoritative list of 'violations of the laws and customs of war' was developed by the Commission on Responsibilities of the Paris Peace Conference, in 1919. It was largely derived from provisions of the two Hague Conventions, of 1899 and 1907, although the preparatory work does not provide any

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<sup>5</sup> *Prosecutor v. Tadić* (IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 94.

<sup>6</sup> Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 3 *Martens Nouveau Recueil* (3d) 461, Art. 45. For the 1899 treaty, see Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247, 91 British Foreign and State Treaties 988.



precise references for each of the thirty-two crimes in the list. The Commission noted that the list of offences was ‘not regarded as complete and exhaustive’. The Commission was especially concerned with acts perpetrated in occupied territories against non-combatants. The war crimes on the list that are of particular relevance to situations of occupation include:

- Murders and massacres; systematic terrorism.
- Torture of civilians.
- Deliberate starvation of civilians.
- Rape.
- Abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution.
- Deportation of civilians.
- Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions.
- Forced labour of civilians in connection with the military operations of the enemy.
- Usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation.
- Compulsory enlistment of soldiers among the inhabitants of occupied territory.
- Attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory.
- Pillage.
- Confiscation of property.
- Exaction of illegitimate or of exorbitant contributions and regulations.
- Debasement of the currency, and issue of spurious currency.
- Imposition of collective penalties.
- Wanton destruction of religious, charitable, educational, and historic buildings and monuments.<sup>7</sup>

### III. TEMPORAL ISSUES

As a preliminary matter, two temporal issues require attention. First, international criminal law, like criminal law in general, is a dynamic phenomenon. Conduct that may not have been criminal at a certain time can become so, reflecting changing values and social development, just as certain acts may be decriminalized. It is today widely recognized that the recruitment and active use of child soldiers is an international crime. A century ago, the practice was not necessarily viewed in the same way. There is no indication of prosecution of child soldier offences relating to the Second World War, for example. Similarly, some acts that were once prohibited and that might even be viewed as criminal are now accepted as features of modern warfare.

Second, it is important to bear in mind that, as the judgment of the International Military Tribunal famously stated, ‘crimes against

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<sup>7</sup> *Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities, Conference of Paris, 1919*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919.

international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced'.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, human longevity means that the inquiry into the perpetration of war crimes becomes quite abstract after about 80 years, bearing in mind the age of criminal responsibility. Writing in 2019, it serves little purpose to consider the international criminality of acts that may have taken place at the end of the nineteenth century or the early years of the twentieth century, given that there is nobody alive who could be subject to punishment.

Statutory limitation of war crimes is prohibited by customary law.<sup>9</sup> The prohibition of statutory limitation for war crimes has been proclaimed in several resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.<sup>10</sup> In a diplomatic note to the Government of Iraq in 1991, the Government of the United States declared that 'under International Law, violations of the Geneva Conventions, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, or related International Laws of armed conflict are war crimes, and individuals guilty of such violations may be subject to prosecution at any time, without any statute of limitations. This includes members of the Iraqi armed forces and civilian government officials.'<sup>11</sup>

#### IV. SPECIFIC CRIMES

A thorough review of all war crimes is beyond the scope of this chapter, which is focused on those for which allegations have been made that they appear to arise in the case of occupation of Hawai'i. As explained above, war crimes that may have been perpetrated at the time the occupation began cannot today be prosecuted and for this reason these do not receive any detailed attention.

##### *A. Usurpation of sovereignty during occupation*

The war crime of 'usurpation of sovereignty during occupation' appears on the list issued by the Commission on Responsibilities. The Commission

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<sup>8</sup> France et al. v. Göring et al., (1948) 22 IMT 411, p. 466.

<sup>9</sup> Fédération nationale des déportés et internés résistants et patriotes et al. v. Barbie, (1984) 78 ILR 125, at p. 135. Also: France, Assemblée nationale, Rapport d'information déposé en application de l'article 145 du Règlement par la Mission d'information de la Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées et de la Commission des affaires étrangères, sur les opérations militaires menées par la France, d'autres pays et l'ONU au Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994, 1999, at p. 286.

<sup>10</sup> GA Res. 3 (I); GA Res. 170 (II); GA Res. 2583 (XXIV); GA Res. 2712 (XXV); GA Res. 2840 (XXVI); GA Res. 3020 (XXVII); GA Res. 3074 (XXVIII).

<sup>11</sup> Department of State, Diplomatic Note to Iraq, Washington, 19 January 1991, annexed to Letter dated 21 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22122, 21 January 1991, Annex I, p. 2.

did not indicate the source of this crime in treaty law. It would appear to be Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: ‘The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.’

The Annex to the report of the Commission on Responsibilities provides examples of acts deemed to constitute the crime of ‘usurpation of sovereignty during occupation’. The Commission charged that in Poland the German and Austrian forces had ‘prevented the populations from organising themselves to maintain order and public security’ and that they had ‘[a]ided the Bolshevik hordes that invaded the territories’. It said that in Romania the German authorities had instituted German civil courts to try disputes between subjects of the Central Powers or between a subject of these powers and a Romanian, a neutral, or subjects of Germany’s enemies’. In Serbia, the Bulgarian authorities had ‘[p]roclaimed that the Serbian State no longer existed, and that Serbian territory had become Bulgarian’. It listed several other war crimes of Bulgaria committed in occupied Serbia: ‘Serbian law, courts and administration ousted’; ‘Taxes collected under Bulgarian fiscal regime’; ‘Serbian currency suppressed’; ‘Public property removed or destroyed, including books, archives and MSS (e.g., from the National Library, the University Library, Serbian Legation at Sofia, French Consulate at Uskub)’; ‘Prohibited sending Serbian Red Cross to occupied Serbia’. It also charged that in Serbia the German and Austrian authorities had committed several war crimes: ‘The Austrians suspended many Serbian laws and substituted their own, especially in penal matters, in procedure, judicial organisation, etc.’; ‘Museums belonging to the State (e.g., Belgrade, Detchani) were emptied and the contents taken to Vienna’.<sup>12</sup>

The crime of ‘usurpation of sovereignty’ was referred to by Judge Blair of the American Military Commission in a separate opinion in the ‘Justice Case’: ‘This rule is incident to military occupation and was clearly intended to protect the inhabitants of any occupied territory against the unnecessary exercise of sovereignty by a military occupant.’<sup>13</sup>

Article 64 of the fourth Geneva Convention imposes a similar norm:

Art. 64. The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they

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<sup>12</sup> Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities, Conference of Paris, 1919, Annex, TNA FO 608/245/4.

<sup>13</sup> *United States v. Alstötter et al.*, Opinion of Mallory B. Blair, Judge of Military Tribunal III, (1951) III TWC 1178, at p. 1181.

constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.

Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws.

The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.

The Commentary to the fourth Geneva Convention describes Article 64 as giving ‘a more precise and detailed form’ to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.<sup>14</sup>

The war crime of ‘usurpation of sovereignty’ has not been included in more recent codifications of war crimes, casting some doubt on its status as a crime under customary international law. Moreover, there do not appear to have been any prosecutions for the crime by international criminal tribunals.

In the situation of Hawai‘i, the usurpation of sovereignty would appear to have been total since the beginning of the twentieth century. It might be argued that usurpation of sovereignty is a continuous offence, committed as long as the usurpation of sovereignty persists. Alternatively, a plausible understanding of the crime is that it consists of discrete acts. Once these acts occur, the crime has been completed. In other words, the actus reus of the crime is the conduct that usurps sovereignty rather than the ongoing situation involving the status of a lack of sovereignty. In this respect, an analogy might be made to the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance, where the temporal dimension has been a matter of some controversy. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has said that disappearance is ‘characterized by an on-going situation of uncertainty and unaccountability in which there is a lack of information or even a deliberate concealment and obfuscation of what has occurred’. Therefore, it is not ‘an “instantaneous” act or event; the additional distinctive element of subsequent failure to account for the whereabouts and fate of the missing person gives rise to a continuing situation.’<sup>15</sup> In

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<sup>14</sup> Oscar M. Uhler, Henri Coursier, Frédéric Siordet, Claude Pilloud, Roger Boppe, René-Jean Wilhelm and Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer, *Commentary IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958.

<sup>15</sup> *Varnava and Others v. Turkey* [GC], nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, § 148, ECHR 2009.

order to counteract such an interpretation, the Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute specify that the widespread or systematic attack associated with the enforced disappearance must have taken place after entry into force of the Statute.<sup>16</sup> Given that there have been no prosecutions for ‘usurpation of sovereignty’ and essentially no clarification at the legislative level or in the academic literature, whether or not the crime is ‘continuing’ remains open to debate.

On the assumption that it is an ongoing crime, the actus reus of the offence of ‘usurpation of sovereignty’ would consist of the imposition of legislation or administrative measures by the occupying power that go beyond those required by what is necessary for military purposes of the occupation. The occupying power may therefore cancel or suspend legislative provisions that concern recruiting or urging the population to resist the occupation, for example.<sup>17</sup> The occupying power may also cancel or suspend legislative provisions that involve discrimination and that are impermissible under current standards of international human rights.

Given that this is essentially a crime involving State action or policy or the action or policies of an occupying State’s proxies, a perpetrator who participated in the act would be required to do so intentionally and with knowledge that the act went beyond what was required for military purposes or the protection of fundamental human rights.

#### *B. Compulsory enlistment of soldiers*

The ‘compulsory enlistment of soldiers among the inhabitants of occupied territory’ was listed as a war crime by the Commission on Responsibilities in its 1919 report.<sup>18</sup> In treaty law, authority for the crime is found in Article 23 of the 1907 Hague Regulations: ‘A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent’s service before the commencement of the war.’ The prohibition is repeated, in a somewhat broader manner, in Article 51 of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949: ‘The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted.’ Article 147 of the fourth Convention declares that ‘compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power’ is a grave

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<sup>16</sup> Elements of Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, art. 7(1)(i).

<sup>17</sup> Oscar M. Uhler, Henri Coursier, Frédéric Siordet, Claude Pilloud, Roger Boppe, René-Jean Wilhelm and Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer, *Commentary IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958, p. 336.

<sup>18</sup> *Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities, Conference of Paris, 1919*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919, pp. 17-18.

breach (and therefore a war crime). More recently, the United Nations Security Council listed ‘compelling a ... a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power’ among the grave breaches of the fourth Geneva Convention punishable by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.<sup>19</sup> There is a similar provision in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: ‘Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power’.<sup>20</sup>

The Commentary on the fourth Geneva Convention explains that the prohibition on ‘forcing enemy subjects to take up arms against their own country’ is ‘universally recognized in the law of war’.<sup>21</sup> It says that the object of Article 51 is ‘to protect the inhabitants of the occupied territory from actions offensive to their patriotic feelings or from attempts to undermine their allegiance to their own country’.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, Article 147 of the Convention does not require that civilians in the occupied territory be forced ‘to take up arms against their own country’. The same can be said of the modern formulations in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court. The Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute, which are intended to assist in the interpretation of its provisions, describe the material element of the war crime of compulsory enlistment as follows: ‘The perpetrator coerced one or more persons, by act or threat, to take part in military operations against that person’s own country or forces or otherwise serve in the forces of a hostile power.’<sup>23</sup> When the Elements of Crimes were being negotiated, some States wanted it to be clearly indicated that the provision did not require the civilian to act against his or her own country. It was felt that an explicit mention was unnecessary and that the issue was addressed adequately with the words ‘or otherwise serve’.<sup>24</sup>

There do not appear to have been any prosecutions for this crime by international criminal tribunals. The Commission on Responsibilities provided examples of the crime of compulsory enlistment committed by

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<sup>19</sup> Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/RES/827, Annex, Art. 2(e).

<sup>20</sup> Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 8(2)(a)(v).

<sup>21</sup> Oscar M. Uhler, Henri Coursier, Frédéric Sordet, Claude Pilloud, Roger Boppe, René-Jean Wilhelm and Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer, *Commentary IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958, p. 293.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 294.

<sup>23</sup> Elements of Crimes, Art. 8(2)(a)(v).

<sup>24</sup> Knut Dörmann, ‘Paragraph 2(a)(v): Compelling a protected person to serve in the hostile forces’, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos, eds., *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes, Article by Article*, 3rd edn., Munich: C.H. Beck, Baden-Baden: Nomos, Oxford: Hart, 2015, pp. 329-331, at p. 330.

Bulgarian authorities in Greece, where ‘[m]any thousands of Greeks [were] forcibly enlisted by Bulgarians’ in Eastern Macedonia’, by Bulgarian authorities in Serbia who ‘[f]orced Serbian subjects to fight in the ranks of Bulgarians against their own country’ and where ‘[f]amilies and villages were held responsible for refusal to enlist (in Eastern Serbia)’, and by Austrian and German authorities in Serbia where ‘Serbian subjects were recruited for the Austrian armies, or were sent to the Bulgarians to be incorporated in their forces’.<sup>25</sup>

In the author’s opinion, the material elements (*actus reus*) of the crime of ‘compulsory enlistment’ are: coercion, including by means of pressure or propaganda, of nationals of an occupied territory to serve in the forces of the occupying State. The enlistment must be undertaken during armed conflict and the service must have a connection or nexus with the armed conflict. The mental element (*mens rea*) consists of knowledge of the existence of an armed conflict, knowledge that the person recruited is a national of an occupied State, and the intent to enlist or recruit the person for the purposes of serving in an armed conflict.

### *C. Denationalization*

The list of war crimes of the Commission on Responsibilities included ‘[a]ttempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory’. The crime does not appear to be derived from any specific provision of the Hague Conventions where the notion of denationalization is not apparent. Decades later, discussing the war crime of denationalization, the United Nations War Crimes Commission suggested it was related to Article 43 of the Hague Conventions because it was ‘clearly the duty of belligerent occupants to respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the territory’. The Commission also referred to the protection of educational institutions enshrined in Article 56 of the Hague Conventions.<sup>26</sup>

Under the heading ‘attempts to denationalise the inhabitants of occupied territory’, the Commission on Responsibilities charged several crimes committed in Serbia by the Bulgarian authorities: ‘Efforts to impose their national characteristics on the population’; ‘Serbian language forbidden in private as well as in official relations. People beaten for saying “Good morning” in Serbian’; ‘Inhabitants forced to give their names a Bulgarian form’; ‘Serbian books banned – were systematically destroyed’; ‘Archives of churches and law-courts destroyed’; ‘Schools and churches closed,

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<sup>25</sup> Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities, Conference of Paris, 1919, Annex, TNA FO 608/245/4.

<sup>26</sup> United Nations War Crimes Commission, *History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War*, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1948, p. 488. See also Egon Schwelb, ‘Note on the Originality of “Attempts to Denationalize the Inhabitants of Occupied Territory”’ (appendix to Doc. C.I. No. XII) – Question Referred to Committee III by Committee I, UNWCC Doc. III/15.

sometimes destroyed'; 'Bulgarian schools and churches substituted – attendance at school made compulsory'; 'Population forced to be present at Bulgarian national solemnities'. It also said that in Serbia the Austrian and German authorities 'interfered with religious worship, by deportation of priests and requisition of churches for military purposes. Interfered with use of Serbian language'.<sup>27</sup>

The war crime of denationalization received some attention during the post-Second World War period. The United Nations War Crimes Commission used the list of war crimes adopted by the 1919 Commission on Responsibilities as a basis for its consideration of war crimes. However, it also discussed the relevance of the list and considered specifically the nature of the war crime of 'denationalization'. Unlike many other war crimes that constituted in and of themselves criminal acts under ordinary criminal law, 'denationalization' might involve underlying conduct that was not normally or inherently criminal, such as administrative measures governing language of education. In an expert opinion for the Commission, Egon Schwelb wrote:

It is submitted that each case will have to be judged on its own merits. The 'denationalization' may be either effected or accompanied by acts on the part of the occupying authorities, which are criminal *per se*. There may, on the other hand, exist circumstances which do not let the activities appear criminal, though they, no doubt, are illegal. An example of the latter type of 'attempts at denationalization' may exist where the occupation authorities do not close the existing schools and do not prevent parents from sending their children to them either by actual violence, or by threat, but where they try to bribe parents into sending children to schools instituted by the occupant by offering various advantages, like better school meals, clothing, etc.

In his report to the United Nations War Crimes Commission dated 28 September 1945, Bohuslav Ečer argued that 'denationalisation' was not only a war crime but also 'a genuine international crime – a crime against the very foundations of the Community of Nations'.<sup>28</sup>

This discussion must be understood in the context of legal debates about the time about the creation of new categories of international crime, specifically crimes against humanity and genocide, neither of which had been contemplated by the 1919 Commission on Responsibilities. The scholar who devised the term 'genocide', Raphael Lemkin, writing in late 1944 referred to the inadequacies of the Hague Conventions in dealing with the scope of Nazi atrocity directed at minority groups. Lemkin

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<sup>27</sup> Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities, Conference of Paris, 1919, Annex, TNA FO 608/245/4.

<sup>28</sup> Preliminary Report by the Chairman of Committee III, UNWCC Doc. C/148, p. 3.



considered that the Hague Regulations dealt with technical rules concerning occupation but he said ‘they are silent regarding the preservation of the integrity of a people’.<sup>29</sup> Lemkin specifically acknowledged the war crime of denationalization in the list of the Commission on Responsibilities, saying it was ‘used in the past to describe the destruction of a national pattern’. He said it was inadequate in three respects: it did not ‘connote the destruction of the biological structure’, ‘in connoting the destruction of one national pattern it does not connote the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor’ and ‘denationalization is used by some authors to mean only deprivation of citizenship’.<sup>30</sup>

The United Nations War Crimes Commission discussed the war crime of denationalization in the note accompanying the judgment in the *Greifelt et al.* case. The Commission referred to the list of war crimes in the report of the 1919 Commission on Responsibility, observing that

[a]ttempts of this nature were recognized as a war crime in view of the German policy in territories annexed by Germany in 1914, such as in Alsace and Lorraine. At that time, as during the war of 1939-1945, inhabitants of an occupied territory were subjected to measures intended to deprive them of their national characteristics and to make the land and population affected a German province. The methods applied by the Nazis in Poland and other occupied territories, including once more Alsace and Lorraine, were of a similar nature with the sole difference that they were more ruthless and wider in scope than in 1914-1918. In this connection the policy of ‘Germanizing’ the populations concerned, as shown by the evidence in the trial under review, consisted partly in forcibly denationalizing given classes or groups of the local population, such as Poles, Alsace-Lorrainers, Slovenes and others eligible for Germanization under the German People's List. As a result in these cases the programme of genocide was being achieved through acts which, in themselves, constitute war crimes.<sup>31</sup>

Evidence in the *Greifelt et al.* case dealt with Nazi policies in occupied Poland aimed at ‘Germanization’. These included measures to prevent births and measures of population displacement that might today be described as ‘ethnic cleansing’. The *History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission* also refers to attempts at denationalization conducted by both Italian and German occupation authorities in Greece, Poland and Yugoslavia. These were directed at ‘uproot[ing] and destroy[ing] national cultural institutions and national feeling. The effort took various forms

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<sup>29</sup> Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, 1944, p. 90.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>31</sup> *United States v. Greifelt et al.*, (1948) 13 LRTWC 1, 42 (United States Military Tribunal).

including a ban on the use of native language, supervision of the schools, forbidding the publication of native language newspapers, and various other devices and regulations.<sup>32</sup>

Denationalization does not appear in any of the modern codifications of war crimes. This is explained by the development of robust bodies of international criminal law and international human rights law dealing with the protection of groups and minorities, applicable in time of peace and in time of war. Acts of ‘denationalization’ as the concept was understood by the 1919 Commission on Responsibilities and the post-Second World War United Nations War Crimes Commission would today be prosecuted as the crime against humanity of persecution and, in the most extreme cases, where physical ‘denationalization’ is involved, genocide.

There are similar concerns about the continuing nature of the crime as those expressed above with respect to the war crime of usurping sovereignty.

On the assumption that it is an ongoing crime, the actus reus of the offence of ‘denationalization’ consists of the imposition of legislation or administrative measures by the occupying power directed at the destruction of the national identity and national consciousness of the population.<sup>33</sup>

Given that this is essentially a crime involving State action or policy or the action or policies of an occupying State’s proxies, a perpetrator who participated in the act would be required to do so intentionally and with knowledge that the act was directed at the destruction of the national identity and national consciousness of the population.

#### *D. Pillage*

‘Pillage’ is a war crime included in the list of the 1919 Commission on Responsibilities.<sup>34</sup> It is derived from Articles 28 and 47 of the Hague Regulations. Prohibition of pillaging is also set out in Article 33 of the fourth Geneva Convention (‘Pillage is prohibited’). In the modern era,

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<sup>32</sup> United Nations War Crimes Commission, *History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War*, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1948, p. 488.

<sup>33</sup> Oscar M. Uhler, Henri Coursier, Frédéric Siordet, Claude Pilloud, Roger Boppe, René-Jean Wilhelm and Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer, *Commentary IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958, p. 336.

<sup>34</sup> *Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members of the Commission of Responsibilities, Conference of Paris, 1919*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919, pp. 17-18.

pillage is a war crime punishable by the International Criminal Court.<sup>35</sup> Acts of ‘pillage’ have been held to be comprised within ‘plunder’,<sup>36</sup> and the two terms have often been treated as if they are synonyms.<sup>37</sup> The Charter of the International Military Tribunal referred to ‘plunder of public or private property’ rather than to ‘pillage’. This provision was repeated in article 3(e) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.<sup>38</sup> The Commentary to the fourth Geneva Convention explains that international law is concerned not only with ‘pillage through individual acts without the consent of the military authorities, but also organized pillage, the effects of which are recounted in the histories of former wars, when the booty allocated to each soldier was considered as part of his pay’.<sup>39</sup>

‘Pillage’ is also subject to prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.<sup>40</sup> The Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provide important additional criteria: the perpetrator appropriated certain property; the perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use; the appropriation was without the consent of the owner.<sup>41</sup> A footnote in the Elements of Crime specifies that ‘appropriations justified by military necessity cannot constitute the crime of pillaging’.

The war crime of pillage has been interpreted recently by various international criminal tribunals, notably the International Criminal Court. One of its Pre-Trial Chambers wrote that the war crime of pillage ‘entails a somewhat large-scale appropriation of all types of property, such as public or private, movable or immovable property, which goes beyond

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<sup>35</sup> Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 8(2)(b)(xvi).

<sup>36</sup> *Prosecutor v. Blaškić* (IT-95-14-A) Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 147; *Prosecutor v. Delalić* (IT-96-21-A), Judgment, 20 February 2001, para. 591; *Prosecutor v. Kordić et al.* (IT-95-14/2-A), Judgment, 17 December 2004, para. 77.

<sup>37</sup> *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.* (SCSL-04-16-T), Judgment, 20 June 2007, para. 751.

<sup>38</sup> UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).

<sup>39</sup> Oscar M. Uhler, Henri Coursier, Frédéric Siordet, Claude Pilloud, Roger Boppe, René-Jean Wilhelm and Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer, *Commentary IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958, p. 226.

<sup>40</sup> Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), annex, art. 4(f).

<sup>41</sup> Elements of Crimes, War Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(xvi), War crime of pillaging, paras. 1–3; Elements of Crimes, War Crimes, Article 8(2)(e)(v), War crime of pillaging, paras. 1–3.

mere sporadic acts of violation of property rights'.<sup>42</sup> With specific reference to the Rome Statute, which limits its jurisdiction to war crimes that are 'serious', the Pre-Trial Chamber said that 'cases of petty property expropriation' might not be within the scope of the provision. 'A determination on the seriousness of the violation is made by the Chamber in light of the particular circumstances of the case', it said.<sup>43</sup> Subsequently, however, a Trial Chamber of the Court discouraged the notion that there is any particular gravity threshold for the crime of pillaging.<sup>44</sup> The Chamber said it would determine a violation to be serious 'where, for example, pillaging had significant consequences for the victims, even where such consequences are not of the same gravity for all the victims, or where a large number of persons were deprived of their property'.<sup>45</sup> Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia hold that 'all forms of seizure of public or private property constitute acts of appropriation, including isolated acts committed by individual soldiers for their private gain and acts committed as part of a systematic campaign to economically exploit a targeted area'.<sup>46</sup>

Because it must belong to an 'enemy' or 'hostile' party, 'pillaged property—whether moveable or immoveable, private or public—must belong to individuals or entities who are aligned with or whose allegiance is to a party to the conflict who is adverse or hostile to the perpetrator'.<sup>47</sup> The same requirement is not explicitly imposed with respect to the war crime of destruction of property but the view that this is implicit finds support.<sup>48</sup> It is not excluded that the property that is pillaged belongs to combatants.<sup>49</sup> The crime of pillage occurs when the property has come under the control of the perpetrator, because it is only then that he or she can 'appropriate' the property.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> *Prosecutor v. Bemba* (ICC-01/05-01/08), Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 317.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Prosecutor v. Katanga* (ICC-01/04-01/07), Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014, para. 908.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Prosecutor v. Gotovina* (IT-06-90-T), Judgment, 15 April 2011, para. 1778.

<sup>47</sup> *Prosecutor v. Katanga et al.* (ICC-01/04-01/07), Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 329.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, fn. 430.

<sup>49</sup> *Prosecutor v. Katanga* (ICC-01/04-01/07), Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014, para. 907.

<sup>50</sup> *Prosecutor v. Katanga et al.* (ICC-01/04-01/07), Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 330.

In *Prosecutor v. Katanga*, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court said ‘the pillaging of a town or place comprises all forms of appropriation, public or private, including not only organised and systematic appropriation, but also acts of appropriation committed by combatants in their own interest’.<sup>51</sup> There is some old authority for the view that pillage entails an element of force or violence,<sup>52</sup> but this is not confirmed by recent case law. The Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute specify that the perpetrator ‘intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use’.<sup>53</sup> An accompanying footnote specifies that ‘[a]s indicated by the use of the term “private or personal use”, appropriations justified by military necessity cannot constitute the crime of pillaging’.<sup>54</sup> The Rome Statute provision on pillage was copied into the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and has been interpreted by one of its Trial Chambers, which explained: ‘The inclusion of the words “private or personal use” excludes the possibility that appropriations justified by military necessity might fall within the definition. Nevertheless, the definition is framed to apply to a broad range of situations.’<sup>55</sup> The Special Court was of the view that the requirement of ‘private or personal use’, imposed by the Elements of Crimes applicable to the Rome Statute, was ‘unduly restrictive and ought not to be an element of the crime of pillage’.<sup>56</sup>

The *actus reus* of pillage consists of the appropriation of property belonging to members of the civilian population without the consent of the owner. Whether the appropriation must also be for personal use of the perpetrator is a matter of debate. The *mens rea* requires that the perpetrator act with the specific intent of depriving the owner of the property without consent.

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<sup>51</sup> *Prosecutor v. Katanga* (ICC-01/04-01/07), Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014, para. 905.

<sup>52</sup> See Andreas Zimmermann, ‘Pillage’, in Otto Triffterer, ed., *Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes, Article by Article*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999, p. 237, at 238.

<sup>53</sup> Elements of Crimes, War Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(xvi), War crime of pillaging, para. 2; Elements of Crimes, War Crimes, Article 8(2)(e)(v), War crime of pillaging, para. 2.

<sup>54</sup> Elements of Crimes, War Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(xvi), War crime of pillaging, para. 2, fn. 47; Elements of Crimes, War Crimes, Article 8(2)(e)(v), War crime of pillaging, para. 2, fn. 61. See *Prosecutor v. Katanga* (ICC-01/04-01/07), Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014, para. 906.

<sup>55</sup> *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.* (SCSL-04-16-T), Judgment, 20 June 2007, para. 753.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 754. Also: *Prosecutor v. Brima et al.* (SCSL-2004-16-T), Decision on Defence Motions for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, 31 March 2006, paras. 241–243.

*E. Confiscation and Destruction of Property*

Confiscation of property is included in the list of war crimes adopted by the 1919 Commission on Responsibilities. It appears to be derived from Article 55 of the Hague Regulations: ‘Exaction of illegitimate or of exorbitant contributions and regulations: ‘The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied territory. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.’

The fourth Geneva Convention lists as a grave breach the ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’. It is derived from a number of provisions of the Convention that mainly concern attacks in the course of armed conflict and the conduct of hostilities, a matter that is not of concern in this legal opinion. With respect to occupied territory, the relevant provision is Article 53: ‘Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.’ The Commentary to the fourth Convention observes:

In the very wide sense in which the Article must be understood, the prohibition covers the destruction of all property (real or personal), whether it is the private property of protected persons (owned individually or collectively), State property, that of the public authorities (districts, municipalities, provinces, etc.) or of co-operative organizations. The extension of protection to public property and to goods owned collectively, reinforces the rule already laid down in the Hague Regulations, Articles 46 and 56 according to which private property and the property of municipalities and of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences must be respected.<sup>57</sup>

The grave breach of ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of property’ is included in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.<sup>58</sup>

The Prosecutor considered charging this offence in the *Gaza flotilla situation*, based on confiscation by Israeli military personnel of the

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<sup>57</sup> Oscar M. Uhler, Henri Coursier, Frédéric Siordet, Claude Pilloud, Roger Boppe, René-Jean Wilhelm and Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer, *Commentary IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958, p. 301.

<sup>58</sup> Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 8(2)(a)(iv).

belongings of passengers on the humanitarian relief ship *Mavi Marmara*, such as cameras, mobile phones, laptop computers, MP3 players, recording devices, cash, credit cards, identity cards, watches, jewellery and clothing. Only a portion of the property was returned, some of it in a damaged or incomplete state. The Prosecutor said that some of the Israeli soldiers ‘may have unlawfully and wantonly appropriated the personal property and belongings’, noting that it was not possible to justify the taking of some of this property on grounds of military necessity. Some of this property, such as cash, jewellery and personal electronic devices, did not fall within the scope of article 8(2)(a)(iv), according to the Prosecutor. She explained that although Article 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention refers to real or personal property belonging individually to private persons, the reference only applies in the context of destruction and not appropriation, noting that ‘it is not evident that this grave breach was intended to encompass appropriation of personal property belonging to private individuals’. The Prosecutor also noted that appropriation within the meaning of article 8(2)(a)(iv) must be ‘extensive’ and therefore did not generally apply to an isolated act or incident although each assessment would have to be made on a case by case basis.<sup>59</sup>

The actus reus consists of an act of confiscation or destruction of property in an occupied territory, be it that belonging to the State or individuals. The mens rea requires that the perpetrator act with intent to confiscate or destroy the property and with knowledge that the owner of the property was the State or an individual.

#### *F. Exaction of illegitimate or exorbitant contributions*

The war crime of ‘exaction of illegitimate or of exorbitant contributions and regulations’ is included in the list of war crimes of the 1919 Commission on Responsibilities. It is derived from Article 48 of the Hague Regulations: ‘If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall do so, as far as is possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force, and shall in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the same extent as the legitimate Government was so bound.’ The fourth Geneva Convention does not address this issue. It does not appear to have been considered a war crime since its inclusion in the list of the Committee on Responsibilities in 1919 making its status as a war crime under international law rather questionable.

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<sup>59</sup> *Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia* (ICC-01/13), Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, 16 July 2015, paras. 83-89.

*G. Deprivation of Fair and Regular Trial*

Wilful deprivation of the right of fair and regular trial for a non-combatant civilian is a grave breach under the fourth Geneva Convention. It is not comprised in the list of the 1919 Commission of Responsibilities. It is a war crime listed in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. There are a number of examples of post-Second World War prosecutions based upon the holding of unfair trials,<sup>60</sup> including the well-known *Justice case* of Nazi jurists by a United States Military Tribunal.<sup>61</sup> There do not appear to have been any prosecutions under this provision by international criminal tribunals in the modern period.

It would appear that the provision applies principally to the fairness of the proceedings. In this context, detailed standards are set out in a number of international instruments, most notably in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is also required that the tribunal in question be independent, impartial and regularly constituted. According to the Customary Law Study of the International Committee of the Red Cross, '[a] court is regularly constituted if it has been established and organised in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country'.<sup>62</sup> However, it seems clear that if the courts of the occupying power were regularly constituted under international law, the trials held before them are not inherently defective. This can be seen in Article 66 of the fourth Geneva Convention which acknowledges the right of the occupying power to subject accused persons 'to its properly constituted, non-political military courts, on condition that the said courts sit in the occupied country'.

The *actus reus* of the war crime of deprivation of the right of fair and regular trial consists of depriving one or more persons of fair and regular trial by denying judicial guarantees recognized under international law, including those of the fourth Geneva Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The *mens rea* requires that the accused person acted intentionally and with knowledge that the person allegedly deprived of the right to fair trial was a civilian of the occupied territory.

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<sup>60</sup> See the authorities cited in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Law, Vol. I: Rules, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 352, fn. 327.

<sup>61</sup> United States of America v. Alstötter et al. ('The Justice case'), (1948) 3 TWC 954.

<sup>62</sup> Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Law, Vol. I: Rules, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 355.



*H. Unlawful deportation or transfer of civilians of the occupied territory*

‘Deportation of civilians’ is a war crime listed in the Report of the 1919 Commission on Responsibilities. It reflects a prohibition under customary law, set out in writing as early as the Lieber Code, which was adopted by President Lincoln during the Civil War: ‘private citizens are no longer . . . carried off to distant parts’.<sup>63</sup> Curiously, the prohibition was not explicit in the Hague Regulations. Widespread outrage at German deportations of Belgians who were forced to work in slave-like conditions probably prompted the addition to the list by the Commission on Responsibilities. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal criminalizes ‘deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory’.<sup>64</sup> The grave breach of ‘unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement’ of a non-combatant civilian is set out in Article 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention. The prohibition on such deportation or transfer is found in Article 49 of the Convention: ‘Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.’

No exception is allowed, for example, in the case of prisoners who are convicted of crimes perpetrated in the occupied territory that would allow them to be sent to serve their sentence on the territory of the occupying power. Nevertheless, the Israeli authorities have deported or transferred many Palestinian nationals from the Occupied Palestinian Territory to serve custodial sentences within Israel proper. The Supreme Court of Israel has held that the prohibition of deportation or transfer in Article 49 of the Convention does not apply to the deportation of selected individuals for reasons of public order and security,<sup>65</sup> but this is an isolated view.

The grave breach of deporting civilians is included in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute specify that the crime is committed by the deportation or transfer of one or more persons ‘to another State or to another location’.

The *actus reus* of the offence involves the transfer of a non-combatant civilian to another State, including the occupying State, or to another

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<sup>63</sup> Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (‘Lieber Code’), Art. 23.

<sup>64</sup> Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), (1951) 82 UNTS 279, annex, Art. VI(b).

<sup>65</sup> See Ruth Lapidoth, ‘The Expulsion of Civilians from Areas which came under Israeli Control in 1967: Some Legal Issues’, (1990) 2 *European Journal of International Law* 97, at pp. 106-108; Theodor Meron, *Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 46.

location within the occupied territory. The *mens rea* requires that the perpetrator act intentionally and that the perpetrator have knowledge of the fact that the person being deported or transferred is a non-combatant civilian.

*I. Unlawful transfer of populations to the occupied territory*

Article 49(6) of the fourth Geneva Convention reads: ‘The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.’ Violation of article 49(6) of the fourth Geneva Convention, ‘when committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions or the Protocol’, is deemed a ‘grave breach’ by Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977. The grave breach is incorporated into the Rome Statute, where the words ‘directly or indirectly’ have been added to the text of Additional Protocol I: ‘The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory.’<sup>66</sup> The word ‘indirectly’ is aimed at a situation where the occupying power does not actually organize the transfer of populations, but does not take effective measures to prevent this.<sup>67</sup>

According to the Commentary to the fourth Geneva Convention, the prohibition ‘is intended to prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own population to occupied territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those territories. Such transfers worsened the economic situation of the native population and endangered their separate existence as a race.’<sup>68</sup> In recent decades, there have been occurrences of such population transfers, widely condemned, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in Northern Cyprus. In 1980, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution declaring that ‘Israel’s policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East’.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 8(2)(b)(viii).

<sup>67</sup> Herman von Hebel and Darryl Robinson, ‘Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court’, in Roy S. Lee, ed., *The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results*, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 79–126, at p. 113.

<sup>68</sup> Oscar M. Uhler, Henri Coursier, Frédéric Sordet, Claude Pilloud, Roger Boppe, René-Jean Wilhelm and Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer, *Commentary IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958, p. 283.

<sup>69</sup> UN Doc. S/RES/465 (1980), OP 5.

The Commentary to the Geneva Conventions notes that the words ‘transfer’ and ‘deport’ have a different meaning than they do elsewhere in article 49, in that they do not contemplate the movement of protected persons but rather nationals of the occupying Power.<sup>70</sup> Belligerent occupation is a temporary situation and not the prelude to annexation. For this reason, the Occupying Power must not change the demographic, social and political situation in the territory it has occupied to the social and economic detriment of the population living in the occupied territory. Discussing article 49(6) of the fourth Geneva Convention, the International Court of Justice stated that the provision ‘prohibits not only deportations or forced transfers of population such as those carried out during the Second World War, but also any measures taken by an occupying Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own population into the occupied territory’.<sup>71</sup>

## V. CONCLUSIONS

This opinion has examined the application of the international law of war crimes to the United States occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom since 17 January 1893. It has identified the sources of this body of law in both treaty and custom, and described the two elements – *actus reus* and *mens rea* – with respect to the relevant crimes.

The Elements of Crimes is one of the legal instruments applicable to the International Criminal Court. The initial draft of the Elements was prepared by the United States, which participated actively in negotiation of the final text and joined the consensus when the text was finalized. It provides a useful template for summarizing the *actus reus* and *mens rea* of international crimes. It has been relied upon in producing the following summary of the crimes discussed in this report:

### General

With respect to the last two elements listed for each crime:

1. There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as international or non-international;
2. In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international or non-international law;

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<sup>70</sup> Oscar M. Uhler, Henri Coursier, Frédéric Siordet, Claude Pilloud, Roger Boppe, René-Jean Wilhelm and Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer, *Commentary IV, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958, p. 283.

<sup>71</sup> *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004*, p. 136, para. 120.

3. There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms “took place in the context of and was associated with.”

**Elements of the war crime of usurpation of sovereignty during occupation**

1. The perpetrator imposed or applied legislative or administrative measures of the occupying power going beyond those required by what is necessary for military purposes of the occupation.
2. The perpetrator was aware that the measures went beyond what was required for military purposes or the protection of fundamental human rights.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict.
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.

**Elements of the war crime of compulsory enlistment**

1. The perpetrator recruited through coercion, including by means of pressure or propaganda, of nationals of an occupied territory to serve in the forces of the occupying State.
2. The perpetrator was aware the person recruited was a national of an occupied State, and the purpose of recruitment was service in an armed conflict.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict.
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.

**Elements of the war crime of denationalization**

1. The perpetrator participated in the imposition or application of legislative or administrative measures of the occupying power directed at the destruction of the national identity and national consciousness of the population.
2. The perpetrator was aware that the measures were directed at the destruction of the national identity and national consciousness of the population.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict.
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.

**Elements of the war crime of pillage**

1. The perpetrator appropriated certain property.

2. The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use.
3. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.

**Elements of the war crime of confiscation or destruction of property**

1. The perpetrator confiscated or destroyed property in an occupied territory, be it that belonging to the State or individuals.
2. The confiscation or destruction was not justified by military purposes of the occupation or by the public interest.
3. The perpetrator was aware that the owner of the property was the State or an individual and that the act of confiscation or destruction was not justified by military purposes of the occupation or by the public interest.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.

**Elements of the war crime of deprivation of fair and regular trial**

1. The perpetrator deprived one or more persons in an occupied territory of fair and regular trial by denying judicial guarantees recognized under international law, including those of the fourth Geneva Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
2. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict.
3. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.

**Elements of the war crime of deporting civilians of the occupied territory**

1. The perpetrator deported or forcibly transferred, without grounds permitted under international law, one or more persons in the occupied State to another State or location, including the occupying State, or to another location within the occupied territory, by expulsion or coercive acts.
2. Such person or persons were lawfully present in the area from which they were so deported or transferred.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the lawfulness of such presence.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict.

5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.

**Elements of the war crime of transferring populations into an occupied territory**

1. The perpetrator transferred, directly or indirectly, parts of the population of the occupying State into the occupied territory.
2. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an occupation resulting from international armed conflict.
3. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of the armed conflict and subsequent occupation.

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